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 History of Histories 
 Gerry  Simpson * 
 It is one of the pleasures of organizing a conference and then editing the resulting 
book that an idea—and one that had appeared so capricious and odd—materializes 
in the hands of intelligent and alert speakers and writers. At the end of 2010, we 
convened a conference in Melbourne called ‘Untold Stories: Th e Hidden Histories 
of War Crimes Trials’. 1 Th is was the fi rst of four conferences held under the auspices 
of an Australian Research Council (ARC) project on the history and theory of war 
crimes trials (the others were, in 2011, ‘Aff ective States’ and ‘ Eichmann at 50’, and 
‘Th e Passions of International Law’ in 2012). 
 Th e call for papers generated a surprisingly enthusiastic response from colleagues 
around the world. Th ere were, it turned out, many stories to be told about war 
crimes trials that the discipline had either neglected or under-rehearsed. Sometimes, 
these were stories about familiar but under-explored and misunderstood landmarks 
in the conventional history of international criminal law. (For example, we had an 
instinct that there was more to Peter von Hagenbach than the pantomime cliché, 
but Greg Gordon has actually done the work, and enlivened the circumstances and 
legal culture around this iconic moment in the fi eld.) Sometimes a trial, unknown 
even to the international criminal law cognoscenti, was positioned as a moment 
in the fi eld’s pre-development, eg Benjamin Brockman-Hawe’s comprehensive 
account of the Franco-Siamese Tribunal and the trial of Kham Muon as an early 
example of complementarity enacted in the context of late-empire. Here, from his 
chapter (Chapter 3), is the French view of the original Siamese trial:
 Th e authors of the assassination of [Kham Muon] shall be tried by the Siamese authorities. 
A representative of France shall be present at the trial and witness execution of the sentence 
pronounced. Th e French Government reserves the right to appreciate whether the punish-
ment is suffi  cient and, where applicable, claim a new trial before a Mixed Court, whereof it 
shall determine the composition. 2 
 *  Kenneth Bailey Professor of Law, Melbourne Law School. 
 1  Half the title has survived into print. Th e other, now missing, half was borrowed from the English 
playwright, Alan Bennett. See  Alan  Bennett ,  Untold Stories ( London :  Faber and Faber ,  2001 ) . 
 2  Von Hagenbach’s trial, too, is understood as the fi rst in which the interaction between local 
prerogative and international trial is played out. As Brockman-Hawe reminds us: 
 [Th e Kham Muon Trial ] was only the second time that a supranational court had been accused of 
violating an individual’s right to be tried by a court of their home country ( jus de non evocando ) [the 
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 Sometimes, the best-known trials (notably, the post-war trials in Germany) were 
subject to a re-reckoning (see Rosa Ana Alija-Fernández on the Spanish Kapos trials 
at Mauthausen, Chapter 5; and Grietje Baars on the trial and non-trial of industri-
alists after the war, Chapter 8). In one instance, an incident that had twice briefl y 
touched my consciousness became fully illuminated. About ten years ago, I was 
travelling through a mid-size French town called Confolens in Limousin. Ten miles 
outside of town there was a road sign for the village of Oradour-sur-Glane. Th e 
name seemed familiar to me. I remembered, as a student, reading a novel in which 
this village had been the leading character. 3 I drove into Oradour-sur-Glane. Here 
was a village that was now two villages: a fully visible, nondescript contemporary 
country exurb and a hidden place surrounded by a high fence and accessible only 
through a museum. Th e latter was the dead village of Oradour-sur-Glane preserved 
in its history or, one should say, a single day in its history—the day that the ‘3rd 
company of the 1st battalion of Panzergrenadier of the 4th SS-Panzer-Regiment 
“Der Führer” of the 2eSS-Panzer-Division “Das Reich” (Mégret)’ had entered the 
village and massacred the inhabitants. As Frédéric Mégret reminds us, there was a 
trial, too. Th is trial, held in Bordeaux in 1953, is, in a way, a hidden history of a 
dead village. 
 In off ering a history of this book and its histories we must make all the usual 
apologies concerning selection, amnesia, and the temptations of mistellings and 
re-tellings. Nevertheless, we might refl ect on at least four modes of historical work 
being done here:  Consolation ,  Recovery ,  Pedigree and  Pedagogy . In this collection, 
there are terrifi c examples of each of these four, but some chapters have been exer-
cises in more than one of these modes while others have exploded the categories 
altogether. 
 (I)  Consolation 
 Trial narratives console us just as newly exposed histories of the past can provide 
comfort. 4 Some of the chapters here have rotated around the idea either that an 
obscure trial has provided a measure of consolation to the bereaved or the injured 
(Faedi Duramy, Chapter 10; Tiba, Chapter 15), or that a trial that might have done 
this has failed to do so (Balint, Chapter 4), or that a trial or series of trials that has 
consoled the victims has, at the same time, created a new cast of victims by misap-
plying legal procedure to the detriment of the accused (Fitzpatrick, Chapter 16). 
 One sort of untold story, then, is derived from a form of identity politics or 
scholarship. Writing and practice in this genre might concern Japanese slave labour 
fi rst being the trial of von Hagenbach before a twenty-eight judge panel at Breisach over four hundred 
years before]. 
 3  David  Hughes ,  Th e Pork Butcher ( London :  Constable and Constable ,  1984 ) . 
 4  See Christine Schwobel on the idea of comfort in Gerry Simpson (ed),  Th e Passions of International 
Law (forthcoming, 2014). 
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or the rape of ‘comfort women’. 5 Telling these stories either in trial or in scholarship 
is sometimes derived from a wish to re-inscribe Narrelle Morris’s ‘numerous and 
unknown victims’ or ensure that they do not become what Lia Kent, in her paper 
at the original conference, called, ‘wandering ghosts’. 6 Sometimes, this can be a 
demand for recognition, as in Jennifer Balint’s plea for an acknowledgement on the 
part of the Turkish state that the Armenian genocide took place and was not simply 
a series of deportations initiated because of ‘wartime necessity’. And it is Balint who 
makes the important point here that law will not always off er consolation. Indeed, 
law itself was complicit in these crimes, making them ‘allowable’, as she puts it. 
 In Benedetta Faedi Duramy’s chapter (Chapter  10) on German massacres in 
post-Mussolini Italy, she seeks to tell the untold story of a number of survivors (and, 
by implication, those that did not survive). In such instances legal proceedings (and 
here these include both the trials of those responsible and the civil proceedings 
brought in 2008 by the German state against Italy) occasion a narrative in which 
survivors speak directly. Th e proceedings themselves may be less important in this 
regard. No doubt the trial of Joseph Milde (the proximate untold story) and, to a 
greater extent the  Germany v Italy proceedings at the International Court of Justice, 
were signifi cant  as legal events. But, for Faedi Duramy, their importance lies in the 
way in which such events provide a catalyst for story-telling and, perhaps more 
importantly, off er an audience for such stories. People  listen to trial testimony and 
extracurial narratives around trials. 
 Th e demands of consolation, of course, might become something akin to a claim 
for compensation. We might think here of the class actions brought in California 
by the victims of slave labour, or civil society agitations on behalf of Korean women 
exploited by the Japanese Imperial Army. Yuki Tanaka’s graphic account of the 
killing of Nauran Lepers or Firew Kebede Tiba’s compelling chapter (Chapter 15) 
on the history of the Derg and its Red Terror in Ethiopia belong in this category. 
As Tiba argues, ‘[t] he full scale of atrocities committed in Ethiopia following the 
overthrow of the imperial regime in 1974 is yet to be fully told’. 
 Perhaps, though, there can never be a fully compensatory or truly consoling re-telling. 
 (II)  Recovery 
 Th ere is, of course, also a scholarly imperative to  recover lost histories. Why should 
the fi eld keep repeating the same narrative arc from ‘Tokyoberg’ to Th e Hague? 
Bringing in from the margins under-told trial histories helps to de-Europeanize 
 5  See Yuki Tanaka, ‘Japanese Atrocities on Nauru Island During the Pacifi c War’ (unpublished 
paper, on fi le with editors) and essays by Nicola Henry and Tina Dolgopol on comfort women in  Yuki 
 Tanaka ,  Tim  McCormack and  Gerry  Simpson (eds),  Beyond Victor’s Justice? Th e Tokyo War Crimes Trial 
Revisited , ( Leiden :  Martinus Nijhoff  ,  2011 ) . 
 6  See Lia Kent, ‘Special Panels in East Timor: Offi  cial Goals and Local Expectations’, (unpublished 
paper, on fi le with editors). See, too, Hannibal Travis’s treatment of the Biafran massacre and the 
Bengal killings in his fi ne-grained historical study, ‘Cold War Genocides: Failures of Global Justice in 
Nigeria and Pakistan’ (unpublished paper, on fi le with editors). 
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the history of war crimes trials by showing that trials were also occurring in ‘other 
places’. Th ese can be national stories. Georgina Fitzpatrick and Narrelle Morris 
(Chapters 16 and 17) tell the story of Australia’s involvement in a series of hidden 
trials in the Asia-Pacific region. As Morris powerfully demonstrates, Asian 
victims—largely absent from the major trial in Tokyo—were much more visible in 
the 300-odd trials undertaken by the Australians in the Asia-Pacifi c region. Th at 
is not to say that ‘Asianness’ was not constructed in a certain way in those trials or 
that visibility was not also a fresh form of invisibility. Nonetheless, these are important 
trials, and the project (led by our colleague, Tim McCormack) to publish trial 
reports arising out of this period is to be greatly welcomed. 
 Sometimes the conference and book have sought to decentre the major trials 
in general. Yuma Totani in her (unpublished) conference paper described the 
trials in Tokyo that followed the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, 
while Alija-Fernández brings to the light the experience of Spanish inmates in 
the camps and the way in which they moved back and forth themselves between 
nationality and statelessness. Finally, we have Roger Clark’s and Mark Drumbl’s 
chapters (Chapters 19 and 20), in which  Greiser and  Sakai are announced as 
major pre-Nuremberg, pre-Tokyo, national landmarks in the history of international 
criminal law. 
 National histories, of course, are often deliberately obscured by a diffi  dent state. 
Th e Australians and Spanish might be keen to see the recovery of their lost histories 
of prosecution and trial, but what of the French? Th e trials of Laval and Pétain 
are hardly celebrated moments in French contemporary history, after all. And for 
good reason, according to Dov Jacobs, in his Chapter 6. Th e Turkish authorities, 
too, have been reluctant to advertise the trials they convened after the mass killings 
of Armenians. Paradoxically, here is a state that did deliver—through a series of 
trials held after the Great War—what Jackson Maogoto (Chapter 14) claims is a 
‘measure of justice’ for the victims but now would prefer to see that eff ort left in 
the archive. 
 Steve Vladeck’s forensic chapter (Chapter 9) also seeks to recover a hidden history, 
but one that is embedded in a larger much more visible history. During the US 
Supreme Court’s struggle over (and sometimes with) the Bush administration’s 
detention of individuals on Guantanamo Bay, a great deal turned on the extent to 
which foreign nationals were able to claim constitutional or statutory rights in US 
federal courts. Th e 1950 case of  Eisentrager was at the centre of this debate. Yet, as 
Vladeck notes, the decision was widely misread, and treated as a precedent for the 
view that aliens are not entitled to enjoy Fifth Amendment rights outside the sov-
ereign territory of the United States. Vladeck’s re-reading of the case and his return 
to the military commission hearing that provoked the Supreme Court’s review is 
an exercise in carefully calibrated recovery. 
 Th e lost history recovered by Grietje Baars (Chapter 8) is that of international 
criminal law as a retributive structure to be imposed on economic actors guilty of 
encouraging, provoking or facilitating war or mass criminality. Th e ‘economic case’, 
as she calls it, has been largely hidden in subsequent accounts of the post-Nuremberg 
trials and was comprehensively elided in the West by the time the Cold War was in 
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train (though it remained potent in the East as a way of explaining culpability for 
Nazism). Indeed, the relationship between political economy and mass atrocity has 
remained obscure in international criminal law since that time. Baars captures this 
when she says: ‘As such, to paraphrase Miéville, the de facto immunity of business 
leaders, a necessary ingredient of economic imperialism,  is  ICL.’ 
 War and atrocity can be attributed to many causes (race, religion, ethnicity), but 
‘the “economic” has been removed from the narrative of war’. Th is is what Baars 
calls, in an expressive epigram, ‘capitalism’s victor’s justice’. 
 (III)  Pedigree 
 Tom Franck, who died in 2009, employed the idea of “pedigree” to great eff ect in 
his  Th e Power of Legitimacy Among Nations , and in international criminal law, there 
is an increasing tendency to identify a lineage or pedigree for what often looks like 
a departure from existing norms. 7 Perhaps as a fi eld matures the turn to history 
becomes more attractive. Th e general idea appears to be: ‘the present seems worked 
through, it’s time to do some archaeology’ (to use a loaded term) or ‘the system 
is built, let’s fi nd out how it happened’. Pedigree also is partly about establishing 
that a new fi eld has not simply engaged in bootstrapping (or ‘making it up as we 
go along’, as someone said at the conference). Th ese histories suggest that instead 
someone in the past made it up. 
 Untold Stories took place a few months after the meeting of the International 
Criminal Court’s Assembly of States Parties in Kampala. One of the more signifi cant 
outcomes of that meeting was an agreed defi nition of a crime of aggression. Of 
course, this crime was desperately short of pedigree when the Nazi and Japanese 
elites were placed on trial at Nuremberg and Tokyo. Kellogg-Briand and a passing 
reference in the Versailles Peace Treaty hardly constituted fi rm precedents. Th e 
position improved very little  after 1949. In  R v Jones , the House of Lords and, at an 
earlier stage, the Court of Appeal struggled to fi nd post-war evidence of a robustly 
prosecuted crime of aggression. 8 Had there been any prosecutions apart from those 
in the zonal trials? Roger Clark, (Chapter 19) with brisk authority, disinters the 
‘suggestive’ trial of Takashi Sakai by a Chinese national court in 1946 and makes 
the tentative claim that Sakai was the fi rst Japanese to be tried and executed for 
the crime of aggression. Th is would make him only the second person in history 
to be prosecuted for the crime of aggression. Th e fi rst may well have been Arthur 
Greiser. His trial before the Supreme National Tribunal of Poland ended with him 
being sentenced to death on 9 July 1946 and then executed ‘in the early hours of 
the morning of July 21, 1946’. Mark Drumbl’s familiar combination of doctri-
nal sure-footedness and sensitivity to context (Chapter 20) illuminates this trial 
 7  Th omas M.  Franck ,  Th e Power of Legitimacy Among Nations ( Oxford :   Oxford University 
Press ,  1990 ) . 
 8  R v Jones and Milling [2006] UKHL 16. 
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and establishes this mostly untold story as a genuine precursor to Nuremberg and 
Kampala. 
 Th e pedigree of international criminal law norms or procedures is often established 
through an account of a local history. Certainly, this book is greatly concerned with 
the recovery of those lost histories of the local that off er pedigree in a diff erent 
idiom. Julia Selman-Ayetey’s chapter (Chapter 13) on Norway’s universal jurisdic-
tion laws and the case of Mirsad Repak does precisely this. Norway, it turns out, 
enacted a law of universal jurisdiction as far back as 1902. It is a modifi ed version 
of this law that permitted Norwegian courts to assert jurisdiction over Mr Repak, a 
member of the Croatian Defence Forces (‘HOS’), during the Bosnian wars. Mr Repak 
was sentenced to eight years in prison and was ordered to pay damages to some of 
his victims. Here, as in many other instances documented in the book, a domes-
tic court was obliged to engage in an analysis of the nature of a particular armed 
confl ict and the applicability of international norms in local settings. One theme 
that emerges, then, again and again (eg Tallgren) is the way in which international 
criminal justice is always hybridized or modifi ed in its encounters with local juris-
diction before sometimes returning again to the cosmopolitan space (see Liivoja’s 
discussion of the European Court of Human Rights cases arising out of the Baltic 
trials, Chapter  12). And here, too, there is a sense (discernible, as well, in the 
chapters by Maogoto and Tiba) that the future of international criminal law—like 
many of its recovered pasts—may lie not in the grand gesture of the international 
trial but in the modest strivings of local jurisdiction. 9 
 (IV)  Pedagogy 
 A fi nal style that emerged in the volume was built around  pedagogy and the 
problems of historiography. Laurence Douglas’s phrase ‘didactic legalism’ fl oated 
around at the conference, as did the belief that lessons might be learnt or unlearnt 
from our untold trials. Th e past is a foreign country, they do things the same way 
there. At least sometimes. Peter von Hagenbach’s trial was grisly in some respects, 
but in others, as Greg Gordon points out (Chapter 2), it compared favourably with 
the Military Commissions Acts in the US or the detention of Prisoner X. Georgina 
Fitzpatrick cautioned us not to simply condemn historical actors, and indeed there 
was very little of that in the presentations. In the end, there was genuine curiosity 
about how they, in that foreign country, had thought about collective guilt, about 
joint criminal enterprise, about complementarity and so on. 
 9  Th is combination of local and international justice takes us back to piracy of which Neville Sorab, 
at the conference, spoke when discussing some recent piracy trials (on fi le with the editors). But it is in 
war crimes trials in general that piracy is often invoked as a precedent for what would otherwise appear 
unprecedented (for example, the assertion of unusual forms of extra-territorial jurisdiction)—thus 
the description of Eichmann, at this trial, as a ‘latter-day pirate’. Early piracy trials provide, in other 
words, the fi eld’s missing pedigree. 
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 Th is book does not tell the story of unenlightened lawyers working in the dark-
ness of history waiting to be redeemed in some great late-twentieth century leap 
forward. Instead, we read about acts of imagination and innovation going back to 
the nineteenth century, and we read about mistakes that we are familiar with from 
the contemporary scene. 
 In Fred Mégret’s chapter (Chapter 7) we see lawyers themselves engage in pedagogic 
eff orts. As he puts it:
 As in previous and subsequent war crimes trials, both defendants and victim witnesses were 
tempted to make grand declarations about what they saw as the issues at stake rather than 
simply answer the judges’ factual questions. 
 Dov Jacobs’ chapter (Chapter 6)—also about the French reckoning with the past but 
this time involving the trials of Pétain and Laval—confronts head on the problem 
of history and truth-telling through trial. It is clear that the French state wanted a 
particular version of history to emerge from these trials: one that blamed a treacher-
ous and superannuated elite for the collaboration and, at the same time, exonerated 
France. Th ese narratives, then, ‘shape’ history, but the telling of hidden histories is 
also a way of reshaping that same history. Jacobs puts the point forcefully (whether 
one accepts his distinction between ‘reasoned analysis’ and ‘illusory truth’):
 Only a reasoned analysis of the importance of post-confl ict narratives, with their ambiguities, 
rather than an over-reliance on an illusory objective truth, can help academics and practitioners 
advance in the direction of the desired reconciliation. 
 Rain Liivoja’s chapter (Chapter 12) also negotiates a tension in the didactic trial, 
between what he calls ‘the historical record produced by such trials [and] existing 
historical paradigms’. In the case of the Soviet trials held in the Baltic Republics, 
the trial record is deeply unreliable. Here we have what Liivoja calls a ‘conscious 
falsifi cation of evidence’ (as he notes, the notorious Soviet Prosecutor Andrey 
Vyshinsky, who turns up at Nuremberg as well, had engaged in doctoring the 
medical reports produced by the Extraordinary State Commission established 
as early as 1942 to investigate alleged Nazi atrocities in the Baltic states). But 
even in the case of the investigations undertaken into Soviet off ences, the tension 
between histories is palpable. In particular, there is the sharp divergence between 
the still-persistent Russian ‘myth of war’ and the judicial correction of that myth. 
Sometimes this tension becomes explicit:
 Th e trials and tribulations of Mr Kononov had probably something to do with the fact that 
on 15 May 2009, Mr Dmitry Medvedev, President of the Russian Federation, established a 
Commission to Counter Attempts to Falsify History to the Detriment of Russia’s Interests. 
Reportedly, legislation is being prepared that would make it a criminal off ence to diverge 
from the offi  cial line of history as determined by the commission. On 30 September 2009, 
the Parliament of Lithuania fi red back by amending the Criminal Code, criminalising the 
denial or justifi cation of crimes against humanity committed by the Soviet Union or Nazi 
Germany. Th e battle of histories continues. 
 Tamás Hoff mann, traversing similar territory, wonders if international criminal 
law is really capable of coming to terms with something we might think of as ‘the 
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past’. In his chapter (Chapter 11), he explores the use and misuse of international 
criminal law’s categorizations and tropes in the context of Hungary’s investigation 
and prosecution of those responsible for communist repression in the period 
immediately following the 1956 uprising. Th is is another story of a local court 
either getting the (international) law wrong somehow or creating a distinctively 
local rendering of that law (a great deal in the fi eld turns on the diff erence between 
these two positions). But it is also a story about the limits of international justice 
in recounting a certain kind of past. Not every hidden history has to have a moral, 
but as Hoff man puts it:
 If there is any moral in the story—apart from the necessity of reforming the educa-
tion of judges—it is that international criminal law cannot in itself substitute for the 
ultimately political project of confronting past wrongs and trying to achieve national 
reconciliation. 
 Th is sort of reckoning is elusive. Perhaps it is not even desirable. In his chapter 
(Chapter 18), our colleague at Melbourne Law School, Peter Rush, pivots around 
the fi lm  El secreto de sus ojos in a series of gestures at the ineff ability of pain and 
suff ering, and the genres of representation that seek to work round that ineff ability 
and establish what he calls a ‘memorial jurisdiction’ in relation to Argentina’s Dirty 
War between 1976 and 1983. Th is war—a war of terror conducted in offi  cial and 
clandestine keys—has been the subject of a highly visible campaign of national 
reckoning. It has bequeathed a name—the disappeared (or  desaparecidos )—and a 
politics of memory. Law, of course, a ‘producer of truth’ and memory, is (sometimes) 
central to all of this. Indeed, it is a hidden history of Rush’s chapter that the trial 
processes have intensifi ed in recent years. Yet Rush is as uneasy as Hoff mann at the 
idea that law could provide a defi nitive accounting or any sort of stable representation 
of atrocity or trauma. In a life lived with law, there is always ‘slippage and complexity’ 
(Rush). 
 What might ‘we’ do in the face of all of this? On one hand, the Finnish War 
Responsibility cases are early examples of trials in which the crime of aggression is 
given a local re-interpretation. In this sense, Immi Tallgren’s chapter (Chapter 21) 
belongs in the tradition of, say, Roger Clark’s recovery of the  Sakai Trial. Tallgren’s 
chapter though—inquisitorial, forthright  and tentative—is also about the 
(im)possibility of a law that writes history. In this case, law is recruited to com-
prehend and read the relations between Finland, Nazi Germany and the Soviet 
Union during the 1940s. But that law, too, had to negotiate Allied demands that the 
Finnish leadership during the war with the Soviet Union (the Continuation War) 
be held to account, as well as outrage within Finland that wartime leaders ‘who had 
tried their best for the nation’ (Soini, quoted by Tallgren) should be prosecuted at all. 
Th e trial proceeded and some important Finnish leaders were convicted and jailed. 
Th e questions then arise: can this juristic history be re-written or unwritten by law? 
Should they be? By whom? Told stories can certainly be retold. But in the act of 
re-telling, it seems, many other stories emerge from new contexts at diff erent times. 
 In the end, this book features a series of untold or under-told stories about trials 
and histories that have, in some respect or other, been hidden or obscured by the 
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imperatives of an offi  cial or semi-offi  cial disciplinary history. Yet, while acknowl-
edging the expressive value of trial, the scholarly value of recovery, the human value 
of consolation and the doctrinal value of pedigree, the contributors have, at the 
same time, kept their eyes fi xed on the problem of history itself and the boundaries 
of the knowable. 
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 PART 1 
PRE-HISTORIES: 
FROM VON HAGENBACH TO 
THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE  
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 Th e Trial of Peter von Hagenbach: 
Reconciling History, Historiography and 
International Criminal Law 
 Gregory S.  Gordon * 
 (I)  Introduction 
 It is an article of faith among transnational penal law experts that Sir Peter von 
Hagenbach’s 1474 prosecution in Breisach for atrocities committed serving the Duke 
of Burgundy constitutes the fi rst international war crimes trial in history. Hagenbach 
was tried before an ad hoc tribunal of twenty-eight judges from various regional 
city-states for misdeeds, including murder and rape, he allegedly perpetrated as gover-
nor of the Duke’s Alsatian territories from 1469 to 1474. Th ough it remains obscure 
in the popular imagination, most legal scholars perceive the trial as a landmark event. 
Some value it for formulating an embryonic version of crimes against humanity. 
Others praise it for ostensibly charging rape as a war crime. And all are in agreement 
that it is the fi rst recorded case in history to reject the defence of superior orders. 
Such a perspective has arguably helped invest the Nuremberg trials with greater 
historical legitimacy and lent subtle sanction to the development of international 
criminal law in the post-Cold War world. But the legal literature typically deals 
with the trial in very cursory fashion and its stature as pre-Nuremberg precedent 
may hinge on faulty assumptions. As the 1990s explosion of ad hoc tribunal activity 
is nearing its end and the legal academy is taking stock of its accomplishments and 
 *  Associate Professor, University of North Dakota (UND) School of Law and Director, UND 
Centre for Human Rights and Genocide Studies. Th is piece would not have been possible without 
the wisdom, insight and language skills of Dr Robert G. Waite, a talented and generous German 
historian. Th e author is also quite grateful for the exceptional research assistance of Jan Stone, Head of 
Faculty Services at the UND School of Law Th ormodsgard Library. I am grateful as well to Dr Scott 
Farrington whose excellent Latin translations were essential. Th anks for invaluable editorial help are 
also due to Professor Laurie Blank, Director of the Emory Law School Humanitarian Clinic. Special 
thanks as well go to research assistants Moussa Nombre and Lilie Schoenack and to UND law student 
Vanessa Anderson, whose German translation assistance was very much appreciated. My dear friend 
Dominique Latteur also provided invaluable historical insights. And thanks, as always, to my wonderful 
wife and children. 
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failures, it is perhaps time to look more closely at the Hagenbach trial. Th is piece 
will do that by digging below the surface and revisiting some of the historical and 
legal premises underlying the trial’s perception by legal academics. 
 In the main, international law specialists have relied on older historical accounts 
to conclude that Hagenbach’s service as Burgundy’s Alsatian bailiff  constituted 
a fi ve-year reign of terror that culminated in a legitimate and ground-breaking 
atrocity conviction. 1 But revisionist historians tend to see Hagenbach’s ordeal not 
as a good-faith justice enterprise but rather as a show trial meant to rebuff  the 
territorial ambitions of Sir Peter’s master, Charles the Bold. 2 Th ey emphasize that 
liability was grounded on confessions obtained through torture. 3 And while they 
concede that Hagenbach may have been boorish and autocratic, they note that the 
fi rst few years of his rule were relatively pacifi c and the 1474 uprising against Sir 
Peter was primarily a reaction to attempted Burgundian regional encroachments 
and perceived feudal suppression of growing urban and bourgeois prerogatives. 4 
Th e trial itself, they point out, was not international at all as the men who sat in 
judgment of Hagenbach were all subjects of the Holy Roman Empire. 5 Nor was 
it a war crimes trial, since there was no armed confl ict at the time the alleged 
atrocities took place. 6 
 But there are shortcomings in the revisionist analysis as well. Th e high level of 
animosity shown to Hagenbach, as demonstrated by the severity of the torture and 
the stripping of his knighthood, as well as a criminal past, indicate that the atrocity 
allegations may not be unfounded. Moreover, there is evidence that, in the period 
leading up to the trial, Burgundy’s occupation of the territory was hostile and so 
the charges against Hagenbach may very well be considered war crimes. Finally, by 
1474, the Holy Roman Empire was no longer a viable political entity and so the 
ad hoc tribunal may indeed have been international in nature. 
 Th is chapter is divided into four sections. Part II examines the conventional 
view of Hagenbach in the fi eld of international criminal law (ICL). It demonstrates 
that the ICL perception of the case as history’s fi rst ‘international war crimes trial’ 
fi nds its origins in a law professor’s  Manchester Guardian op-ed published while the 
International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg was deciding the fate of the 
major Nazi war criminals. Th e op-ed, by English jurist Georg Schwarzenberger, 
argued that the Hagenbach precedent supported many of the legal positions taken 
by the IMT prosecution at Nuremberg, including charging crimes against humanity 
 1  See, for example, Georg Schwarzenberger, ‘A Forerunner of Nuremberg: Th e Breisach War Crime 
Trial of 1474’,  T he Manchester Guardian (London), 28 September 1946, 4;  L.C.  Green ,  Superior Orders 
in National and International Law ( Leiden :  Sijthoff ,  1976 ),  263 ;  Robert  Cryer ,  Prosecuting International 
Crimes: Selectivity and the International Criminal Law Regime ( Cambridge :   Cambridge University 
Press,   2005 ) . 
 2  See, eg,  Richard  Vaughan ,  Charles the Bold: Th e Last Valois Duke of Burgundy ( Suff olk :  Th e Boydell 
Press,  2002 ),  283–86 . 
 3  Vaughan, above n 2.    4  Vaughan, above n 2, 266–85. 
 5  Hermann  Heimpel ,  ‘Mitelalter und Nürnberger Prozeß’ in  Festschrift Edmund E. Stengel: zum 
70. Geburtstag am 24. Dezember 1949 dargebracht von Freunden Fachgenossen und Schülern ( Münster 
[u.a.] :  Böhlau ,  1952 ),  449 . 
 6  Hermann Heimpel, above n 5. 
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and rejecting the defence of superior orders. And, following in Schwarzenberger’s 
footsteps, subsequent ICL scholars have cited the Hagenbach case in support of 
arguments for normative evolution in the fi eld, such as contending that Hagenbach 
represents precedent for charging rape as a war crime. Part III considers the case’s 
historiography, limning the evolution of a narrative that starts with Hagenbach as 
evil incarnate and progresses toward a more charitable view that explains the his-
torical animosity toward him in terms of Hagenbach’s being a francophone outsider 
imposing a reform regime on an entrenched, corrupt, germanophone society. Given 
the historiographical cleavage, then, each camp has an historical narrative that nec-
essarily diverges from the other. But they also have many points in common. Th is 
part considers the convergences and divergences as well. Finally, Part IV attempts to 
reconcile the divergences and concludes that both historic portrayals of Hagenbach 
are likely accurate: he was a despised outsider and reformer at fi rst, but became 
violent and despotic toward the end of his stewardship when resources to govern 
were dwindling and local unrest reached a tipping point. Hagenbach likely committed 
atrocities in this fi nal phase. At the same time, and for related reasons, Burgundy 
became a belligerent occupying power. And given the atrophied state of the Holy 
Roman Empire, those who sat in judgment of Hagenbach represented sovereign 
polities. So the trial of Peter von Hagenbach was indeed the world’s fi rst international 
war crimes trial. 
 It is no coincidence that such a unique event took place between the erosion of 
medieval hegemony and the imminent establishment of Westphalian sovereignty. 
Not until the Westphalian veil was pierced by the Nuremberg trials nearly 500 
years later, did the subject of the Hagenbach trial take on contemporary relevance 
in the legal literature. In the end, the piece concludes that while some of its details 
may be lost in the mists of time and its legal status may remain muddled in theoretic 
gray zones, the Hagenbach trial should continue to play an important role as an 
historic and conceptual pillar of international criminal law’s ‘pre-history’. 
 (II)  Hagenbach and International 
Criminal Law 
 International criminal law is a product of the twentieth century. After World War I, 
through the treaties of Versailles and Sèvres, Allied leaders contemplated using it 
to bring to justice Kaiser Wilhelm II and the Ottoman offi  cials responsible for 
the Armenian genocide. But the requisite political will to follow through proved 
lacking and the formulation and use of ICL would have to wait for the pros-
ecution of the architects of another world war’s horrors. Th e IMT was, then, a 
novel enterprise and thought to be without precedent. As such, at the time of its 
establishment, it was subjected to much criticism. Among other things, detractors 
accused it of enforcing laws  ex post facto and creating out of whole cloth a new 
off ence—crimes against humanity. 
 But at least one expert had a very unique view of the Nuremberg proceedings. 
Georg Schwarzenberger, an English jurist of Jewish–German descent who had 
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fl ed Nazi persecution in the 1930s, saw an analogy between Nuremberg and an 
obscure case from the fi fteenth century—the criminal trial at Breisach of Sir Peter 
von Hagenbach. In an article written after the close of evidence at the IMT trial, 
while the judges were still deliberating, Schwarzenberger published an article in 
Th e  Manchester Guardian titled ‘A Forerunner of Nuremberg: Th e Breisach War 
Crime Trial of 1474’. 7 In the article, Schwarzenberger opined that the Hagenbach 
proceeding ‘appears to be the fi rst international war crime trial’ and that it was 
conducted ‘in accordance with the highest judicial standards’. 8 
 Schwarzenberger explained that, in serving as a governor for the Duke of 
Burgundy, Hagenbach ‘established a regime of arbitrariness and terror that went 
beyond anything that was customary even in those rather rough times’ and he went 
so far as to analogize Hagenbach’s conduct with that of the Nazi leaders in the 
dock at Nuremberg. 9 In referring to the trial itself, Schwarzenberger suggested that 
Hagenbach was charged with something akin to crimes against humanity. In the 
words of the prosecutor, he noted, the accused had ‘trampled under foot the laws 
of God and men’ and had committed what would be called today crimes against 
humanity. 10 
 Moreover, Schwarzenberger stated that Hagenbach’s trial involved charges of war 
crimes because ‘the hold of Burgundy over the pledged Austrian territories was more 
akin to the occupation of foreign territory in war-time than to a peacetime occupation 
of foreign territory under treaty’. 11 Similarly, by Schwarzenberger’s estimation, the 
trial was ‘international’ in character since the judges hailed from diff erent sovereign 
city-states in the region that were no longer part of the Holy Roman Empire. 12 
 Finally, the article closed by noting that ‘when judgment was pronounced, the 
tribunal rejected the advocate’s preliminary objections to its jurisdiction. It overruled 
the plea of superior orders, found Hagenbach guilty, and condemned him to death’. 13 
 Apparently, the prosecutors at Nuremberg noticed Schwarzenberger’s article. 
In the Control Council Law No. 10  ‘subsequent proceedings’, American Chief 
Prosecutor Telford Taylor relied on the Hagenbach case to argue to the Nuremberg 
Military Tribunal in Th e  Ministries Case , for example, that charging crimes against 
humanity did not constitute an impermissible  ex post facto application of law. 14 
Th e Hagenbach trial factored into  Th e High Command Case as well. In noting 
that the provisions of the IMT Charter and Control Council Law No. 10 were 
the expression of existing international law, the NMT in  Th e High Command Case 
judgment referred to ‘the trial of Sir Peter of Hagenbach held at Breisach in 1474. 
Th e charges against him were analogous to “Crimes against Humanity” in modern 
concept. He was convicted’. 15   
 7  Schwarzenberger, above n 1, 4.    8  Schwarzenberger, above n 1, 4. 
 9  Schwarzenberger, above n 1, 4.    10  Schwarzenberger, above n 1, 4. 
 11  Schwarzenberger, above n 1, 4.    12  Schwarzenberger, above n 1, 4. 
 13  Schwarzenberger, above n 1, 4. 
 14  See  US v Ernst von Weizsaecker (Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals 
under Control Council Law No. 10 ) (International Military Tribunal, Ministries case No 11/Vol 13, 
October 1946–May 1949) 96–7. See also  US v Von Leeb (Th e High Command Case No 12/Vol 11, 
October 1946–May 1949), 476.  
 15  US v Von Leeb (Th e High Command Case No 12/Vol 11, October 1946–May 1949), 476. 
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 And so this became the Rosetta Stone for ICL perception of the Hagenbach 
case—forged by Schwarzenberger and embraced at Nuremberg. Schwarzenberger 
strengthened its foundation with subsequent scholarly publications. For example, 
he devoted a short chapter to it in his treatise  Th e Law of Armed Confl ict (1968). 16 
Chapter 39 (‘Th e Breisach Trial of 1474’) of Volume Two, titled  International Law 
as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals , fl eshed out the materials of his 
 Manchester Guardian article. 17 
 By 1976, Professor L.C. Green of the University of Alberta could observe in his 
book,  Superior Orders in National and International Law :
 Th ere seems to be a widely accepted view that the problem of superior orders on the level 
of international law is of recent date, originating with the judgment of the Nuremberg 
tribunal after the Second World War. In fact, this is not historically correct. In September 
1946, Professor Schwarzenberger drew attention to the trial conducted on the orders of the 
Archduke of Austria on behalf of himself and his Allies of Peter of Hagenbach, Charles of 
Burgundy’s Governor of Breisach. Th e trial took place in 1474 before a court made up of 28 
judges drawn from Breisach, the other allied Alsatian and Upper Rhenian towns, Berne, a 
member of the Swiss Confederation, and Solothurn, allied with Berne. Broadly speaking, the 
charges covered what today would be described as war crimes and crimes against humanity. 18 
 Th en, in a passage starkly demonstrating Schwarzenberger’s infl uence in connecting 
the Hagenbach trial to modern ICL antecedents, Green linked Hagenbach to both 
Article 227 of the Versailles Treaty (contemplating an international criminal trial for 
Kaiser Wilhelm II) and a nascent version of crimes against humanity. ‘Foretelling 
the charges specifi ed in the Treaty of Versailles against the Kaiser, Hagenbach was 
alleged to have “trampled under foot the laws of God and man” ’. 19 
 Subsequent descriptions of the case in ICL literature, with minor variations, are 
remarkably consistent with the Schwarzenberger blueprint. Robert Cryer has noted 
that, with respect to the Hagenbach trial, ‘the standard reference for international 
criminal lawyers remains Georg Schwarzenberger’s  International Law as Applied by 
International Courts and Tribunals II: Th e Law of Armed Confl ict , Chapter 39’. 20 
And thus Schwarzenberger’s infl uence extends to every form of scholarship in 
ICL, including treatises, compilations, casebooks, law review articles, and internet 
commentary. 21 
 In the meantime, one can discern through this entrenched narrative many of the 
important lineaments of modern ICL norm development. In addition to being 
traditionally recognized as establishing precedent for rejection of the superior 
 16  Georg  Schwarzenberger ,  Th e Law of Armed Confl ict ( London :  Stevens and Sons,  1968 ),  462–6 . 
 17  Schwarzenberger, above n 1, 462–6.    18  Green, above n 1, 263. 
 19  Green, above n 1, 264.    20  Cryer, above n 1. 
 21  See, eg,  Michael P.  Scharf and  William A.  Schabas ,  ‘Slobodan Milosevic on Trial: A Companion’ , 
 Continuum ,  39 ( 2002 ) (‘Th e history of international war crimes trials begins with the 1474 prosecu-
tion of Peter von Hagenbach’);  Jules  Deschenes ,  Toward International Criminal Justice , in  Roger 
S.  Clark and  Madeleine  Sann (eds),  Th e Prosecution of International Crimes: A Critical Study of the 
International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ( New Brunswick and London :  Transaction Publishers, 
 1996 ),  30 ;  Cherif  Bassiouni ,  ‘Perspectives on International Criminal Justice’ ,  Virginia Journal of 
International Law ,  50 ( 2010 ),  298 . 
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orders defence 22 and formulation of crimes against humanity, 23 the case is now 
credited with helping cultivate new ICL norms. For example, it is now considered 
precedent for charging rape as a war crime. 24 Similarly, the tribunal’s refusal to 
accept Hagenbach’s argument that only a court of Burgundy could try him is 
thought to have served as a model for the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia’s rejection of Dusko Tadic’s plea of  jus de non evocando . 25 
More recently, in response to claims that the International Criminal Court’s Rome 
Statute does not brook state self-referral of cases, 26 Mohamed El Zeidy has invoked 
the Hagenbach trial as proof to the contrary. 27 
 Th is phenomenon of citing Hagenbach to help legitimize modern norm crea-
tion is summed up nicely by Timothy L.H. McCormack: ‘Th ere is a tendency by 
some commentators to make too much of the Hagenbach trial by characterizing it, 
without qualifi cation as “the fi rst international war crimes trial” and then relying 
on it as international legal precedent for more contemporary developments’. 28 
Is it appropriate for modern jurists to avail themselves of the Hagenbach case in this 
manner? In order to answer that question, we must take a much deeper look at the 
historical record and legal issues. 
 (III)  Hagenbach and History 
 To understand the Hagenbach phenomenon in the ICL context, one must reconstruct 
the historical record and then dig below its surface. Given the plethora of historical 
narratives regarding the Burgundian bailiff , it is necessary to classify and parse the 
materials—in other words, as a preliminary matter, an examination of the case’s 
historiography is indispensable. Th en the history itself can be considered to identify 
the narrative points of convergence and divergence. 
 22  See, eg,  Gary D  Solis ,  ‘Obedience to Orders: History and Abuses at Abu Graib Prison’ ,  Journal of 
International Criminal Justice ,  2 ( 2004 ),  990 (‘He [Henry Wirtz, Commandant of the Andersonville 
prisoner-of-war camp] pleaded superior orders and, like von Hagenbach nearly 400 years previously, 
the plea was rejected’). 
 23  See, eg,  Evo  Popoff  ,  ‘Inconsistency and Impunity in International Human Rights Law: Can the 
International Criminal Court Solve the Problems Raised by the Rwanda and Augusto Pinochet Cases’ 
(Note) ,  George Washington International Law Review ,  33 ( 2001 ),  364 (‘Aside from the Hagenbach case, 
eff orts to create and enforce international crimes against humanity were mostly unsuccessful prior to 
World War II’). 
 24  See  Th om  Shanker ,  ‘Sexual Violence’ in  Roy  Gutman ,  David  Rieff  , and  Anthony  Dworkin (eds), 
 Crimes of War: What the Public Should Know ( New York, NY : 2nd edn,  W.W. Norton,  2007 ),  323 . 
 25  Cryer, above n 1, 20. 
 26  See, eg,  Gregory S  Gordon ,  ‘Complementarity and Alternative Justice’ ,  Oregon Law Review ,  88 
( 2009 ),  662 (‘Self-generated referrals, on the other hand, do not inspire the same kind of confi dence 
[and fi nd] no support in the  Rome Statute ’s “(travaux préparatoires)” . . . [essentially, they] represent a 
government’s request for ICC help in dealing with rebel groups’). 
 27  Mohamed M.  El Zeidy ,  Th e Principle of Complementarity in International Law: Origin, Development 
and Practice ( Boston, MA and Leiden :  Brill,  2008 ),  211 . 
 28  Timothy L.H.  McCormack ,  ‘From Sun Tzu to the Sixth Committee:  Th e Evolution of an 
International Criminal Law Regime’ in  Timothy L.H.  McCormack and  Gerry J.  Simpson (eds),  Th e 
Law of War Crimes: National and International Approaches ( Alphen aan den Rijn :  Kluwer,  1997 ),  38 . 
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 (1)  Historiography 
 Over the centuries, history has been progressively more kind to Peter von Hagenbach. 
Th at might have seemed inconceivable in 1474. In the aftermath of his execution, 
he was portrayed as evil incarnate. His trial was seen as fair and his execution 
entirely justifi ed. Hagenbach’s initial infamy owes primarily to contemporary 
narratives published by his foes. 29 On the Teutonic side, Swiss chaplain Johannes 
Knebel, a conscientious diarist from Basel, chronicled the governorship, trial and 
execution of Sir Peter. 30 In the words of historian Gabrielle Claerr-Stamm, ‘the 
Knebel diary results in a [Hagenbach] biography that is very dark, where everything 
is atrocities, brutality, a portrait completely black, without nuance’. 31 To a lesser 
extent, Johannes von Durlach, Breisach’s notary, also described the Burgundian 
bailiff ’s supposed depredations in a publication known as ‘Th e  Reimchronik ’, a 1474 
collection of rhymed verse. 32 Claerr-Stamm has noted that ‘for centuries these 
fi rst texts would infl uence historians who would repeat them, without any critical 
distance’. 33 Historian Werner Paravicini adds: ‘For centuries, histories and poetic 
accounts cast this dark fi gure in the role of anti-hero for the Burgundian occupation 
of the Upper Rhine, the quintessential alien French speaker, the man of every 
excess, sexual and otherwise.’ 34 
 Among those historians (both expert and lay) one would include Charles the 
Bold’s Gallic enemies (allies of French King Louis XI), who did not give terribly 
fl attering accounts of Hagenbach in those early years. 35 For example, Philippe de 
Commines, former counsellor to the Duke of Burgundy, until he switched his 
allegiance by becoming a key advisor to Louis XI, 36 contributed towards creating 
the ‘black legend’ surrounding Hagenbach. 37 Subsequent French historians wrote 
even more damning prose about the Alsatian bailiff . In his  History of France , Henri 
Martin wrote that Hagenbach’s pastimes were murder and rape. 38 P.E. Tueff ert 
 29  Gabrielle  Claerr-Stamm ,  Pierre de Hagenbach: Le Destin Tragique d’un Chevalier Sundgauvien au 
Service de Charles le Téméraire ( Riedisheim :  Société d’Histoire du Sundgau  2004 ),  11 . 
 30  Claerr-Stamm, above n 29, 11. 
 31  Claerr-Stamm, above n 29, 11 (author’s translation). 
 32  Werner  Paravicini ,  ‘Hagenbach’s Hochzeit:  Ritterlichhöfi sche Kultur zwischen Burgund und 
dem Reich im 15. Jahrhundert 41’ in  Konrad  Krimm and  Rainer  Brüning ,  Zwischen Habsburg und 
Burgund. Der Oberrhein als europäische Landschaft im 15. Jahrhunderts ( Ostfi ldern :  Th orbecke,  2003 ) . 
Paravicini points out that the  Reimchronik may also have been written by Berthold Stehelin, the mayor 
of Breisach. 
 33  Claerr-Stamm, above n 29, 11. 
 34  Werner  Paravicini ,  ‘Parler d’amour au XVe siècle: Pierre de Hagenbach et la dame de Remiremont’ , 
 Comptes-rendus des séances de l’année ,  147 ( 3 ) ( 2003 ),  1277 ,  1278 . Paravicini has devoted much time 
to reversing this perception of Hagenbach, including publication of a book containing a series of 
love letters exchanged between Hagenbach and an anonymous paramour. See  Werner  Paravicini ,  ‘Un 
Amour Malheureux du XVe Siècle: Pierre de Hagenbach et La Dame de Remiremont’ ,  Journal des 
savants ( 2006 )  105–81 . 
 35  Claer-Stamm, above n 29, 11–12. 
 36  See  Andrew Richard  Scoble ,  ‘Life of Philip de Commines’ in  Th e Memoirs of Philip de 
Commines: Lord of Argenton: Containing the Histories of Louis XI. and Charles VIII., Kings of France, 
and of Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy ( London :  Henry G. Bohn ,  1856 ), vol 1,  xi–xx . 
 37  Scoble, above n 36, 8. 
 38  Henri  Martin ,  Th e History of France from the Earliest Period Until 1789 ( Furne et Compagnie, 
Librairies-Éditeurs ,  1841 ) . 
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described Hagenbach as the archetypal feudal monster whose life was one long 
string of crime and infamy. 39 Perhaps the best known and most infl uential of these 
French historians (and, in many ways, the culmination of the work of previous 
ones) was Aimable-Guillaume-Prosper Brugière, baron de Barante (commonly 
referred to as ‘Prosper de Barante’) whose multi-volume work  Histoire des ducs de 
Bourgogne de la maison de Valois: 1364–1477 fi gures prominently in any bibliog-
raphy of the Burgundian duchy. 40 Barante, who apparently relied in large part on 
the now-missing text of Hagenbach contemporary M. Golbéry (in a journal kept 
by sixteenth-century architect Daniel Specklin), provided the classic portrait of 
Hagenbach as demonic villain. 41 
 Nevertheless, a more nuanced view of Hagenbach began to emerge in the latter 
half of the nineteenth century. In his study of the fi nal years of the Burgundian 
court,  History of Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy  (1868), American historian 
John Foster Kirk questioned the reliability of the contemporaneous germanophone 
accounts of Hagenbach. 42 French historians eventually followed suit. In his book 
 Peter von Hagenbach and the Burgundian Domination , author Charles Nerlinger 
off ered this charitable description of Hagenbach:  ‘He was a forward-looking 
character, but impressionable, guided only by instinct, brooking no dissent and 
prone to fl y off  the handle.’ 43 Th at trend continued into the twentieth century. 
In her 1957 Hagenbach biography,  Der Landvogt Peter von Hagenbach , German 
historian Hildburg Brauer-Gramm attributed tyrannical qualities to Hagenbach 
but found them somewhat mitigated by his capabilities as a soldier and partly 
excusable given the boorish culture of the Burgundian court. 44 
 Hagenbach’s reputation was further rehabilitated by English historian Richard 
Vaughan in his 1972 study  Charles the Bold: Th e Last Valois Duke of Burgundy . 45 
Vaughan portrayed Hagenbach as a visionary administrative reformer who was not 
given suffi  cient resources to eff ect necessary change in the region. Finally, Hagenbach’s 
reputation was more recently rehabilitated in Gabrielle Claerr-Stamm’s full-length 
biography of Hagenbach. As Paravicini notes:  ‘Nerlinger, Witte, Bernoulli, and 
very recently Gabrielle Claerr-Stamm have written Hagenbach biographies which 
tend to rehabilitate his image: Georges Bischoff  goes as far as to call him “Peter the 
Good, or the Bold”.’ 46 
 39  P.E.  Tueff ert ,  Pierre de Hagenbach ( Strasbourg :  Revue d’Alsace  1878 ),  210 . 
 40  Amable-Guillaume-Prosper  Brugière de Barante ,  Histoire des ducs de Bourgogne de la maison de 
Valois: 1364–1477 ( Paris :  Librairie Le Normant,   1854 ) . 
 41  Georges  Bischoff  , ‘Noblesse, Pouvoirs, Société:  Les Pays Antérieurs de l’Autriche (Milieu 
XIVe Siècle—Milieu XVIe Siècle)’, Doctoral Dissertation ( University of Paris ,  1996 ),  34 . See also 
 Joseph  Billioud ,  Les États de Bourgogne aux XIVe et XVe siècles ( Dijon :   Académie des sciences, arts 
et belles-lettres  1922 ),  151 (stating that Barante relied on the Alsatian history of Daniel Specklin 
(1536–1589) whose manuscript disappeared in 1870). 
 42  John Foster  Kirk ,  History of Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy ( Philadelphia, PA :  J.P. Lippincott,   1864 ) . 
 43  Charles  Nerlinger ,  Pierre de Hagenbach et La Domination Bourguignonne ( Persée ,  1890 ),  156 . 
 44  Hildburg  Brauer-Gramm ,  Der Landvogt Peter von Hagenbach ( Northeim and Zurich :  Musterschmidt 
Verlag ,  1957 ),  48 . 
 45  Vaughan, above n 2, 84.    46  Paravicini, ‘Parler d’amour au XVe siècle’, above n 34, 1278. 
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 So which historians have it right—those relying on the contemporaneous accounts 
or the revisionists? Are there any degrees of consensus between them? Th e section 
that follows will attempt to stitch together an historical record from the various 
strands of available narratives. 
 (2)  History 
 (a)  Points of consensus in the record 
 (i) Overview: Th e Duchy of Burgundy in a time of upheaval and transformation 
 Th e pre-Westphalian political Europe in and around the time of Peter von Hagenbach 
bears little resemblance to today’s continent. While the nation-state represents the pre-
dominant contemporary European unit of organization, a less homogenous political 
confi guration predominated in the fi fteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Alongside 
the larger kingdoms and imperial realms, the landscape was dotted with lordships, 
principalities, cantons, grand duchies, prince-bishoprics, federations, abbeys, petty 
lordships, countships, fi efdoms, margraviates, and city-states. Th e proliferation of 
these smaller polities was in part responsible for a rather volatile transnational 
environment with strategic manoeuvring and jostling for position and power 
throughout the continent—sometimes directly in competition with larger king-
doms, nascent nation-states and the continent’s supranational behemoth, the Holy 
Roman Empire. Against this backdrop played out the bloody battles of, among 
others, the end-stages of the Hundred Years War and the incipient clashes of what 
would become the Protestant Reformation and culminate in the Th irty Years War. 
 Some of the era’s tumult was due to the emerging erosion of certain medieval power 
structures, such as the Holy Roman Empire and the Catholic Church. Glimmerings 
on the horizon of the Protestant Reformation, the resolution of dynastic struggles, 
and embryonic yearnings for democracy and ethno-linguistic self-determination 
can certainly account for much of this change. On the other hand, some of the 
violent upheaval of the time was very personality driven—certain ambitious rulers 
wished to expand their domains and were willing to engage in armed confl ict to 
make that happen. 
 One such ruler in the latter half of the fi fteenth century was Charles, Duke of 
Burgundy, whom history remembers by the colourful cognomen, ‘the Bold’. His 
detractors referred to him as Charles ‘the Terrible’. Th e Valois Burgundian duchy 
that Charles took over in 1465 had grown considerably in size, wealth and power 
in the century since Charles’s similarly-dubbed great-grandfather, Philip the Bold, 
received it in apanage from King John II of France. Originally a relatively modest 
fi ef in the northeast portion of France, it became something of a middle kingdom 
between England, France, and the German Holy Roman Empire. It eventually 
stretched from the Low Countries to parts of modern-day Germany and its posses-
sions included, among others, Franche-Comté, Flanders, Brabant, Luxembourg, 
Lorraine, and Alsace. 
 Charles the Bold, aggressively following the expansionist policies of his father, Philip 
the Good, was responsible for bringing the duchy’s growth to its apex. Notwithstanding 
that growth, there were signifi cant north-south territorial gaps in the Burgundian 
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realm and Charles wanted to bridge them to form a united super-landmass, the 
‘Kingdom of Lotharingia’, under his rule in the heart of Europe. He also had hopes of 
parlaying such power into a bid for accession to the Holy Roman Imperial throne. 
As a consequence of such ambition and expansionist aims, as well as a series of 
shifting alliances among other sovereigns vying for power in the region, Charles 
found himself within the eye of a bellicose Continental storm that would eventually 
consume him. 
 More precisely, to the west, as Burgundy sought to maintain and enlarge its 
territory in France, Charles was engulfed in a turf war with French King Louis XI. 
To the east, the Duke incurred the enmity of the Swiss and Austrians after gaining 
control of Alsace and subjecting its citizens to the authoritarian stewardship of 
Hagenbach. He would ultimately be squeezed between these two axes of confl ict. 
 At the same time, the Europe of Peter von Hagenbach was transitioning from a 
feudal, land-based civilization to an increasingly urbanized, bourgeois society. Much of 
the tension precipitating the armed confl icts was also due to this increasing rift between 
these old and new orders during the High Middle Ages. Peter von Hagenbach and 
his master Charles the Bold represented the old order. Th e emerging nation-state 
of France, whose king, Louis XI, appreciated and supported the sociological and 
economic shift from medieval to modern, represented the new order. So did many 
of the Swiss cantons and Alsatian free city-states. Th e rising burgher class in these 
pre-modern territorial pockets would lock horns with Charles and his bailiff  and 
history would never again be the same. 
 (ii)  Th e confl ict with Louis XI 
 Th e contest between Charles the Bold and Louis XI began not long after Louis’s 
ascension to the French throne. In an eff ort to extend and centralize royal power, 
Louis began to limit the prerogatives of the French nobility—assessing them new 
levies and stripping them of much authority. At the same time, Louis discharged 
some of his father’s most loyal and competent ministers and offi  cers and they, in 
turn, intrigued with the nobility to stir up rebellion against the French monarch. 
 Th e foremost champion of their cause was Charles the Bold, who used Louis’s 
young and ineff ectual brother Charles, the Duke of Berry, as the fi gurehead of a 
nobility opposition group, known as ‘the League of the Public Weal’. 47 Led by 
Burgundy, the League went to war against the King of France. 48 Th e position of the 
two sides ebbed and fl owed. 49 But after royal forces failed to check a Burgundian 
advance on Paris, Louis, a very shrewd diplomat (later dubbed the ‘Universal 
Spider’) gave the impression that he was yielding to the League’s demands. All 
these measures, however, were seemingly taken in an underhanded eff ort to break 
up the League. Louis was temporizing. Within months of ceding Normandy to his 
brother, for example, he reclaimed it. In the end, France was saved from collapse 
by the refusal of the lesser gentry to rise up against its king, and by the alliance of 
Louis with the citizen class, especially the growing ranks of city dwellers. 
 47  Christopher  Hare ,  Th e Life of Louis XI: Th e Rebel Dauphin and the Statesman King ( London and 
New York :  Harper & Brothers  1907 ),  99–100 . 
 48  Hare, above n 47, 102.    49  Hare, above n 47, 102–09. 
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 But the larger war between Louis XI and Charles the Bold continued and entered 
a new phase. Louis extended an olive branch to certain key members of the League 
by returning to them various estates and privileges and beginning the process of 
turning them against Charles. Over the next few years, Charles would win various 
military campaigns against Louis but could not bring him down. Louis had some 
success on the battlefi eld as well and in 1472, after an unsuccessful invasion of 
France, Charles was obliged to make a lasting truce with Louis. Yet another phase 
opened in which Charles’s projects were to be concentrated primarily on his eastern 
fl ank, toward the German-speaking territories. In the meantime, Louis kept his 
eye on Charles’s new endeavours and waited for his chance to destroy Burgundy 
through new diplomatic alliances. 
 (iii)  Austria, Switzerland and Alsace 
 To put the case of Peter von Hagenbach into context, one must also consider the situ-
ation on Charles’s eastern fl ank—the area that now comprises Switzerland, Austria, 
and Germany. Th e Holy Roman Empire took control over the territories of modern 
Switzerland in approximately  AD 1033. Over the next two centuries, certain Swiss 
cantons entered into a political alliance known as the ‘Old Swiss Confederacy’. By 
the mid-fi fteenth century, the Confederates, or  Eidgenossen , formed a loose affi  liation 
of about a dozen largely independent small states. 
 Although they had the status of ‘imperial immediacy’ within the Holy Roman 
Empire (ie, directly under the Emperor), they had been for some time under the 
eff ective control of Austria’s ruling family, the Habsburgs. Th e latter resisted Swiss 
eff orts to gain independence and this led to a series of fourteenth-century battles 
against Habsburg forces that the Swiss won decisively, most notably the Battles 
of Sempach and Näfels. By the time Charles assumed the Burgundian mantle in 
1465, there was still much bad blood between the fi ercely independent Swiss and 
their former Austrian feudal overlords. And the Swiss were expanding their control 
over territory in the Rhine region. Th e Confederacy controlled most of the land 
south and west of the Rhine to the Alps and the Jura mountains and was poised to 
take the Sundgau portion of the Rhine territory (southern Alsace). Ultimately, the 
 Eidgenossen agreed not to attack this region in exchange for a signifi cant reparations 
pledge from the Austrians. 
 Unfortunately for the Austrians, Archduke Sigismund (also known as ‘Sigmund’) 
was in dire fi nancial straits and could not aff ord to pay the Swiss and/or maintain 
control over his possessions on the Upper Rhine. So he agreed to mortgage these 
Alsatian lands to Charles the Bold. By the treaty of St Omer, entered into on 
9 May 1469, Charles acquired Habsburg possessions on both sides of the Rhine, 
including the Landgraviate of Alsace, the counties of Ferrette and Hauenstein 
(with a large part of the Black Forest), the towns of Breisach and Ortenburg, 
and the four so-called ‘Forest Towns’ of Rheinfelden, Seckingen, Lauff enburg, 
and Waldshut. In exchange, Sigismund received 50,000 Rhenish fl orins and a 
promise from Charles that he would pay the Swiss reparations in the sum of an 
additional 10,000 Rhenish fl orins. Title to these possessions could be redeemed 
by Sigismund but only upon a lump-sum payment made at a specifi ed place—it 
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was not contemplated that Sigismund would ever be solvent enough to regain his 
Upper Alsace lands. 
 So what exactly did Charles acquire for 60,000 fl orins? His new possessions might 
be described as an archipelago of city-states more or less accustomed to independ-
ence given the absentee-landlord role played by Sigismund while he was nominally 
in control. Assuming Charles could keep the citizens of these newly-acquired towns 
happy, the Treaty of St Omer put him in quite an advantageous position. In con-
cluding the entente with Sigismund, Charles and the Austrian archduke both gave 
and received pledges of friendship and support to one another. After all, Charles 
would be solving for the Austrian ruler a thorny fi nancial and administrative 
problem in Alsace and in return Sigismund would help quench the Burgundian’s 
thirst for territorial aggrandizement. At the same time, Charles would extinguish 
Sigismund’s reparations debt to the Swiss Confederacy. Th is could help strengthen 
the longstanding friendly relationship between the Confederacy and the House of 
Burgundy. 
 On the other hand, from Charles the Bold’s perspective, the new arrangement 
was fraught with peril. For one thing, the  Eidgenossen , likely believing Sigismund 
incapable of satisfying his reparations debt, were prevented by Charles’s assumption 
of the debt from acquiring new territory. Moreover, the new Austro–Burgundian 
arrangement might have convinced the Swiss that Charles had formed a strong 
alliance with Sigismund, the Confederacy’s perceived oppressor and sworn enemy. 
Th is could potentially put Charles in a precarious position vis-à-vis the militarily 
powerful  Eidgenossen . 
 Moreover, the smaller power brokers of the parts of Upper Alsace not within 
Burgundian control—the independent city leaders and Imperial regional governors, 
for example, would now have to coexist with the acquisitive Duke of Burgundy 
in their backyard, and they were justifi ably concerned about Charles’s territorial 
ambitions. Further, all these independent neighbourhood polities, in addition 
to those in Charles’s possession, were German-speaking. Th e Burgundians were 
francophone—and no overlord in this largely Germanic region had ever spoken a 
foreign language. Th at could certainly become a source of friction. 
 So while the Treaty of St Omer could understandably have brought many 
strategic advantages to Charles, it certainly had the potential to upset the rela-
tively harmonious relations his duchy had previously established in the region. 
If governed judiciously, the new Alsatian possessions might promote ducal pres-
tige, generate tax revenue, serve as a strategic buff er and perhaps further solidify 
Charles’s relations with his Germanic allies. If governed maladroitly, Charles 
could alienate his eastern neighbours and perhaps make attractive an alliance 
with the ever-scheming Louis XI that could squeeze Burgundy within dangerous 
pincers. 
 Th us, Charles the Bold seems to have needed someone eff ective and politically 
astute to administer these territories. In the event, he chose Peter von Hagenbach, 
a trusted lieutenant whose dog-like loyalty and blind devotion had endeared him 
to Charles through years of Burgundian court intrigue and military conquest. 
Unfortunately, while the ideal candidate might have won the region over with a 
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light touch and eff ective diplomacy, Charles’s deputy ultimately terrorized Upper Alsace 
with blunt force trauma and what some accounts would describe as a reign of terror. 
 (iv)  Peter von Hagenbach 
 Th e origins of Peter von Hagenbach are rather obscure 50 —even his year of birth is 
unknown (although estimated to be 1420). 51 His father Anton was a lesser noble-
man of southern Alsace and his family had been under the feudal dominion of the 
Habsburgs since the middle 1300s. Anton hailed from the town of Hagenbach, 
where his family’s like-named ancestral castle was located. Th is small municipality 
was within the vicinity of Mulhouse, a larger town that would later factor promi-
nently in Peter’s life as a servant of the Duchy of Burgundy. Records indicate that 
Anton von Hagenbach became a citizen of Th ann and entered into the service of 
the powerful Habsburgs. 52 In 1428, he became the mayor of Th ann and in 1440 
he was named Habsburg Council at the Court of Ensisheim. 53 
 When Anton von Hagenbach met Peter’s mother, Catherine, she was the widow 
of a French nobleman by the name of Jean de Montjustin, the Lord of Belmont. 54 
Belmont’s castle, in which Peter was raised, was located in the Franche-Comté, 
a nearby francophone Burgundian province. Refl ective of his parents’ respective 
mother tongues, Peter was fully fl uent in French and German. 55 
 Peter von Hagenbach appears to have received his education in a francophone 
monastery and then turned to a life of military and ducal court service. Historian 
Werner Paravicini writes that an ‘unknown intermediary opened the door for him 
[Hagenbach] to the Burgundian court’. 56 An early reference to his service to the 
Duchy appears in 1443, when he apparently took part in a military operation in 
Luxembourg conducted under the aegis of Charles the Bold’s father, Philip the Good. 57 
Perhaps not coincidentally, in the same year, Peter was made a Knight of the Order 
of St George of Burgundy. 58 Th e year 1443 played a signifi cant role in Hagenbach’s 
personal life too as he then married Marguerite d’Accolans, a noblewoman of the 
Franche-Comté. 59 
 By 1448, Sir Peter von Hagenbach’s darker side had begun to manifest itself. 
According to historian Hildburg Brauer-Gramm, Hagenbach kidnapped a certain 
Marquard Baldeck, a banker from Basel with whom he had dined the previous 
evening. 60 Hagenbach demanded a ransom from Baldeck’s family. 61 Th e plot was 
foiled when, at Philip the Good’s behest, Baldeck was immediately released without 
the ransom being paid. 62 
 50  Heinrich  Witte ,  ‘Zur Geschichte des burgundischen Landvogts Peter von Hagenbach’,  Zeitschrift 
für die Geschichte des Oberrheins ,  8 ( 1893 ),  646 . 
 51  Brauer-Gramm, above n 44, 12.    52  Brauer-Gramm, above n 44, 12. 
 53  Brauer-Gramm, above n 44, 12–13.    54  Brauer-Gramm, above n 44, 14. 
 55  Brauer-Gramm, above n 44.    56  Paravicini, ‘Parler d’amour au XVe siècle’, above n 34, 1277. 
 57  Paravicini, above n 34, 1277.    58  Paravicini, above n 34, 1277. 
 59  Brauer-Gramm, above n 44, 14.    60  Brauer-Gramm, above n 44, 14. 
 61  Brauer-Gramm, above n 44, 14. 
 62  Brauer-Gramm, above n 44, 14. Th is seems a foreshadowing of Hagenbach’s future interaction with 
Swiss citizens and his eventual trial and execution as Charles’s Alsatian Bailiff . It should be noted that 
Hagenbach subsequently wrote a letter to the local Habsburg bailiff  attempting to justify his actions. 
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 In the early 1450s, Hagenbach’s name fi rst appears in offi  cial Burgundian court 
records as ‘Aquenbacq’ or ‘Archembault’. 63 By 1460, he was a maitre d’hotel at the ducal 
court and the career prospects of the ambitious courtier were rapidly improving. 64 
According to Duchy of Burgundy expert Richard Vaughan:
 Soon after then [Hagenbach] took sides with Charles, then count of Charolais, in the quarrels 
between him and his father Philip the Good, and he was able to earn Charles’s undying 
gratitude in the summer of 1462 when he exposed Jehan Coustain’s alleged plot to murder 
him, a plot which he himself may have contrived on Charles’s behalf in order to eliminate 
Coustain and discredit his patrons the Croys. It was probably soon after this that Charles 
wrote to Hagenbach addressing him as ‘my very good friend’ and assuring him that he 
would neither abandon nor fail him whatever might happen. 65 
 Hagenbach’s exploits on the battlefi eld during the 1460s further endeared him 
to Charles, particularly with ‘Hagenbach winning military renown in the 1465 
war of the League of the Public Weal’. 66 Th at confl ict began in June with Charles 
attacking the French Count of Nevers’s towns of Péronne, Roye, and Montdidier, 
with Péronne being ‘captured by a nocturnal escalade’ in October—Hagenbach’s 
‘most brilliant exploit’, according to Richard Vaughan. 67 
 Vaughan also credits Hagenbach’s military renown to his participation in Charles’s 
bloody campaigns against Dinant and Liège, two rebellious towns in the Burgundian 
territory of what is now Belgium. 68 For example, disregarding the preference for noc-
turnal siege operations, Hagenbach brazenly took the lead in charging Dinant in the 
middle of the day. Kirk notes that his ‘vigour and resolution strongly recommended 
him to the favour of a commander [Charles the Bold] personally so distinguished 
for these qualities, and obtained for him ultimately a place in Charles’s confi dence 
productive of fatal consequences to both’. 69 
 Hagenbach was also valuable to Charles off  the battlefi eld. Owing to his fl uency 
in German, for example, he was frequently utilized on diplomatic missions. 70 It was 
Hagenbach, for instance, who negotiated the 1465 alliance between Burgundy and 
the count palatine of the Rhine. 71 In the estimation of Richard Vaughan: ‘In the 
summer of 1469, [Hagenbach] was an obvious choice for the post of ducal bailiff  
in Upper Alsace.’ 72 
 (b)  Points of divergence in the historical record—the bailiff  years 
 (i)  Th e demonic portrait of Hagenbach 
 Th ere are diff ering accounts of Hagenbach’s time as Charles’s bailiff  in Upper Alsace. 
Th e older and more contemporaneous accounts tend to paint him as a tyrannical, 
 63  Brauer-Gramm, above n 44, 14.    64  Brauer-Gramm, above n 44, 14, 16. 
 65  Vaughan, above n 2, 255. Th is is certainly ironic in light of later events. 
 66  Vaughan, above n 2, 255. 
 67  Richard  Vaughan ,  Philip the Good:  Th e Apogee of Burgundy ( Woodbridge :   Th e Boydell Press, 
 2002 ),  391 . 
 68  Vaughan, above n 67, 256.    69  Vaughan, above n 67, 256. 
 70  Vaughan, above n 2, 255.    71  Vaughan, above n 2, 255.    72  Vaughan, above n 2, 255. 
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sexually deviate, bloodthirsty monster. Th is portrait was nicely encapsulated 
by French historian Prosper de Barante. In introducing readers to Hagenbach, 
Barante noted that the Alsatian bailiff  was ‘one of the most cruel and violent men 
to hold power over a people’. 73 ‘He knew no justice’, Barante elaborated, ‘and 
the slightest refusal to satisfy his whims was tantamount to a death sentence’. 74 
Barante observed that he had people killed without even giving the slightest clue 
as to why—many of them with his own hand. 75 For example, Barante described 
the case of four citizens of the Alsatian town of Th ann who were sent by the Th ann 
government to complain to Hagenbach about exorbitant taxation (this incident 
would eventually become a focal point at Hagenbach’s 1474 trial). 76 ‘Without any 
sort of trial’, Barante recounted, ‘Hagenbach had these four unfortunate burghers 
decapitated’. 77 
 As this incident reveals, Hagenbach’s taxes were responsible for sowing much 
discontent in the Upper Alsace. One of the conditions on which the Alsatian lands 
were mortgaged to Charles, Barante explained, was that the liberties of their 
residents be preserved and respected. 78 Barante recounted that Hagenbach paid 
no heed to that guarantee and ultimately violated it by imposing a one- pfennig tax 
on each bottle of wine consumed in the region. 79 Barante then detailed a series of 
other violations of the Alsatian rights under his stewardship: (1) farmers were sub-
jected to compulsory labour service and thereby prevented from engaging in their 
agricultural work; (2) soldiers were regularly quartered in the homes of the citizens 
without their consent and the soldiers would mistreat the homeowners without 
the latter having any legal protection or recourse; (3) noblemen were deprived of 
their right to hunt; and (4) sexual violence was visited on young girls from all walks 
of life and classes, including nuns. 80 
 With regard to sexual depredations, Johannes Knebel, the Basel chaplain, 
reported that the bailiff  became acquainted with a cloister of nuns in Breisach. 81 
Among them was a beautiful young vestal. 82 Knebel reported that Hagenbach 
‘stared at her with burning desire’. 83 He threatened her with death if she did not 
submit to his desires. 84 One of his lieutenants searched the cloister, found the 
attractive holy woman, and took her to Hagenbach, who raped her. 85 Hagenbach’s 
lieutenant threatened the other nuns with death for having attempted to hide 
Hagenbach’s victim. 86 
 73  Barante, above n 40, vol 9, 405.    74  Barante, above n 40, vol 9, 406. 
 75  Barante, above n 40, vol 9, 406. 
 76  Barante, above n 40, vol 9, 406. Th ese killings would eventually be the basis of one of the counts 
against Hagenbach at his 1474 trial. 
 77  Barante, above n 40, vol 9, 406. A  point that supports the revisionists is that other specifi c 
examples of murder are not given. It would seem that Hagenbach’s chief atrocity crime was mass rape. 
 78  Barante, above n 40, vol 9, 406.    79  Barante, above n 40, vol 9, 405–6. 
 80  Barante, above n 40, vol 9, 406–7. 
 81  Johannes  Knebel ,  Chronicle of the Chaplain Johannes Knebel from the Time of the Burgundian Wars 
( Bahnmaier ,  1851 ),  49 . 
 82  Knebel, above n 81, 49.    83  Knebel, above n 81, 49.    84  Knebel, above n 81, 49. 
 85  Knebel, above n 81, 49.    86  Knebel, above n 81, 49, 49–50. 
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 Prosper de Barante focused on one particularly heinous incident wherein Hagenbach 
invited a town’s married couples to his residence for a party. 87 Once all were assembled, 
he removed the husbands from his residence and forced the wives to strip naked. 
Following this, he placed a covering over the head of each woman. Th e husbands 
were then ordered to return and inspect the naked bodies of the masked women. 
Th ose who were not able to identify their wives in this state were thrown down 
a long fl ight of stairs. Th ose who recognized their wives were rewarded by being 
forced to ingest copious amounts of alcohol that rendered them fatally ill. 88 
 According to Barante, Hagenbach’s hatred for the inhabitants of his ducal charge 
was particularly intense toward the townspeople, as opposed to the rural residents. 89 
And this included the towns outside the Duke’s direct authority, such as Strasbourg, 
Colmar, Schelestadt, and other cities under Imperial aegis. Hagenbach is supposed 
to have subjected them to a regular litany of insults and poor treatment. Strasbourg 
in particular seemed to bear the brunt of the bailiff ’s wrath. He subjected Ortenberg 
Castle, owned by the Strasbourgeois, to a military siege and then occupied it as ducal 
property. He imposed the dreaded wine tax on Strasbourg and then demanded that 
its citizens swear an oath of allegiance to the Duke of Burgundy. 90 ‘In the end’, 
writes Barante, ‘no one knew when the limits of the bailiff ’s tyranny would be 
reached’. 91 
 However, Hagenbach’s greatest mistake by far, writes Barante, was alienating the 
Swiss, the House of Burgundy’s traditional ally and good neighbour. Th is began 
with Hagenbach’s seizure of the seigneury of Schenkelberg, which was property 
of the Swiss city of Berne. Later on, one of Hagenbach’s deputies arrested near 
the town of Breisach a group of Swiss merchants travelling with their fi ne cloths 
to the Frankfurt Fair. ‘Th ey were mistreated, their goods were confi scated, and 
they were imprisoned in the Schuttern Castle, where their captors demanded from 
them a ransom of 10,000 crowns.’ 92 Th ese prisoners were liberated by soldiers of 
Strasbourg who burned Schuttern Castle to the ground. 93 Th is helped forge an 
alliance between the Swiss and the free cities of Alsace. 94 
 (ii)  Th e revisionist portrait of Hagenbach 
 Later chroniclers of the period have taken a much more charitable view of 
Hagenbach’s role in alienating Alsace and its neighbours. In his work,  A History 
of Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy (1863–67), John Foster Kirk pointed out 
that surviving contemporaneous accounts, those supporting Barante’s history, were 
written by the chroniclers of Hagenbach’s judges and executioners. ‘Th e truth is, 
these chroniclers—monks and municipal scribes at Basel and Strasburg—recorded 
simply from day to day, without personal cognisance or investigation, whatever 
rumours had currency and a special interest in their localities.’ 95 
 87  Barante, above n 40, vol 9, 407.    88  Barante, above n 40, vol 9, 407. 
 89  Barante, above n 40, vol 9, 408.    90  Barante, above n 40, vol 9, 408. 
 91  Barante, above n 40, vol 9, 408–9.    92  Barante, above n 40, vol 9, 410. 
 93  Barante, above n 40, vol 9, 411.    94  Barante, above n 40, vol 9, 411. 
 95  Kirk, above n 42, 471. 
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 And the negative reports regarding Hagenbach, he noted, date from his fi nal 
year in Alsace—there is little to nothing during the fi rst four years. 96 Nevertheless, 
even Kirk acknowledged that Charles the Bold ‘left Alsace to the mercies of a 
tyrannical steward, the minor villain of the piece, in whom the vices of his principal 
were mixed with others still more odious, whose cruelty and craft had no false 
lustre, no redeeming trait’. 97 
 British historian Richard Vaughn refused to accept wholesale the cartoonish 
depiction of Hagenbach ‘as the archetypal tyrant, the Burgunidan bogeyman, the 
iniquitous immoral offi  cial of a detested foreign regime’. 98 Instead, Vaughan focused 
on the fact that Charles was not very concerned about the administration of his 
Alsatian properties. 99 And thus Hagenbach was left to fend for himself with few 
resources and little direction. Given his aristocratic sense of superiority, his gruff  
military demeanour and his disdain of the region’s Swiss, urban and lower class 
citizens, he soon ostracized the Alsatian population. 100 
 Vaughn opines that the situation was aggravated by fears of Charles’s territorial 
ambitions in the region and further exacerbated by his administrators’ speaking a 
foreign language:
 Unlike the Austrians, the Burgundians were  welsch , or French-speaking foreigners, in a 
thoroughly Germanic area. Th eir arrival and the administrative activities which accompanied 
it, aroused the suspicions and distrust of Charles’s ally the imperial  Landvogt of Alsace, Frederick 
the Victorious, elector palatine of the Rhine, as well as of two of the most powerful and populous 
cities on the Rhine, Strasbourg and Basel. 101 
 Concerns about Charles’s desire for land acquisition seemed to reach their peak in 
September 1473, when he met with Holy Roman Emperor Frederick III in Trier 
to discuss Charles’s possible ascension to the Imperial crown. 102 
 Alsatian historian Georges Bischoff  has noted that, in addition to local fears about 
Burgundian expansion, the citizens of the Upper Rhine resented Hagenbach’s strict 
administration and his curbing of corrupt practices in the region. 103 He went so 
far as to add that Hagenbach’s administrative reforms, so abhorred by the Alsatians 
and Rhenians, presaged the structures instituted by Louis XIV two centuries later. 104 
Heinrich Heimpel noted that Hagenbach went through the territory with an ‘iron 
sweeper’—imposing duties, improving castles, establishing a road-police, improving 
trade and organizing a court system moulded after the Burgundian, and reforming 
cloisters. 105 Certainly, one of Hagenbach’s most impressive achievements was in 
the area of public safety and roads administration. During his tenure, Charles 
Nerlinger pointed out, ‘security on the roads was so good that one could carry 
across the region gold or silver attached to nothing more than a bindle stick’. 106 
 96  Kirk, above n 42, 471, 472.    97  Kirk, above n 42, 471, 475. 
 98  Vaughan, above n 2, 286.    99  Vaughan, above n 2, 91–5. 
 100  Vaughan, above n 2, 99.    101  Vaughan, above n 2, 261. 
 102  Vaughan, above n 2, 105. 
 103  Georges Bischoff , ‘Preface’ to Claerr-Stamm, above n 29, 8–9.    104  Bischoff , above n 103, 9. 
 105  Heimpel, above n 5, 444.    106  Nerlinger, above n 42, 148. 
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 Vaughan believed that Burgundian problems in the region were well illustrated in 
the case of the imperial city of Mulhouse, whose citizens had been enduring a wave of 
criminal attacks by brigands in the region. 107 In response, in May 1470, Hagenbach, 
‘in his typically forthright manner’, demanded that Mulhouse ‘should accept in 
perpetuity the protection of the Duke of Burgundy and his successors . . . But 
though the Burgundian bailiff  stormed, threatened, and coaxed Mulhouse . . . she 
remained resolute in her opposition to any sort of Burgundian penetration’. 108 
Over time, the Alsatian population was subjected to a rising level of insults, threats 
and occasional physical violence—behaviour that in the fi nal months of his service 
Vaughan described as ‘increasingly arbitrary, off ensive and indecorous’. 109 
 (c)  Hagenbach’s downfall 
 Regardless of whether one subscribes to the older view of Hagenbach as blood-
thirsty monster or the revisionist version of him as tactless bully, one thing is certain: he 
managed to whip up hatred within the region and unify the citizens of the Upper 
Rhine in passionate opposition against him. With encouragement from Louis XI, 
in March–April 1474, the Swiss Confederation, the Austrians and the free/imperial 
towns entered into an alliance, known as the ‘League of Constance’, to achieve ‘the 
peace of the land’ and extricate it ‘from the tyranny of the Duke of Burgundy and 
his wicked bailiff  Peter von Hagenbach’. 110 Th e fi rst order of business was to redeem 
Sigismund’s mortgage from Charles the Bold. Th is was achieved through the 
funding of the towns of Basel, Colmar, Sélestat, and Strasbourg. 111 Subsequently, 
Sigismund appointed his own bailiff , Sundgau nobleman Hermann von Eptingen, 
to replace Hagenbach. 112 
 By this point, events were closing in on Peter von Hagenbach and he knew it. 
He appealed to Charles the Bold for additional troops but the request was denied 
as Charles had military ventures occupying his troops in other parts of Europe 
including the Low Countries and Lorraine. 113 Th ann had been Hagenbach’s 
headquarters but he feared for his safety there since its citizens had, from his 
perspective, plotted against him the previous summer. 114 So he decided to make his 
stand in Breisach, a walled and more easily defensible town on the Rhine, 115 and 
he fortifi ed it with a large garrison of Picard and German mercenaries. 116 It was 
bruited about town that Hagenbach planned to expel the citizens of Breisach and 
then drown them in the Rhine. Th ere seemed to be a great sense of urgency that 
League of Constance troops launch an assault against the Burgundians and save 
Breisach’s civilians. 
 107  Nerlinger, above n 43, 95.    108  Nerlinger, above n 43, 95. 
 109  Vaughan, above n 2, 283.    110  Vaughan, above n 2, 278. 
 111  Vaughan, above n 2, 278.    112  Vaughan, above n 2, 284. 
 113  Vaughan, above n 2, 286; Kirk, above n 41, 478–9.    114  Vaughan, above n 2, 283. 
 115  Kirk, above n 42, 477.    116  Kirk, above n 42, 477. 
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 (i)  Th e arrest, inquisition and torture 
 In the end, though, it was not the direct action of enemy troops that led to the 
Burgundian governor’s demise. Unfortunately for Hagenbach, Charles the Bold 
had not provided suffi  cient funding for the bailiff ’s tiny garrison and they began to 
mutiny against him on Easter Sunday, 10 April 1474. Vaughan notes that the local 
citizenry which ‘had suff ered at Hagenbach’s hands the total abrogation of their 
civic institutions and liberties, encouraged and supported them’. 117 Th e mercenaries 
were expelled from the city and Hagenbach was placed under house arrest (he had 
been living in the house of the Breisach mayor and would remain there for a few 
days). 118 Th e day after his arrest he was bound in cords. 119 Th ree days later he was 
removed to a dungeon in the public prison, his body covered in chains, his wrists 
secured in handcuff s, and his legs set in stocks. 120 
 Prison conditions were apparently quite harsh. A note from his jailers in mid-April 
acknowledged that ‘the harsh handling of the prisoner seems to be in order . . . so he 
is not able to escape’. 121 Kirk added that ‘three strong men were appointed to watch 
him day and night’ until the arrival of Archduke Sigismund. 122 Th e latter reached 
Breisach at the end of April and ordered that instruments of torture be brought 
there from Basel. 123 Sometime during that week, Hagenbach was interrogated 
while being subjected to torture on six diff erent occasions. 124 While the interro-
gation focused on Hagenbach’s conduct as bailiff  in Upper Alsace from 1469 to 
1474, it also dealt with Charles the Bold’s territorial ambitions, particularly the 
details regarding his meeting with Holy Roman Emperor Frederick III at Trier in 
September of 1473. 125 
 On 5 May 1474, ostensibly because of poor prison conditions, Hagenbach was 
taken from the dungeon to what was known as ‘Th e Water Tower’ (on the other 
side of town) for additional interrogation. 126 Unable to move his broken body of his 
own force, he was transported in a wheelbarrow while onlookers derisively heckled 
him. 127 During the transfer, he ‘cried loudly’ and at one point he shouted ‘murderer’. 
He was tortured severely on that day—four separate times. He supposedly admitted 
to his misdeeds and named accessories. 128 Among other things, he is supposed to 
have admitted that he intended to remove forcibly the citizens of Breisach from the 
 117  Vaughan, above n 2, 283.    118  Vaughan, above n 2, 283. See also Kirk, above n 42, 484. 
 119  Kirk, above n 42, 487. 
 120  Kirk, above n 42, 488. See also  Bernhard Emanuel  von Rodt ,  Die Feldzüge Karls des Kühnen, 
Herzogs von Burgund ( Schaff hausen :  Hurter ,  1843 ),  221 . 
 121  Von Rodt, n 120 above, 221. 
 122  Kirk, above n 42, 488. 
 123  Hermann  Heimpel ,  ‘Das Verfahren gegen Peter von Hagenbach zu Breisach 1474’ ,  Zeitschrift für 
Geschichte des Oberrheins ,  55 ( 1942 ),  321 ,  346–7 . 
 124  Heimpel, see above n 123, 347, 349. In all likelihood, according to Heimpel, the primary torture 
position consisted of Hagenbach being hanged by his bound hands with rocks tied to his feet. 
 125  Heimpel, see above n 123, 348–9. See also Kirk, above n 42, 489. 
 126  Heimpel, above n 123, 349; Kirk, above n 42, 488 (Kirk suggests the prisoner was transferred to 
the tower because it off ered superior torture facilities). 
 127  Von Rodt, above n 120, 223. 
 128  Heimpel, above n 123, 348. Th e record is not entirely clear as to which crimes he would have 
confessed. 
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city with the intention of eventually exterminating them. 129 One of Hagenbach’s 
associates, an offi  cial in the Breisach government, was detained and questioned about 
the bailiff . Pursuant to physical coercion, he admitted that Hagenbach intended to 
deport the citizens of Breisach and have them exterminated. 130 
 (ii) Th e trial 
 Now that Hagenbach had confessed to his supposed crimes, what was to follow? In 
that era, one might have supposed that the prisoner would be summarily executed. 
He escaped lynch-mob justice on Easter Sunday only thanks to Breisach resident 
Friedrich Kappelar’s decision to arrest him and await instructions from Archduke 
Sigismund. 131 In his book  Die Feldzüge Karls des Kühnen (1843), German historian 
Bernhard Emmanuel von Rodt related that, when presented with the situation, 
Sigismund made a startling decision for the time. Given Hagenbach’s position as 
bailiff  to the Duke of Burgundy, Sigismund concluded that he was entitled to an 
open, public hearing and ‘his fate would be decided by it’. 132 Eminent German 
historian Hermann Heimpel has noted that the contemplated trial was consistent 
with other legal actions in late fi fteenth-century Swabia. 133 
 What might have seemed entirely unprecedented, though, was the make-up of 
the court that would sit in judgment of Hagenbach. He was not to be tried by a 
local judge. Instead, numerous representatives of sovereigns from around the region, 
twenty-eight in all—including sixteen knights, would sit as part of an international 
ad hoc tribunal. 134 As described by Georg Schwarzenberger: ‘Eight of [the judges] 
were nominated by Breisach, and two by each of the other allied Alsatian and 
Upper Rhenanian towns [Strasbourg, Sélestat, Colmar, Basel, Th ann, Kenzingen, 
Neuburg am Rhein, and Freiburg im Breisgau], Berne, a member of the Swiss 
Confederation, and Solothurn, allied with Berne.’ 135 
 In fact, each sovereign represented a member of the League of Constance (Berne 
being the only representative of the Swiss cantons). 136 As one contemporaneous 
account put it, Hagenbach ‘was judged on behalf of all the members of the alli-
ance’. 137 Heimpel elaborated: ‘Th e assembly of this court shows that the League of 
Constance . . . was more than a “political union” in the modern sense of the term; 
those united saw themselves as a legal community, such as a medieval union, and 
such entities set up courts for special cases.’ 138 As Breisach’s sovereign, Austria 
provided the presiding judge. 139 
 On 9 May 1474, at 8 am, Peter von Hagenbach’s ‘special’ case opened for trial 
before an enormous crowd assembled outdoors in front of the Breisach mayor’s 
residence (not far from the Water Tower). 140 Th e open-air setting was consistent 
 129  Claerr-Stamm, above n 29, 171.    130  Claerr-Stamm, above n 29, 171. 
 131  Heimpel, above n 123, 345.    132  Von Rodt, above n 120, 223. 
 133  Heimpel, above n 123, 338.    134  Schwarzenberger, above n 16, 463. 
 135  Schwarzenberger, above n 16, 463. 
 136  Claerr-Stamm, above n 29, 175; Kirk, above n 42, 494.    137  Vaughan, above n 2, 285. 
 138  Heimpel, above n 123, 325. 
 139  Schwarzenberger, above n 16, 463.    140  Claerr-Stamm, above n 29, 175. 
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with an old Germanic judicial custom that was still observed at the time. 141 Th omas 
Schutz, the chief magistrate of Ensisheim, was designated as the tribunal’s presid-
ing judge. 142 Th e nominal trial prosecutor was Sigismund’s new Alsatian bailiff —
Hermann von Eptingen. 143 Eptingen, for his part, chose Heinrich Iselin, one of the 
commissioners from Basel, 144 to present the prosecution’s case to the court. 145 Th e 
other representative from Basel, Hans Irmy, took on Hagenbach’s representation. 146 
 Th e proceedings began with the presiding judge requesting the prosecution to 
make its opening statement. 147 According to most accounts, Iselin began dramatically 
by explaining to the tribunal that Hagenbach had ‘trampled under foot the laws of 
God and man’. 148 He then read the indictment, consisting of four counts: 
 1.  Murder in relation to the 1473 beheading of the four Th ann citizens 
without any validly rendered judgment in violation of imperial law; 149 
 2.  Perjury in relation to Hagenbach’s oath to uphold the laws of Breisach, which 
he violated by restructuring certain governmental offi  ces, stripping certain 
government representatives of their power, illegally quartering soldiers in 
homes, pillaging and plundering property, and imposing onerous taxes on 
the town’s citizens; 
 3.  Conspiracy to commit murder in relation to the supposed plot to expel and 
exterminate the citizens of Breisach; 150 
 4.  Rape of numerous women and girls in the region, including nuns. 151 
 141  Claerr-Stamm, above n 29, 175.    142  Claerr-Stamm, above n 29, 175. 
 143  Heimpel, above n 123, 324–5.    144  Kirk, above n 42, 435. 
 145  Claerr-Stamm, above n 29, 175.    146  Claerr-Stamm, above n 29, 175. 
 147  Heimpel, above n 123, 325. 
 148  Schwarzenberger, above n 16, 465. Heimpel disputes that Iselin used the expression ‘trampled 
under foot the laws of God and man’. See Heimpel, above n 5, 450 n 1 (‘I fi nd nowhere that the pros-
ecutor said: [in English from newspaper article] “Hagenbach’s deeds outraged all notions of human-
ity and justice and constituted crimes under national law” [in German] and that he [in English] 
“trampled under foot the laws of God and men and had committed what would be called today 
crimes against humanity” ’). On the other hand, French historian Prosper de Barante and British 
historian John Foster Kirk support Schwarzenberger’s account of Iselin’s opening statement regard-
ing Hagenbach’s trampling ‘under foot the laws of God and men’. See Barante, above n 40, vol 9, 15 
(‘Pierre de Hagenbach, chevalier, maître d’hôtel de monseigneur le duc de Bourgogne, et son gou-
verneur dans les pays de Ferrette et Haute-Alsace, aurait dû respecter les privilèges réservés par l’acte 
d’engagement; mais il n’a pas moins  foulé aux pieds les lois de Dieu et des hommes que les droits jurés et 
guarantis au pays.’ [emphasis added]); Kirk, above n 42, 435 (‘the accuser demanded that Hagenbach 
should be adjudged worthy of death, as a murderer, perjurer, and a general  transgressor of the laws both 
of God and men .’ [emphasis added]). 
 149  Vaughan noted that the beheadings were in response to an alleged uprising in Th ann against the 
Duke of Burgundy on 3 July 1473. See Vaughan, above n 2, 285. 
 150  Th e indictment appears not to have used the term ‘conspiracy’ but this was the gist of the charge. 
 151  Kirk, above n 42, 494–5; Claerr-Stamm, above n 29, 177; Vaughan, above n 2, 285. For the 
fourth count of the indictment, the historians do not actually use the word ‘rape’ in describing 
Hagenbach’s transgressions with women in the region. Still, that appears to be the clear import of the 
charge. See Von Rodt, above n 120, 224–5 (‘noting that Hagenbach violently mishandled honourable 
women, including virgins and nuns.’). Claerr-Stamm also points out that all the charged conduct 
was of relatively recent vintage (within the previous year) and did not cover most of the period of 
Hagenbach’s governorship. 
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 Given these charges, the prosecutor notifi ed the tribunal that he would be seeking 
a death sentence. 152 
 Hagenbach’s counsel, Hans Irmy, then gave his opening statement. He began by 
challenging the jurisdiction of the tribunal. He argued forcefully that ‘the Tribunal 
was not competent to decide this case’ because ‘only the Duke of Burgundy could 
be [Hagenbach’s] judge and his superior’. 153 Th e tribunal rejected the jurisdictional 
challenge and found that it was competent to sit in judgment of Hagenbach for 
the crimes charged. 154 
 Th e prosecution then put on its case-in-chief, which consisted of the testimony 
of six witnesses who had heard Hagenbach’s confession to the crimes charged. 155 
After this, Hagenbach asked for a recess and requested that two additional attorneys 
be added to his defence team. Th e tribunal then assigned to the Hagenbach team 
one representative each from Colmar and Sélestat. 156 After Hagenbach conferred 
with his attorneys, the defence put on its case, which consisted of the following 
arguments: 
 1.  Regarding the execution of the Th ann citizens, they had tried to rise up 
in rebellion to Burgundian rule and were executed pursuant to the Duke’s 
orders with the consent of the Holy Roman Emperor; 
 2.  He acknowledged he swore to respect the Breisach citizens’ rights but they 
subsequently swore a new oath of allegiance to the Duke which had the eff ect 
of overriding Hagenbach’s pledge regarding previously existing rights—the 
actions he took after the Breisachers swore their new oath of allegiance was 
pursuant to orders from the Duke; 
 3.  Regarding the quartering of troops, that was again pursuant to the Duke’s 
order—Hagenbach does not seem to have directly answered the charge that 
he planned to deport and exterminate the Breisachers; 
 4.  As to the charge of rape, Hagenbach responded that his accusers were just as 
guilty as he was of that crime and that he never actually committed violence 
against the women in question—he paid to have consensual sex with them. 157 
 Given that all of Hagenbach’s conduct was at the behest of and under the aegis 
of the Duke, his attorneys renewed their motion to dismiss on jurisdictional 
grounds—only the Duke could sit in judgment of his servant. 158 In the words of 
defence counsel Hans Irmy:
 Sir Peter von Hagenbach does not recognise any other judge and master but the Duke of 
Burgundy from whom he had received his commission and his orders. He had no right to 
question the orders which he was charged to carry out, and it was his duty to obey. Is it not 
known that soldiers owe absolute obedience to their superiors? Does anyone believe that 
the Duke’s  Landvogt could have remonstrated with his master or have refused to carry out 
 152  Claerr-Stamm, above n 29, 177.    153  Von Rodt, above n 120, 224. 
 154  Th ere is no indication that the tribunal elaborated or provided specifi c reasons for its rejection of 
Hagenbach’s jurisdictional challenge. 
 155  Von Rodt, above n 120, 225.    156  Claerr-Stamm, above n 29, 177. 
 157  Claerr-Stamm, 177–80, n 29.    158  Claerr-Stamm, 180, n 29. 
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the Duke’s orders? Had not the Duke by his presence subsequently confi rmed and ratifi ed 
all that had been done in his name? 159 
 After presentation of the defence, the motion appears to have held more sway. 160 
Remarkably, the judges seem to have recognized that it was a close call. So persuasive 
must the defence argument have been that prosecution attorney Heinrich Iselin 
actually made a motion to withdraw the charges. 161 
 In response, a new attorney for the prosecution, Hildebrand Rasp, was appointed 
and he reasserted the charges of the indictment, arguing as well that Hagenbach 
confessed to many other crimes that were not even charged. 162 Th e defence responded 
that such admissions were invalid as they were the product of torture. Rasp’s dubious 
retort: the admissions were made when Hagenbach was not actually on the rack so 
they were made freely. 163 Several new witnesses were then called to testify and they 
corroborated that Hagenbach did not make the confessions during torture. 164 
 Nevertheless, Rasp advanced an alternative argument. Even if the confessions 
were deemed tainted, Hagenbach had committed the crime of  lèse-majesté . In other 
words, by testifying that Charles and the Holy Roman Emperor had ordered 
conduct by Hagenbach that was manifestly in violation of the law, he slandered these 
leaders. 165 It was not possible, he concluded, that they could have given Hagenbach 
such orders. 166 
 Hagenbach’s defence counsel Hans Irmy then called for an adjournment of the 
trial. 167 He wanted time to serve the Duke of Burgundy with interrogatories asking 
whether, in fact, he had given Hagenbach the orders as asserted by the defence. 168 
In the annals of the law, this was a watershed moment. If the judges had granted 
the continuance motion and sought to verify the factual accuracy of Hagenbach’s 
testimony regarding the Duke’s directives, the defence of obeying superior orders 
would have been implicitly reaffi  rmed. Instead, the Tribunal made history. It found 
an adjournment unnecessary. 169 Even if Hagenbach had received orders to commit 
the charged conduct, he should have known such orders were patently illegal. 170 
 Th e parties having rested their cases, the Tribunal retired and deliberated for some 
time. According to Charles Nerlinger:
 Th e President of the tribunal then addressed the judges and asked if they found Peter von 
Hagenbach guilty. Th e judge representing Strasbourg, Peter Schott, rose and asked that 
 159  Schwarzenberger, above n 16, 465.    160  Schwarzenberger, above n 16, 465. 
 161  Schwarzenberger, above n 16, 465.    162  Schwarzenberger, above n 16, 465. 
 163  Heimpel, above n 5, 331. Of course, that does not touch on the fact that any such additional 
criminal conduct was not even charged. 
 164  Kirk, above n 42, 498. 
 165  Claerr-Stamm, above n 29, 180. Th e crime of  lèse-majesté consists of aff ronting the dignity of the 
monarchy. See  Frank  Munger ,  ‘Globalisation, Investing in Law, and the Careers of Lawyers for Social 
Causes: Taking on Rights in Th ailand’ ,  New York Law School Review ,  53 ( 2008–09 ),  770 , n 109 (‘Th e 
critical element is an aff ront to the monarchy, usually through speech, rather than the veracity of the 
representation. Th e crime has long since ceased to be meaningful in Europe, but continues to play a 
role in Th ai politics.’). 
 166  Claerr-Stamm, above n 29, 180.    167  Claerr-Stamm, above n 29, 180. 
 168  Claerr-Stamm, above n 29, 180.    169  Schwarzenberger, above n 16, 466. 
 170  Schwarzenberger, above n 16, 466. 
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he and the other judges be allowed to retire and deliberate on the weighty issue they were 
asked to resolve. Th ey remained for a long period in deliberations, more than one of them 
undoubtedly aware that his sense of confi dence regarding the bailiff ’s guilt had been shaken. 
Finally, they returned and in hushed silence they declared slowly, one after the other, that 
Peter von Hagenbach was guilty and sentenced him to death. 171 
 According to John Foster Kirk, a herald advanced and, standing in front of Hagenbach, 
declared his degradation from the order of the Knights of St George’s Shield. 172 
‘Another functionary followed, who, with a glove of mail, struck him a blow upon 
the right cheek.’ 173 
 (iii)  Th e execution 
 Th e Tribunal had not specifi ed in what manner the sentence would be carried out. 
Th e judges permitted Hagenbach to be heard on this issue. Given that the manner 
of his execution would likely shape the way posterity viewed his legacy, the heretofore 
stoic  Landvogt suddenly became emotional:
 [Th e prisoner] lost, for the fi rst time, the fi rmness and composure which he had manifested 
throughout the day, and which had been rendered the more conspicuous by the contrasted 
spectacle of his enfeebled and emaciated frame. His head sank upon his chest. His red eyes, 
instead of their customary fl ashes of menace and derision, sent forth from their deep recesses 
a glance of timid supplication. ‘Have pity’, he whispered, ‘and execute me with the sword!’ 
Strange to say, the appeal was not disregarded. Each member of the court, as he was called upon 
by name, gave his voice that Hagenbach should die by the sword. 174 
 Hans Irmy, for his part, fought hard for his client to the last. He renewed his motion 
to adjourn the proceedings to seek verifi cation from the Duke that he had given his 
bailiff  the supposed orders that gave rise to the charged crimes. 175 Th is fi nal appeal 
was rejected. 176 It was 4 pm and the trial was over. 177 
 Preparations were then made for the execution. Th e judges rode on horseback 
at the head of a long, torch-illuminated procession toward a fi eld just outside of 
town. 178 Th e condemned man was marched on foot at the centre of the cavalcade, a 
confessor holding a crucifi x before his eyes as he strode beside him. 179 Apparently, the 
role of executioner was quite coveted and seven headsmen (from as many diff erent 
towns) vied for the privilege. 180 Th e honour was ultimately bestowed on Colmar’s 
offi  cial, a ‘short man with a short sword’. 181 
 On the scaff old, Hagenbach made his last public announcement:
 I am not concerned about my life; I have risked it enough on the fi eld of battle. But I lament 
that the blood of many an honest man should be shed on my account. For assuredly my noble 
master, the Duke of Burgundy, will not suff er this deed to go unavenged. I regret neither my 
life nor my body: I ask only that you forgive me for having done what I have been sentenced 
 171  Nerlinger, above n 43, 131.    172  Kirk, above n 42, 499.    173  Kirk, above n 42, 499. 
 174  Kirk, above n 42, 499.    175  Kirk, above n 42, 499–500. 
 176  Kirk, above n 42, 499–500.    177  Claerr-Stamm, above n 29, 182. 
 178  Kirk, above n 42, 500.    179  Kirk, above n 42, 500.    180  Kirk, above n 42, 500. 
 181  Kirk, above n 42, 500. 
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for and for other things even worse than that. Th ose of you for whom I served as governor for 
four years, please forgive what I have done through lack of wisdom or through malice. I was 
only human. Please pray for me. 182 
 Th e disgraced knight then bequeathed his gold chain and sixteen horses to a 
religious house in Breisach. He asked that this provision be honoured by the prof-
ligate Sigismund. His hands were then tied, he genufl ected, said another short 
prayer and fi nally placed his head on the block. Th e executioner’s blade then sliced 
through the air and found its mark. Five years to the day after Charles the Bold 
signed the treaty of St Omer, Burgundy was offi  cially expelled from the Sundgau 
and its governor was dead. 
 (d)  Th e aftermath 
 Kirk reports that, when hearing of Hagenbach’s execution, the Duke of Burgundy 
‘fell into a paroxysm of rage’. 183 Nevertheless, he failed to take immediate action. 184 By 
summer, though, he was ready for reprisal measures. In August, Burgundian troops, 
led by Peter’s brother Stefan von Hagenbach, conducted a raid in the Sundgau region 
wherein they looted, pillaged and burnt everything in their path. 185 Th ey murdered 
and displaced a large number of Alsatian residents and took children to be sold and 
enslaved. 186 
 Th is incursion might be considered the opening salvo in a protracted confl ict 
between Charles the Bold and the League of Constance, known to history as the 
‘Burgundian Wars’. 187 Th e hostilities culminated in three decisive battles. Th e Duke 
of Burgundy drove into modern-day Switzerland but his forces were defeated by 
Confederate troops at the Battle of Grandson in March 1476. 188 Within three 
months, Charles the Bold had gathered a new army and marched yet again into 
Swiss territory. But he would lose once more in the June 1476 Battle of Morat. 189 
Finally, in January 1477, Swiss troops fi ghting with an army of the Duke of 
Lorraine beat Charles in the Battle of Nancy, the war’s decisive engagement. 190 
Charles himself had taken the battlefi eld with his troops outside the walls of Nancy 
and his badly mutilated body was found in a ditch three days after the defeat. 191 
Such was the fate of the last of the Valois Dukes of Burgundy. 
 When Charles the Bold died in battle without sons, Louis XI declared the Duchy 
extinct, and he absorbed into the French crown its territorial portion lying in modern- 
day France. 192 Th e Burgundian Low Countries possessions were ultimately trans-
ferred to the Habsburgs (via the marriage of Charles the Bold’s daughter, Mary, 
 182  Claerr-Stamm, above n 29, 186.    183  Kirk, above n 42, 502. 
 184  Kirk, above n 42, 503–4.    185  Vaughan, above n 2, 285. 
 186  Kirk, above n 42, 505–6. 
 187  Nicholas A.  Hooper ,  Th e Cambridge Illustrated Atlas of Warfare:  Th e Middle Ages, 768–1487 
( Cambridge :  Cambridge University Press,  1996 ),  150 . 
 188  Vaughan, above n 2, 375–8.    189  Vaughan, above n 2, 390–5. 
 190  Vaughan, above n 2, 429–32.    191  Vaughan, above n 2, 432. 
 192  George  Ripley and  Charles Anderson  Dana ,  Th e American Cyclopaedia: A Popular Dictionary of 
General Knowledge ( New York, NY :  D. Appleton ,  1873 ),  451 . 
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to Archduke Maximilian of Austria). 193 Th is gave rise to two centuries of hostilities 
between France and the Habsburgs (Spain/Austria) over possession of these 
lands. 194 And two major confl agrations followed—the Th irty Years War and the War 
of the Spanish Succession. 195 
 (IV)  Final Analysis 
 (1)  Who was Peter von Hagenbach? 
 In life, Peter von Hagenbach played a signifi cant role in bringing about the fall of the 
House of Burgundy, which ultimately led to a seismic realignment of the European 
balance of power. 196 In death, he has traditionally been portrayed as evil incarnate 
and the subject of the world’s fi rst international atrocity trial. But is his infamy 
deserved? And should his legacy take on such mythic proportions? As with most 
matters related to Hagenbach, it is hard to say with certainty. 
 But the traditional view seems more consistent with the available evidence. Th at 
said, a reasonable argument can be made that any insights into Hagenbach’s 
character and actions during his time as bailiff  must be parsed sequentially. Put 
another way, the Hagenbach of 1469 was not the Hagenbach of 1474. Revisionist 
historians have emphasized the relative dearth of bad press for Hagenbach during 
the fi rst years of his Alsatian administration. And that makes sense. At the beginning 
of the relationship between Hagenbach and the Duke’s new subjects, everyone was 
apparently on his best behaviour (and during that early period, Hagenbach was 
often away from Alsace still engaging in military service for the Duke). 197 
 But over time, the local citizenry grew weary of Hagenbach’s insults, his aristocratic 
animosity towards townspeople and the bourgeoisie, his boorish behaviour, and his 
use of progressively more strong-arm tactics to raise revenue and exert control over 
the region for Burgundy. And it did not help that he was perceived as linguistically 
and culturally foreign—a feudally-oriented francophone in a germanophone region 
then developing a merchant class and trending toward urbanization. By 1473–74, 
uneasy relations between a restive population and its by now desperate bailiff  dete-
riorated to such a degree that Hagenbach was arrested, tried and executed. 
 Revisionist historians also point out that Hagenbach was attempting to enact 
administrative reforms to help modernize the region and make it run more effi  ciently. 
But for that he needed the proper personnel and material. Revisionists contend 
that, in large part, Charles the Bold’s failure to provide him with that is what led 
 193  Carlos  Ramirez-Faria ,  Concise Encyclopaedia of World History ( New Delhi :  Atlantic Publishers and 
Distributors  2007 ),  683 . 
 194  Encyclopaedia Britannica , ‘House of Habsburg’ (11th edn, 1910), vol 12, 789. 
 195  Encyclopaedia Britannica , above n 194, 789. 
 196  See Vaughan, above n 2, 255 (‘the course of events and with it the entire destiny of Charles the 
Bold and of Burgundy was decisively aff ected by the attitudes and antics of Peter von Hagenbach 
[who] made a [great] impact on history.’). 
 197  See Claerr-Stamm, above n 29, 112. 
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to his lieutenant’s downfall. Th e old guard, on the other hand, believed fi rmly that 
Hagenbach’s own follies, namely his tyrannical, capricious and violent methods, 
precipitated his demise. 
 But these superfi cially competing explanations can perhaps be reconciled. Th e 
Duke’s fi nancial and logistical support of Hagenbach’s administration was indeed 
lacking. But that does not tell the whole story. With few resources at his disposal, 
Hagenbach may have chosen to fulfi l his duties in a progressively violent and arbi-
trary manner so as to rule more eff ectively by fear. He did not have the personnel 
necessary to quell an increasingly restive population—perhaps terror was used to 
compensate for this. 
 Consistent with this view, as resources were choked off  even further during the 
fi nal months of his satrapy, Hagenbach’s intimidation tactics escalated until spiral-
ling out of control in 1474. Th e historical record permits such an inference. Th e 
bulk of specifi c allegations against the Burgundian bailiff  are from his fi nal year in 
power. It would make sense then, that the charges lodged against him at trial were 
related to conduct of recent vintage. Seen in this light, we can understand that the 
citizens of the Upper Rhine were at fi rst only berated, taxed and put upon. Th ey 
were likely terrorized and violated only toward the end. In the words of historian 
Ruth Putnam: ‘It is in this period of Hagenbach’s life that the stories of gross excess 
are told . . . his personal passions . . . were permitted to run riot and he spared no 
wife nor maid to whom he took a fancy’. 198 
 What evidence supports the view that the good burghers of Alsace were the 
victims of Sir Peter’s violence? Th eir treatment of the wayward knight after his 
arrest is most revealing in this regard. While torture may have been commonplace 
in ordinary criminal inquisitions of the time, 199 the severity of torment infl icted 
leads one to believe it was inspired by and directed at the kind of mass, depraved 
criminality of which Hagenbach has traditionally been accused. 200 Signifi cantly, in 
this regard, in addition to enduring horrifi c torture, he was stripped of his knight-
hood. Degradation of knighthood was exceedingly rare in the Middle Ages and 
reserved only for the most extreme and infamous crimes. 201 
 And there is other evidence to suggest Hagenbach’s culpability for atrocities. 
Most telling perhaps is the trial record itself. Hans Irmy, it must be remembered, 
mounted a valiant and spirited defence to the very end. And yet the record does 
not reveal his even attempting to refute the charge that Hagenbach planned to 
 198  Ruth  Putnam  Charles the Bold, Last Duke of Burgundy ( New York, NY :  G.P. Putnam’s Sons,  1908 ), 
 380 . As mentioned previously, rape, as opposed to murder, appears to have been Hagenbach’s pre-
ferred weapon of terror and atrocity. 
 199  See  Rinat  Kitai-Sangero ,  ‘Detention for the Purpose of Interrogation as Modern “Torture” ’ , 
 University of Detroit Mercy School of Law Review ,  85 ( 2008 ),  156 . 
 200  On the other hand, it would appear the torture ended once Hagenbach ‘confessed’ to his crimes. 
 201  See Th e Caputo Family Association, ‘Knighthood and Noble Titles’,  Noble Dynasty [website], 
< http://www.nobledynasty.com/knighthoodandnobletitles.htm > (accessed 28 February 2013)  (‘In 
extreme cases . . . a knight . . . could lose his honour by formal degradation—a public ceremony in 
which his accoutrements were taken from him.’); Jeri Westerson, ‘Degradation of Knighthood’, 
 Getting Medieval [blog], < http://www.getting medieval.com > (accessed 28 February 2013) (‘It’s some-
thing in the history of chivalry that doesn’t often come up’). 
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exterminate the citizens of Breisach 202 or that he murdered the four petitioning 
residents of Th ann. At most, he off ered the rejected defence of superior orders. Nor 
did Irmy (or Hagenbach, for that matter), directly deny the rape charges (merely 
objecting that taking women in this fashion was common practice and/or he had 
paid for services rendered). 203 
 Did Hagenbach slaughter thousands of innocent civilians in concentrated liqui-
dation campaigns? Th ere is no evidence to suggest he did—he was not a fi fteenth- 
century proto-Nazi. But the record suggests that he terrorized the local population by 
murdering civilians, raping numerous women and conspiring to commit a large-scale 
massacre in Breisach. It should be noted that the rape charges are the most persuasive 
as there are numerous examples and they were never directly refuted. 
 And Hagenbach’s backstory further validates this view of him. He was the product 
of a Burgundian ducal culture that was steeped in and glorifi ed violence—the 
refl ection of its bellicose chief, Charles the Bold (known to his enemies as Charles 
the Terrible). 204 Th e duchy was in almost a permanent state of war with one enemy 
or another during Charles’s reign. 205 Charles the Bold’s Burgundy was in the 
practice of laying siege to towns and routinely killing civilians who resisted—Liège, 
Dinant, Neuss—all were subjected to horrifi c violence by Burgundian troops and 
Hagenbach played a leading role in the fi rst two. 206 And within that violent culture, 
Hagenbach was Charles’s fi ercest, most loyal lieutenant. In that regard, Sir Peter’s 
steadfast reliance on superior orders at trial speaks volumes. 
 And it is not to be overlooked that a criminal disposition was apparent even 
before Hagenbach cast his lot with Charles the Bold. Th e reported kidnapping of 
Marquard Baldeck, the Swiss banker for whom Hagenbach demanded ransom, 
is telling in that regard. Hagenbach also seems to have fabricated a murder plot 
 202  Émile Toutey provides a plausible explanation for why Hagenbach would have wanted to murder 
the citizens of Breisach. Hagenbach was aware of other towns that had plotted to kill him during 
the previous year and, when requesting entry to create defensive fortifi cations in anticipation of an 
attack by the League of Constance, he had already been denied admittance with his troops into Th ann 
and Ensisheim. He was only able to gain entry into Breisach because his mercenaries were already 
there. Given the animosity shown him in these other towns and the previous conspiracy to kill him, 
Hagenbach did not want to take any chances. Killing Breisach’s citizens would have permitted him to 
use the town as a defensive fortifi cation without the risk of an uprising from its citizens.  Émile Paul 
 Toutey ,  Charles Le Temeraire et La Ligue De Constance ( Paris :  Hachette ,  1902 ),  136–7 . 
 203  It seems quite implausible to accept that women of the cloth, supposedly among Hagenbach’s 
victims, would have accepted payment for sexual services. 
 204  See Hugh Chisolm,  Encyclopaedia Britannica (1910), 824 (describing Charles as ‘violent, 
pugnacious . . . treacherous’). 
 205  See  Bruce D.  Porter ,  War and the Rise of the State ( New York, NY :  Free Press,  2000 ),  29 . (‘Charles the 
Bold . . . waged a decade-long war (1467–77) aimed at carving out a separate Burgundian Kingdom.’). 
 206  ‘Dinant Travel Guide’,  Eupedia  [website], < http://www.eupedia.com/belgium/dinant.shtml > 
(accessed 28 February 2013) (describing the siege as ‘the darkest moment in local history’ wherein the 
‘city was completely pillaged and burnt down’);  Mark  Twain ,  Personal Recollections of Joan of Arc ( San 
Francisco, CA :  Ignatius Press,  1989 ) (recounting the ‘unspeakable atrocities which Charles the Bold 
infl icted upon the men and women and children of Dinant’); Vaughan, above n 2, 40 (explaining 
that Charles the Bold ‘sacked Dinant and demolished Liège’);  Nicholas  Michael ,  Armies of Medieval 
Burgundy 1364–1477 ( Oxford :   Osprey Publishing,  1983 ) (detailing that at the halfway point of a 
year-long siege, ‘the gates of Neuss had been reduced to rubble by Charles’s 229 guns [and] everything 
down to the last rat had been eaten’). 
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against Charles the Bold, which he falsely pinned on a court rival to have him 
eliminated. 207 
 Add to this Hagenbach’s contempt for the emerging bourgeoisie and townspeople, 
as well as a deep animosity toward the Swiss, and his stewardship of the Upper 
Rhine represented the perfect storm. By 1474, he had indeed become the scourge 
of the Sundgau. In this regard, it is interesting to note Burgundy expert Richard 
Vaughan’s insight that, in fact, it may have been Hagenbach driving policy and 
tactics in Charles’s Alsatian territory, not the other way around:
 Many of Hagenbach’s activities were undertaken at [Charles’s] express command, though 
often as a result of representations made to him by Hagenbach in the fi rst place. 
It is possible, for example, that Charles only agreed to sign the treaty of St Omer on 
Hagenbach’s persuasion. In the duke’s letters to Hagenbach of 8 August 1470 he orders 
him to undertake the siege and conquest of Ortenberg castle, ‘in accordance with your 
memorandum ( advertissement )’, which seems to imply that Charles was here acting on 
detailed advice to take Ortenberg sent him by Hagenbach. As to other mortgaged places, 
the bailiff  wrote to Charles describing how he had seized possession of Landser and seeking 
the duke’s approval, which was given on 6 January 1474 . . . . On 26 December 1470 he 
wrote congratulating Hagenbach on taking Ortenberg. 208 
 Finally, it should be pointed out that Hagenbach may be responsible for atrocities 
in the region, even if he did not personally commit or order them. In particu-
lar, the Picard and Wallon mercenaries he hired toward the end of his reign had 
a well-known reputation for being unruly, violent and hostile toward the local 
Alsatian population. 209 French historian Émile Paul Toutey, for example, describes 
Picard soldiers engaging in mass rape of Breisach’s women toward the very end 
of 1473. 210 Th ese troops may have acted on their own initiative but Hagenbach 
was their superior and, at the very least, he bore command responsibility for their 
actions. 
 (2)  Was the 1474 Breisach Proceeding history’s fi rst 
international war crimes trial? 
 Th ose who critique Georg Schwarzenberger’s conclusion that the Breisach 
Trial was Nuremberg’s precursor, spearheaded by German historian Heinrich 
Heimpel, 211 are supported in this view by two fairly straightforward and super-
fi cially compelling arguments: (1) the trial was not ‘international’ because those 
who sat in judgment of Hagenbach owed their allegiance to the same sovereign—
the Holy Roman Empire; and (2)  no war crimes were implicated as the ‘war’ 
between Burgundy and the League of Constance had not yet offi  cially begun. 
Looking at each of these points a little more carefully, however, tends to vindicate 
Schwarzenberger. 
 207  See Vaughan, above n 2, 255.    208  See Vaughan, above n 2, 99. 
 209  Toutey, above n 201, 102.    210  Toutey, above n 201, 101. 
 211  See Heimpel, above n 5, 449. 
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 (a)  An ‘international’ trial? 
 Nominally, the trial was presided over by a group of judges representing diff erent 
political entities (primarily city-states, such as Strasbourg and Basel) in the Upper 
Rhine region. Th e argument that the trial was not international in nature hinges 
on the assertion that each of the entities represented was incorporated into a larger 
political superstructure—the Holy Roman Empire, which had been founded by 
Charlemagne in the year 800. 212 But is this a credible claim? Many historians are 
of the view that, by the late Middle Ages, the Holy Roman Empire had ‘ceased to 
be an eff ective entity’. 213 In particular:
 [Consisting of ] more than 300 principalities . . . the Holy Roman Empire emerged from the 
Middle Ages a weak and fragmented entity. Even the fabled Hohenstaufen Emperors were 
unable to prevent the emerging sovereignty of territorial princes . . . . Aptly described by 
Voltaire as neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire, this historical atavism was moribund 
long before its fi nal dissolution. 214 
 In this sense, by 1474, perhaps it is more accurate to describe the Holy Roman 
Empire as something more akin to an intergovernmental organization with hundreds 
of independent member states. Could it be rightly compared, for example, to the 
modern Commonwealth of Nations, which consists of sovereign states that were 
formerly part of the British Empire? 215 If so, the men who sat in judgment of Peter 
von Hagenbach clearly represented sovereign entities, not imperial subjects. 
 On the other hand, it must be pointed out that the murder charges were based 
on ‘imperial law’. Th at indicates the Holy Roman Empire may have been a bit 
more than the modern equivalent of the British Commonwealth. Might it look 
more like the European Union, for example? Even if that is the case, it does 
not necessarily diminish the sovereign status of the political entities represented 
at Breisach that day. To analogize in modern terms, an ad hoc tribunal using 
European Union law to resolve an issue—but not convened by or operating 
explicitly under the authority of the European Union—would not signify that the 
individual European states participating in the tribunal (France and Germany, for 
example) had lost their sovereignty. In this regard, it cannot be ignored that the 
Tribunal was convened by Sigismund, the Archduke of Austria, not by Emperor 
Frederick III. 216 
 212  See, eg, Heimpel, above n 5, 449. 
 213  Tony  Allan et  al,  World and Its Peoples, Germany and Switzerland ( Tarrytown, NY :   Marshall 
Cavendish Reference,  2009 ),  318 . 
 214  Roderick  Stackelberg ,  Hitler’s Germany:  Origins, Interpretations, Legacies ( London :   Routledge, 
 1999 ),  26 . 
 215  See ‘Profi le:  Th e Commonwealth’,  BBC:  News [website], < http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
europe/country_profi les/1554175.stm > (accessed 28 February 2013). In fact, two members of the 
Commonwealth were not formerly part of the British Empire—Mozambique and Rwanda. 
 216  As Heimpel points out, ‘[t] he staffi  ng of the court was noble-Austrian’: above n 5, 446. 
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 (b)  A ‘war crimes’ trial? 
 Regardless of its international nature, the other key issue is whether the Hagenbach 
inquest can be properly characterized as a ‘war crimes’ trial. Telford Taylor summarized 
the argument against calling it a war crimes trial in his  Ministries Case opening 
statement: ‘Th e acts of which he was accused were not committed during actual 
hostilities or in time of war and, therefore, under our modern terminology would 
be akin more to crimes against humanity than to war crimes.’ 217 But Taylor’s statement 
may be erroneous on both factual and legal grounds. 
 First, from a factual perspective, by April 1474 a state of hostilities did arguably 
exist between the Duchy of Burgundy and the League of Constance principalities 
and city-states. Th e League was formed in March 1474 with the primary purpose 
of expelling Burgundy from the region. Not coincidentally, at about the same 
time, Hagenbach took up fortifi cations in Breisach and prepared for an attack—
he knew a state of hostilities existed. Indeed, House of Valois expert Richard 
Vaughan concludes that there was an ‘authentic armed revolt against Charles the 
Bold [in] Alsace in April 1474’. 218 
 Second, from a legal perspective, even assuming Burgundy was not offi  cially at 
war with the League by April 1474, it is still arguable, under modern conceptions 
of the law of war, that Hagenbach engaged in war crimes. According to law of 
war expert Yoram Dinstein, ‘belligerent occupation may be carried out without 
any hostilities either preceding or following it’. 219 Dinstein then elaborates: ‘If the 
occupation of the territory of State A (in whole or in part) by State B is suff used 
with coercion, the occupation is belligerent and the relationship between States 
A and B shifts from peace to war (even in the absence of hostilities.)’ 220 
 In the case of the Burgundian occupation of Alsace, it had clearly turned coercive 
during the fi rst part of 1474. In the fi rst place, funded by the League of Constance, 
Sigismund had paid off  his debt and he and his League allies sought to reclaim 
the Alsatian lands held by Charles the Bold as collateral pursuant to the Treaty of 
St Omer. Consistent with this, Sigismund appointed a new bailiff  for the region, 
Herman Eptingen. Th e population’s entreaties to Charles the Bold to remove 
Hagenbach had fallen on deaf ears and Hagenbach clearly perceived rebellion in 
his midst during those fi nal months of service to the Duke. In addition to the 
defensive fortifi cations at Breisach, Hagenbach’s claim he extra-judicially killed the 
citizens of Th ann on grounds of rebellion attests to this. 
 Nevertheless, in the absence of a more detailed bill of particulars, we cannot 
know with certainty which of Hagenbach’s charged crimes took place during this 
period of coercion. In fact, it is diffi  cult to identify the precise date on which the 
occupation could be safely described as ‘coercive’. Nor is it clear whether a coercive 
occupation in 1474 existed in the same manner and degree in each of the Alsatian 
 217  US v Ernst von Weizsaecker  above n 14, 96–7. 
 218  Vaughan, above n 2, 403. 
 219  Yoram  Dinstein ,  Th e International Law of Belligerent Occupation ( Cambridge :   Cambridge 
University Press,  2009 ),  31 . 
 220  Dinstein, above n 219, 35. 
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territories occupied by Charles the Bold where any of Hagenbach’s charged crimes 
may have occurred. And so, as is true with so much else in this case, no defi nitive 
conclusions are possible. 
 (3)  Crimes against humanity? 
 But perhaps it is well to reconsider Telford Taylor’s analysis that Hagenbach was 
charged and convicted of misdeeds akin to the modern formulation of crimes 
against humanity. For ICL purposes, along with the rejection of the superior orders 
defence, this could be the trial’s most signifi cant legacy. Modern experts routinely 
quote prosecutor Heinrich Iselin’s opening charge that Hagenbach had ‘trampled 
under foot the laws of God and man’. But where is that supported in the histori-
cal record? Heinrich Heimpel contends it is nowhere to be found in the original 
source materials. 221 Of the non-contemporaneous historians, Prosper de Barante 
appears to be the earliest quoted source of Iselin’s most famous words. And from 
that source, succeeding generations of historians have quoted one another, in echo 
chamber fashion, as support for Iselin’s weighty utterance. But what exactly are the 
words used in Barante’s treatise? Th e relevant passage follows:
 On 4 May 1474 [Hagenbach] was . . . brought before his judges on Breisach’s town 
square . . . Henrich Iselin, of Basel, then addressed the court as Herman Eptingen’s representa-
tive, acting on behalf of Duke Sigismund and the country. He spoke  more or less in these terms: 
‘Peter von Hagenbach, knight, chief steward of his lord the Duke of Burgundy, and the Duke’s 
governor in the territory of Ferrette and Upper Alsace, should have respected the privileges he 
swore to protect when taking his oath of offi  ce; but not only did he violate the rights pledged 
and guaranteed in this country, he  trampled under foot the laws of God and man .’ 222 
 And where exactly did Barante himself fi nd evidence of Iselin’s peroration? 
Barante’s treatise off ers no clues—there is no specifi c citation in support of the text 
(or approximate text). Consistent with Heimpel’s conclusion, my research has not 
unearthed reports of that exact language in contemporaneous accounts. 223 Th ere 
are hints of it, however, in the journal of Basel’s diarist Johannes Knebel, the most 
frequently quoted contemporary chronicler (and, according to historian Charles 
Nerlinger, ‘the most reliable source’). 224 For example, Knebel quotes Iselin in his 
 221  Heimpel, above n 5, 450 n 1. 
 222  Barante, above n 40, vol 9, 14–15 [emphasis added]—author’s translation. ‘More or less’ might 
also be translated as ‘approximately.’ Th e original French text reads as follows: ‘Pierre de Hagenbach, 
chevalier, maître d’hôtel de monseigneur le duc de Bourgogne, et son gouverneur dans les pays de 
Ferrette et Haute-Alsace, aurait dû respecter les privilèges réservés par l’acte d’engagement; mais il n’a 
pas moins  foulé aux pieds les lois de Dieu et des hommes que les droits jurés et guarantis au pays.’ 
 223  In addition to Knebel’s diary and the previously mentioned  Reimchronic (see above n 32), Richard 
Vaughan cites  Die Berner-Chronik by Schilling and  Die Strassburgische Chronik by Trausch. See 
Vaughan, above n 2, 262 n 1. Th e author has not read the latter two, which are not widely available 
and kept in locations not currently accessible to the author. Of course, it is possible Barante relied 
on the manuscripts of Schilling or Trausch but this seems unlikely given that he cites neither in his 
treatise. 
 224  Nerlinger, above n 43, 127 n 1. Some consider Knebel the sole source of reportage on the trial. 
John Foster Kirk refers to Knebel as ‘ the chronicler’. Kirk, above n 42, 494 [emphasis added]. 
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opening statement as follows:  ‘And after the tribunal was summoned, Heinrich 
Iselin . . . began to lay charges against Peter von Hagenbach . . . First, that in [1473], 
in [Th ann], he caused four citizens . . . to be decapitated without tribunal or justice, 
 and so had acted against the law of the divine emperors ’. 225 Knebel has Iselin go on 
to say:  ‘Also, he had overwhelmed by force and against their will many married 
women, maidens, even nuns . . . and had done the same things  against God, justice, 
and all honesty .’ 226 
 Th us, while Knebel’s Iselin quotations allude to Hagenbach’s acting ‘against 
the law of the divine emperors’ and ‘against God, justice, and all honesty’, with 
specifi c respect to the fi rst and fourth counts of the indictment, they do not have 
Iselin generally charging Hagenbach with ‘trampling under foot the laws of God 
and man’. 
 Th e discrepancies can perhaps be explained, though. First, according to Gabrielle 
Claerr-Stamm, Barante constructed his Hagenbach history, at least in part, rely-
ing on another old chronicle kept by a prominent architect of Strasbourg, Daniel 
Specklin. 227 Barante indicates in his book that Specklin’s manuscript was compiled 
based on the contemporaneous accounts of a certain M. Golbéry, an offi  cial of the 
Alsatian city-state of Colmar. 228 Unfortunately, the portion of the Specklin chroni-
cle dealing with Hagenbach (the entire year 1474, for that matter) was lost in a 
fi re after the Strasbourg library holding it was shelled in 1870 by German troops 
during the Franco–Prussian war. 229 As a result, it is quite possible that Barante’s 
rendering of the Iselin-opening derives from the missing portion of the Specklin 
manuscript (to which, for example, twentieth-century historian Heinrich Heimpel 
would not have had access). 
 Th ere may be yet another simple explanation. Barante essentially acknowledged 
that he was only paraphrasing Iselin (qualifying his reporting of Iselin’s words as 
‘approximate’ or ‘more or less’— à peu près in French). Given the admitted loose 
transcription, there is arguably enough consistent language in Knebel to reconcile 
 225  Knebel, above n 81, 86 [emphasis added]. Th e original Latin reads:  ‘Et judicio bannito cepit 
Heinricus Ysenlin nomine domini Hermanni de Eptingen balivi contra dominum Petrum de 
Hagenbach querulare et quatuor articulos contra eum proposuit: [1] primo: quod anno preterito, vide-
licet 73, in Tannis quatuor cives, probos et honestos viros, absque judicio et justicia fecisset decapitari, 
unde  contra legem divorum imperatorum fecisset.’ Scott Farrington translated the Latin into English. 
 226  Knebel, above n 81, 86–7 [emphasis added]. Th e Latin reads: ‘Multas eciam in civitate Brisacensi 
mulieres maritatas, virgines, eciam moniales vi oppressisset et contra ipsarum voluntatem, et similia 
non solum ibi, verum eciam in multis aliis opidis et villis  fecisset contra deum, justiciam et omnem hon-
estatem.’ As before, Scott Farrington translated the original Latin into English. 
 227  Claerr-Stamm, above n 29, 186 (‘Barante . . . relied on the chronicle of Daniel Specklin, which 
has disappeared’). 
 228  Barante, above n 40, vol 9, 405. 
 229  Claerr-Stamm, above n 29, 186. See also  Rodolphe  Reuss ,  Les Collectanées de Daniel Specklin, 
Chronique Strassbourgeoise du XVIème Siècle ( Strasbourg :   Librairie J.  Noiriel ,  1890 ) ; Georges 
Delahache, ‘La Cathédrale de Strasbourg:  Notice Historique et Archéologique (1910)’,  University 
of Toronto Libraries:  Internet Archive [website], < http://www.archive.org/stream/lacathdraledes00de-
lauoft/lacathdraledes00delauoft_djvu.txt > (accessed 28 February 2013) (‘Specklin left a manuscript 
that was partially destroyed in a fi re of the city’s library during the 1870 bombardment and that was 
published in retrievable fragments by Rod. Reuss’) (translated by the author). 
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the slightly diff erent language in Barante. In this regard, the notion that Barante 
was a less than careful historian is reinforced by an obvious mistake two sentences 
before the recounting of Iselin’s opening statement. In particular, Barante intro-
duced the section by informing readers that Sir Peter’s trial took place on ‘4 
May 1474’. 230 It is universally acknowledged that Sir Peter von Hagenbach was 
tried and executed on the  ninth of May 1474, not the fourth. Ironically, given 
its future impact on the development of international criminal law, a potentially 
minor transcription error in a Burgundian side-plot may be the most signifi -
cant legacy of Barante’s mammoth ten-tome history of the Burgundian House 
of Valois! 231 
 Even if we can chalk up Barante’s inadvertent proto-formulation of crimes against 
humanity (via Iselin) to a transcription error, Hagenbach was arguably guilty of 
our modern understanding of the off ence all the same. Th e Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court defi nes crimes against humanity as a series of heinous 
acts, such as murder or rape, committed as ‘part of a widespread or systematic 
attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack’. 232 
As with war crimes, legal analysts could quibble about exactly when Hagenbach 
committed various acts of murder, rape and other crimes in relation to a widespread 
 or systematic attack (or whether he had knowledge of the attack). But as most of 
the crimes charged at the Breisach Trial were committed in and around a period of 
hostility between Burgundy and the Alsatian polities, the requisite nexus between 
Hagenbach’s individual transgressions and a widespread  or systematic attack can 
likely be established. 233 Similarly, given that he was in charge of the forces engaging 
in the widespread or systematic attack, it is not a stretch to impute knowledge to 
him of any such attack. 
 230  Barante, above n 40, vol 9, 14. 
 231  Another possible source of the phraseology is suggested by historian Ruth Putnam. She explains 
that the anti-Burgundian alliance sent Emperor Frederick III a letter in August 1474 explaining why 
Sigismund had reasserted dominion over the mortgaged Alsatian territories. In particular, she recounts 
the letter informed the Emperor that Charles the Bold’s ‘appointed lieutenant had been peculiarly 
odious and had  broken the laws of God and men ’ (Putnam, above n 198, 394 [emphasis added]). To 
support this, Putnam cites to page 442 of the 1902 treatise  Charles le Téméraire et la ligue de Constance 
by French historian Émile Paul Toutey. But the cited language in French reads as follows: ‘Il a inquiété 
gravement les prêtres, dans leurs corps et dans leurs biens, honteusement outragé des femmes et des 
fi lles, fait passer de vie à trépas beacoup d’innocents,  contre Dieu et le droit , sans acun jugement.’ Émile 
Paul Toutey,  Charles le Téméraire et la ligue de Constance (Hachette, 1902) 442 [emphasis added]. Th e 
author translates this passage as follows: ‘He seriously harassed the priests, with respect to both their 
persons and possessions, shamefully off ended women and girls, and put to death many innocent per-
sons,  against God and the law , without judicial sanction.’ Putnam’s translation seems a stretch and the 
language quoted by Toutey is not even close to Barante’s formulation of ‘ les lois de Dieu et des hommes ’. 
Even if Putnam’s translation is accepted, it is quite possible that that letter’s authors were merely quot-
ing Iselin’s words at trial. 
 232  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 UNTS 3, opened for signature 17 July 
1998 (entered into force on 1 July 2002), Art. 7. 
 233  Given the widespread and systematic attack, Heimpel’s assertion that the trial involved only gar-
den variety charges of murder and rape is ill considered. See Heimpel, above n 5, 450. 
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 (V)  Conclusion 
 In illuminating the hidden history of the 1474 Breisach Trial, this chapter has 
attempted to identify and resolve certain vertical and horizontal dissonances in 
Hagenbach scholarship. With respect to the former, this has amounted to an exercise 
in historiographic and historical archaeology. Th e recent attention lavished on the 
case by ICL experts is informed by a cartoonish conception of the defendant—an 
ultra-violent, sexually depraved monster who ran amok for years along the Upper 
Rhine and terrorized its population. Consistent with that interpretation, the 
authorities who captured and tried him engaged in a righteous and visionary justice 
enterprise. Th ey came out on the winning side of a Manichean struggle that gave 
birth to ICL and ennobled its pedigree. 
 Digging deeper, though, one fi nds a very diff erent narrative developed initially 
by nineteenth-century historians and embraced by most of their twentieth-century 
confreres. Th ey saw Hagenbach as a would-be administrative reformer whose eff orts 
were thwarted by xenophobic subjects and a parsimonious superior. In trying to 
transform a fragmented archipelago of city-states into a cohesive governmental entity, 
Hagenbach was despised because he threatened an ingrained culture of seigneurial 
privilege and parochial complacency. In his eff orts to redeem property put in hock 
by Sigismund, he likely reinforced views of Burgundy as excessively acquisitive and 
bent on conquest (this was exacerbated by Charles’s own eff orts to accede to the 
imperial throne). And in levying taxes to pay for good government, Hagenbach 
stoked local fears of fi nancial servitude and ruin. But in doing the Duke’s bidding, 
he did not have the Duke’s support. So he was left to fl ounder, his undoing has-
tened by his admitted crass and prurient behaviour. Th ey point out that his trial, 
a marketplace spectacle based on torture-extracted confessions, was little more 
than drumhead justice. It was akin to executing Charles the Bold in effi  gy. Peter 
von Hagenbach may not have been the most adroit governor and perhaps he did 
manifest contempt for the rising merchant and urban classes. But, the revisionists 
would contend, his fi nal deserts were not just at all. 
 Digging deeper still, the bottom layer of historiography consists of the journalistic 
rough draft and the fi rst generations of historians that followed. It is largely consistent 
with the modern ICL expert view but without the larger historical perspective and 
legal focus. And it is more regionally tinged and archaic. Th is layer is at once more 
reliable, given its comtemporaneity or relative proximity, and less reliable, given 
the inherent biases of its initial chroniclers and the disproportionate infl uence they 
exerted on sixteenth- to eighteenth-century historians. 
 But this piece has demonstrated that each layer is not necessarily inconsistent 
with the others. In fact, there are many points of convergence. And it is there that 
a unifi ed, coherent narrative can be stitched together. Hagenbach  was coarse and 
confrontational. But he was also hardworking and loyal and wanted to do right 
by his master. His entire career had been built on pleasing Charles the Bold. He 
undoubtedly meant to reform and upgrade the administration of his Alsatian fi ef-
dom. And, consequently, resentment of the bailiff  grew over the years as he pushed 
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while the Alsatians pulled. Hostilities boiled over in 1473 and matters came to 
a head in 1474. Charles’s loyal lieutenant with a criminal past and odd sexual 
predilections felt increasingly boxed in and he eventually lashed out. Th e almost 
exclusive procedural focus of his defence at trial strongly supports accounts of the 
resulting crime spree. 
 It should also be noted that modern Hagenbach scholarship is characterized by 
a certain horizontal dissonance as well—between jurists and historians. Given the 
historical points of convergence just noted, however, these two schools ought to 
fi nd common ground too. Certain views of the revisionist historians concerning 
the Hagenbach judicial proceedings are not without merit. Th e Breisach ad hoc 
tribunal may not have been a kangaroo court but it bears no resemblance to the 
comparatively well-oiled machine of modern international criminal justice admin-
istration. Th e defendant was hideously tortured for days before the trial. He was 
given no notice of the charges or allegations against him in advance of the hearing. 
He had no time to speak with a lawyer before standing in front of the judges. Th e 
proceeding itself was held on a market square in a circus atmosphere and con-
cluded within a matter of hours. He was not able to call his most important (and 
only) witness to the stand—Charles the Bold. And there is no indication of a high 
burden of proof or that any such burden even rested with the prosecution. Th e 
Breisach Trial was certainly not the paragon of due process. 
 On the other hand, this was the late Middle Ages—centuries removed from our 
modern notions of due process. Torture was part of standard pre-trial procedure 
at that time. And the trial itself seems relatively fair for that era. Hagenbach was 
represented by a zealous advocate in Hans Irmy and he was given two additional 
lawyers of his choice. Th ere is as well a fl ip side to the ‘public spectacle’ aspect of his 
trial—transparency. Hagenbach could have been summarily condemned in front 
of a secretive Star Chamber but his trial was held in public (and that was consistent 
with local custom). He was able to confront witnesses called against him. He had 
twenty-eight fi nders of fact (compared to twelve in the modern jury system). And 
Charles the Bold, his sole designated witness, was not allowed to testify because 
the defence of superior orders was rejected  ab initio . As well, the proceedings lasted 
from early in the morning until late at night—which could equate to two or three 
modern court days. Th ere seems to have been signifi cant deliberation among the 
twenty-eight judges suggesting that a consensus was cobbled together after care-
fully sifting through the evidence. In an age of witch-hunts, trials by ordeal, the 
Star Chamber, and the Inquisition, this was an exceedingly fair trial. 
 And in many ways it seems inappropriate to use twenty-fi rst century ICL ter-
minology to analyse a fi fteenth-century judicial proceeding. But if that terminol-
ogy is used, this chapter has demonstrated that the Breisach Trial has many of the 
hallmarks of a modern international atrocity adjudication. As a threshold mat-
ter, regardless of anything else, it is the fi rst recorded case in history to reject the 
defence of superior orders. In itself, that distinction invests the trial with universal 
historic importance in the development of atrocity law. 
 But has the Hagenbach inquest left a larger legacy? Is it the world’s fi rst inter-
national war crimes trial? Did it bequeath us the fi rst primitive formulation of 
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crimes against humanity? As this chapter has demonstrated, given the relatively 
circumscribed writ of the Holy Roman Empire by the late fi fteenth century, it is 
not unreasonable to classify the trial as ‘international’. And Burgundy’s hostile 
occupation of the Sundgau in the fi rst part of 1474 means Hagenbach’s transgres-
sions may arguably be recognized in contemporary terminology as war crimes. 
Moreover, the bailiff ’s apparent widespread and systematic attack against the 
Alsatian civilian population (most clearly via rape and murder)—made with his 
commander’s knowledge of the attack—seems to qualify as crimes against human-
ity as it is understood today. 
 Whether, on that fateful Monday morning in the spring of 1474, Heinrich 
Iselin spontaneously and intuitively attempted to vocalize the raw concept of a new 
kind of atrocity crime—off ences violating ‘the laws of God and man’—may never 
be known for sure and, in any event, is beside the point. Since the modern birth of 
international criminal law in 1945, experts have  perceived that the Swiss procurator 
articulated a new juridical concept that morning—crimes against humanity. Th at 
perception has undoubtedly had an infl uence, however nuanced or attenuated, on 
the modern development of ICL. And it has lent the subtle sanction of ancient 
pedigree to jurists attempting to blaze new trails with respect to ICL theories of lia-
bility, defence, and procedure. Th is chapter has shown that though they might be 
grounded in inaccurate or superfi cial understandings of history, modern perceptions 
of the trial are at least not based on unsubstantiated myth. Perhaps this chapter will 
disabuse ICL of its one-dimensional portrait of Hagenbach as history’s consummate 
bogeyman. But it should also enhance appreciation for the important semiotic and 
iconographic space the Breisach Trial now inhabits in transnational legal discourse. 
 Th e case did set an epochal precedent. Nothing in history leading up to that 
moment in 1474 would have suggested the remarkable course of action taken by 
Sigismund. It is tempting to see that decision as an historic anomaly that would 
not be repeated for centuries to come. But on closer inspection, Sigismund’s choice 
to hold a trial before an international court fi ts well within the historical narrative 
of that era. 
 It was a time of religious and political disintegration. Th e Holy Roman Empire 
was fading into irrelevance and the Catholic Church was on the verge of losing its 
European hegemony. It was the eve of the nation-state—a unique moment when the 
old collective structures were dying and the new ones had yet to be born. Given the 
interstitial political turbulence, the time was ripe for a plural approach to law enforce-
ment in the cosmopolitan geographic centre of Europe. Hagenbach’s inter-regional 
depredations, which helped forge a rare pan-Germanic consensus, provided the per-
fect forum to experiment with international justice during that fragmented time. 
Th e Westphalian order, already on the horizon, would foreclose any such future 
experiments until Nazi brutality put a chink in the Westphalian armour and inspired 
an unprecedented transnational justice operation in the wake of a truly global war. 
In that sense, although on much diff erent scales, Breisach and Nuremberg have 
much in common. And should the nation-state ever manage to reassert its absolute 
supremacy again, Breisach will undoubtedly be on the lips of future international 
jurists seeking, as before, to end impunity at the expense of sovereignty. 
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 A Supranational Criminal Tribunal 
for the Colonial Era: 
Th e Franco-Siamese Mixed Court 
 Benjamin E.  Brockman-Hawe * 
 (I)  Introduction 
 Th e year 1892 was one of great change for the institution of French colonialism. Th e 
emergence of a French electorate preoccupied with colonial matters and sensitive to 
threats, real and perceived, to France’s imperialistic pretensions 1 coincided with a 
rise in the political fortunes of the most opportunistic and demagogic members of 
the  parti colonial to create an environment favorable to the adoption of aggressively 
expansionist policies and projects. Th e impetus towards expansion manifested early 
on as a breakdown in French-Siamese relations. When the British government 
announced in 1892 its intention to cede its territorial rights over the Southeast 
Asian statelet of Chieng-Keng to Siam, the decision was seized upon by the  parti as 
evidence of an international conspiracy to expand England’s regional infl uence at 
the expense of French Indochina. Championing a policy of forceful confrontation and 
military intervention, the  parti successfully agitated for the dispatch of a ‘police 
force’ to occupy the easternmost territories of Siam. 2 
 Th e French anticipated a quick and uncomplicated victory, but the campaign 
took an unexpected turn when  Inspecteur de la Garde Civile Grosgurin died at the 
hands of Siamese troops at Kham Muon. Grosgurin’s demise further whipped 
the  parti and the French nation into a nationalistic frenzy, so much so that an 
 *  Th is chapter is dedicated to my mother, Dr. Linda Brockman, who has always encouraged me to 
dig deeper. 
 1  It was only after colonial problems were reframed as issues of inter-European competition that wide-
spread public interest in colonial aff airs was realized.  C.M.  Andrew and  A.S.  Kanya-Forstner ,  ‘Th e French 
“Colonial Party”: Its Composition, Aims and Infl uence, 1885–1914’ ,  Historical Journal ,  14 ( 1971 ),  100 . 
 2  Patrick  Tuck ,  Th e French Wolf and the Siamese Lamb: Th e French Th reat to Siamese Independence 
1858–1907 ( Bangkok :  White Lotus  1995 ),  104 . France fi rst challenged Siam’s suzerainty over the ter-
ritories of Laos in 1867, when French negotiators insisted that all phrases that might be construed to 
imply their acceptance of Laos’ tributary status be removed from a proposed treaty with Siam: 27–9. 
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Article specifi cally related to the incident was inserted into one of the two treaties 
that marked the end of hostilities between France and Siam. Pursuant to Article III 
of the Franco-Siamese Convention of October 1893:
 Th e authors of the assassination of [Kham Muon] shall be tried by the Siamese authorities. 
A representative of France shall be present at the trial and witness execution of the sentence 
pronounced. Th e French Government reserves the right to appreciate whether the punishment 
is suffi  cient and, where applicable, claim a new trial before a Mixed Court, whereof it shall 
determine the composition. 
 Th is provision was exceptional among colonial-era agreements; the establishment 
of a Mixed Court represented a radical departure from precedent, which favoured 
the trial of persons accused of crimes committed during military operations before 
the national courts ‘of the belligerent in whose hands they [were]’. 3 How such an 
unusual article came to be included in an otherwise typical colonial-era agreement 
is discussed in greater detail in section II. Sections III and IV will describe the 
prosecutions of the ‘author of the assassination’, initially before a Siamese Special 
Court and later before the Article III Franco-Siamese Mixed Court. Th is chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the signifi cance of the Mixed Court as an international 
criminal law phenomenon, including its role as a progenitor of contemporary ICL 
mechanisms and the substantive and procedural laws they apply. 
 (II)  Th e Aff air of Kham Muon and Negotiation 
of the Convention of 3 October 1893 
 Although France was relatively late to stake a claim in Southeast Asia, by 1885 it 
had established eff ective control over most of the territory comprising contemporary 
Vietnam and Cambodia. Th e French, however, remained covetous of the more 
lucrative trade routes thought to lie just beyond their grasp to the west, and in 
1886 and 1889 sponsored missions into Laos, a Mekong River-straddling suzerain of 
Siam whose easternmost frontier delimited the border between French Indochina 
and Siam. Th e purpose of these incursions was two-fold: fi rst, to legitimate French 
claims that the Mekong was the appropriate border between the two sovereigns by 
uncovering archival evidence that Laotian territories running along the east bank of 
the river rightfully belonged to states that were now French colonies; and second, 
to pave the way for a French commercial and political presence in the Mekong 
Valley by negotiating the withdrawal of Siamese garrisons along the east coast of 
the River. 4 
 August Pavie, the leader of both missions and future French consul to Bangkok, 
failed to achieve either objective. Th e explorer unearthed so little evidence supportive 
 3  Institute of International Law, Manual of the Laws of War on Land (adopted 9 September 1880), 
Part III ( Chapeau and Article 84);  James W.  Garner ,  ‘Punishment of Off enders Against the Laws and 
Customs of War’ ,  American Journal of International Law ,  14 ( 1920 ),  76–9 . 
 4  Tuck, above n 2, 85–96. 
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of a theory of Vietnamese (and by extension French) possession that in his fi nal 
report he recommended avoiding negotiations with Siam until his employers were 
prepared to answer competing territorial claims with force, and the Siamese eff ec-
tively counteracted the commercial and political aspirations of the  Missions Pavie 
by denying the eponymous leader permission to negotiate directly with civilian 
and military leaders living in the Mekong valley. 5 Frustration over these failures 
prompted the  parti  to contemplate more forceful means of compelling Siam into 
ceding the disputed Laotian territories to France. A  suitable  casus belli for the 
deployment of French troops to the disputed region was found in December 
1892, when the English handed over control of the northern Mekong territory 
Chieng-Keng to Siam. Th e move convinced key colonialists that England had 
insidiously been encouraging the Siamese to reject French claims over eastern 
Laos all along, and the  parti eventually convinced the French parliament to accept 
their plan for an immediate and forcible eviction of Siamese offi  cials and troops 
from the Mekong’s east bank. 6 After receiving the blessing of the Chamber of 
Deputies, the  parti leadership wasted no time in dispatching armed columns of 
French and Annamite (Vietnamese) soldiers to the contested region, and by April 
1893 French ‘police forces’ had established a toehold in Laos. 7 
 Because the  parti expected Siam to off er only a ‘comic gesture of resistance’ 8 
it came as a considerable surprise when Captain Luce telegrammed Paris that the 
Siamese Commissioner of Kham Muon, Phra Yot, who had initially agreed to 
peacefully relinquish the contested territory and to leave for Outhene under the 
‘protection’ of an armed escort led by M. Grosgurin, had in fact ‘secretly sent for 
a band of 200 armed Siamese and Laotians[,] who surrounded . . . the house where 
[M. Grosgurin] was lying ill, and “assassinated [him] with a revolver” whilst the 
band massacred the escort’. 9 Th e  parti  immediately demanded full reparations for 
the ‘act of treason’, sent three men-of-war from Saigon to Bangkok and ordered the 
 5  Tuck, above n 2, 89, 9–97. 
 6  Archives d’Outre-Mer (AOM), Pavie to Ribot, 29 December 1892, No. 40 (referring to an 
earlier report by the Resident Superior of Hue suggesting that a ‘de facto occupation . . . will lead 
promptly . . . to the withdrawal of Siamese troops’ from the contested area). Th e parliament budgeted 
180,000 francs for the operation: Tuck, above n 2. 
 7  Foreign Offi  ce (FO) 881/6373, Inclosure ‘Extract from  Le Matin of 5 April 1893’, Marquis of 
Duff erin to Rosebery, 5 April 1893, No. 44 (describing the French occupation of Stung Treng); FO 
881/6373, Inclosure ‘Extract from  Le Matin of 10 April 1893’ in Marquis of Duff erin to Rosebery, 
5 April 1893, No. 48 (describing the French occupation of the Island of Khone). Th e French author-
ized a ‘police action’ specifi cally to avoid the appearance of waging an open war against Siam: Tuck, 
above n 2, 123. 
 8  Archives du Ministre des Relations Exterieures (MRE), Asie-Indochine 83, Jules Harmand, 
‘report from Novembre 1892’. August Pavie was of the opinion that  ‘ [t] he Siamese government, seeing 
that it has exceeded the limits that our forbearance had seemed to authorize, will doubtless move from 
one extreme to the other as is generally the case with Asiatics’:  Letter from Pavie to Le Myre, 12 December 
1893, ‘Th e Escalation in Franco-Siamese Relations’,  Auguste Pavie:  Th e Barefoot Explorer , < http://
pavie.culture.fr/rubrique.php?rubrique_id=60&lg=en#ecran2> (accessed 3 March 2013). 
 9  FO 881/6793, Inclosure ‘Extract from  Le Matin of 27 June 1893’ in Phipps to Rosebery, 
27 June 1893, No. 139. See also FO 881/6793, Inclosure ‘Extracts from  L’Independant de Cochin-China ’ 
of 16 June 1893 in Marquis of Duff erin to Rosebery, 25 July 1893, No. 146. 
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capture of the Gulf Islands in the Bay of Samit and Luang Prabang. 10 Th e Siamese, 
however, doubted the veracity of Luce’s telegram, and refused to pay reparations 
unless and until additional reports confi rmed that events had taken place in the 
manner described therein. 11 
 News of Siam’s temporizing in the face of Grosgurin’s ‘murder’ remained on 
the front page of the major Parisian periodicals for over a month, 12 where it fed a 
wave of anti-Siamese sentiment that emboldened the  parti  to enlarge their territorial 
claims and agitate the remainder of the French political establishment into action. 13 
On 20 July 1893 the French parliament communicated its fi rst formal ultimatum to 
Siam, by which Bangkok was required to (1) relinquish all rights to the east bank 
of the Mekong; (2) pay an indemnity to the victims of various acts of Siamese 
aggression; and (3) punish the offi  cers responsible for various attacks on French 
troops, including the Grosgurin attack. Failure to accept the terms of the ultimatum 
within forty-eight hours would result in a blockade of the Siamese capital. 14 Th e 
Chamber of Deputies also unanimously ratifi ed the decision of Foreign Minister 
Jules Develle to send Charles Le Myre de Vilers, the parliamentary deputy for 
Cochinchina, to Bangkok, with instructions to negotiate a treaty that would 
guarantee French territorial rights along the Mekong River and secure compensation 
for Siam’s various ‘violations of  jus gentium ’. 15 
 10  Walter E.J.  Tips ,  Siam’s Struggle for Survival; Th e Gunboat Incident at Paknam and the Franco-Siamese 
Treaty of October 1893 ( Bangkok :  White Lotus  2006 ),  65 (journal entry for 18 June 1893); AOM, 
Siam 3/46, Lanessan to Declasse, 11 June 1893, No. 95. M. Develle, the French Foreign Minister, 
warned the English Minister in Paris that he would ‘present matters in their true light’ to the Chamber 
of Deputies if Siam did not address France’s grievances. Develle assured the English Minister that the 
Chamber would escalate the confl ict by committing an additional 10,000,000 francs and 6,000 men 
for the operation, and authorizing military operations against Bangkok: FO 881/6479, Phipps to 
Rosebery, 30 June 1893, No. 6. 
 11  Prince Devawongse, the Siamese Foreign Minister, protested to Pavie that:
 Th e event would have happened on the seventh, four days marching away from Kam 
Muon and it is starting from the ninth that the Annamites bring this news. Th e Siamese 
offi  cer would have brought two hundred men from Outhene and . . . it appears that in 
Outhene there were only fi fty men. Th e offi  cer, who is Phra Yot, is moreover known as 
an honourable man and his whole character goes against this accusation of assassination. 
 Tips, above n 10, 64 (journal entry for 17 June 1893). Pavie, who knew Phra Yot from his time 
spent surveying Laos during the 1889  Mission , was reported to have had ‘nothing bad to say’ about 
the Siamese Commissioner at this meeting. 
 12  See for example, ‘Le Guet-Apens de Keng-Kien’,  Le Figaro (Paris, France), 17 June 1893; ‘Au 
Siam’,  Le Matin (Paris, France), 17 July 1893; ‘Le Question au Siam’,  Le Matin (Paris, France), 27 June 
1893. Rolin-Jaequemyns confi rmed that the incident produced ‘great emotions in Paris’. Tips, above 
n 10, 65 (journal entry for 18 July 1893). 
 13  FO 881/6479, Inclosure No. 1 ‘Extract from the  Temps of 19 July 1893’ in Phipps to Rosebery, 19 
July 1893, No. 78. See generally Tuck, above n 2, 112. 
 14  Ministre des Aff aires Etrangères (MAE), Documents Diplomatique, Aff aires du Siam, Develle to 
Pavie, 19 July 1893, No. 12. See also FO 881/6479, Phipps to Rosebery, 19 July 1893, No. 80; FO 
881/6479, Rosebery to Jones, 20 July 1893, No. 88; Tips, above n 10, 97–8 (journal entry for 20 July 
1893). 
 15  Documents Diplomatique, above n 14, No. 1.  See also No. 78 above n 13; FO 881/6479, 
Inclosure ‘Extract from the  Journal Offi  ciel of 19 July 1893’, in Phipps to Rosebery, 19 July 1893, 
No. 82. 
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 Two days later Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns, the Belgian General Advisor to the 
King of Siam, drafted and sent a qualifi ed acceptance in which Siam (1) agreed 
to withdraw their military posts from the disputed territory within the month, 
but suggested that the dispute over ownership of the territory be submitted to 
international arbitration; (2) consented to paying the indemnity demanded, but 
proposed that a Joint Commission be established to investigate the French claims; 
(3) confi rmed its readiness to deposit a 3,000,000-franc guarantee with the French, 
but emphasized that the Siamese counted on ‘French justice’ to restore to them 
any sum remaining after the ‘equitable adjustment of all claims’; (4) assented to 
the punishment of any individuals ‘responsible for personal attacks not in com-
pliance with national and international law’; and (5)  accepted responsibility for 
paying reparations to the families of the deceased ‘in accordance with ordinary 
justice’. 16 Alas, the Siamese reply was considered ‘insolent’ and ‘unsatisfactory’ by 
Develle, and prompted the umbrageous French cabinet to escalate their demands 
once more. 17 After announcing the imposition of a blockade on 26 July 1893, the 
French sent a ‘declaration’ to supplement the terms of the ultimatum,  inter alia 
obliging the Siamese to withdraw all troops located within twenty-fi ve kilometres 
of the Cambodian border and accept the French occupation of Chattaboon. 18 
Th e Siamese, fearful of losing additional territory, unconditionally acquiesced to 
the ‘second Ultimatum’ that same day. 19 
 Le Myre’s arrival in Bangkok on 16 August 1893 marked the beginning of the 
second phase of negotiations between France and Siam. 20 Although Develle had 
cautioned the Plenipotentiary to adopt ‘an attitude of benevolence’ during the 
 16  FO 881/6479, Jones to Rosebery, 23 July 1893, No. 118; Tips, above n 10, 99 (journal entry for 
21 July 1893). By this time French offi  cials had deposed survivors of the events at Kieng Chek and 
their accounts forwarded to the Siamese. Th ese records apparently confi rmed that the French had 
‘grossly misinterpreted the circumstances’ and that Grosgurin had been killed in the course of a ‘regular 
battle’ between French and Siamese forces: Tips, above n 10, 72 (journal entry for 26 June 1893). See 
also FO 881/6479, Jones to Rosebery, 10 July 1893, No. 19. 
 17  FO 881/6479, Marquis of Duff erin to Rosebery, 26 July 1893, No. 158. Th e Marquis ‘could not 
help thinking that there was something artifi cial in the indignation [Develle] expressed, not unlike 
that exhibited in a conversation on the banks of a stream between two individuals whose memory 
has been embalmed by a great fabulist’. Develle is reported to have stated that Siam’s ‘disrespectful 
hesitations and suggested modifi cations were intolerable when preferred by so insignifi cant a State to 
so great a Power as the Republic, and would fully justify France in now taking whatever military or 
other measures she might deem expedient’: Cabinet Papers 34/34, Marquis of Duff erin to Rosebery, 
27 July 1893, No. 41. 
 18  Tips, above n 10, 105 (journal entry for 27 July 1893). See also MRE, Correspondence Politique 
des Consuls (CPC) Siam 16, Pavie to Develle, 23 July 1893, No. 93 ; FO 881/6479, Jones to Rosebery, 
1 August 1893, No. 245. 
 19  Documents Diplomatique, above n 14, Nos.19–21; Tips, above n 10, 111 (journal entry for 
31 July 1893). 
 20  When the French Plenipotentiary arrived in Siam, Rolin-Jaequemyns immediately sent a letter of 
introduction explaining his royal authorization to negotiate the terms of a treaty. Le Myre, however, had 
instructions to ‘categorically . . . spurn the intervention of foreign advisers’ and refused to negotiate with 
anyone other than Siamese offi  cials. When Rolin-Jaequemyns learned of these instructions, and upon 
receiving no reply to his overtures to the French negotiator, he considered resigning from his post. 
Ultimately he elected to deny the French the ‘pleasure’ of seeing him leave the service of the King and 
continue advising Prince Devawongse (the Siamese Foreign Minister) behind the scenes: Documents 
Diplomatiques, above n 14, No. 1; Tips, above n 10, 136–137 (journal entry for 20 August 1893). 
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negotiations, 21 Le Myre made no secret of his intention to impose ‘very harsh’ 
measures on the Siamese, with whom he considered negotiating ‘a waste of time’. 22 
Indeed, the record of negotiations is rife with instances of Le Myre attempting to 
deceive, bully and frustrate the Siamese negotiator, Prince Devawongse, into sur-
rendering more than the ultimatum had demanded. 23 For example, during their 
second meeting Le Myre requested that the Prince affi  x his signature to an unexamined 
copy of the proposed Treaty of Peace and Friendship ‘as a matter of form’. When 
the Prince politely declined, Le Myre menacingly reminded him that the French 
warships stationed in the Gulf could make matters ‘at any moment quickly change 
for the worse’. 24 
 Le Myre’s conduct was particularly egregious with respect to the settlement of what 
had come to be known as the Aff air of Kham Muon. Th e French Plenipotentiary 
arrived in Siam determined to see Phra Yot brought before a predominantly French 
Franco-Siamese Mixed Court, 25 but with the exception of one presumptive and off -
hand remark to Devawongse that the ‘culprits’ of the Aff air of Kham Muon would 
‘of course’ face a court composed of the ‘competent Siamese authorities in conjunc-
tion with [French] Consul’ 26 Le Myre refused to discuss the matter, preferring to 
hold it  in terrorem over the Siamese. 27 Th e telegrams exchanged between Le Myre 
and Devawongse tell their own story:  throughout September 1893 the French 
Plenipotentiary constantly protested that Siam had failed to fulfi l its obligation to 
punish ‘guilty parties’ involved in the Kham Muon incident, and demanded that 
Siam grant additional concessions as a consequence, 28 even as Devawongse affi  rmed 
Siam’s willingness to bring the individuals the French considered guilty before an 
 21  MRE, MD Asie-Indochine 87, Develle to Le Myre, 5 August 1893. No. 5. 
 22  MRE, CPC Siam 16, Le Myre to Develle, 24 August 1893 (Le Myre believed that ‘European 
diplomatic niceties are inappropriate in Siam. With Asiatics, you impose your will when you are the 
stronger, or you stand aloof if you are the weaker.’). See also MRE, MD, Asie-Indochine 87, Le Myre 
to Develle, 3 August 1893. 
 23  FO 881/6479, Inclosure ‘Statement of Circumstances and Proceedings Connected with M. Le 
Myre de Vilers’ Special Mission to Bangkok’, in Jones to Rosebery, 25 August 1893, No. 423; FO 
881/6479, Inclosure ‘Second Meeting of the Conference for the New Treaty of Peace and Friendship’, 
in Jones to Rosebery, 13 September 1893, No. 454. See also ‘France Not Yet Satisfi ed—New Demands 
Daily Forced Upon the Siamese’,  New York Times (New York, USA), 30 August 1893. 
 24  No. 423, above n 23. See also Tips, above n 10, 141 (journal entry for 24 August 1893). 
Rolin-Jaequemyns writes in his journal of a letter sent by Le Myre to Devawongse that is ‘unusually 
insolent, [and] written in a mocking tone which would be suffi  cient, in an ordinary negotiation, to 
justify a breaking off ’. Neither the Belgian nor French archives hold a copy of this letter. Tips, above 
n 10, 157 (journal entry for 18 September 1893). 
 25  A telegram from Le Myre to Develle from 21 August 1893, drafted three full days before his arrival 
in Siam, contains the earliest draft of what would eventually become Article III of the Convention. 
AOM, Siam 4/51, Le Myre to Develle, Draft of the proposed terms of a Franco-Siamese Convention, 
21 August 1893, No. 12. Develle initially attempted to persuade Le Myre to reduce Article III to a 
right to demand a retrial before a Siamese court, but later capitulated and agreed to allow Le Myre 
‘to be the judge’ of how best to handle the matter: AOM, Siam 4/51, Develle to Le Myre, 23 August 
1893; AOM, Siam 4/51, Develle to Le Myre, 25 August 1893. 
 26  No. 454, above n 23. Th ere is nothing in the minutes to indicate that Devawongse even heard 
this stray remark. 
 27  FO 881/6479, Jones to Rosebery, 14 September 1893, No. 411. 
 28  FO 881/6479, Inclosure No. 1 ‘Le Myre de Vilers to Prince Devawongse’, in Jones to Rosebery, 
13 September 1893, No. 453. See also FO 881/6479, Inclosure No. 2 ‘Le Myre de Vilers to Prince 
Devawongse’ in, Jones to Rosebery, 26 September 1893, No. 494. 
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impartial domestic court, pending confi rmation from the Plenipotentiary that this 
would satisfy France. 29 
 Th e question of Phra Yot’s fate came to a head on 29 September 1893, when Le Myre 
handed Devawongse a draft Treaty and draft Convention, the latter incorporating 
his as yet unseen proposal for a trial of Phra Yot before a Mixed Franco-Siamese 
Court (Article III), and announced his intention to leave for Saigon with or without an 
agreement within four days. Rolin-Jaequemyns spent the evening reviewing the terms 
of the proposed Convention and, fi nding himself in agreement with Devawongse 
that Article III was ‘completely unacceptable’, immediately began work on a  note 
verbal summarizing Siam’s objections. 30 In the note, which was delivered to Le Myre 
on 31 September 1893, Rolin-Jaequemyns protested that ‘the Siamese govern-
ment do not think that it is in their power to violate by a retroactive disposition 
the individual right, recognized by Treaties, of any of their subjects to be judged by 
a competent Court of their own nation’. 31 
 On 1 October 1893, the two Plenipotentiaries commenced a fi nal round of negoti-
ations. Le Myre fl atly refused to alter the language of the Convention itself, but agreed 
to address Siamese concerns over Article III in a  proces-verbal to be appended to 
the Convention. 32 He also insinuated that a rejection of the draft Treaty and the 
unmodifi ed draft Convention would incite the French to authorize additional 
attacks against Siam. 33 Facing a ‘third Ultimatum’, 34 mindful of the inferiority 
of Siam’s armed forces, and exhausted by months of French cavilling, deception 
and abuse, 35 the Prince fi nally capitulated and signed the Treaty and Convention, 
 29  No. 453, Inclosure No. 2 ‘Prince Devawongse to Le Myre de Vilers’, above n 28. See also No. 494, 
Inclosure No. 3 ‘Prince Devawongse to Le Myre de Vilers’, above n 28. 
 30  Tips, above n 10, 168 (journal entry for 1 October 1893). Captain Henry Jones, British Minister 
in Bangkok, agreed that ‘the demands of Article III are in violation of all reason and justice’: FO 
881/6479, Jones to Rosebery, 12 October 1893, No. 516. 
 31  MAE, Siam 16, Enclosure No. 1  ‘Note Verbal sur le Convention’, in Le Myre to Develle, 4 
October 1893, No. 110. Rolin-Jaequemyns’ citation to ‘treaties’ was probably a reference to the Treaty 
of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between France and Siam, which in Article 9 provided that 
if ‘a Siamese commit any crime or off ence against Frenchmen, he shall be arrested by the Siamese 
authorities, and punished according to the laws of the country’: Siam Government, State Papers of 
the Kingdom of Siam, 1664–1886, Compiled by the Siamese Legation in Paris (William Ridgeway, 
1886), 43, available in the General Archives of the Kingdom of Belgium, Papiers du Gustave 
Rolin-Jaequemyns, dossier 1, T-423-1. 
 32  In the  proces-verbal Le Myre responded to Rolin-Jaequemyn’s objections by noting that ‘foreign 
jurisdiction is already recognised in Siam, and . . . Mixed Courts already exist’: FO 881/6479, Jones to 
Rosebery, 2 October 1893, No. 432. 
 33  Although it appears that no record was kept of this fi nal meeting between the French and Siamese 
negotiators, Devawongse later told Rolin-Jaequemyns that threats of renewed violence had compelled 
him to sign the Treaty and Convention: Tips, above n 10, 167 (journal entry for 1 October 1893). 
James G. Scott, Captain Jones’ successor, confi rms that Le Myre ‘threatened to leave if he did not 
obtain the Prince’s signatures; he actually went through the theatrical performance of keeping up 
steam on the board the  Aspic and putting his baggage into the innards of that gunboat at the French 
Legation steps’: FO 881/6586, Scott to Rosebery, 28 January 1894, No. 44. 
 34  Tips, above n 10, 167 (journal entry for 1 October 1893). 
 35  Even Develle agreed that Le Myre de Vilers had conducted himself in a reprehensible manner 
throughout the negotiations. In personal letters Develle described Le Myre de Vilers as ‘an idiot who 
almost jeopardised everything’, remarked that Le Myre’s demands were ‘violent, brutal and excessive’, 
and complained that Le Myre’s draft treaties, ‘formulated in a pretty dishonest manner, . . . actually 
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thereby committing Siam to trying Phra Yot before a domestic court and, at the 
discretion of the French, before a Mixed Court as well. 
 Rolin-Jaequemyns was furious at Devawongse’s ‘act of inconceivable weakness’ and 
drafted a letter to Le Myre ‘highlight[ing] the gaps’ of Article III. 36 In his last-ditch 
eff ort to alter the Convention language, Rolin-Jaequemyns characterized Article III’s 
inclusion in the signed Convention as a ‘common oversight’, suggested extricating 
the Article from the Convention before news of the agreement was publicized, and 
reiterated the concerns of his letter of 31 September 1893, adding that:
 [I] f there is some sort of mixed jurisdiction in civil cases where both parties belong to diff erent 
nationalities, there is none at all in criminal cases . . . It would thus be a serious infringement on 
individual rights to create a Mixed Court for the trial of past crimes or off ences, infringement 
all the graver if the composition of the Court depends upon a State to which the accused 
do not belong. 37 
 Le Myre again declined to remove the controversial provision, arguing that Rolin- 
Jaequemyn’s ‘reasoning [was] based on an incomplete draft of the Convention’, 38 and 
on 3 October 1893 the Siamese government publicly acknowledged their acceptance 
of the unmodifi ed Treaty and Convention. 39 
 (III)  Phra Yot’s Trial before a National Tribunal 
 (1)  Designing the Special and Temporary Court 
 Th e Siamese were understandably sceptical that anything other than a guilty verdict 
coupled with a harsh sentence would mollify France. In a fi nal eff ort to avoid the 
humiliation of having a Siamese subject who had resisted France be brought before 
French judges, in January 1894 the Siamese sent a telegram to Pavie proposing 
the creation of a ‘Mixed International Court’ presided over by neutral American 
and Dutch consular offi  cials and an English Law Offi  cer from Singapore. 40 A trial 
before such a court, the Siamese argued, would provide the French government and 
destroyed our text’: Les Archives de la Sarthe (ADS), Fonds Paul d’Estournelles de Constant, 12 J 
119, Develle to d’Estournelles de Constant, 9 October 1893; MRE, MD Asie-Indochine 87, Develle 
to Paul Revoil, undated. 
 36  Tips, above n 10, 168–9 (journal entries for 1 October 1893 and 2 October 1893). 
 37  FO 881/6479, Inclosure ‘Prince Devawongse to M. Le Myre de Vilers’ in Jones to Rosebery, 15 
October 1893, No. 552. See also MAE, Siam 16, Enclosure No. 2 ‘Letter from Prince Devawongse 
to Le Myre de Vilers’, in Le Myre to Develle, 4 October 1893, No. 110. Rolin-Jaequemyns did not 
expect that the French would completely expunge Article III from the Convention, but had hoped to 
‘obtain some attenuation, during the time which precede[d] the ratifi cation of the treaty’: Tips, above 
n 10, 169 (journal entry for 2 October 1893). 
 38  MAE, Siam 16, Le Myre to Develle, 4 October 1893, No. 110. Rolin-Jaequemyns confi rmed that 
‘de Vilers [had] not wanted to hear anything about our objections’: Tips, above n 10, 170 (journal 
entry for 3 October 1893). 
 39  Th e full text of the Treaty, Convention, and  proces-verbal are available at FO 881/6479, Inclosures 
No. 1–3 in Jones to Rosebery, 12 October 1893, No. 516, and on the website of the MAE at < https://
pastel.diplomatie.gouv.fr/choiseul/ > (accessed 14 May 2013). 
 40  FO 881/6586, ‘Prince Devawongse to M. Pavie’, in Scott to Kimberley, 19 March 1894, No. 78. 
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the European public with ‘guarantees of impartiality’ beyond those of a national 
court. 41 But Pavie was intransigent, and dismissed the suggestion as contrary to the 
terms of the Convention, 42 leaving the despondent Siamese with no alternative but 
to sign into law a Royal Decree creating a ‘Special and Temporary Court’ to try 
Phra Yot. 43 
 Despite the virtual certainty that Phra Yot would end up before French judges, 
the Siamese went to considerable eff ort to design a domestic court that, under 
diff erent circumstances, might have brought the Aff air of Kham Muon to a mutually 
satisfactory resolution. 44 Th e Court applied existing Siamese legal codes but operated 
according to procedural rules inspired by the laws of England and France. 45 Special 
Court proceedings were adversarial in nature but presided over by six judges and 
one Chief Justice with broad powers to summon foreign subjects, compel Siamese 
subjects to give evidence or produce documents, and generally to ‘take proper 
measures to enlighten the conscience of the Court and to remove from the proceed-
ings all causes which appear of a nature to prolong it’. 46 Th e accused had the right 
to the assistance of one or more counsel, as well as the right to provide a full answer 
to the charges, to cross-examine any prosecution witness, to produce witnesses and 
evidence in his defence, and to have ‘the last word’ in Court. 47 He was also entitled 
 41  FO 17/1220, Prince Bidyalath to Prince Svasti, received 5 February 1894, 52. See also ‘Prince 
Devawongse to M. Pavie’, n 40 above.. 
 42  Th e  Siam Free Press , whose editor and correspondents were partial to the French position, was 
no doubt conveying the thoughts of the French Representatives when it published the opinion that 
‘[o] nly the most sanguine, obstinate, and deluded of persons could put any trust in an “International 
Court” or arbitration’: No. 78, above n 40, Inclosure No. 9 ‘Extract from  Siam Free Press of 2 March 
1894’. Th at the  Siam Free Press was little more than a mouthpiece of the French legation is confi rmed 
by an interview with M. Byrois, a correspondent with the  Press , who in 1894 described M. Lillie (the 
editor of the his paper) as a ‘devoted friend of France’ and provided examples of instances in which Le 
Myre rewrote his articles to make them more ‘vigorous and aggressive’: FO 17/1221, ‘Extract from  La 
Patrie ’, in Duff erin to Rosebery, 15 April 1894, page 243, No. 148. See also FO 881/6586, Scott to 
Rosebery, 18 February 1894, No. 54. 
 43  No. 78, above n 40. Scott felt that ‘[t] he refusal of the French Representatives to entertain the idea 
of a Mixed International Court forced the conclusion that from the beginning they had no intention 
of accepting the decision of the Siamese Court, and that fi nality of decision was the last thing they 
desired. Th e literal fulfi lment of this suspicion still further dismays the Siamese’. Rolin-Jaequemyns, 
the primary author of the Royal Decree, initially conceived of a trial for Phra Yot before a Siamese 
court-martial, but for unknown reasons abandoned that idea in favour of a trial before a regular crimi-
nal court: Tips, above n 10, 164 (journal entry for 25 September 1893). See also No. 54, above n 42. 
 44  Tips, above n 10, 211. 
 45  Th e Siamese and English considered the Special Court to be more French than English. 
Devawongse felt that the Court applied ‘very nearly same law of France’ and Scott reported that 
the procedural rules were ‘very much more founded on French than on English forms of law, and is 
certainly not too favourable to the accused’: No. 54, above n 42; FO 17/1220, Prince Devawongse 
to Prince Svasti, 15 February 1894, 147. M Pavie, however, would later ascribe the (perceived) slug-
gishness of the proceedings as ‘entirely [due] to English procedure’: India Offi  ce Archives, MSS F278, 
George Scott’s Diary (11), entry for 28 February 1894, 24. Th e  Siam Free Press derided the Siamese 
for binding the Special Court to a ‘mongrel procedure’: No. 78, above n 40, Inclosure No. 9 ‘Extract 
from the  Siam Free Press of March 2, 1894’. 
 46  Rule 16, 17, 22 of the Royal Decree Instituting a Special and Temporary Court for the trial of 
the aff airs of Tong-Xieng-Kham and Keng-Chek (Kham-Muon), in  Full Report, With Documentary 
Appendices, of the Phra Yot Trial Before the Special Court at Bangkok ,  Bangkok Times (Bangkok, 1894). 
 47  Royal Decree, above n 46, rules 10 and 21. 
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to a translated copy of any evidence brought against him in a language he did not 
understand. 48 Th e Court was obliged to work without interruptions other ‘than 
those which [were] necessary for the ordinary wants of life’ and to deliver a judgment 
within twenty-four hours of the conclusion of the closing arguments. 49 Th e Royal 
Decree also authorized a representative designated by the French government to 
confer with the Siamese prosecutor as to the content of the indictment, request that 
a particular witness be heard, cross-examine a defence witness and off er ‘remarks’ 
to the prosecution concerning the content of their closing arguments. 50 
 (2)  Th e culture of the courtroom 
 Dr John MacGregor, an English Offi  cer in the employ of the Indian Medical 
Service, happened to be passing through Siam for the commencement of Phra Yot’s 
trial on 24 February 1894. He captured the occasion in his memoirs:
 Th e court-room, where the case was tried, was in one of the large public buildings within the 
enclosure of the walled city; and it was only a comparatively small room, though honoured 
with so great a trial. On the elevated dais sat the six Siamese judges, in the centre of whom 
sat and presided HRH Prince Bitchit. To the right hand of the court and below the dais sat 
the French advocate, the French consul, and a French legal expert, who had come all the 
way from Saigon to watch the case. To the left of the court and facing the French party sat 
the defending pleaders, consisting of an English and a Cingalese lawyer, while the Crown 
Prince’s ex-tutor acted the part of interpreter, in preference to coming with me through the 
wilds of Siam. Immediately in front and behind the judges was the Recorder’s table, with 
three or four people sitting at it; and this party seemed to me to act the part of a ‘buff er 
state’ between the other two parties, and thus prevented a fresh collision on the fl oor of the 
court house. 
 Last, but not least, there sat in front of the Recorder’s table no less a personage than Phra 
Yott [sic] himself, who was being tried for his life for all these crimes mentioned above, and 
who was the immediate cause of all this hullaballoo, the echoes of which have not yet quite 
died away. It is needless to say that he was the observed of all observers. He was dressed in a 
blue coat and waistcoat, and a skirt that bore some distant resemblance to a kilt, but folded 
up behind in Siamese fashion, while on his feet he wore the daintiest little pair of pumps, 
and the long white stockings, reaching above the knee, which are so very much aff ected at 
the present time by the real Pink-’uns of Siam. 51 
 After a preliminary objection to the presence of a key prosecution witness in the 
court room during open session (sustained) and a request that the trial be adjourned 
for ten days to allow the defence team additional time to prepare (overruled), the 
court recorder read out the  acte d’information . 52 Phra Yot had been charged with 
ordering the wilful and premeditated murder of Grosgurin and an unknown 
 48  Royal Decree, above n 46, rule 15. 
 49  Royal Decree, above n 46, rule 23. According to Scott’s report, this rule was inserted upon the 
suggestion of the French: No. 54, above n 42. 
 50  Royal Decree, above n 46, rules 7, 11, 14 and 21. 
 51  John  MacGregor ,  Th rough the Buff er State: A Record of Recent Travels Th rough Borneo, Siam, and 
Cambodia ( London :  F.V. White,  1896 ),  100 . 
 52  ‘Th e Trial of Phra Yot—First Day’ in  Full Report , above n 46, 1. 
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number of Annamite soldiers, robbery, arson, and the infl iction of severe wounds 
or bodily harm on Boon Chan, Grosgurin’s Cambodian interpreter, and Nguen 
van Khan, an Annamite soldier hospitalized as a result of wounds infl icted by the 
Siamese at Kieng Chek. 53 
 Despite the gravity of the accusations levelled against him and the severity of the 
punishments he potentially faced, 54 Phra Yot displayed perfect sangfroid during the 
reading, a reaction that made quite an impression on the audience. Th e  Bangkok 
Times correspondent covering the trial noted Phra Yot’s ‘considerable resource and 
self control’, 55 James G. Scott, British chargé to Bangkok, wrote in his personal 
journal of Phra Yot’s ‘peaceful’ presence, 56 and Dr MacGregor eff ervesced that:
 [Th e Accused] was as cool as the proverbial cucumber, chewing his betel all the while 
with appreciative gusto. He did not appear bloodthirsty or ferocious in any way, and had 
nothing in his appearance to distinguish him either as a felon or a hero. After the usual 
preliminaries had been gone through, and after Phra Yott [sic] had pleaded ‘not guilty’ to 
the series of charges laid against him, he left the Recorder’s table, and went to sit beside his 
counsel to the left of the court, and still under the guard of a Siamese soldier, who always 
stood behind him. 
 By this time he had got tired of chewing his betel-nut, and so he calmly took out of his 
pocket a great big cheroot, and commenced to smoke it there and then! Th e scene would 
strike any European with surprise, if unacquainted with the ways and manners of Eastern 
nations—to see the prisoner, tried for his life, and yet pulling away at his cheroot in the open 
court, as if the results of the trial were a matter of mere indiff erence to him. Most Europeans 
would have their throats a little too dry for smoking under the circumstances, and I should 
have liked very much to have possessed the brush of a ready artist, to depict the scene which 
I am now trying to describe with the more humble material of a scribbling pen. 57 
 Th e attitude and conduct of the two French Representatives (M. Pavie and 
M. Ducos, President of the Court of Appeal in Saigon) left an equally indelible 
impression on those who attended the trial. In his offi  cial account of the pro-
ceedings for the Foreign Offi  ce, Scott took care to report that the representatives 
‘scoff ed openly at the whole proceedings, habitually came late, knowing that . . . by 
the terms of the Convention . . . the Court could not sit without them, and did 
not hesitate to repeat daily that the trial was a mere waste of time, because the 
case must of necessity be tried again before a French Court’. 58 Comparing the 
‘high handed’ behaviour of the representatives to that of Le Myre de Vilers, Scott also 
informed the British Foreign Offi  ce that Ducos, who had worked with the Siamese 
 53  FO 17/1222,  Acte d’Information , pages 95–6. 
 54  Phra Yot could be sentenced to death, mutilation, lashing and imprisonment, condemned to cut 
grass for elephants or fi ned:  Acte d’Information , above n 53. 
 55  ‘Th e Trial of Phra Yot—First Day’ in  Full Report , above n 46, 1. 
 56  Scott Diary, above n 45, 24 (journal entry for 26 February 1894). 
 57  MacGregor,  Buff er State , above n 51. Th e accused was not the only smoker in court. One corre-
spondent reported ‘the judges, counsel . . . witnesses, policemen, and spectators, all sit smoking cigarettes 
and cigars’. Apparently tea was ‘handed round occasionally’ as well: ‘A Trial in Siam’,  Lancaster Gazette 
(Lancaster, England) 14 April 1894. 
 58  No. 78, above n 40. Scott also reported that Ducos dismissed the Special Court as a ‘useless formality’ 
and a ‘farcical waste’ to the  Siam Free Press : No. 78, above n 40. See also No. 54, above n 42. 
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prosecutors to ‘frame [the  acte d’information ] in accordance with his ideas’ 59 and 
drafted what would become rules 22 and 23 of the Royal Decree, 60 and Pavie, who 
had consented to the Royal Decree and declined to object to the appointment of 
the Siamese judges, 61 had both subsequently refused to publicly acknowledge their 
role in the development of the Court. 
 (3)  Phra Yot’s vindication by the Special Court 
 Th e representatives doubtlessly anticipated that, by their belligerence and mendacity, 
they could disrupt the trial proceedings and frustrate Siamese eff orts to legitimize 
the Special Court in the eyes of the European public. Although Pavie and Ducos 
achieved some success in accomplishing the latter, they utterly failed to bring 
about the former. In fact the Justices, drawing on the testimonies of the single 
prosecution witness (Boon Chan) and seven defence witnesses (including Phra 
Yot) that were heard over eight days of public session, impressively managed to 
pull together the fi rst complete and convincing narrative of the events leading to 
the aff ray at Kieng Chek. 
 According to the Court’s exonerating verdict of 17 March 1894, in mid-May 1893 
an armed column of French and Annamite soldiers commanded by Captain Luce 
was dispatched to Kham Muon with orders to depose the Siamese Commissioner 
of the province. Th e Commissioner (Phra Yot) resisted the French for several days, 
but on 23 May 1893 submitted under protest and agreed to be escorted to Kieng 
Chek, in Outhene, by a small contingent of Annamite troops under the command 
of Inspector Grosgurin. Phra Yot’s protests were recorded in a letter addressed to 
Captain Luce, in which the deposed Commissioner insisted upon Siam’s ‘continued 
absolute rights’ over the territory, committed Kham Muon ‘to the care’ of the French 
until such time as he ‘received any instructions’, whereupon he would ‘arrange the 
measures to be taken subsequently’, and required that the letter be forwarded to 
the Siamese government ‘so that the matter may be examined into, and a decision 
may be arrived at’. 62 Phra Yot then surreptitiously sent a second letter to the nearby 
 59  No. 54, above n 42; No. 78, above n 40. 
 60  No. 54, above n 42. Th e only evidence that Ducos contributed to the development of the Siamese 
Court in this manner comes from Scott’s reports to the Foreign Offi  ce. 
 61  No. 54, above n 42. In letters to Siam’s plenipotentiary in Europe, Devawongse purported to 
have ‘consulted the French minister on every step: as to how the Court shall be constituted, and as 
to who shall be the judges of the court’: FO 17/1220, Prince Devawongse to Prince Svasti, 1 March 
1894, 41. See also Prince Devawongse to Prince Svasti, 15 February 1894, above n 45, wherein Prince 
Devawongse explained that the President of the Court would be ‘Prince Bichit, with the regulations 
for the proceeding which [the French Minister] agreed’. Despite his involvement, Pavie ‘refused to rec-
ognise the Tribunal’: ‘Colonial Aff airs’,  Le Temps (Paris, France) 17 April 1894. Pavie also reneged on a 
promise that he would provide the Siamese with a ‘description of the charges’ that should be brought 
against Phra Yot, and delayed the start date of the proceedings by failing to act on Siam’s pre-trial 
requests for evidence in a timely manner: Prince Devawongse to Prince Svasti, 1 March 1894, above 
n 61. See generally Prince Bidyalath to Prince Svasti, above n 42; FO 17/1220, Scott to Rosebery, 26 
February 1894, No. 61. 
 62  Letter reproduced in ‘Th e Trial of Phra Yot—Tenth Day’ in  Full Report , above n 46, 35–6. 
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Commissioner of Outhene, Luang Vichit, in which he appealed for assistance, in 
the form of men and arms, in overcoming his French escort. 63 
 When the convoy reached Kieng Chek Inspector Grosgurin was informed that 
Phra Yot’s second in command, Luang Anurak, had been seen publicly advocating 
armed resistance against the French. Luang Anurak was promptly arrested and 
taken to Grosgurin’s house, where he remained in custody. Phra Yot, anxious that 
he would face a similar ‘act of violence’, secretly set out for nearby Wieng Krasene 
that evening. Along the way he met troop commanders Nai Tooi and Nai Plaak, 
who had been ordered by the Commissioner of Outhene to take fi fty troops and, 
with the cooperation of forces from Kham Muon, secure Phra Yot and eject the 
foreign soldiers from the country. 64 
 On 3 June 1893 Phra Yot, Nai Tooi and Nai Plaak led approximately twenty 
Siamese soldiers to Grosgurin’s residence in Kieng Chek. As they communicated their 
demands to the Inspector, who was in poor health, Luang Anurak ran out of the 
house, prompting the Annamite soldiers to fi re upon the Siamese. Nai Tooi, Nai 
Plaak and Phra Yot held a brief consultation and jointly issued an order to return fi re. 
Inspector Grosgurin, approximately twelve Annamite soldiers, six Siamese soldiers 
and one Siamese translator were killed during this exchange. 65 
 Th e Justices unanimously absolved the accused of all direct or indirect responsi-
bility for Grosgurin’s death, Boon Chan’s and Nguen van Khan’s wounds, the thefts 
and the house fi re. 66 In a poorly organized but otherwise insightful and compelling 
opinion the Justices explained that Phra Yot was not in command of the Siamese 
soldiers that had fi red upon the French and Annamite forces:
 It is true that the accused had a higher position in the permanent service than the two 
offi  cers; but his authority extended only to the districts of Kham Kurt and Khammuon 
[sic]. If the accused had acted like this when he fi rst met M. Luce he would have born the 
whole responsibility; but it was otherwise when the accused allowed the Annamite soldiers 
to drive him out of the stockade and to escort him to the frontier. Even if he could get 
away from the authority of M. Grosgurin he could only consider himself under the orders 
of other people, namely, in this case, of Nai Tooi and Nai Plaak. Th ese, again, were acting 
under the order of Luang Vichit Sarasate, who was the civil and military Commissioner at 
Tar Outhene and Kammoun . . . Th e accused could only be considered as a councillor, as 
the soldiers were under the command of the two offi  cers . . . Even, therefore, if the accused 
should have given such orders, the only orders, which could be obeyed, were the orders 
given by the offi  cers. 67 
 Th e Justices also addressed the prosecutor’s allegation, not mentioned in the  acte 
d’information but developed during their closing arguments, that Phra Yot had, 
by his letter to Captain Luce of 23 May 1893, ‘implicitly engaged himself not 
 63  Copy of letter reproduced in ‘Th e Trial of Phra Yot—Ninth Day’ in  Full Report , above n 46, 34. 
 64  Copy of orders reproduced in ‘Th e Trial of Phra Yot—Ninth Day’ in  Full Report , above n 46, 34. 
 65  ‘Th e Trial of Phra Yot—Fourteenth Day’ in  Full Report , above n 46, 57–61. 
 66  ‘Th e Trial of Phra Yot—Fourteenth Day’ in  Full Report , above n 46, 59–61. 
 67  ‘Th e Trial of Phra Yot—Fourteenth Day’ in  Full Report , above n 46, 60. 
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to commit any act of hostility against the French’. 68 Th e Justices rejected this 
interpretation, stating that:
 [I] f Counsel for the Prosecution maintains that [the letter] is a handing over according to 
Treaty, and that [Kham Muon] could not be recovered by force of arms, they have wrongly 
interpreted those words. We must understand the letter to mean that the accused expressed 
his unwillingness to accede to the request of the French, and that he would take measures 
to recover when occasion off ered. Th e letter cannot be considered as binding as a Treaty, as 
Phra Yot had no right to act in this matter for his Government. 69 
 Th e Justices further adduced in dicta that the accused had been acting pursuant 
to the orders of a superior, and was therefore absolved of any legal responsibility:
 Th e soldiers who were examined in Court stated that they acted according to the orders 
of the offi  cers. Even, however, if the accused had to share the responsibility with the two 
offi  cers it can only be said that he acted under the orders of [Luang Vichit] . . . For the aff ray 
itself no individual responsibility exists. 70 
 Finally, in one of the more abstruse sections of the judgment, the Justices suggested 
that Phra Yot’s issuance of the order to fi re was excused as a matter of self-defence 
or duress, and was a reasonable response to the danger faced by the Siamese forces. 
Th us:
 When the offi  cers saw that several Siamese had fallen it became the duty of the soldiers to 
resist. Th ey soon saw, however, that whether they off ered resistance or not they had to die, 
and therefore the fi re was returned. Th e Siamese soldiers were far more numerous than 
the opposing party and the result was what might have been expected. Th e fault does not 
lie with the accused or his men. We are, therefore, unanimously of the opinion that the act 
of the accused, and the two offi  cers was done in strict execution of their duty. 71 
 Th e Justices did not explicitly address the defence submission that the law of war 
applied to the aff ray between France and Siam in Kieng Chek, and that Phra Yot 
had acted entirely consistent with his obligations under international law. 72 Th e 
reluctance of the Justices to rule on this issue is understandable. Th e French had 
maintained that its engagements with Siamese forces and incursions into disputed 
territories had not amounted to declarations of war, 73 and a ruling by a Siamese 
court to the contrary would have endangered the fragile  détente that had prevailed 
between the two powers since October 1893. However, there is little doubt that, 
had the political stakes been lower, the Justices would have resolved this question 
in favour of the accused; throughout the judgment the Justices repeatedly referred 
to French and Annamite forces as ‘armed invaders’ and the ‘attacking party’. 74 
 68  ‘Th e Trial of Phra Yot—Tenth Day’ in  Full Report , above n 46, 37. 
 69  ‘Th e Trial of Phra Yot—Fourteenth Day’ in  Full Report , above n 46, 61. 
 70  ‘Th e Trial of Phra Yot—Fourteenth Day’ in  Full Report , above n 46, 60. 
 71  ‘Th e Trial of Phra Yot—Fourteenth Day’ in  Full Report , above n 46, 60. 
 72  ‘Th e Trial of Phra Yot—Eleventh Day’ in  Full Report , above n 46, 50–1. 
 73  See discussion section V(1) below. 
 74  ‘Th e Trial of Phra Yot—Fourteenth Day’ in  Full Report , above n 46, 60–1. 
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 (IV)  Phra Yot’s Trial before the Franco-Siamese Mixed Court 
 Public opinion on the Special Court’s verdict was split along predictable lines. Th e 
non-French expatriate community in Siam and the Siamese regarded Phra Yot’s 
exoneration as reasonable and the Special Court proceedings as fundamentally 
fair, 75 while the French in Paris and Bangkok perceived the decision as inevitable 
and a blow to ‘all who were hoping that the Franco-Siamese Agreement would lead 
to just satisfaction’. 76 In an interview published in  Le Matin , Le Myre explained 
that he was ‘not at all surprised’ at the verdict given his familiarity with ‘the Asian 
temperament and their approach to interpreting Treaties’, and pledged that the 
‘blatant eff orts of the Siamese Government to support its offi  cials will run afoul of 
our fi rm commitment to demanding just satisfaction’. 77 One high-profi le French 
offi  cial who wished to remain anonymous declared to a correspondent from the 
 Éclair that an ‘ordinary conviction’ would have caused him the ‘deepest amazement’, 
and promised that Phra Yot would be convicted by a mixed tribunal on the basis of 
‘arguments and a surfeit of evidence that will humiliate and shame Siam’. 78 
 (1)  Th e jurisdiction and rules of the Mixed Court 
 Ducos made known his intention to constitute the Article III tribunal one day 
after the Special Court handed down its decision, and on 26 May 1894 the French 
and Siamese ‘mutually consented’ to rules of procedure that established a mixed 
court with jurisdiction over the Kham Muon aff air. 79 Th e Mixed Court was to be 
 75  ‘Th e Trouble in Siam’,  Ashburton Guardian (Ashburton, New Zealand) 22 March 1894; ‘Phra 
Yot’s Case’,  Daily Advertiser (Singapore) 20 June 1894; ‘Th e Phra Yot Trial’,  Daily Advertiser , 4 April 
1894 (Singapore) Page 3. According to Henry Norman, an English journalist, ‘[Prince Bijit’s] special 
talents made him the only possible man to occupy the very diffi  cult post of Presiding Judge at the 
recent State Trial of Pra Yot [sic]. Th roughout the prolonged proceedings his conduct was such as to 
win him the highest praise from all the Europeans who were present’:   Henry  Norman ,  Th e Peoples 
and Politics of the Far East: Travels and Studies in the British, French, Spanish and Portuguese Colonies, 
Siberia, China, Japan, Korea, Siam and Malaya ( London :  T. Fischer Unwin ,  1895 ),  450 . 
 76  FO 881/6586, Inclosure ‘Extracts from the  Matin of 18 and 19 March 1894’, in Phipps to 
Rosebery, 19 March 1894, No. 53. See also FO 881/6586, Inclosure ‘Extracts of the  Éclair of 3 April 
1894’, in Marquis of Duff erin to Kimberley, 2 April 1894, No. 58. One French correspondent sug-
gested that the Special Court had made Phra Yot out to be a ‘great patriot’ as part of a Siamese scheme 
to lay ‘an indictment for persecution and barbarism against France, incite hatred of the French name 
and place Siam under the protection of the British Lion’: FO 881/6586, Inclosure No. 10 ‘Extract 
from the  Courrier d’Haiphong of 17 March 1894’, in No. 78, above n 40. 
 77  No. 53, above n 76. 
 78  No. 58, above n 76. Th is same offi  cial stated that since ‘[i] t would be unwise to count on absolute 
justice in political or international matters even in our own country, we can therefore imagine what 
this kind of justice means in the mind of a Siamese’. 
 79  Although the Constitution of the Mixed Court confi rms that ‘slight alterations’ to (France’s) 
initial draft of the Rules of procedure were made by ‘mutual consent’, there are no documents in the 
French, Belgian or English archives that show which party had input into which rules. ‘First Part—
Constitution of the Mixed Court—Rules of Procedure’ in  Th e Case of Kieng Chek Kham Muon Before 
the Franco-Siamese Mixed Court—Constitution of the Mixed Court and Rules of Procedure—Th e Trial, 
Judgment and Condemnation of Phra Yot (June 1894) 
 < http://www.archive.org/details/caseofkiengchekk00franrich > (accessed 3 March 2013). 
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presided over by two French judges, two Siamese judges and a French President, 
each authorized to ‘ask from the witness or the accused any explanation . . . necessary 
to discover the truth’. 80 Th e accused was entitled to: 
 1)  receive a copy of the  acte d’accusation at least three days in advance of his 
trial; 
 2)  ‘appear free’ before the Justices; 
 3)  the assistance of counsel; 
 4)  receive a faithful translation of the proceedings; 
 5)  respond to the testimony of prosecution witnesses; 
 6)  put questions to a prosecution witness through the President; 
 7)  present exculpatory evidence, including evidence that undermined the cred-
ibility of a prosecution witness. 81 
 Th e Rules also defi ned the crimes over which the Mixed Court would exercise 
jurisdiction (murder, assassination, theft, incendiarism, parricide, infanticide and 
poisoning) and listed the applicable modes of liability, 82 pursuant to which the pros-
ecutor submitted the following  acte d’accusation on 27 May 1894:
 Th e accused Phra Yot Muang Kwang, about 40 years of age, Siamese mandarin . . . , is accused: 
 1)  Of having, at Kieng Chek, been an accomplice in a wilful homicide committed on 
the person of . . . Grosgurin, in provoking by culpable machinations and artifi ces, the said 
homicide; in giving himself to the author or authors instructions for its committal; in 
procuring arms and other means of action, knowing they would be used for that purpose 
and in aiding and knowingly abetting the authors in the acts which prepared, facilitated, 
and consummated it. With this circumstance, that the said homicide was committed with 
premeditation. 
 2)  Of having, under the same circumstances of time and place, and by the same means 
enumerated above, become accomplice of the crime of wilful homicide committed on the 
persons of diverse Annamite militiamen and of the Cambodian interpreter Boon Chan. 
With this circumstance, that the said homicides were committed with premeditation. 
 80  ‘First Part—Constitution of the Mixed Court—Rules of Procedure’ in  Franco-Siamese Mixed 
Court , above n 79, rules 2 and 8. Interestingly, only the President was granted the authority to ‘obtain 
all information . . . necessary to discover the truth’:  ‘First Part—Constitution of the Mixed Court—
Rules of Procedure’ in  Franco-Siamese Mixed Court , rule 9. 
 81  ‘First Part—Constitution of the Mixed Court—Rules of Procedure’ in  Franco-Siamese Mixed 
Court , above n 79, rules 1–4 and 8. Th e accused retained his Cingelese attorney from the national 
proceedings, Mr Tilleke, in addition to the French-speaking M. Duval of Saigon. 
 82  Crimes were listed in Articles 1, 2, 6, 8 and 10. Assassination was defi ned as ‘murder committed 
with premeditation or through ambush’:  ‘First Part—Constitution of the Mixed Court—Rules of 
Procedure’ in  Franco-Siamese Mixed Court , above n 79, Article 2. Although the Rules did not explicitly 
provide for principal liability, the applicability of this mode of liability may be inferred from Article 
4: ‘Accomplices of a crime or an off ence shall incur the same punishment as the authors of such a crime 
or off ence, except when the law will have disposed otherwise.’ Article 5, which defi ned the scope of 
accomplice liability, is noteworthy for its comprehensiveness:
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 3)  Of having, under the same circumstances of time and place, been an accomplice in diverse 
thefts of personal property, eff ects and apparel, arms and munitions, committed to the preju-
dice of the same and of the Annamite militiaman Nguen van Khan and knowingly concealing 
all of part of the articles stolen. 
 4)  Of having, under the same circumstances of time and place, been an accomplice of the 
crime of wilful incendiarism of diverse Laotian huts used for habitation, in giving instructions 
for its committal and knowingly aiding and abetting the authors in the acts which prepared, 
facilitated and consummated it. 83 
 Th e Rules prescribed capital punishment for an accused found guilty of mur-
der, assassination, theft or incendiarism, but permitted the judges to exercise 
their discretion and reduce a death sentence to between fi ve and twenty years hard 
labour if, in their opinion, ‘extenuating circumstances in favour of the Accused’ 
existed. 84 
 (2)  Phra Yot’s re-trial before the Mixed Court 
 Phra Yot’s trial before the Mixed Court, which commenced on 4 June 1894, 
was a theatrical aff air. Th e trial itself was held in the French Embassy, in a room 
guarded by marines armed with loaded rifl es and fi xed bayonets. Entry to the trial 
was granted exclusively to individuals who had received a ticket from the French 
legation, and the accused was transported to and from court in chains. 85 Over the 
course of four days President Mondot (President of the Court of Appeal at Hanoi), 
Judge Cammatte (Councillor of the Court of Appeal at Saigon), Judge Fuynel 
(Procurer of the French Republic at Mytho), Judge Maha Th ibodia and Judge 
Phya Sukari heard the testimony of the accused, Nguen van Khan and six defence 
witnesses. 86 Almost all of the witnesses had already testifi ed or had their statements 
read before the Siamese Special Court, and their evidence before the Mixed Court 
 [Individuals who] [s] hall be punished as accomplices of an action termed crime of off ence: 
 Th ose who by gifts, promises, menaces, abuse of authority or power, culpable machinations 
or artifi ce, shall have provoked such an action. 
 Th ose who shall have procured arms, instruments or any other means employed to commit 
the action, knowing that they were to be employed to commit it. 
 Th ose who knowingly shall have aided or abetted the author or authors of the action, in the 
facts which led up to, or facilitated or prepared it, or those that completed it. 
 83  ‘Second Part—First Sitting’ in  Franco-Siamese Mixed Court , above n 79, 9. 
 84  ‘First Part—Constitution of the Mixed Court—Rules of Procedure’ in  Franco-Siamese Mixed 
Court, above n 79, rule 11 and Article 12. 
 85  FO 881/6628, Scott to Kimberley, 25 June 1894, No. 46 (describing the trial as ‘stagey and melo-
dramatic in the extreme’). Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns, James G. Scott and various Siamese Ministers 
attended the trial. See generally   Walter E.J.  Tips ,  Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns and the Making of Modern 
Siam: Th e Diaries and Letters of King Chulalongkorn’s General Adviser ( Bangkok :  White Lotus,  1996 ), 
 69 ; Scott Diary, above n 45, 62 (journal entry for 4 June 1894). Rolin-Jaequemyns encouraged King 
Chulalongkorn not to attend, arguing that ‘[w] hatever may be the fi nal result, the fact of a Siamese 
subject being tried by foreign judges, is in itself a sad and unfortunate event and it is better that 
the King’s presence should be kept as far as possible from it’: Tips,  Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns , 70. 
 86  Th e Court read into evidence Phra Yot’s letters to Captain Luce and Luang Vichit, as well as Boon 
Chan’s testimony before the Special Court read into evidence, Boon Chan having died in the interim 
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was consistent with the version of events that each had previously provided. Only 
President Mondot’s examination of the accused is noteworthy, not for its particu-
larly eff ective extraction of hitherto undiscovered evidence, but for the President’s 
aggressive style of questioning:
 Q:   Did Grosgurin explain to you why he arrested Luang Anurak? 
 A:  He told me because Luang Anurak had spread certain alarming rumours at Kham Muon 
that the Siamese would return in force. 
 Th e President :  Grosgurin had a perfect right to arrest Luang Anurak after that, in self 
defence, for he was in an unknown country and only had a handful of men whose fi delity 
was doubtful. . . . 
 Q:   Considering that France and Siam were not at war at the time, why did you take such a 
large body of men to ask for the release of Luang Anurak, seeing that Grosgurin and the 
Annamites were living in private houses? 
 A:   I had not at the time the least intention of attacking Grosgurin. I simply went to ask for 
the release of Luang Anurak. 
 Q:   It is quite impossible to believe that Grosgurin who was sick and whose party was the 
weakest would be the fi rst to attack. Th e Siamese witnesses have stated that there were 
at least 100 men surrounding the house. . . . 
 Accused  here stated that after Grosgurin had been told that peace would be broken Luang 
Anurak jumped from the verandah when immediately a shot was fi red from the house 
which killed a soldier from Korat. Several other shots followed and two more men fell 
before the Siamese began fi ring. Th e men of Grosgurin were arrayed at the foot of the 
stairs. Grosgurin was above. 
 Th e President:  Th at version is diffi  cult to believe, all the witnesses have agreed that this was 
not so, in their depositions in Saigon and Bangkok. 87 
 (3)  Th e Mixed Court’s verdict 
 On 13 June 1894 the Aff air of Kham Muon was brought to a close when the 
accused was found guilty by majority (the two Siamese judges refused to sign the 
verdict) as an accomplice to the assassination of Grosgurin and fi fteen Annamite 
soldiers, but acquitted of any thefts and burning that took place during or after the 
gunfi ght. 88 Th e gravamen of the verdict lay in the fact that:
 By [his letter] dated May 28 Phra Yot repudiated the formal engagement contained in the 
letter he had written fi ve days before to Capt. Luce; in breaking thus the compact which he 
between trials:  ‘Second Part—Second Sitting’ in  Franco-Siamese Mixed Court , above n 79, 17. Th e 
Court spent only a little over an hour examining all six defence witnesses: ‘Second Part—Th ird Sitting’ 
in  Franco-Siamese Mixed Court , above n 79, 18–22. 
 87  ‘Second Part—First Sitting’ in  Franco-Siamese Mixed Court , above n 79, 9–13. Th e President 
adopted a decidedly more conciliatory tone with the prosecution’s sole witness, Nguen van 
Khan: ‘Second Part—Second Sitting’ in  Franco-Siamese Mixed Court , above n 79, 14–16. 
 88  ‘Th ird Part—Judgment’ in  Franco-Siamese Mixed Court , above n 79, 37–8.  Le Temps suggested 
that the vote of the Siamese judges could be explained by the fact that the judges were of the same caste 
with the accused: ‘Siam’,  Le Temps (Paris, France) 28 July 1894. 
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had freely made with the French offi  cials without even being able to pretend now that he 
had received at that moment any order, any advice which led to that sudden determination 
he not only committed a disloyal act, he spontaneously and voluntarily assumed the penal 
responsibility of the crimes which would necessarily result as the immediate consequence 
of that provocation. 
 . . . 
 It was [Phra Yot] who caused troops to arrive, who went himself to fetch them at Wieng 
Kratone, and who conducted them to the place where, under his direction and with his 
assistance, they committed the murder which it is the duty of the Court to punish. 89 
 Th e majority recognized Kham Muon as French territory 90 and reasoned that the 
laws of war could not be applied to the case, inasmuch as Convention Article III had 
described the act the Court was charged with examining as ‘ attentat ’ and thereby 
confi rmed that ‘[p] eace reigned between France and Siam’ at the time the crime 
was committed. 91 Th e majority also declined to exonerate the accused on the 
grounds of self-defence, noting that:
 If the law allows the legalisation of an act committed when we are menaced with death, it is 
only in the case in which the imperious necessity of self-preservation makes it a duty. One 
can only resist an aggression; and it is evident that Grosgurin, confi ned to his room by ill-
ness, as is attested by all the witnesses who were near him, surrounded by a small number of 
Annamites, could not for an instant have thought of attacking the numerous armed troops 
which surrounded his house. 92 
 Phra Yot was sentenced to death for the assassinations, but had his sentence com-
muted to twenty years’ hard labour on the grounds that he had not acted with 
the ‘view to gratify . . . cupidity and to satisfy [the] feeling of hatred or personal 
vengeance’ that characterized the ‘ordinary assassin’. 93 
 Th e Siamese, who had always suspected that French judges would be biased 
against the accused, 94 toyed with the idea of refusing to carry out any sentence and 
contemplated ‘forcible resistance’ against the French as early as 10 June 1894, 
several days before the verdict was handed down. 95 But it was France’s decision to 
follow the verdict with a demand that Phra Yot serve his time in a French penal 
colony that cemented Siam’s will to resist. 96 Th e Siamese government expressed its 
willingness to carry out Phra Yot’s punishment on Siamese territory, but categorically 
 89  ‘Th ird Part—Judgment’ in  Franco-Siamese Mixed Court, above n 79, 36–7. Th ese paragraphs 
refl ect the entirety of the Mixed Court’s determination of liability, the remainder of the opinion being 
devoted to a description of the facts of the Aff air. 
 90  ‘Th ird Part—Judgment’ in  Franco-Siamese Mixed Court, above n 79, 35. 
 91  ‘Th ird Part—Judgment’ in  Franco-Siamese Mixed Court, above n 79, 36. 
 92  ‘Th ird Part—Judgment’ in  Franco-Siamese Mixed Court, above n 79, 36. 
 93  ‘Th ird Part—Judgment’ in  Franco-Siamese Mixed Court, above n 79, 37, 39. 
 94  See Letter of 6 June 1894 from Prince Damrong to Rolin-Jaequemyns in Tips,  Gustave 
Rolin-Jaequemyns , above n 85, 70 (in which Damrong writes of his feeling that Phra Yot’s fate ‘has been 
decided before [the trial]. Th e verdict has been guilty.’). 
 95  FO 17/1222, Scott to Kimberley, 10 June 1894, No. 37. See also FO 881/6586, Scott to Kimberly, 
10 June 1894, No. 99. 
 96  Damrong wrote to Rolin-Jaequemyns ‘the news which reached me today that they want to take 
[Phra Yot] away from his native land is too much to bear. I quite agree with the attitude taken by my 
brother [Prince Devawongse]. Th ere is really no other alternative, in my judgement, but to make a 
03_9780199671144c3.indd   68 10/3/2013   3:58:01 PM
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in 
any way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
A Supranational Criminal Tribunal for the Colonial Era 69
refused to allow the former Commissioner to be removed from Siam to a place 
where ‘all language, climate, ideas, would be totally unknown, unintelligible, and 
foreign to him, and where he would lose, from the fi rst moment, any prospect of 
ever seeing again his country, his friends and his own family’. 97 Only the timely 
intervention of the British Foreign Offi  ce prevented the fragile peace that prevailed 
between Siam and France from breaking; under a British-brokered plan Phra Yot 
served his sentence in a Siamese prison, and a member of the French legation visited 
him periodically to check that his punishment was duly carried out. 98 
 (V)  An Assessment of the Mixed Court 
 Situating the Franco-Siamese Mixed Court in the dominant contemporary narra-
tive of historic international criminal law, which portrays the international justice 
enterprise as indelibly righteous and even-handed, is not an easy or straightfor-
ward task. Th e Mixed Court is redolent of ‘victor’s justice’ and is inexorably linked 
to the exploitive institution of colonialism, and Phra Yot’s treatment at the hands 
of the French instinctively off ends our contemporary notions of due process. 
Moreover, the potentially redeeming qualities of the Court are diffi  cult to defi ni-
tively characterize as such in the absence of impartial records. Were the Rules of 
Procedure that aff orded the accused basic rights a hard-won victory by the Siamese 
or a cynical indulgence by French plenipotentiaries confi dent that their Court 
appointees would render a verdict favourable to France? Did the French judges 
perceive themselves to have transcended any quid pro quo associated with their 
appointment and to have fairly judged the accused? Was the creation of the Mixed 
Court inspired by the proliferation of neutral inter-state arbitral tribunals that 
predated it, or was it an extension of the resented and magisterial ‘consular court’ 
system maintained and operated by the centres of colonial power throughout their 
respective spheres of infl uence? Although the biased, fragmented and, in some 
cases, incomplete papers maintained in the French, Belgian and British archives 
provide no defi nitive answers to these questions, in this section I will make a very 
preliminary attempt to describe the relevance of the Mixed Court to modern ICL 
in a manner that is consistent with the available evidence. 
stand and take the consequences’: Letter of 15 June 1894 from Prince Damrong to Rolin-Jaequemyns, 
in Tips,  Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns , above n 85, 70. 
 97  FO 881/6628, Inclosure No. 7 ‘Prince Devawongse to M. Pilinski’, in Scott to Kimberley, 18 
June 1894, No. 27. Devawongse threatened to resign rather than hand over the former Commissioner, 
and King Chulalongkorn was prepared to resist the French on this point, even if it cost him the 
throne: No. 46, above n 85; FO 881/6586, Scott to Kimberley, 16 June 1894, No. 106. 
 98  No. 46, above n 85. See also FO 881/6586, Inclosure ‘Memorandum’, in Marquis of Duff erin 
to Kimberley, 22 June 1894, No. 112. King Chulalongkorn, with the permission of the French, 
pardoned Phra Yot in 1898: Tips, above n 85, 133. Phra Yot has been memorialized with a statue in 
the Nakhom Phanom province of Th ailand, an exhibit related to his case in the Court Museum in 
Bangkok and through the play ‘Pra Yod [sic] of Muang Kwang’ by Sompop Chandraprabha. 
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 (1)  Th e character of the Court and the genesis of complementarity 
 Impressing the ‘international court’ appellation on the Mixed Court has implications 
beyond the theoretical; the more international the Court is perceived to be, the 
more signifi cance will be ascribed to its existence and jurisprudence. 
 Th e strongest argument in favour of characterizing the Court as an international 
entity would be that the judges did not completely foreclose the possibility of applying 
the international law of war to the proceedings. Recall that the judges rejected the 
laws of war on the grounds that the 1893 Convention purportedly established that 
a state of peace prevailed between the France and Siam. Th is reasoning suggests that 
the judges believed they could have employed the law of war but for the Convention 
language to the contrary, and by extension that the Court, with its apparent access 
to law set forth outside of the four corners of its constituent agreement, was more 
international than not. 
 To be sure, this interpretation has a certain intuitive appeal. Th e confl ict between 
France and Siam falls squarely within the modern conception of war, and crimes 
of the sort Phra Yot was accused of perpetrating are specifi cally prohibited by 
contemporary  jus in bello . It must be recalled, however, that in 1893 armed engage-
ments, even engagements between two militias acting under the authority of their 
respective governments, were often still considered mere ‘acts of reprisal’ (measures 
of forcible coercion short of war to which the laws of war did not apply). 99 Indeed, 
neither France nor Siam ever acknowledged that they were engaged in a ‘war’. 
France explicitly referred to the existence a ‘state of reprisals’ between the two adver-
saries in its 29 July 1893 Statement of Blockade, 100 and there is no indication that 
the Siamese deduced that a state of war existed from the fact that French military 
operations had been carried out in Siamese territory. 101 While it is tempting to 
conclude that the parties intended to terminate a state of war from the fact that 
the October 1893 Treaty was referred to as one of ‘Peace and Friendship’ in the 
Convention of the same date, there is precedent against drawing this inference. 102 
 99  See  William J.  Ronan ,  ‘English and American Courts and the Defi nition of War’ ,  American 
Journal of International Law ,  31 ( 1937 ),  649 . 
 100  FO 881/6749, Inclosure No. 3 ‘Notifi cation of Blockade, dated 29 July 1893’, in Admiralty to 
Foreign Offi  ce, 8 September 1893, No. 394. Louis Dartige Du Fournet, Commander of the  Comète 
 (one of two French ships to have exchanged fi re with Siamese ground forces in July 1893 in what would 
come to be known as the Paknam Incident) repeatedly suggested that France and Siam were not in a 
state of war:   Louis Dartige  du Fournet ,  Journal d’un Commandant de La Comète: China-Siam-Japon 
(1892–1893) ( Plon ,  1915 )  234 ,  237 ,  249 (journal entries for 20 July 1893, 25 July 1893 and 3 August 
1893). 
 101  MAE, Siam 16, Enclosure No. 1  ‘Note Verbal’ summarizing 2 June 1893 meeting between 
Devawongse and Pavie, in Dispatch from Bangkok, 25 June 1893, No. 109 (in which Devawongse 
inquires of Pavie whether Siam’s capture of France’s Captain Th oreux was a lawful response to an act 
of war on the part of France); Tips,  Siam’s Struggle , above n 10, 91 (journal entry for 14 July 1893) 
(in which Rolin-Jaequemyns describes how he explained to the King that the two French gunboats 
that had been sent to Bangkok in response to the Aff air would abstain from attacking Siam as the two 
countries were not offi  cially at war). 
 102  See  Cushing, Adm. v United States , 22 Ct. Cl. 1 (USA, 1886). See also  French Spoilation Claims: 
Message from the President of the United States Transmitting a Communication from the Secretary of State, 
Accompanied by a Report of Somerville P. Tuck, in Relation to French Spoilation Claims (Govt. Print. 
Off . 1888), 12. 
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Th e superior view is that the Court’s insinuation that it had the power, in theory, 
to draw upon the law of war amounts to specious overreaching. Had the judges 
actually applied international law, it would have been to acts that the relevant 
states acknowledged were not governed by that body of law, a result that is counter-
intuitive and against a great deal of coeval authority. 103 
 Although the Mixed Court lacks for the most distinctive hallmark of interna-
tionality (the ability to apply international law) it cannot be understood as a 
singularly French or Siamese institution. 104 Th e ad hoc nature of the Rules and 
their appearance in a legal instrument agreed to by two states, the presence of 
judges from two states on the tribunal, 105 and Siam’s agreement (however coerced) 
to ‘mix’ its jurisdiction with that of France to try the purported criminal Phra Yot, 
suggests that the Mixed Court is best understood as the fi rst modern supranational 
criminal tribunal. It is this last component, the pooling of jurisdiction, that is 
undoubtedly one of the Mixed Court’s most noteworthy features, as it denotes a 
shift from restrained notions of criminal jurisdiction towards the more expansive 
and fl exible conceptions and practices that would come to characterize the fi eld in 
subsequent centuries. 106   
 103  See eg,  Janson v Driefontein Consolidated Mines, Ltd . [1902] AC 484 (‘However critical may be the 
condition of aff airs . . . so long as the government of the State abstains from declaring or making war 
or accepting a hostile challenge, there is peace.’);  Gray, Adm. v United States , 21 Ct. Cl., 340 (USA, 
1886) (Finding that a state of war did not exist between France and the United States where ‘[t] here 
was no declaration of war; the tribunals of each country were open to the other—an impossibility 
were war in progress; . . . there were retaliation and reprisal, but such . . . have often occurred between 
nations at peace; there was a near approach to war, but at no time was one of the nations turned into 
an enemy of the other in such a manner that every citizen of the one became the enemy of every citizen 
of the other’);  Cushing, Adm. v United States , 22 Ct. Cl. 1 (USA, 1886) (Holding that ‘Congress did 
not consider war as existing, for every aggressive statute looked to the possibility of war in the future, 
making no provision for war in the present, and France, our supposed enemy, absolutely denied the 
existence of war.’);  Bishop v Jones & Petty , 28 Tex. 294 (1886) (in which the Supreme Court of Texas 
held that ‘[h]ostile attacks and armed invasions of territory or jurisdiction of a nation, accompanied 
by the destruction of life and property by offi  cers acting under the sanction and authority of their 
governments, however great and fl agrant provocations to war, are often atoned for and adjusted without 
its ensuing.’). 
 104  In fact, the substantive law applied by the Court was based on French law. A comparison between, 
for example, the defi nition of the crime of assassination found in Article 2 of the Rules of the Court 
and analogous defi nitions in Article 296 of the French  Code pénal de 1810 , Article 101 of the Lieber 
Code (1863), Article 13 of the Brussels Declaration (1874) and Article 8 of the Oxford Manual 
(1880) establishes that this portion of the text was inspired by the French statute, as opposed to the 
more expansive and comprehensive articulations of the crime found in the pre-existing codifi cations 
of the  jus in bello . Th e defi nition of the crime of arson that appears in Article 11 of the Rules is similar 
to Article 434 of the  Code pénal , though it appears to have been modifi ed to fi t the particulars of the 
crime Phra Yot was accused of perpetrating (ie, house-burning). 
 105  Th e trial record refl ects that the Siamese judges participated only twice in the day-to-day 
proceedings of the trial, at one point attempting to clarify the meaning of some physical evidence for 
the Accused, and later to question a witness. ‘Second Part—First Sitting’ in Franco-Siamese Mixed 
Court, above n 79, 13; ‘Second Part—Second Sitting’ in Franco-Siamese Mixed Court, above n 79, 
17. Ultimately, however, the minority status and nominal participation of the Siamese judges erodes 
but does not extirpate the Court’s veneer of supranationality. 
 106  For example, the  Einsatzgruppen court justifi ed the existence of the Nuremberg Military Tribunals 
as a valid exercise of pooled jurisdiction, explaining that ‘if a single national may legally take jurisdiction 
in such instances, with what more reason may a number of nations agree, in the interests of justice, 
to try alleged violations of the laws of war’.  US v Ohlendorf et al (‘ Einsatzgruppen Case ’ ) , reprinted in 
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 Remarkably, the Convenion also anticipated the basic ‘complementarity’ framework 
that is a hallmark of international crimes prosecutions in the modern era. Convention 
Article III on its face  presumed that a Siamese national court would dutifully fulfi ll its 
obligation (regrettably articulated as an obligation to ‘punish’ as opposed to ‘try’) 
while creating a supranational authority capable of re-adjudicating the matter in the 
exceptional event that domestic proceedings were defi cient. Although the poten-
tially revolutionary impact of this arrangement went unrecognized at the time—the 
Mixed Court was neither mentioned in contemporaneous issues of the  Revue de 
droit international et de législation compare or the  Revue générale de droit interna-
tional public , nor discussed by the delegates at the subsequent meetings of  l'Institut 
de Droit international or the  International Law Association— the Court’s creation 
pursuant to an instrument that (even insincerely) acknowledged the primacy of a 
domestic court marks a point of infl ection in the development of the idea that a 
supranational tribunal can be vested with supplemental jurisdiction. 
 (2)  Th e birth of international due process 
 Because the Mixed Court is so distinctively ‘modern’ it feels natural to bring our 
present-day expectations about the nature and quality of international justice to 
bear upon the Court. From the perspective of today’s reader, the record of the Mixed 
Court’s operation is rife with questionable decisions and procedural shortcomings. 
Th e most obvious of these are the seemingly brief time (one week) the Defence was 
aff orded to prepare its case, the combative and heavy-handed attitude demonstrated 
by the President of the Court as he questioned the Accused, and the Court’s super-
fi cial analysis with respect to the inapplicability of the Law of War and the guilt of 
the defendant. 
 It is possible, however, to explain each of these ‘fl aws’ without recourse to theories 
of deceptiveness or tendentiousness. Th e 1808  Code d’instruction criminelle  (‘the 
 Code ’), which was applied throughout France and French Cochinchina 107 (and with 
which the three French judges would have been most familiar), did not oblige 
criminal judges to maintain an appearance of impartiality during trial proceedings. 
Instead, the  Code vested criminal judges with broad discretion to take any action at 
trial considered ‘useful to discovering the truth’, subject only to the limits of their 
honour and conscience. 108 No French observer would have expected President 
Mondot to maintain an impartial façade if his judicial instincts suggested he do 
otherwise. Nor would the insouciantly brief nature of the verdict have shocked 
French citizens. While the  Code obliged judges to submit written opinions, the 
French never adopted the practice of issuing lengthy or discursive decisions in the 
IV Trial of War Criminals before Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10 
(US GPO, 1951), at 492. 
 107  Peter  Zinoman ,  Th e Colonial Bastille: A History of Imprisonment in Vietnam, 1862–1940 ( Berkeley, 
CA :  University of California Press,  2001 ),  40. 
 108  Code d’instruction criminelle de 1808 (France), Article 268. 
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manner of their common-law counterparts. 109 It is also to the credit of the Mixed 
Court that the accused had seven days to prepare his case, as the  Code and the Rules 
of the Court aff orded the Accused a mere three. 110 Lastly, while hardly constituting 
defi nitive evidence that the French judges excercised their judicial duties without 
bias, it is noteworthy that they commuted Phra Yot’s death sentence, a decision that 
is reported as having been unpopular with the French community in Bangkok. 111 
 Moreover, while the decision to decline to apply the laws of war to an armed 
aff ray between two state militias may seem prejudicial today, particularly when that 
body of law may have favoured the accused, 112 it must be recalled that in 1894 the 
line between reprisals and war was fl uid, and many eighteenth- and nineteenth- 
century courts struggled to develop a test that could reliably distinguish between 
the two states. 113 While it is true that at the time of Phra Yot’s trial a number 
of foreign courts had developed and applied multipart tests that accounted for 
the ‘objective realities’ associated with the confl agration at issue, including the 
intent of the parties, the degree of armed resistance to the ‘challenge’ issued by 
an intervening state and the scale and duration of the hostilities, judges of a more 
conservative disposition persisted throughout the nineteenth century in looking 
only to whether an offi  cial declaration of war had been issued by at least one of the 
belligerent parties. 114 Taking into account the the unsettled status of the law, the 
Mixed Court’s ultimate eschewal of the  jus in bello in favour of the ad-hoc law set 
forth in the Rules should not of itself be regarded as evidence of bias. 
 Of course there are other indications that the French judges, ‘if indeed they had 
not defi nite orders, came full of the conviction that if they did not fi nd Phra Yot 
guilty and punish him they would be found wanting themselves by their country-
men, and would have suff ered accordingly’. 115 Le Myre had openly treated the 
verdict as a foregone conclusion, and the French judges that heard Phra Yot’s case 
enjoyed prestigious positions in France’s colonial possessions. British chargé James 
G. Scott reported that the President openly scoff ed at the defence witnesses before 
they had even begun to testify, displayed the ‘strongest animus’ towards the accused 
and excluded his Siamese co-adjutors from deliberations. 116 Moreover, it is inherently 
diffi  cult to regard as unprejudiced a court that took a little over an hour to examine 
 109  William D.  Popkin ,  Evolution of the Judicial Opinion: Institutional and Individual Styles ( New York, 
NY :  NYU Press,  2007 ),  38 . 
 110  ‘First Part—Constitution of the Mixed Court—Rules of Procedure’, above n 79, rule 1;  Code , 
above n 108, Article 184. Moreover, as the factual record was well developed at the fi rst trial, the 
judges, Plenipotentiaries and parties may simply have assumed that additional time to prepare was 
unlikely to result in the discovery of additional evidence. 
 111  No. 27, above n 97. 
 112  ‘Th e Trial of Phra Yot—Eleventh Day’ in  Full Report , above n 46, 50–1. 
 113  See for example  United States v Plenty Horses (1891), in which the existence of a state of war 
between the Lakota Nation and the United States was contentiously debated:   Gary D.  Solis ,  Th e Law 
of Armed Confl ict: International Humanitarian Law in War ( Cambridge :  Cambridge University Press, 
 2010 ),  30 . 
 114  See above n 103. 
 115  No. 46, above n 85. 
 116  No. 27, above n 97. Th e trial transcript confi rms that the President disparaged at least one defence 
witness; as Honiu Visot took the stand, the President remarked that he ‘did not appear [to be] very 
intelligent’: ‘Second Part—Th ird Sitting’ in  Franco-Siamese Mixed Court , above n 79, 21. Th ere may 
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all of the defence witnesses, and originated in a convention signed under duress 
and an Article that  prima facie presupposed the guilt of the accused. 
 Although it is unlikely that the cloud of suspicion hanging over the trial will ever 
fully dissipate, it is commendable that the Rules of the Court aff orded Phra Yot more 
rights than  any enacted or proposed international legal instrument with a criminal 
component drafted prior to the 1944 Draft Convention for the Establishment of 
a United Nations War Crimes Court. 117 Regardless of any structural or procedural 
defects that marred Phra Yot’s actual trial, the Rules of the Mixed Court,  qua Rules, 
represented a major stepping stone towards the complete internationalization of the 
principle that an individual brought before a criminal tribunal is entitled to a fair 
trial and the benefi ts of codifi ed procedural protections. 
 (3)  Th e Mixed Court and the cultivation of new substantive norms 
 Rolin-Jaequemyns’ objections to the creation of a Mixed Court, raised during the 
negotiations between Devawongse and the French Plenipotentiary, mark the fi rst 
time that the legality of a supranational criminal court was challenged on the grounds 
(1) that one of the state signatories to the establishing treaty lacked the authority to 
delegate its criminal jurisdiction to such a court; and (2) that bringing an accused 
before a new tribunal with retroactive jurisdiction over ‘past crimes or off ences’ 
would amount to a serious violation of their rights ( nullum crimen ,  nulla poena sine 
have been similar incidents that simply went unrecorded, as there is some indication that the 
transciptionist or publisher may have elected, for reasons of their own, to provide a less than complete 
picture of the trial. For example, during his closing arguments defence counsel M. Duval responded to 
the President’s (alleged) insinuation off ered ‘in the course of [the] debates’ that defence witnesses were 
‘repeating a lesson learnt by heart’, yet the President is nowhere recorded as having made any such 
insinuation: ‘Second Part—Fourth Sitting’ in  Franco-Siamese Mixed Court , above n 79, 29. 
 117  United National, Draft Convention for the Establishment of a United Nations War Crimes 
Court (30 September 1944) Article 15, reprinted in  Historical Survey of the Question of International 
Criminal Jurisdiction , UN Doc. A/CN.4/7/Rev. 1 (1949), 112. 
 Gustave Moyneir’s 1872 proposal for an international criminal court aff orded broad discretion to 
individual trial panels in determining the rules of procedure they would apply:    Christopher  Hall , 
 ‘Th e fi rst proposal for a permanent international criminal court’ ,  International Review of the Red Cross , 
 322 ( 1998 ),  57 . Th e treaties establishing the nineteenth-century anti-slavery ‘mixed courts of justice’, 
which lacked criminal jurisdiction over the crews of slave vessels but had the authority to remit crew-
members to their home country to face domestic criminal proceedings, did not provide procedural 
protections for the crews of seized ships, but did require that judges and arbiters take an oath to judge 
fairly and with impartiality. See eg Treaty Between the United States of America and Great Britain, for 
the Abolition of the African Slave Trade, signed 7 April 1863, 12 Stat 1125 (entered into force 25 May 
1862). See also   Jenny  Martinez ,  ‘Anti-Slavery Courts and the Dawn of International Human Rights 
Law’ ,  Yale Law Journal ,  117 ( 2008 ),  591 . 
 In January 1919 the British Committee of Inquiry into the Breaches of the Laws of War called for 
the creation of an international tribunal to try ‘enemy persons alleged to have been guilty of off ences 
against the laws and customs of war’. Although the British proposal established minimum procedural 
protections to which the accused would be entitled, the Allies, acting through the Commission on the 
Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties, however, eventually agreed 
only to suggest the creation of an international tribunal authorized to ‘determine its own [rules of ] 
procedure’: CAB 24/72, First Interim Report from the Committee of Inquiry into the Breaches of the 
Laws of War, 13 January 1919, 16. ‘Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and 
on Enforcement of Penalties’,  American Journal of International Law , 14 (1920), 122. 
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praevia lege poenali ). Additionally, it was only the second time that trial before a 
supranational court had been disparaged as a breach of an individual’s right to be 
tried by a court of their home country ( jus de non evocando ), the fi rst being the trial 
of von Hagenbach before a twenty-eight judge panel at Breisach over four hundred 
years before. 118 Although these objections (regrettably) were not introduced during 
the trial and therefore were not addressed in the verdict, the establishment of the 
Mixed Court implicitly affi  rms the precepts that states can pool their criminal 
jurisdiction, that the principle of legality does not proscribe an  ex post facto supra-
national court tasked with examining violations of  jus gentium from ruling on the 
individual criminal responsibility of an accused, 119 and that  jus de non evocando 
does not preclude a trial before judges of a supranational criminal jurisdiction. 
 Th e Mixed Court is also notable as the fi rst distinctively Westphalian suprana-
tional tribunal 120 to apply the then-nascent doctrines of participative liability and 
command responsibility, 121 as well as to consider motive a mitigating circumstance 
in the imposition of sentence. 122 Alas, the judges’ reasoning is too opaque, their incli-
nation to intermingle discussions of fact with fi ndings on liability and sentencing 
too pronounced, their verdict too brief and their impartiality in too much doubt to 
ascribe much meaningful precedential value to any of their scant legal fi ndings. 
 (VI)  Conclusion 
 In light of the international criminal lawyer’s voracious appetite for precedent and 
the sheer number of successful and unsuccessful attempts to create international 
courts since 1893, it is shocking that the Mixed Court has not already assumed 
 118  Robert  Cryer ,  Prosecuting International Crimes:  Selectivity and the International Criminal Law 
Regime ( Cambridge :  Cambridge University Press,  2005 ),  19 . 
 119  Th e French considered Phra Yot’s actions a violation of  jus gentium but not a violation of the laws 
of war: see above section V(1) and n 15. 
 120  See ‘Th ird Part—Judgment’ in  Franco-Siamese Mixed Court , above n 79, 37. Von Hagenbach was 
tried before twenty-eight judges representing diff erent political entities (principally city states) in the 
Upper Rhine. Th ese political entities were not ‘states’ in the Westphalian sense and their relationship 
with the Holy Roman Empire (and by extension their status and the status of the von Hagenbach 
court in international law) is contested:  see   Timothy  McCormack ,  From Sun Tzu to the Sixth 
Committee: Th e Evolution of an International Criminal Law Regime in  Timothy L.H.  McCormack and 
 Gerry J.  Simpson (eds),  Th e Law of War Crimes: National and International Approaches ( Boston, MA 
and Leiden :  Martinus Nijhoff ,  1997 ),  38 ;   George  Schwarzenberger ,  International Law as Applied in 
International Courts and Tribunals ( London :  Stevens & Sons,  1968 ),  466 . 
 121  Th e Rules of the Court blended these two modes of liability by providing for command responsi-
bility only to the extent that an individual who ‘abused authority or power’ qualifi ed as an accomplice 
to a crime: ‘Second Part—First Sitting’ in  Franco-Siamese Mixed Court , above n 79, 9; ‘First Part’ in 
 Franco-Siamese Mixed Court , above n 79, Article 5. 
 122  Th e judges did not clarify whether it was Phra Yot’s desire to follow the Commissioner’s orders or 
his goal of ejecting the French soldiers from Kham Muon that warranted mitigation. For an example 
of a contemporary international court adopting a similar approach to mitigating circumstances and 
sentencing, see International Criminal Court R.P. & Evid. Rule 145 (instructing the Chambers of the 
International Criminal Court to account for inter alia ‘the degree of participation of the convicted 
person’ and ‘the degree of intent’ during sentencing). 
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the same totemic status as the trial of von Hagenbach. How has the Mixed Court 
slipped through the cracks?  123 
 R. John Pritchard, writing on the similarly neglected international crimes trials 
that followed the Great Powers intervention in Crete in 1898, has theorized that 
the Allies downplayed their experiences with international criminal law in an eff ort 
to conform to the anti-international trial stance maintained by the United States at 
the close of World War I. 124 Th is theory is not entirely implausible, as there is some 
evidence that suggests that the Mixed Court was at one time considered worthy 
of remembrance. Th ere is tantalizing hint, for example, in the form of an 1895 
 Sydney Morning Herald article discussing the potential criminal liability of Chinese 
offi  cials for the massacre of European and American missionaries, that the Mixed 
Court briefl y came to stand for the (then novel) proposition that the de facto 
immunity political fi gures implicated in mass crimes directed at foreign citizens 
enjoyed before domestic courts should be circumvented with fair and impartial 
international tribunals. 125 Th ere is also a passing reference to the Mixed Court in a 
1931  Recueil des Cours entry on municipal courts, state responsibility and denials 
of justice, implying that the Court remained relevant to international law experts 
even after the turn of the century. 126   
 Lacking a legacy, it falls to the current generation of international lawyers to 
bestow one upon the Court. Certainly there is no shortage of material to work 
with. Th e motifs of imperialism, intercultural enmity, fairness and accountability 
run through the story of the Mixed Court, as they do through the competing 
narratives interested parties have associated with twentieth and twenty-fi rst cen-
tury international judicial institutions, and the Mixed Court, as a treaty-based and 
statutorily-regulated supranational judicial machine applying ad hoc law, is readily 
identifi able as direct forerunner of these more ambitious and powerful successors. 
With this in mind, it is clear that the most interesting chapters on the Mixed Court 
remain to be written. 
 123  None of the proposals for the creation of international tribunals that followed WWI and WWII 
so much as mentioned the Franco-Siamese Mixed Court. See generally  Historical Survey , above n 117; 
‘Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War’ above n 117; Committee of Inquiry, 
above n 117. 
 124  R.  John Pritchard ,  International Humanitarian Intervention and Establishment of an International 
Jurisdiction over Crimes against Humanity:  the National and International Military Trials in Crete 
in 1898 in  John  Carey ,  Willian V.  Dunlap ,  R.  John Pritchard (eds),  International Humanitarian 
Law: Origins, Challenges, Prospects ( Ardsley, NY :  Transnational Publishers, Inc.  2003 )  80–1 . 
 125  ‘Th e Massacres in China’  Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney, Australia), 7 August 1895 (in which an 
anonymous European resident in Foochow called for the chief offi  cials of the province to ‘be brought 
to formal trial before a mixed tribunal, as was the case with Phra Yot . . . Let these men be tried in the 
some way, before a tribunal in which representatives of China, Great Britain, France, and the United 
States sit as Judges. If guilt cannot be brought home, well and good, but if it be shown that they 
instigated the riots . . . let sentence be passed upon them adequate to their off ence’.). 
 126  Jacques  Dumas ,  ‘La Responabilite des Etats a raison des crimes et des Delits commis sur leur 
territoire au prejudice d’etrangers’ ,  Receuil des Cours ,  36 ( 1931 ),  200 . 
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 Th e Ottoman State Special Military 
Tribunal for the Genocide of the 
Armenians: ‘Doing Government Business’ 
 Jennifer  Balint * 
 Legal stories are often buried. Political and social processes subvert and suppress the 
fi ndings and processes of law. What begins as an important authoritative statement 
of harm becomes hidden. We see many cases of this. With the political settlement 
between the new state of Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, for example, the international 
crimes prosecutions initiated in Bangladesh in the wake of the 1971 war of secession 
were derailed and the proposed tribunal aborted. 1 Another hidden story has been 
the  in absentia trials of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary at the end of the Khmer Rouge 
regime which, despite their importance to many victims at the time, due to the 
Cold War context and as political trials were shunned by the international community. 2 
In Australia, the 1881 Parliamentary Board of Inquiry into the management of 
the Coranderrk Aboriginal station in the Australian state of Victoria that ruled in 
 *  Note: the spelling of names, places and terms follows the materials used, which are translations 
from original documents, resulting in some variations with diff erent authors. Some authors refer to 
Cemal and others to Kemal. Bey and Pasa are used interchangeably as titles. Spellings can depend 
on whether the Ottoman or modern Turkish spelling is followed (for example, place names can 
be diff erent—Baiburt or Bayburt). Some authors refer to the Attorney-General, and some to the 
Procuror-General. 
 1  Th e new Bangladeshi government passed an Act to ‘provide for the detention, prosecution and 
punishment of persons for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes under 
international law’ (International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973). Special tribunals were established 
to try Bangladeshi citizens who had collaborated with the Pakistani armed forces. National prosecu-
tions commenced at the end of January 1972, under the Bangladesh Collaborators (Special Tribunals) 
Order:  International Crimes (Tribunal) Act 1973. A  tribunal comprising Bangladeshi Supreme 
Court justices was constituted. Th ese proceedings are now being resurrected. See further,  Bina 
 D’Costa and  Sarah  Hossein ,  ‘Redress for Sexual Violence before the International Crimes Tribunal 
in Bangladesh: Lessons from History, and Hopes for the Future’ ,  Criminal Law Forum ,  21 ( 2010 ), 
 331–59 . 
 2  Th e fi rst decree passed by the new People’s Revolutionary Council of Kampuchea after the over-
throw of the Khmer Rouge by Vietnam in 1979 was Decree-Law No 1, ‘providing for the setting up 
in Phnom Penh of a People’s Revolutionary Tribunal to judge the genocide crimes committed by the 
Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique’: International Covenants on Human Rights,  Letter dated 4 October 1979 
from the Permanent Representative of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to the United Nations addressed 
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favour of local Aboriginal residents in their eff orts to stay on the land, was subsumed 
under political developments that saw the enactment of legislation known as the 
Half-Caste Acts and the subsequent breaking up of the station. 3 Another example is 
the judgment by a state court in Australia that found genocide had been committed 
in the course of British colonization, yet that judgment has failed to enter public 
consciousness. 4 Stories of injustice recognized by law, yet hidden. 
 Th ese fi ndings of state crime, of genocide and crimes against humanity, are often 
contested by the state. Legal statements of state-perpetrated harm are the most 
disputed stories, as they go to the core of state identity and nationhood. Th e case of 
the Ottoman Courts-Martial established in the wake of World War I to prosecute 
the genocide of the Armenians, with an estimated sixty-three trials run, yet abandoned 
due to the rise of Kemalism, is a key illustration of this. What had been a recognized 
and mourned event by the Ottoman state became, through the changed political 
situation in the formation of modern Turkey, a denied and disputed genocide, with 
the trials subsequently forgotten. Th ese trials both tell a mostly untold story, that of 
the Armenian genocide, as well as being a hidden story themselves. 
 Modern-day Turkey has waged such a campaign of denialism that it has been 
mostly left to the Armenian community to remember the genocide perpetrated 
against its members from 1915–1918. 5 Claims have been made that the deportations 
to the Secretary-General , UN Doc.A/C.3/34/1, New York: United Nations, 1979. Th e former Prime 
Minister Pol Pot and his deputy Ieng Sary were tried  in absentia and found guilty of genocide by the 
Revolutionary People’s Tribunal of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea. See People’s Revolutionary 
Tribunal, Held in Phnom Penh for the Trial of the Crime of Genocide Committed by the Pol 
Pot-Ieng Sary Clique, Ministry of Information, Press and Cultural Aff airs of the People’s Republic of 
Kampuchea, Phnom Penh, August 1979. 
 3  Th e 1881 Inquiry was established by Victoria’s Chief-Secretary. Th e nine commissioners sat for 
two and a half months. Twenty-one of the sixty-nine witnesses who were examined were Aboriginal. 
Th is story has been resurrected recently through the Minutes of Evidence project, an Australia Research 
Council collaboration between the University of Melbourne and artists, researchers, education experts 
and community members to promote new modes of publicly engaging with historical and structural 
injustice through performance, education and research, including the verbatim theatre production 
 Coranderrk: We Will Show the Country which uses the record of this inquiry. See further at < http://
minutesofevidence.com/ > and  Jennifer  Balint ,  Julie  Evans ,  Nesam  McMillan ,  Giordano  Nanni and 
 Melodie  Reynolds ,  ‘Th e  Minutes of Evidence Project: Creating Collaborative Fields of Engagement 
with the Past and Present’ , in  Lynette  Russell and  Leigh  Boucher (eds),  Governance, Race and the 
‘Aboriginal Problem’ in Colonial Victoria 1851–1900 , (forthcoming:  Aboriginal History Inc. and ANU 
E Press ,  2013 ) . 
 4  Justice Crispin of the Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court found, in proceedings initiated 
by members of the Aboriginal Tent Embassy (Wadjularbinna Nulyarimma, Isobel Coe, Billy Craigie 
and Robbie Th orpe):  ‘Th ere is ample evidence to satisfy me that acts of genocide were committed 
during the colonisation of Australia’:  Re Th ompson; Ex parte Nulyarimma (1998) 136 ACTR 9. See 
further,  Jennifer  Balint ,  ‘Stating Genocide in Law: Th e Aboriginal Embassy and the ACT Supreme 
Court’ ,  Th e Aboriginal Tent Embassy: Sovereignty, Black Power, Land Rights and the State , in  Gary  Foley , 
 Andrew  Schaap and  Edwina  Howell (eds) ( Routledge ,  2013 ) . 
 5  Th e Turkish government has sent out reams of books and pamphlets countering the genocide, as 
well as fi nancing public propaganda campaigns and funding (and disrupting) research. See  Richard 
G.  Hovannisian ,  ‘Th e Armenian Genocide and Patterns of Denial’ , in  Richard G.  Hovannisian (ed), 
 Th e Armenian Genocide in Perspective ( New Brunswick and London :  Transaction Publishers ,  1998 ), 
 111–33 ;  Roger  Smith ,  ‘Denials of the Armenian Genocide’ , in  Israel W.  Charny (ed),  Encyclopedia of 
Genocide ( Santa Barbara, CA :  ABC-CLIO  1999 ),  161–6 . Smith relates how a conference in Tel Aviv 
04_9780199671144c4.indd   78 10/3/2013   4:00:13 PM
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in 
any way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
Th e Ottoman State Special Military Tribunal 79
(the main feature of the genocide) were a ‘wartime necessity’ (yet communities away 
from the war zone also faced deportation) 6 or that the Armenians were an internal 
threat (yet the Courts-Martial in its indictment noted that ‘the deportations [rep-
resented] neither a military necessity, nor a punitive disciplinary measure’, 7 and 
documentary evidence gathered by the Tribunal also disproves this allegation). 8 
Recent attempts within Turkey have begun to counter the offi  cial national myth. 9 
Parliaments around the world are acknowledging this genocide. 10 Reparations 
claims now being brought by the Armenian community may well provide a recogni-
tion that has been denied. Bringing the record of these trials to light, may also serve 
to counter offi  cial denialism. 
 Th ere has been scant academic analysis of these legal proceedings. Th e Turkish state 
archives have been closed to most scholars, and while some of the Courts-Martial 
proceedings were included at the time as special supplements in the government 
gazette  Takvim-i-Vekâyi , these remain unpublished and untranslated as a single 
collection. 11 Further, as Taner Akçam notes, the location of the complete offi  cial 
was disrupted in 1982 with threats to the safety of Jews in Turkey:  Roger W.  Smith ,  Eric  Markusen 
and  Robert Jay  Lifton ,  ‘Professional Ethics and the Denial of the Armenian Genocide’ ,  Holocaust 
and Genocide Studies ,  9 ( 1995 ),  1–22 . When I was an undergraduate student studying genocide in 
the early 1990s with Professor Colin Tatz at Macquarie University in Sydney, Australia, there were 
more books produced by Turkey denying genocide than scholarly works on the genocide itself, and 
the Turkish government also sent an emissary to one of my tutorials to ‘counter’ what we were taught 
about the genocide. 
 6  Vahakn Dadrian points out, as verifi ed by documents presented to the Tribunal as well as 
Ottoman census sources, that 61,000 members of the 63,605-strong Armenian community in Ankara 
were deported, despite Ankara being the ‘farthest removed from all war zones’:  Vahakn N.  Dadrian ,  ‘A 
Textual Analysis of the Key Indictment of the Turkish Military Tribunal Investigating the Armenian 
Genocide’ ,  Journal of Political and Military Sociology ,  22 ( 1994 ),  135–6 . 
 7  Takvim-i-Vekâyi , 3540: Dadrian cited above n 6, 136. 
 8  Evidence given included, in the fi rst trial held at the Courts-Martial, a cipher telegram of 14 
July 1915 from Colonel Şahabeddin addressed to Colonel Recayi in Ankara, stating that ‘there was 
no evidence whatsoever’ about any uprising being planned ( hig bir delail olmadigi ) (2nd sitting, 8 
February 1919). See  Vahakn N.  Dadrian ,  ‘Th e Turkish Military Tribunal’s Prosecution of the Authors 
of the Armenian Genocide: Four Major Courts-Martial Series’ ,  Holocaust and Genocide Studies ,  11 
( 1997 ),  36 . 
 9  Th ese include the statements by author Orhan Pamuk in 2005 that a million Armenians had 
been killed (which saw him prosecuted for ‘insulting Turkishness’), the translation into Turkish of 
Vartkes Yeghiayan,  British Foreign Offi  ce Dossiers on Turkish War Criminals (which contains the case 
information on suspected war criminals compiled by the British), and the publication by lawyer 
Fethiye Çetin in 2008 of her memoir  My Grandmother (New York, NY: Verso, 2008) that revealed 
that her grandmother had been Armenian, and the subsequent publication of gathered stories of 
Armenians in Turkish families, published as  Th e Grandchildren (Fethiye Cetin and Ayse Gül Altinay, 
Istanbul: Metis, 2009). See  Maureen  Freely ,  ‘Secret Histories’ ,  Index on Censorship ,  39 ( 2010 ),  14–20 . 
 10  See  Rouben Paul  Adalian ,  ‘International Recognition of Armenian Genocide’ , in  Israel W.  Charny 
(ed)  Encyclopedia of Genocide , Vol 1 ( Santa Barbara, CA :  ABC-CLIO ,  1999 ),  100–1 . 
 11  Annette  Höss ,  ‘Th e Trial of Perpetrators by the Turkish Military Tribunals: Th e Case of Yozgat’ , in 
 R.G.  Hovannisian (ed)  Th e Armenian Genocide: History, Politics, Ethics ( New York, NY :  St Martin’s Press , 
 1992 ),  221 , fn 5. Further, as Dadrian notes, outside Turkey only the Jerusalem Armenian Patriarchate 
Archive and the Nubar Library in Paris own the originals of these ‘supplement’ issues: Dadrian, above 
n 7, 30. Kirakossian also notes that the French newspaper  La Renaissance published in Constantinople 
also published materials of the sessions:  John S.  Kirakossian ,  Th e Armenian Genocide. Th e Young Turks 
Before the Judgment of History ( Madison, CT :  Sphinx Press ,  1992 ),  162 . 
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court records is unknown (while some copies are fi led in the Armenian patriarchate in 
Jerusalem, these are handwritten and not original copies). 12 What this has meant 
is that much of the work has of necessity focused on piecing together a picture 
of the trials, including drawing on other government sources such as the United 
States and British archives. Th e main analysis until recently—with the publica-
tion of Raymond Kévorkian’s  Th e Armenian Genocide: A Complete History , which 
includes a section on the trials, and of Taner Akçam’s  A Shameful Act: Th e Armenian 
Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility , and the recent publication of 
Vahakhn Dadrian and Taner Akçam’s  Judgment at Istanbul , the fi rst major work 
on the trials—has been the substantial work of Vahakhn Dadrian. 13 It is primarily 
upon Dadrian’s work, together with that of John Kirakossian and Taner Akçam, 
that I rely for information on the Courts-Martial. 
 (I)  Th e ‘Forgotten Genocide’ of the Armenians 
 Th e genocide of the Armenians was perpetrated by the Ottoman state under the 
cover of World War I. With the entry of Turkey into the war, an opportunity arose 
for the destruction of what was seen as an alien nation, the Christian Armenians, and 
the establishment of a ‘Pan-Turkic empire’. Th e Committee of Union and Progress 
(CUP) or Ittihad Party (known as the Young Turks), which had on its establish-
ment been a force for change, moved away from what Richard Hovannisian has 
described as egalitarianism Ottomanism to the ideology of Turkism. 14 Under the 
leadership of the Young Turks, the Ottoman state moved to annihilate the Armenians 
 12  Taner  Akçam ,  A Shameful Act: Th e Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility , 
transl Paul Bessemer ( New York, NY :  Metropolitan Books New York ,  2006 ),  5–6 . 
 13  See in particular, Dadrian:  above n 7, 28–59;  Th e History of the Armenian Genocide. Ethnic 
Confl ict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus (Oxford and New York, NY: Berghahn Books, 
3rd edn, 1997); ‘Th e Documentation of the World War I Armenian Massacres in the Proceedings 
of the Turkish Military Tribunal’,  International Journal of Middle East Studies , 23 (1991), 549–76. 
In 2008, Vahakn N.  Dadrian and Taner Akçam,  Tehcir ve Taktil:  Divan-i Harb-i Orfî Zabitlari. 
Ittihad ve Terakki’nin Yargilanmasi, 1919–1922  was published in Turkish by Bilgi University Press. 
Th is is the fi rst major book devoted to the trials. An English language edition was published in late 
2011:   Vahakn N.  Dadrian and  Taner  Akçam ,  Judgment at Istanbul. Th e Armenian Genocide Trials 
( Oxford and New York, NY :  Berghahn Books,  2011 ) . Other work includes  Taner  Akçam’s  A Shameful 
Act: Th e Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility ( New York, NY :   Henry Holt 
and Company ) ;  Raymond  Kévorkian’s  Th e Armenian Genocide:  A  Complete History ( London and 
New York, NY :  I.B. Tauris ,  2011 ) which includes a section on the trials, John S. Kirakossian, above 
n 13;  Annette  Höss ,  ‘Th e Trial of Perpetrators by the Turkish Military Tribunals: Th e Case of Yozgat’, 
in  R.G.  Hovannisian (ed),  Th e Armenian Genocide. History, Politics, Ethics ( New York, NY :  St Martin’s 
Press ,  1992 ) ,  J.F.  Willis ,  Prologue to Nuremberg: Th e Politics and Diplomacy of Punishing War Criminals 
of the First World War ( Westport, CT :  Greenwood Press ,  1982 ) . Vartkes Yeghiayan has collated two 
sets of documents: the British case notes on suspected  Turkish war criminals— British Foreign Offi  ce 
Dossiers on Turkish War Criminals ( La Verna, CA :   American Armenian International College Press , 
 1991 ) , and the translation of the  Courts-Martials transcripts— Th e Armenian Genocide and the Trials 
of the Young Turks ( La Verna, CA :  American Armenian International College Press ,  1990 ) . 
 14  R.G.  Hovannisian ,  ‘Th e Historical Dimensions of the Armenian Question, 1978–1923’ , in 
 R.G.  Hovannisian (ed),  Th e Armenian Genocide in Perspective ( New Brunswick and London :  Transaction 
Publishers ,  1986 ),  28 . 
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in their search, as Hovannisian has noted, for a homogeneous Turkey rather than 
a multinational Ottoman Empire. 15 Th e entry into the war provided the oppor-
tunity for this. Th e secret decision to destroy the Armenian people was taken by 
the key leaders of the Ittihad Party—Talat, Enver and Cemal (the ‘triumvirate’). 16 
Robert Melson notes that the deportations were coordinated between Talat Pasha’s 
Ministry of the Interior, which was in charge of the civilian population, and Enver 
Pasha’s Ministry of War, which was in charge of the disarmed labour battalions 
(which contained Armenian soldiers). 17 
 Th e genocide was perpetrated in stages. First came the separation of Armenian 
soldiers serving in the Ottoman armies into labour battalions. Th en, on the night 
of 24 April 1915, Armenian political, religious, educational, and intellectual leaders 
throughout the Ottoman state were arrested, deported into Anatolia, and killed. 18 
Armenian populations across the Ottoman state were forcibly deported and 
stripped of their possessions. Armenians serving in the Ottoman armies were also 
killed. Th e mass deportation of Armenians was intended to result in their death, 
with abductions and starvation along the way, together with great cruelty to the 
mainly women and children. As Hovannisian explains:
 Th e adult and teenage boys were, as a pattern, swiftly separated from the deportation caravans 
and killed outright . . . Th e greatest torment was reserved for the women and children, who 
were driven for months over mountains and deserts, often dehumanised by being stripped 
naked and repeatedly preyed upon and abused. Intentionally deprived of food and water, 
they fell by the thousands and the hundreds of thousands along the routes to the desert. 19 
 Eyewitnesses were later to report on the horrifi c use of medical experimentation on 
children, and on the brutality of the destruction of the Armenians in villages and towns 
throughout the Ottoman state. 20 Th e orders to destroy the Armenians came from the 
centre through a series of telegrams sent by the ruling Ittihad leaders to ministers and 
local governors. One telegram sent by Cemal to the Minister of the Interior stated 
that the ‘number of Armenians deported from Diarbekir amounted to 120,000’, 
and that ‘every Muslim who tries to protect Armenians will be hanged in front 
of his house, and his house will be burned down’. 21 Governors were instructed to 
implement the orders without question. Th ose who refused were demoted. 
 15  Hovannisian, above n 15. 
 16  See Dadrian, ‘Th e Documentation of the World War I Armenian massacres’, above n 14, 550. 
 17  Robert  Melson ,  ‘Provocation or Nationalism: A Critical Inquiry into the Armenian Genocide 
of 1915’ , in  R.G.  Hovannisian (ed),  Th e Armenian Genocide in Perspective ( New Brunswick and 
London :  Transaction Publishers ,  1986 ) . 
 18  Richard G.  Hovannisian ,  ‘Th e Armenian genocide’ , in  Israel W.  Charny (ed),  Genocide: A Critical 
Bibliographic Review ( New  York, NY :   Facts on File Publications ,  1991 ),  95 ;  Vahakn N.  Dadrian , 
 ‘Documentation of Armenian Genocide in Turkish Sources’ , in  Israel W.  Charny (ed)  Encyclopedia of 
Genocide , Vol 1 ( Santa Barbara, CA :  ABC-CLIO ,  1999 ),  94 . 
 19  Hovannisian, above n 19, 95. 
 20  See  Vahkhn N.  Dadrian ,  ‘Th e Role of Turkish Physicians in the World War One Genocide of 
Ottoman Armenians’ ,  Holocaust and Genocide Studies ,  1 ( 1986 ),  169–92 . 
 21  Cited in John S. Kirakossian,  Th e Armenian Genocide , above n 11, 169. 
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 An estimated 1.2  million Armenians (which included also the Assyrians and 
Pontiac and Anatolian Greeks) were killed from 1915–1918. Henry Morgenthau, 
the American Ambassador at the time, wrote: ‘I am confi dent that the whole history 
of the human race contains no such horrible episode as this. Th e great massacres and 
persecutions of the past seem almost insignifi cant when compared to the suff erings 
of the Armenian race in 1915.’ 22 
 Law was a partner to this destruction. Th e Temporary Law of Deportation,  Sevk 
ve İskân Kanunu , was drafted in May 1915 to legitimize the deportations of the 
Armenians. Th is use of law is interesting, in that while the Deportation Law was 
drafted after the deportations had begun, it was still seen as important to have leg-
islation to authorize it. Using  the term ‘deportees’ rather than ‘Armenians’, the law 
was deliberately not introduced to Parliament and instead ratifi ed by the Grand 
Vizier and Cabinet. 23 In the subsequent Courts-Martial, the verdict against the 
‘Responsible Secretaries and Delegates’ found that the deportations were ‘exploited 
as a pretext for personal gain’ (in that they gained access to Armenian property) 
and that ‘[t] he deportation was carried out in a manner [so as] to include every 
part [of the country], in contradiction to the spirit behind the wording of the 
Law on Deportation’. 24 Law thus, while a tool of the genocide, was still designed 
to set limits. 
 Th e following year a law to allow the release of prisoners to serve in the Special 
Organization Unit, the group responsible for much of the killing, was rushed 
through Parliament—yet the prisoners had already been released and most 
of the killings completed. 25 A  law to authorize the confi scation and selling of 
Armenian property—the Temporary Law of Expropriation and Confi scation—
was passed in late 1915 with one sole voice of opposition in the Senate, Senator 
Ahmed Riza, who stated that the law was ‘inimical to the principles of law and 
justice’. 26 
 Th ese laws made the perpetration of this state crime ‘allowable’. 27 Th ey provided 
a framework of legitimation for persecution. It was a call to law, yet the genocide 
was not implemented through law—rather, law was used as a tool of legitimation, 
with the relevant legislation either passed after the event or not passed through the 
proper channels at all. It was only after the war that law came to play a far more 
important role—that of securing redress for a genocide that had been legitimized 
by the legal and political processes themselves. 
 22  Henry  Morgenthau ,  Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story ( London :  Gomidas Institute ,  1918 ),  321–2 . 
 23  On this, see Dadrian,  Th e History , above n 13, 221. 
 24  Dadrian and Akçam,  Judgment at Istanbul , above n 13, 315–16. 
 25  Dadrian,  Th e History , above n 13, 236.    26  Dadrian, above n 25, 223. 
 27  See further,  Jennifer  Balint ,  Genocide, State Crime and the Law:  In the Name of the State 
( London :  Routledge-Cavendish ,  2012 ) , in particular Chapter 2. 
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 (II)  Th e Promise of International Proceeding 
 Any trials were supposed to be internationally driven. On 24 May 1915 the Allies 
(Britain, France and Russia) made the following joint declaration:
 In view of these new crimes of Turkey against humanity and civilisation, the Allied govern-
ments announce publicly . . . that they will hold personally responsible . . . all members of 
the Ottoman government and those of their agents who are implicated in such massacres. 28 
 Several Articles stipulating the trial and punishment of those responsible for the 
genocide had been inserted into the Peace Treaty of Sèvres, signed on 10 August 
1920. Article 144 stated that ‘[t] he Turkish Government recognises the injustice of 
the law of 1915 relating to Abandoned Properties ( Emval-i-Metroukeh )’ and outlined 
measures of restoration, Article 228 stated that ‘[t]he Turkish Government under-
takes to furnish all documents and information of every kind, the production of 
which may be considered necessary to ensure the full knowledge of the incriminating 
acts, the prosecution of off enders and the just appreciation of responsibility’, and 
Article 230 continued:
 Th e Turkish Government undertakes to hand over to the Allied Powers the persons whose 
surrender may be required by the latter as being responsible for the massacres committed 
during the continuance of the state of war on territory which formed part of the Turkish 
Empire on August 1, 1914. 
 Th e Allied Powers reserve to themselves the right to designate the tribunal which shall try 
the persons so accused, and the Turkish Government undertakes to recognise such tribunal. 
 In the event of the League of Nations having created in suffi  cient time a tribunal competent 
to deal with the said massacres, the Allied Powers reserve to themselves the right to bring the 
accused persons mentioned above before such tribunal, and the Turkish Government under-
takes equally to recognise such tribunal. 29 
 ‘Crimes against humanity’ was the original charge, which was changed to massacres 
(it had been opposed by the US, who preferred ‘crimes against the law of war’, 
and Japan). Yet the court provided for in Article 230 of the Treaty of Sèvres—the 
Allies reserved ‘the right to designate the tribunal which shall try the persons so 
accused’—never eventuated, and in fact the Peace Treaty of Sèvres was abandoned 
(signed but never ratifi ed). Th ere was even a provision for a court established by 
the League of Nations to be the designated tribunal. Article 230 of the Treaty 
bound Turkey to recognize its jurisdiction if the League ‘created in suffi  cient time 
 28  Cited in Dadrian,  Th e History , above n 13, 216. Th e fi rst draft, proposed by Russia, contained 
the phrase ‘crimes against Christianity and civilisation’, but it was changed to ‘crime against human-
ity and civilisation’ by France in light of the Muslim populations in the French colonies: see  Ulrich 
 Trumpener ,  Germany and the Ottoman Empire ( Princeton, NJ :   Princeton University Press ,  1968 ), 
 210 , fn 26. 
 29  Th e Treaty Of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Turkey Signed at Sèvres, 
10 August 1920,  Armenian News Network  [website],  < http://www.groong.com/treaties/sevres.html > 
(accessed 27 February 2013). 
04_9780199671144c4.indd   83 10/3/2013   4:00:13 PM
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in 
any way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
Pre-Histories: From von Hagenbach to the Armenian Genocide84
a tribunal competent to deal with the said massacres’. Yet this international court 
was not established. 
 Taner Akçam notes that ‘the Allied Powers tied the terms of the peace treaty 
to the Ottoman government’s attitude toward punishing the perpetrators of the 
massacres’. 30 In fact, there was a belief among the Allies that the Turkish nation as 
a whole should be punished—the British deputy high commissioner in Istanbul 
wrote in 1919 to the Paris peace conference:
 Punishing those responsible for the Armenian atrocities means punishing all Turks. Th at is 
why I propose that the punishment, on the national level, should be the dismemberment 
of the last Turkish Empire, and, on the individual level, putting on trial the senior offi  cials 
on my list so as to make an example out of them. 31 
 Accountability for genocide was, however, connected to Allied ambitions over the 
Ottoman state—for the Russians, claims over the Straits, and for the ‘Great Powers’ as a 
whole, the partitioning of Anatolia and a desire to ‘throw the Turks out of Europe’. 32 
Britain also felt a great deal of guilt towards the treatment of the Armenians, having 
withdrawn from an earlier agreement that would have seen the Armenian provinces 
put under Russian instead of Ottoman control. 33 
 Th e successor to the Treaty of Sèvres, the Treaty of Lausanne, omitted all mention of 
war crimes. 34 Despite holding many indicted war criminals hostage on the islands 
of Mudros and Malta, allegedly for their safety, the British held no trials. Th ere 
had been great public outrage in Britain as to the treatment of the Armenians, 
with calls for trials to be held. Th e British had begun arresting Ottoman offi  cials 
and suspected war criminals, together with giving lists of suspects to be arrested 
to the Ottoman authorities. 35 Yet Turkish opposition to Ottoman nationals being 
tried before foreign courts led to the cessation of any British trials (together with a 
concern that there was insuffi  cient documentary evidence to convict). Th e prisoners 
were handed back to Turkey in October 1921 after a promise by the Kemalist gov-
ernment that they would be tried. As Akçam notes, however, ‘most of them moved 
to Ankara and were given posts in the nationalist government’. 36 Th e British Foreign 
Secretary, Lord Curzon, was to write in 1922, ‘I think we made a great mistake in 
ever letting these people out. I had to yield at the time to a pressure which I always 
felt to be mistaken.’ 37 
 Despite a beginning that saw the Allies boldly proclaim they would ‘hold personally 
responsible . . . all members of the Ottoman government and those of their agents who 
are implicated in such massacres’, and recognition of the massacre of the Armenians at 
the Paris Peace Conference by the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors 
of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties, no international or Allied trials were 
held. Legal proceedings convened by the British concerned not the killings of 
the Armenians, but atrocities committed against British soldiers. Th e irony of the 
 30  Akçam, above n 13, 215.    31  Cited in Akçam, above n 13i, 216–17. 
 32  Akçam, above n 13, 211–13.    33  See Akçam, above n 13, 233–4. 
 34  Willis, above n 13, 162.    35  See Akçam, above n 13, 239. 
 36  Akçam, above n 13, 362.    37  Cited in Willis, above n 13, 163. 
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original Allied declaration is thus that with the defeat of Turkey, the end of World 
War I, Turkey’s signing of the Armistice on 30 October 1918, and the cessation 
of the genocide against the Armenians, it was not the Allies who initiated legal 
proceedings against the perpetrators of the genocide, but the Turks themselves. 
In fact, the Ottoman state had begun this process already. 
 (III)  Establishing the Courts-Martial 
 Th e process of establishing a legal process of accountability to address the crimes 
perpetrated against the Armenians began in the Ottoman Parliament. Th is was in 
part due to the public outcry at the escape from Istanbul on 1 November 1918 of 
seven key leaders of the Young Turks (Mehmed Talât, Ismail Enver, Ahmed Cemal, 
Drs Mehmed Nazim and Behaeddin Şakir) and police and security chiefs Osman 
Bedri and Hüseyin Azmi. As Kirakossian notes, based on records of speeches 
printed in  Takvim-i-Vekâyi , in the aftermath of the Armistice signed on 20 October 
1918, ‘the Armenian massacres became the primary topic of conversation in the 
Ottoman Parliament’, with one parliamentarian decrying ‘[w] e inherited a country 
turned into a huge slaughterhouse’. 38 
 On 2 November 1918, a motion for a trial of the ministers of the two wartime 
cabinets was introduced by a Deputy in the Chamber of Deputies of the Ottoman 
Parliament, invoking ‘the rules of law and humanity’. 39 Th e motion included as an 
attachment ten charges against the ministers, including aggression, military incom-
petence, political abuses, and economic crimes. Charges No. 5 and No. 10 related 
to the killings of the Armenians. No. 5 challenged the enactment of the Temporary 
Laws, with their associated ‘orders and instructions’ and subsequent ‘disasters’ being 
‘completely contradictory to the spirit and letter of our Constitution’. Charge No. 
10 indicted the ministers for the creation of ‘brigands [ çetes ] whose assaults on life, 
property and honour rendered the ministers guilty as co-perpetrators of the tragic 
crimes that resulted’. 40 
 At the same time, the upper chamber of the Ottoman Parliament, the Senate, 
began debating the matter of investigating and prosecuting the wartime crimes. 
A  motion was submitted by General Çürüksulu Mahmud, former minister of 
Public Works, who proposed in subsequent debate that investigation of the abuses 
be related to ‘the conduct of internal aff airs policy ( dahiliye siyaseti ) and govern-
ance’. 41 Th is tension between a focus on ‘bad governance’ and on the massacres 
themselves was to continue throughout the trials. Th e Ittihad was blamed for 
‘hurting the interests of the nation and the country’ and, with the Armenians now 
pushing for independence, ‘for the wrong done to the integrity of the Ottoman 
Empire’. 42 
 38  Kirakossian, above n 11, 160, 162.    39  Dadrian,  Th e History , above n 13, 319. 
 40  Dadrian,  Th e History , above n 13.    41  Dadrian,  Th e History , above n 13, 337, fn 11. 
 42  Session of Military Tribunal 8 March 1919, cited in Kirakossian, above n 11, 171. 
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 Two inquiries were subsequently established in late November 1918:  the Fifth 
Committee of the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies ( Beşinci ube Tahkikat Komisyonu ) 
and what was known as the Mazhar Inquiry Commission, headed by Hasan 
Mazhar. 43 Th e Fifth Committee conducted hearings, during which ministers were 
interrogated. It also gathered key documents that demonstrated the collusion 
between the military and the executive in the genocide of the Armenians. 44 Th e 
Mazhar Commission was established by the Sultan and charged with investigating 
the conduct of government offi  cials. It gathered key documents, in particular 
telegraphic orders from twenty-eight provinces identifi ed as centres of deportations 
and massacres. 45 As Kevorkian notes, ‘Hasan Mazhar sent an offi  cial circular to the 
provincial prefects and sub-prefects, demanding the originals or certifi ed copies of 
all orders received by the local authorities in connection with the deportation and 
massacre of the Armenians’. 46 Local inquiry commissions were also established to aid 
regional trials. Th e results of all investigations were provided to the Courts-Martial. 
 (IV)  Th e Ottoman State Special Military Tribunal 
 Th e Courts-Martial were established by Imperial authorization on 14 December 
1918. Tribunals around the country were to be established ‘in accordance with 
the  Regulations on Martial Law of 20 September 1877’. 47 On 8 January 1919, the 
Extraordinary (or Special) Courts-Martial were declared operational. 48 By mid-January 
1919, the Mazhar Inquiry Commission forwarded 130 separate dossiers of suspects 
to the Courts-Martial. Its recommendation, following the Criminal Procedure 
Code, was that the evidence was incriminating enough to warrant the commence-
ment of criminal proceedings against the suspects. 49 Th e tribunal began its work 
on 12 February 1919. On 8 March 1919, the statute of the new Courts-Martial 
was introduced. 50 
 43  Mazhar had been the governor of Ankara who had been dismissed from his position in 1915 for 
refusing to obey Talat’s orders to deport the Armenians: Session of Military Tribunal 8 March 1919, 
cited in Kirakossian, above n 11, 160. 
 44  See further,  Raymond  Kevorkian ,  Th e Armenian Genocide:  A  Complete History ( London and 
New York, NY :  I.B. Tauris ,  2011 ),  725–33 . 
 45  See further Kevorkian, above n 44, 735–8. 
 46  See further Kevorkian, above n 44, 4. 
 47  Dadrian and Akçam,  Judgment at Istanbul , above n 13, 254. 
 48  According to Kevorkian, three courts-martial were established in Istanbul, as well as in ten juris-
dictions in the provinces. In Istanbul, Court-Martial 1 tried people accused of committing crimes 
against the Armenian population, Court-Martial 2 specialized in cases involving the illegal seizure of 
assets, and Court-Martial 3 judged senior offi  cers: Kevorkian, above n 44, 739–40. 
 49  Dadrian,  Th e History , above n 13, 320–1. 
 50  Th ere was debate in the Parliament, the press, and during the fi rst two sittings of the military tribunal, as 
to whether the defendants should be prosecuted before the High Court, before the Military Tribunal, 
or regular criminal courts. It was concluded that as martial law as implemented by the Ittihadists on 
12/25 April 1909 was still in force (and according to Article 113 of the Ottoman Constitution this 
meant that civil laws are suspended), the Courts-Martial were the only option. 
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 During its life the Courts-Martial underwent a number of changes:  from a 
military-civilian to a military Courts-Martial, as well as changes to its staff , including 
a high turnover of judges. 51 Grand Vizier Damad Ferid had put forward a proposal 
to include the participation of the neutral governments of Spain, Switzerland, 
Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark in the prosecution. Th is was not accepted, 
and in March 1919, the Courts-Martial went from being a military-civilian to a 
strictly military Courts-Martial. 
 Th e basis of legal proceedings was Ottoman law. Th e Courts-Martial prosecutors 
relied on the Ottoman Penal Code for the charges. Th e key charge was ‘deportation and 
massacre’. Although the charges came from the existing Penal Code, their application 
(to the charge of massacres of the Armenians) was new. One of the Courts-Martial’s 
chief aims was to establish the systematic manner in which the massacres of the 
Armenians took place, and to allocate institutional (primarily to the Ittihad Party) 
as well as individual responsibility. Th is is refl ected in the organization of the trials. 
Th e indictment emphasized that ‘the investigation of massacres and illegal, personal 
profi teering, is the principal task of this Tribunal’. 52 Th e main indictment as read by 
the Ottoman Attorney-General stated in part:
 Th e principal subject matter of this investigation has been the event of the disaster befall-
ing the deported Armenians—an event which occurred at various times and places. Legal 
steps are now being taken against individuals responsible for that occurrence. Th e disaster 
visiting the Armenians was not a local or isolated event. It was the result of a premedi-
tated decision taken by a central body composed of the above-mentioned persons; and the 
immolations and excesses which took place were based on oral and written orders issued 
by that central body. 53 
 Th e Ottoman State Special Military Tribunal focused on the massacres of the 
Armenians as well as on ‘illegal, personal profi teering’ and Turkey’s entry into the war. 
Th e charges of ‘overthrow of the government’ (added in April 1920), and ‘rebellion’ 
and ‘violation of public order’ were also included. Documents found by the inves-
tigatory Commissions, and the Courts-Martial, in particular coded telegrams sent 
by the main defendants outlining the actions to be taken against the Armenian 
population, were used as key evidence. Importantly, the trials were established and 
conducted around the view that the Armenians had been intentionally massacred. 
As noted by Dadrian, in all its verdicts, the Courts-Martial ‘sustained the charges 
relating to the destruction of the Armenians, pointing to evidence on “the organi-
sation and implementation of the crime of murder ( taktil cinayeti ), by the leaders 
of Ittihad. Th is fact has been proven and verifi ed ( tahakkuk )” ’. 54 
 In fact, the court in the Yozgat trial rejected the Attorney-General’s wish to 
prosecute the accused under Article 56 of the Ottoman Penal Code, which pertains 
 51  See Dadrian, above n 8, 31–2. 
 52  Takvimi Vekâyi , No. 3540, cited in Dadrian,  Th e History , above n 13, 324. 
 53  H.K.  Kazarian ,  ‘Turkey Tries its Chief Criminals:  Indictment and Sentence Passed Down by 
Military Court of 1919’ ,  Th e Armenian Review ,  24 ( 1971 ),  10 . 
 54  Takvimi Vekâyi , No. 3604, cited in Dadrian, ‘Th e Documentation of the World War I Armenian 
Massacres’, above n 13, 556. 
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to ethnic or other groups pitted against each other in mutual slaughter. 55 It used 
instead Article 45, which distinguished between victims and perpetrators. 56 Höss 
notes that not only did this preclude the prosecution of the general civilian population 
of Yozgat, but it demolished the myth that the Armenians were involved in an 
insurgency and that the massacres could be classifi ed within the context of justifi able 
civil war. 57 
 (V)  Th e Operation of the Trials 
 Th e main trials were held in the building of the Ottoman Parliament in Istanbul, in the 
Great Hall of the Ministry of Justice. Th e offi  cial government gazette,  Takvim-i-Vekâyi , 
published extracts daily and the proceedings, unusually, were public, in order, 
according to the presiding judge, ‘to demonstrate the intent of the Court to conduct 
the trials impartially and in a spirit of lofty justice [ kemali adil ve bitaraf ]’. 58 
He continued: ‘Th e court is simply trying to help the defendants and facilitate 
their defence.’ 59 
 Original estimates were that twenty-four trials were held; however, this has 
now been revised to at least sixty-three trials—with only some reported. 60 Over 
200 fi les had been prepared on individuals—government, military and Party offi  -
cials alleged to be participants in the genocide—creating, together with the trial 
records, a substantial documentary record of the genocide. Th ere were four main 
series of trials, within the framework of the Courts-Martial: 
 •  Ittihadist leaders and Central Committee members; 
 •  Ministers of the two wartime cabinets (these fi rst two were merged after the 
sixty-three prisoners were taken by the British to Malta and Mudros in May 
1919); 
 •  Responsible Secretaries and Delegates (who organized and supervised 
deportations) and those of the ‘Special Organization’ (who did the killings); and 
 •  Offi  cials in provinces where the massacres took place. 
 55  Th e claim by the Prosecutor that the Armenians bore guilt for the treatment they received resulted 
in the walking out of the three Armenian lawyers representing the victims: Dadrian, above n 9, 34–5. 
 56  Dadrian, above n 9, 39. 
 57  See Höss, above n 11, 220. 
 58  Takvimi Vekâyi , No. 3540, cited in Dadrian,  Th e History , above n 14, 322. Th is was to later 
change. 
 59  Dadrian, ‘Th e Documentation of the World War I Armenian massacres’, above n 13, 555. 
 60  See Dadrian and Akçam,  Judgment at Istanbul , see above n 13, 202. Akçam notes that while 
twelve of the trials were documented in  Takvim-i-Vekâyi , these were recorded in diff erent ways—some 
were complete or partial records of the trials such as the indictments, minutes and verdicts, and 
others solely through the Sultan’s confi rmation of the Court’s sentence: Akçam, above n 13, 288. It 
also appears that there were a number of military tribunals operating at the same time in this early 
stage—necessitating that the main Tribunal, responsible for the ‘deportation cases’, be known as the 
‘First Military Tribunal’: Akçam, above n 13, 285. 
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 Th ere were further trials ready to proceed, yet with the rise of the Nationalist 
Movement and the challenge to the Grand Vizier, these were abandoned. While some 
proceedings were  in absentia , many indicted persons were present for the trials. 
 Th e Courts-Martial prosecutions focused on three classes of perpetrators: 
 •  Th e organizers of the genocide; 
 •  Th ose who carried out the perpetration in the provinces; and 
 •  Th ose involved in what were termed ‘economic crimes’. 
 Within those responsible for the genocide, the defendants were classifi ed as either 
principal co-perpetrators (cabinet ministers, leaders of the Ittihad Party, Responsible 
Secretaries) or accessories (those who carried out the massacres, namely in the prov-
inces). 61 Th e series of trials that focused on the Ittihadist leaders, Central Committee 
members, and ministers of the two wartime cabinets is known as the Key Indictment, 
and ran from 28 April 1919 until 5 July 1919. Th is indictment of ‘principal 
co-perpetrators’ focused on the ministers of the two wartime cabinets and the leaders 
of the ruling Ittihad Party: Enver, Cemal and Talat. Th e indictment also focused 
on institutions: the Ittihad Party (particularly its Central Committee—namely Drs 
Nazim and Şakir), the General Assembly, and the two provincial control groups. Th e 
Defence Ministry, the War Offi  ce (particularly the Special Organization), and the 
Interior Ministry were also targeted. Th e Young Turk Ittihad Party’s objectives and 
methods were declared criminal by the Procuror-General. 62 Dadrian notes that in 
this series of trials ‘the Court considers the investigation of these deportations and 
massacres as its “integral task” and not only premeditation and decision-making, but 
the organization, supervision, control, and implementation of genocide’. 63 Further, 
it highlighted the secretive nature of the decision-making process, and ‘asserted 
that the deportations and massacres constituted a comprehensive attempt to radically 
solve the Armenian question ( hall vefasl )’. 64 Th ose on trial were shown to have operated 
both as cabinet ministers as well as being involved in directing the genocide. 
 Th e Indictment was also amended. According to Dadrian:
 It refers to the crimes of ‘massacre’, ‘plunder of properties’, ‘torching of corpses and buildings’, 
‘rape’, and ‘torture and torment’. Th e amendment also charges that these crimes were 
committed ‘in a particularly organised way . . . in the capital and in the provinces . . . repeated’. 
Th e preamble to the new indictment speaks of ‘the extermination of an entire people con-
stituting a distinct community’, and of ‘the admission and confession’ of the defendants 
( kabul ve itiraf ). 65 
 Judgment in the Key Indictment was handed down on 5 July 1919. Th e Court 
found the cabinet ministers guilty both of orchestrating the entry of Turkey into 
World War I and of committing the massacres of the Armenians. Former leaders 
Talat, Enver, Cemal, Dr Nazim (and Dr Behaeddin Şakir in a separate prosecution on 
13 January 1920) were found guilty of ‘fi rst degree mass murder’ 66 and given the 
 61  Dadrian,  Th e History , above n 13, 327.    62  Dadrian,  Th e History , above n 13, 323. 
 63  Dadrian, above n 8, 44.    64  Dadrian, above n 8, 44–5. 
 65  Dadrian, above n 8, 46.    66  Dadrian, above n 8, 50. 
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death penalty  in absentia . 67 Other ministers were given prison sentences, including 
the former economics minister, and the former commerce and agriculture minister 
who received sentences of fi fteen years each. 
 Th e Responsible Secretaries trial ran from 21 June until 13 July 1919, with thirty 
defendants. Th ese were the offi  cials of the Ittihad party who had organized the 
deportations. Th e majority had evaded arrest, with only eleven of the indicted on 
trial, and eighteen absent. Th e trial also included other offi  cials. As Dadrian writes:
 Th e centrepiece was the accusation that the defendants had gained control of the state appa-
ratus and imposed upon the government their party objectives. Th ey treated the Central 
Committee as the supreme instance for governmental decision-making. Th e special law on 
deportation was the result of this procedure. Th e deportees were ‘annihilated’ ( imha ) and 
their goods and properties ‘plundered and pillaged’ ( nehb u garet ) by brigands and gangs of 
outlaws engaged ( terib ) for this purpose. 68 
 It is in the trial of the Responsible Secretaries that the meaning of the Deportation Law 
was most clearly demonstrated. Th e verdict found that the Responsible Secretaries 
‘used the May 14/27, 1915 Temporary Deportation law . . . to perpetrate . . . massacre, 
plunder of goods, appropriation and hoarding of riches’. 69 Th e verdict also found, as 
Dadrian relates:
 Th e massacre and destruction of the Armenians and the pillage of their goods [were] organised 
and set in motion ( tertip ve ihzar ) by these Responsible Secretaries and Delegates. Th ey relied 
on and engaged criminal gangs and mobs. Some of them tricked the victims and managed to 
appropriate their abandoned goods after pretending to be helping them. 70 
 Yet the offi  cials were viewed by the Court as ‘accessories to the crime’ and escaped 
any death penalty, with most found guilty of ‘robbery, plunder, and self-enrichment 
at the expense of the victims’. 71 
 Trials that focused on the provinces were those of Trabzon, 72 Yozgat, Harput, 
Erzincan, Bayburt, and Mosul. 73 Other locational trials were being prepared when 
the Courts-Martial was dismantled, including those for atrocities against Armenians 
in Adana, Aleppo, Bitlis, Diarbekir, Erzerum, Marash, and Van. 74 Th ree individuals 
were executed—all came from the trials of offi  cials in provinces where the massacres 
took place. Th ese were Nusret Bey, the Governor (Prefect) of Urfa, sentenced to 
death on 20 July 1920, Abdullah Avni, the offi  cer in charge of the Erzincan 
gendarmery, executed on 22 July 1920, and Kemal Bey, district governor of Yozgat, 
executed on 10 April 1919. 
 Prior to the trials of the Ittihadist leaders, government ministers and Responsible 
Secretaries, the local offi  cials responsible for the deportation in the district of  Yozgat, 
 67  Willis, above n 13, 156. In 1921, Talat was assassinated in Berlin—in his defence, the perpetrator 
Soghomon Tehlirian argued that he had been sentenced to death  in absentia by the Tribunal: 
Kirakossian,  Th e Armenian Genocide , above n 11, 171. 
 68  Dadrian, above n 8, 42.    69  Dadrian, above n 8, 43.    70  Dadrian, above n 8, 43–4. 
 71  Dadrian, above n 8, 44. 
 72  For a discussion of this trial, held between 26 March and 17 May 1919, see Dadrian, above n 8, 
39–42. 
 73  For an account of these trials see Kevorkian, above n 44, 791–5.    74  Höss, above n 11, 210. 
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were put on trial. Th is was the fi rst trial held by the Courts-Martial in Istanbul. 
In this district, which comprised the counties of Bogazhyan, Akdag Madeni and 
Yozgat, 31,147 of a total pre-war Armenian population of 33,133 in Yozgat district, 
who lived mainly in villages, were ‘deported’. 75 Dadrian notes that ‘at the fi rst trial 
of the series (February 5, 1919), the Attorney General disclosed that out of about 
1,800 Armenians from the town of Yozgat proper, only eighty-eight survivors could 
be counted’. 76 
 Th e Yozgat Offi  cials trial ran from 5 February to 7 April 1919, in eighteen 
sittings. Mehmed Kemal (Kemal Bey), Mehmed Tevfi k and Abdul Fayaz—all offi  cials 
from Yozgat—were indicted. Th ey were accused of the ‘mass murder of Yozgat’s 
Armenian deportees at Keller and elsewhere, the pillage and plunder of the victim’s 
goods, and the abduction and rape of many members of the convoys’. 77 Th e off ences, 
notes Höss, were termed ‘anti-human’. 78 One witness spoke of ‘doing government 
business’. 79 Th e Court heard testimony and received affi  davits from Muslim leaders 
from the district as to the horrifi c means by which the Armenian population was 
slaughtered. 80 Th ey also heard from eighteen Armenian survivors. In an affi  davit 
from Major Mehmet Salim, the Military Commandant of Yozgat, requested by the 
Mazhar Inquiry Commission, the point was stressed that ‘underlying the entire 
scheme of deportations lay “a policy of extermination” ( imha siyaseti )’. 81 Th e verdict 
emphasized that ‘[t] heir handwritten documents confi rm the nature of the real 
purpose of these guards [the so-called escorts of the deportee convoys]—the 
massacre of the people of these convoys’. 82 In his analysis of the judgment, 
Dadrian writes:
 Perhaps the most important feature of the Verdict was its conclusion that the deportations 
were a cloak for the intended massacres. ‘Th ere can be no doubt and no hesitation’ on this 
point, it declared in that conclusion ( şüphe ve tereddiit birak- madigindan ). 83 
 On 8 April 1919 Mehmed Kemal, who had been sub-district governor of Bogazliyan 
and subsequently interim district governor of Yozgat, was convicted of ordering the 
robbery and murder of Armenians and sentenced to death under Article 170 of the 
Ottoman Penal Code, which prescribes death for the crime of premeditated murder. 
His sentence was carried out in Istanbul’s Beyazit Square on 10 April 1919. 84 
 While there had been public statements in the Parliament and the media as to the 
nature of the massacre of the Armenians, and condemnation of it, the wider popula-
tion seemed reluctant to accept the legal process and its verdicts. 85 Th is refl ected the 
 75  Dadrian, above n 8, 33.    76  Dadrian, above n 8, 33.    77  Höss, above n 11, 213. 
 78  Höss, above n 11, 213.    79  Höss, above n 11, 220.    80  See Dadrian, above n 8, 36–8. 
 81  Dadrian, above n 8, 37.    82  Höss, above n 11, 218.    83  Dadrian, above n 8, 39. 
 84  Mehmed Tefkik was sentenced to fi fteen years’ hard labour as an accessory. Abdul Fayaz had ear-
lier been removed from the trial for a proposed second Yozgat trial—released on bail, he had escaped 
to join the Kemalists in the interior and later became a deputy in the Grand National Assembly: Höss, 
above n 11, 218. 
 85  Höss relates that due to the public unwillingness to accept Armenian testimony during the Yozgat 
trial, in his closing arguments the Prosecutor-General told the court that he was intentionally exclud-
ing all evidence supplied by Armenian witnesses, and was concentrating on documentary evidence 
and evidence supplied by former government offi  cials: Höss, above n 11. 
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schism in the Ottoman state between support for the Ittihad party and the desire 
to create distance from it and its actions. Th e execution and subsequent funeral 
of Mehmed Kemal turned into a large-scale nationalist demonstration, where 
anti-British and anti-occupation slogans were heard, and wreaths reading ‘Kemal 
Bey, the Great Martyr of the Turks’ were laid, and after which 20,000 Turkish 
pounds were raised for his family. 86 
 (VI)  Th e Record of the Trials 
 While short lived, these trials created an important legacy for the prosecution of 
genocide and, critically, provided a further source of documentation on the geno-
cide of the Armenians. Th e trials also refl ected on a state’s own acts against its 
civilians, and ones it had not usually protected. As Dadrian notes, ‘[f ] or the fi rst 
time, Ottoman-Turkish authorities of the highest rank were being held accountable 
for their crimes against these [non-Muslim] nationalities’. 87 
 Th ere is, in these trials, an offi  cial acknowledgement of the harms perpetrated. 
Th e indictment began:  ‘Th e principal subject matter of this investigation has 
been the event of the disaster befalling the deported Armenians—an event which 
occurred at various times and places.’ 88 Th e Courts-Martial subpoenaed documents 
that provided evidence of the policy to annihilate the Armenians as a people, and 
of the chain of command that implemented this policy. It was this evidence of  state 
crime that makes these trials so important as a record; the trials demonstrated how 
the genocide of the Armenians was a coordinated and deliberate policy of the ruling 
Young Turks. As Kirakossian outlines, ‘the most important conclusion arrived at as a 
result of the investigation [by the Courts-Martial] was that the crimes infl icted upon 
the Armenians in various places and at various times, were not isolated events’. 89 
 Th e trials also showed how this policy was transmitted to the provinces by Talat, 
Enver and Kemal through telegram orders, and how what was known as the ‘Special 
Organization’, the  Teshkilat-i Mahsoosé , was specifi cally established to carry out the 
massacres. Th ese included, outlined in the indictment, a telegram sent by Talat to 
the administrative heads of provinces where Armenians were massacred, ordering 
that ‘the bodies of the dead remaining on the roads not be thrown into ravines, 
rivers or lakes, and instead be interred and their remaining possessions burnt’. 90 
A further telegram sent by Behaeddin Şakir to Sabit Bey, Governor-General 
of the vilayet of Kharput, reads as follows:  ‘Are the Armenians shipped from 
there exterminated? And are the dangerous persons about whose deportation 
you have informed me indeed been destroyed or simply deported? My brother, 
give me accurate information’. 91 
 86  Höss, above n 11, 219; Akçam, above n 12, 293. Th e new Kemalist government later erected a 
statue in the public square of Bogazhyan. 
 87  Dadrian, above n 8, 30.    88  Kazarian, above n 53, 10. 
 89  Kirakossian,  Th e Armenian Genocide , above n 11, 168. 
 90  Kirakossian, 169; Dadrian and Akçam,  Judgment at Istanbul , above n 13, 277. 
 91  Dadrian and Akçam,  Judgment at Istanbul , above n 13, 168. 
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 Evidence gathered by the Courts-Martial pointed to clear coordination and intent. 
At the Yozgat trial, in a session on 22 February 1919, the prosecutor introduced 
twelve cipher telegrams that demonstrated the word ‘deportation’ meant ‘massacre’. 92 
According to Dadrian, ‘[t] his critical piece of evidence was confi rmed by Colonel 
Halil Recayi, who during the course of his testimony at the 7th sitting (February 18) 
explicitly admitted that he had received from Colonel Şahabeddin cipher telegrams 
about the killing operations and that “deportation” in fact meant “massacre” ( kesim )’. 93 
Dadrian records that ‘[t]he testimony of Colonels Şahabeddin and Recayi, and 
others, the Attorney General concluded, confi rmed the organised nature of the 
Yozgat mass murder’. 94 
 Th e Key Verdict against the cabinet ministers and CUP leaders found that:
 Th e evidence shows that the crimes of massacre which occurred in Trabzon, Yozgad, and 
Boğazlıyan, and which were verifi ed as a result of the trials that were held in the Military 
Tribunal, were ordered, planned and carried out by persons found among the leadership 
of the CUP. Furthermore, as was presented during the defence[’s case], [although] there 
were those who became aware of the crimes after their occurrence, the[-se persons] made 
no eff ort whatsoever to prevent their repetition or stop the perpetrators of the previous 
crimes. 95 
 Th e indictment, based on the documentary evidence the Courts-Martial had 
already received from the investigating committees, stated, in part:
 July 1914 . . . immediately after the military movements Talaat, Enver and Jemal put their secret 
plans into operation. Th ey formed  Teshkilat-i Mahsoosé composed of criminals released from 
jail who constituted the ‘core of the gang acting on special orders and instructions’. Prior to the 
mobilisation it was rumoured that the gangs were to participate in the war . . . However, there is 
incontrovertible evidence that they were formed to massacre the Armenians [ Takvim-i-Vekâyi , 
April 2, 1919, N 3604]. 96 
 Th e Tribunal also identifi ed isolated incidents where the orders were disobeyed, as 
with the case of Mazhar Bey, the vali of Ankara who replied to orders from Atif Bey, 
‘No, Atif Bey, I am a governor, not a criminal. I give you my post, execute it your-
self.’ 97 Th e trials showed the consequences of disobedience—as noted by Dadrian, 
in the trial of the Responsible Secretaries, ‘in at least three cases provincial Responsible 
Secretaries had been able to eff ect the dismissal of governors who resisted orders 
for massacres’, with one denounced as ‘the protector of the Armenians, or more 
accurately . . . the governor-general of the infi dels’. 98 
 Many documents, however, were destroyed. Kirakossian relates that ‘in the course 
of the investigation [by the Courts-Martial] it became obvious that most important 
material of the activity of the [Special] Organization and all the documents of the 
 92  Dadrian, above n 8, 35.    93  Dadrian, above n 8, 35.    94  Dadrian, above n 8, 35. 
 95  Dadrian and Akçam,  Judgment at Istanbul , see above n 13, 327. 
 96  Cited in Dadrian and Akçam,  Judgment at Istanbul , see above n 13, 166. 
 97  Dadrian and Akçam,  Judgment at Istanbul , see above n 13. Mazhar was to later head up the 
Commission established by the Sultan to initiate investigations into the genocide. 
 98  Dadrian, above n 8, 43. 
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Central Committee had been stolen’. 99 Documents were burned and taken out of 
Turkey. 100 
 (VII)  Acknowledgement of Genocide 
 In the offi  cial indictment and the mandate of the Courts-Martial there is clear 
acknowledgement of the planned massacres of the Armenians. Th is acknowledge-
ment was supported by media and parliamentary debate at the time. As Kirakossian 
notes, with the signing of the Armistice and the resignation of Talat Pasa’s 
government, ‘criticism of the Young Turks became the chief theme in the Turkish 
press’. 101 One newspaper,  Inkilab , demanded the dissolution of the Majlis, the 
Parliament:  ‘It is impossible to appear before humanity and civilization hand in 
hand with those who had worked with the organisers of the Armenian massacres’. 102 
Another,  Sabah , wrote:
 Th ere is no way to renounce the reality we face today, a reality of endless misery and wretch-
edness. Th e government of Said Halim and Talaat nursed in their accursed hearts a horrible 
plan: using the excuse of war to deport the Christians, and especially the Armenians, from 
one province into another, to the Arabian desert, and in the course of deportation with 
unspeakable, cannibalistic methods not even known in the middle ages or in the centuries 
that followed murder not only grown-up men or boys of tender years, but also infants, 
women, old men—to fi nally destroy and extinguish the Armenian race . . . Talaat Bey, 
Minister of the Interior, gives orders and instructions from the Centre, organises gangs and 
sends them to the provinces. Th e Ittihad Centre sends its members like Drs Nazim and 
Shakir to Erzerum, Trebizond and other places as extraordinary plenipotentiaries to confer 
with Hasan Tahsim and Jemal Azmi. As a result—outrages, methodically planned atrocities 
and massacres conducted with the assistance of lawless elements and criminals specially 
released from jail for the purpose. 103 
 With the establishment of the main trial, there was, as Dadrian and Akçam relate, 
intense press coverage:  ‘headlines in the Turkish press included such terms as 
“Historical Day”, “Historical Judgment”, and “Incredible Indictment” ’. 104 
 Immediately post-war, there was clear recognition of what had been done to the 
Armenians. At the end of the war, in his opening speech to the Ottoman Senate 
on 19 October 1918, the President, Senator Ahmed Riza, invoked the memory of 
‘the Armenians who were savagely murdered’. 105 Two days later, when challenged 
on this, he described the mass murder of the Armenians as an ‘offi  cially’ ( resmen ) 
 99  Kirakossian,  Th e Armenian Genocide , above n 11, 168. 
 100  See further,  Taner  Akçam ,  ‘Th e Ottoman Documents and the Genocidal Policies of the 
Committee of Union and Progress (Ittihat ve Terakki) toward the Armenians in 1915’ ,  Genocide 
Studies and Prevention ,  1 ( 2006 ),  129–32 . 
 101  Kirakossian,  Th e Armenian Genocide, above n 11, 161. 
 102  6 November 1918, cited in Kirakossian, above n 101, 158. 
 103  28 November 1918, cited in Kirakossian, above n 101, 158–9. 
 104  Dadrian and Akçam,  Judgment at Istanbul , above n 13, 203. 
 105  Dadrian, ‘Th e Documentation of the World War I Armenian Massacres’, above n 13, 110. 
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sanctioned ‘state’ crime ( devlet eliyle ) requiring ‘some kind of intervention’ by the 
authorities. 106 Th is recognition even extended to when the Kemalists came into 
power, once the Courts-Martial had been dissolved. 
 Th e testimony recorded in the transcripts of these trials provides an important 
record of state complicity in the genocide of the Armenians. Th ese corroborate 
eyewitness testimony from consular offi  cials present in Turkey during the war. US 
Ambassador Henry Morgenthau noted in his memoir the candid conversations 
that Turkish offi  cials had with him:
 Th e real purpose of the deportation was robbery and destruction; it really represented a new 
method of massacre. When the Turkish authorities gave the orders for these deportations, 
they were merely giving the death warrant to a whole race; they understood this well, and in 
their conversations with me, they made no particular attempt to conceal the fact. 107 
 German Ambassador Metternich wrote in a dispatch in July 1916, one of many 
written by the three German Ambassadors in Turkey throughout the war, despite 
their military allegiance:  ‘Th e Turkish government inexorably carried out her 
plans, namely, the resolution of the Armenian question through the destruction of 
the Armenian race’. 108 Th e former Italian Consul-General in Trebizond, one of the 
sites of the genocide, wrote of:
 the ruthless searches through the houses and in the countryside; the hundreds of corpses 
found every day along the exile road; the young women converted by force to Islam or 
exiled like the rest; the children torn away from their families or from the Christian schools, 
and handed over by force to Moslem families, or else placed by hundreds on board ship 
in nothing but their shirts, and then capsized and drowned in the Black Sea and the River 
Deyirmen Deré—these are my last ineff aceable memories of Trebizond, memories which 
still, at a month’s distance, torment my soul and almost drive me frantic. 109 
 American media reports of the massacres occupied the front page in the  New York 
Times and other newspapers. 110 Th e German missionary, Dr Johannes Lepsius, 
who was present in Turkey as head of the Deutsche Orient-Mission from 1915 
until 1917, documented the genocide, publishing a confi dential albeit circulated 
report that gathered together eyewitness accounts. Historian Arnold Toynbee 
observed, in the Blue Book account published by the British government in 1916, 
organized by member of the House of Lords Viscount Bryce and based on eyewit-
ness accounts, ‘[i] t was a deliberate, systematic attempt to eradicate the Armenian 
population throughout the Ottoman Empire, and it has certainly met with a large 
measure of success’. 111 Statements of the atrocities perpetrated based on eyewitness 
 106  Dadrian, above n 13, 110.    107  Morgenthau, above n 22, 309. 
 108  Cited in Dadrian, ‘Th e Documentation of the World War I Armenian Massacres’, above n 13, 
568. Dadrian documents the extensive communication by the consular community during this period. 
 109  Arnold Toynbee,  Th e Treatment of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire , cited in  Leo  Kuper , 
 ‘Th e Turkish Genocide of Armenians, 1915–1917’ , in  Hovannisian (ed)  Th e Armenian Genocide in 
Perspective ( New Brunswick and London :  Transaction Publishers ,  1998 ),  49 . 
 110  See  Marjorie Housepian  Dobkin ,  ‘What Genocide? What Holocaust? News from Turkey, 1915–1923: 
A Case Study’ , in  Richard G.  Hovannisian (ed),  Th e Armenian Genocide in Perspective ( New Brunswick 
and London :  Transaction Publishers ,  1998 ),  97–109 . 
 111  Toynbee, 1916, cited in Melson, ‘Provocation or Nationalism’, above n 17, 64. 
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accounts of many diplomats stationed in Turkey at the time can also be found in 
government archives. 112 
 Yet with the political turmoil in the wake of the war, and the eventual change of 
government, this acknowledgement turned to denial. Th e authoritative voice of law 
was subverted. Th ose convicted were held up as martyrs. What had the potential to 
shape the nation turned into a diff erent kind of nation building. New borders of 
memory were established, and the past thereby eliminated. It was a failed founda-
tional moment. 
 (VIII)  Political Context of the Trials 
 Th e Courts-Martial operated in a period of great internal turmoil. Th e Ittihad 
Party had been defeated, yet continued to operate insurgently. Further, the Civil 
Service and the Ministries of War, Interior and Justice, together with the offi  ces of 
the Istanbul Police, were dominated by Ittihadists and actively impeded the work 
of the Tribunal, including aiding the escape of some prisoners. 113 Th e enthusiasm 
for holding the trials, and arresting suspects, was mixed. With one key escape early 
on in the trials, that of Dr Reşit Bey, who had been the governor of Diyarbekir and 
oversaw the deportation of the Armenians from that province, a special session of 
the Chamber was called. Th e President, Ahmet Riza Bey, convened the session in 
the upper house to debate ‘the need for an Imperial Council to end government 
indolence, conduct a house-cleaning in the cabinet and give the Sultan some 
necessary warnings’. 114 Meanwhile, in some provinces, progress was slow, with one 
investigating magistrate in Trebizond noting in March 1919, ‘[n] one of my eff orts 
and none of the work I did produced results’. 115 
 Th e change of Grand Vizier from Tevfi k Pasa to Damat Ferid Pasa sped up the 
trials. As Kevorkian notes, ‘it was under his government that the Young Turks began 
to be called to account for their deeds, that arrests were made with greater and greater 
frequency, and that the Ittihadist organisations were challenged’. 116 More suspects 
were arrested (Ferid Pasa was more willing than his predecessor to accept lists of 
suspects from the British), and the fi rst trial was concluded. Th e Grand Vizier was to 
declare that the government’s aim was ‘[t] o show the Victorious Powers that we are 
opposed to the policies of the Union and Progress Party, to punish the war crimi-
nals, to eliminate some of those persons loyal to the CUP from the bureaucracy’. 117 
Th ere was also a sense that holding the trials was politically pragmatic. Internally, it 
 112  See  Donald E.  Miller and  Lorna Touryan  Miller ,  Survivors:  An Oral History of the Armenian 
Genocide ( Berkeley, CA :  University of California Press ,  1993 ),  18–28 . 
 113  See Dadrian, above n 8, 31 and Dadrian, ‘Th e Documentation of the World War I Armenian 
Massacres’, above n 13, 555. Akçam notes as well that indicted persons were often informed of their 
impending arrest, allowing them time to escape:  Akçam, above n 12, 291–2. Further, reports of 
conditions inside the jails where suspects were kept and a failure at times to arrest suspects showed a 
leniency given internally. 
 114  Cited in Akçam, above n 12, 292.    115  Cited in Kevorkian, above n 44, 741. 
 116  Cited in Kevorkian, above n 44, 719.    117  Cited in Akçam, above n 12, 293. 
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would further discredit the Ittihad Party, and externally, the Allies would perhaps 
see that responsibility lay with the Young Turk leadership, not the Turkish people 
as a whole. Th e newspaper  Alemdar  wrote:
 Th e only thing that would help us is to cry all over the civilised world that we will really 
and actually exercise justice over the guilty. If Baghdad Square will not witness the gallows 
of the criminals, then Paris [ie the Peace Conference] will become the place of judgement 
of our state and nation. 118 
 In fact, Mehmed VI, the newly appointed Sultan after the war, had, in an interview 
with a British correspondent, specifi cally asked that the following statement be 
published: ‘Th e great majority of the nation is entirely innocent of the misdeeds 
attributed to it. Only a limited number of persons are responsible.’ 119 
 In establishing the Courts-Martial, the Sultan’s government had thus hoped that 
it would demonstrate that it was the Ittihadist Party, not the Turkish nation, that 
was responsible for the Armenian massacres, and that the Allies would be lenient 
at the Peace Conference. 120 It was therefore critical that the trials establish the 
systematic manner in which the massacres of the Armenians took place, and allocate 
institutional and as well as individual responsibility. Th e Courts-Martial also oper-
ated as an attempt at consolidation of power by the Sultan and of marginalization of 
the Ittihad Party. 
 Political instability continued throughout the duration of the Courts-Martial. 
Trials were halted on 17 May 1919 due to the Greek occupation of Smyrna and 
then resumed on 3 June. In the meantime, sixty-four prisoners were removed 
by the British to the islands of Mudros and Malta, and forty-one prisoners were 
released by the Ottoman government. Th e Kemalists, led by Mustafa Kemal who 
was to be the leader of the new republic of Turkey, were on the ascendancy, in 
part fuelled by events such as the occupation of the coastal port of Smyrna by 
Greece and the occupation of Istanbul by the British. Damat Ferid Pasa resigned 
in September 1919, resulting in a slower pace to the prosecutions again, with trials 
deferred, including a prohibition on Armenians returning to their former homes. 
When Parliament began sitting on 12 January 1920, almost all of the new deputies 
were connected to the emerging Nationalist Movement, leading to a strong chal-
lenge in Parliament to the trials. 121 In the face of this Nationalist challenge, and 
the inability of the Allies to proceed with partition, the British made the decision 
to occupy Istanbul, which they did on 16 March 1920. Th e Ottoman Parliament 
went into recess and a new Parliament was convened in Ankara, in direct challenge 
to the Ottoman Parliament and the leadership of Damat Ferid Pasa. 122 
 118  Cited in Kirakossian,  Th e Armenian Genocide , above n 13, 172. 
 119  Cited in Kirakossian, above n 11, 160.    120  Dadrian, above n 8, 31. 
 121  See Akçam, above n 12, 298–9. 
 122  Th e government of Damat Ferid Pasa began handing the British names of the leaders of the 
Nationalist Movement, as well as putting on trial, through the Courts-Martial, leaders of the 
Nationalists—many were sentenced to death  in absentia , including Mustafa Kemal, with four executed 
on 12 June 1920 for the attempted assassination of Damat Ferid Pasa. See Akçam, above n 12, 350. 
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 (IX)  Demise of the Courts-Martial 
 Th e ascendancy of Kemalism meant the demise of the Courts-Martial. With the 
Treaty of Sèvres and the occupation of Istanbul by the British, the Kemalists no 
longer tolerated the Courts-Martial trials. As Willis notes, the occupation by 
Greece of Smyrna on 15 May 1919 (allowed by the Council of Four) raised fears 
that the Allies favoured permanent territorial annexations by Greece, the ancient 
enemy of Turkey. 123 Th is further galvanized the Nationalist Movement led by 
Mustafa Kemal against the government of Damad Ferid. It is said to have led 
in part to the British taking those in custody to Malta. Th e Kemalists eventually 
overthrew the Sultan’s government in October 1920 and ended the prosecutions 
for the genocide of the Armenians. 
 As the process of supplanting the Sultan’s government and law proceeded, the 
Courts-Martial became irrelevant. Th e British occupation of Istanbul led to 
the end of Ferid’s government and a stronger political centre in Ankara led by 
the Nationalists. On 29 April 1920, a bill was introduced in the new Kemalist 
National Assembly in Ankara to declare the offi  cial decisions and decrees of the 
Sultan’s Istanbul government null and void. On 7 June 1920, the Ankara govern-
ment enacted Law No. 7, which declared the Istanbul government, its treaties and 
agreements, invalid as of 16 March 1920, when the Allies formally occupied the 
city and assumed full control of it. On 11 August 1920, the new Kemalist 
government in Ankara dissolved the Courts-Martial involving ‘proceedings con-
cerning the deportations’, 124 a dissolution that became eff ective in October 1920 
with the demise of Damad Ferid’s cabinet. Th e President of the Courts-Martial 
and three other members were arrested on 14 November for ‘irregularities’ involving 
Nusret’s death sentence, and on 10 December 1920 the new President began to 
release prisoners. 125 On 3 January 1921, the Kemalist Ankara government decided 
to have its Independence Court supplant the Courts-Martial in the judgment 
of the crimes committed in Yozgat (Ankara province). On 13 January 1921, the 
full Courts-Martial were abolished. On 25 April 1922, the last cabinet of the last 
Grand Vizier was impelled by the Kemalists to declare military tribunals incompe-
tent to try ‘nationalists’, meaning adherents of Kemalism. 126 On 11 July 1922, it 
was reported in  Tercüman-ı Hakikat , a daily newspaper, that the government had 
abolished the Courts-Martial. 
 On 31 March 1923, a general amnesty was announced for all those convicted 
by the Courts-Martial as well as by civilian courts. 127 Th e Military Appeals Court 
overturned the 20 July 1920 verdict of the former Governor of Baiburt, Nusret 
and declared both Nusret (found guilty and executed in the Baiburt trial) and 
Kemal (found guilty and executed in the Yozgat trial) ‘national martyrs’. On 25 
 123  Willis, above n 13, 155.    124  Dadrian, above n 8, 52.    125  Akçam, above n 12, 354. 
 126  G.  Jaeschke ,  Türk Inkilâbi Tarihi Kronolojisi 1918-1923 ( Chronology of the Turkish Revolution, 
N.R. Aksu Trans ,  1939 ) , cited in Dadrian,  Th e History , above n 13, fns 111, 113, 340–1. 
 127  Jaeschke, above n 126, 76, 148; cited in Yeghiayan, above n 9, 184. 
04_9780199671144c4.indd   98 10/3/2013   4:00:14 PM
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in 
any way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
Th e Ottoman State Special Military Tribunal 99
December 1920, the Ankara regime enacted Law No. 80/271, allocating a pension 
for the family of Nusret. On 14 October 1922, Mehmed Kemal, executed on 10 
April 1919 in the Yozgat trial, was proclaimed a ‘National Martyr’ by special legis-
lation enacted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly in Ankara. 128 Th e Grand 
National Assembly held a ten-minute silence to honour the memory of Nusret, 
naming a region, a school, and a street in Urfa after him, and a statue of Kemal was 
erected in the public square of Bogazhyan. 129 
 When the Grand Vizier was called to present Turkey’s case before the Council of 
Ten on 17 June 1919, he asked for clemency for Turkey, arguing that ‘the great trial 
of the Unionists at Constantinople has proved the responsibility of the leaders of the 
Committee [for war crimes committed]’. 130 His appeals, however, were rebuff ed. 131 
His request a short time later to the Allies to force the Germans to extradite Enver, 
Talât, and Djemal (Cemal) to Turkey was also denied. 132 
 (X)  Conclusion 
 Th e Special Military Tribunal established by the Ottoman state at the end of World 
War I, the Courts-Martial, provided a record of the genocide of the Armenians. 
In its use of extensive documentary materials and interrogation of key partici-
pants, it provided evidence of the manner in which the genocide was perpetrated. 
Following the tradition of the Ottoman state in establishing court-martials, it drew 
on established law to address the massacres perpetrated and associated crimes and 
clearly addressed them as a crime of state. In one trial, a witness spoke of ‘doing 
government business’, and in others, ministers and offi  cials gave evidence that 
‘deportation’ in reality meant ‘annihilation’. 
 Th e trials were in many ways a pragmatic political response to the situation in 
which Turkey found itself in the wake of World War I, particularly the threat of 
harsh sanctions. Th ey also located the genocide of the Armenians amongst other 
crimes such as bad governance and misappropriation of property. It was hoped that 
a response to the massacres would bring some lenience and that this would also 
solidify the government in a time of political turmoil. As such, the trials can be 
viewed as a project of nation-building and an attempt to establish the parameters 
of the post-war Ottoman state. Th ese eff orts were impeded by Allied incursions 
into Turkey, by a civil service that attempted to boycott the trials, and overall by 
an extremely fragile internal political situation. Despite this, the trials provided a 
record and, critically, recognition of the genocide orchestrated by the Ottoman 
state. While it only succeeded in a few actual sentences that were not  in absentia 
(which resulted in strong criticism from the Armenian press), it created an offi  cial 
 128  Höss, above n 11, 219.    129  Dadrian, above n 8, 52. 
 130  Council of Ten Meeting, 17 June 1919,  FRUS: Paris Peace Conference 1919 , 508–12, cited in 
Willis, above n 13, 156. 
 131  Council of Ten Meeting, above n 130.    132  Council of Ten Meeting, above n 130. 
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record of the genocide, one that was mirrored by political and media commentary 
at the time. 
 Th e record of these trials, however, was actively buried by the new Turkish state. 
Th ey have been largely hidden for years, resurrected mainly by a few scholars with 
some access to the archives. Many documents have been destroyed, and the archive 
is still largely closed. Th is has supported Turkey’s insistence for years that the 
genocide did not happen. Yet despite these trials being actively hidden by Turkey, 
the record of law is something that remains—both to counter the denial and to 
provide a record of the genocide. It is a hidden story that can be resurrected. Law 
produces records. It is the legitimacy of law, even in fragile political times, that 
creates public and authoritative records and acknowledgement. 
 Th e Courts-Martial also show the limitations of law—particularly as a record of 
history—when this history has been submerged under new nationalist priorities, 
such as those of modern-day Turkey. Despite the clear and offi  cial acknowledgement 
of the genocide provided by the post-war government and as found in the trial 
verdicts, denialism has prevailed. Th e story of both the trials and the genocide has 
largely remained hidden. Yet that the records of these trials exist, albeit fragmented 
(it is unclear as to how much was destroyed by Turkey), allows for the record to 
be upheld. Th is account provided by law provides some level of accountability. 
While the political can subvert the legal record, the legal record remains. 
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 Justice for No-Land’s Men? Th e United States 
Military Trials against Spanish Kapos in 
Mauthausen and Universal Jurisdiction 
 Rosa Ana  Alija-Fernández * 
 (I)  Introduction 
 In 1947, fi ve Spaniards—Joaquín Espinosa, Laureano Nava, Indalecio González, 
Moisés Fernández and Domingo Félez 1 —were tried before United States military 
courts in occupied Germany. Th eir treatment and, in particular, the application of 
universal jurisdiction to nationals of neutral states and stateless people, represent 
an important ‘untold story’ of the post-war trials and provides an unusual precursor 
to the development of universal jurisdiction in general. Th eir story illustrates also 
the eff ects of the brutalizing industrialized evil implemented by Nazism and the 
negative eff ects of industrialized justice carried out by the Allies at the end of 
World War II. Life for inmates in concentration camps—where being a hero or a 
villain depended to a great extent on a volatile fate—was too complex for men to 
understand and so simplifi cation and silence have become useful tools to absorb 
it. As fi ghting against impunity after World War II was a laudable task, mistakes in 
the administration of justice seemed more acceptable. Insignifi cant as these cases 
might have been in the wider context of post-war justice, to shed light on them 
now can help both to track the evolution of universal jurisdiction and remind 
international criminal lawyers that fi ghting against impunity after mass atrocities 
 *  Dreur. Lecturer, Universitat de Barcelona. Th e author wishes to thank Alfons Aragoneses, José 
Luis González and Sarah Deery for their helpful comments. Th is research has been carried out as part 
of the research project DER2009-10847 ( La exigibilidad del Derecho Internacional de los Derechos 
Humanos en situaciones de crisis ), funded by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation. 
 1  Names in the offi  cial documents contain several spelling mistakes. For instance, the correct spelling of 
Lauriano Navas should be Laureano Nava, while Indalecio González’s surname was spelled Gonzaless 
in the documentation, and Domingo Félez was called Felix Domingo during the whole proceedings 
(although he is correctly named at Joaquín Espinosa’s trial, where he acted as a witness). Here the 
proper spellings will be preferred, although the original spelling will be kept when citing the name of 
the cases or directly quoting the content of a document. 
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requires quantity, but also quality considerations: due process must be upheld as 
the only way to prevent injustice and victimization. 
 Former soldiers in the Spanish Republican Army fi ghting against Franco’s 
fascism, Espinosa, Nava, González, Fernández and Félez fl ed to France after Franco’s 
victory, where they joined the fi ght against Nazism. 2 Indeed, many veterans from 
the Republican Army joined the French Army as members of the Foreign Legion 
( Légion étrangère ) and the so-called Marching Battalions of Foreign Volunteers 
( Bataillons de marche des volontaires étrangers ), created between 1939 and 1940, 3 as 
well as members of the Companies of Foreign Workers ( Compagnies de travailleurs 
étrangers ). 4 Th ose in the Legion and the Battalions (some 15,000 people in total) 
were combatants, while some 55,000 people in the Companies worked to fortify 
the French defences along the German and Italian borders. 5 In the period from 10 
May to 20 June 1940, during the invasion of France, around 20,000 Spaniards were 
captured by German troops and taken to concentration camps. Mauthausen was 
the main destination for Spanish prisoners, to the extent that by 1941 they most 
probably represented sixty per cent of the camp’s population. 6 More than seven 
thousand veterans of the Spanish civil war were deported there during World War 
II; around 5,000 of them died due to mistreatment and starvation. Th ree thousand 
more were deported to other camps, like Dachau, Buchenwald, Bergen-Belsen and 
even Auschwitz and Treblinka. 
 Espinosa, Nava, González, Fernández and Félez were working for the French 
Army when they were captured by the Germans and taken fi rst to prisoner-of-war 
camps ( Stalags ) 7 and later to Mauthausen, from where they were transferred to its 
satellite sub-camps (mainly Gusen—both 1 and 2—,Steyr and Wiener-Neudstadt). 8 
After the liberation of the camp by US troops on 5 May 1945, the fi ve Spaniards 
were accused of having held posts as Kapos in Mauthausen and, as a result, appre-
hended and taken to Dachau, where they were tried by military courts on the 
basis of their participation in a joint criminal enterprise. Kapos were inmates 
 2  Many Spaniards fought in the European battlefi elds, both with the Allies and beside the Axis 
troops. Th e last ones were integrated into the so-called ‘Blue Division’ ( División Azul  or  Spanische 
Blaue Division ), a hybrid military unit, somewhere between a regular unit of the Spanish Army and 
a voluntary unit ( Emilio Sáenz  Francés ,  Entre La antorcha y la esvástica: Franco en la encrucijada de la 
Segunda Guerra Mundial ( Madrid :  Actas ,  2009 ),  88 ), that was sent to support the German eff orts in 
the new Russian front. 
 3  Luis  Reyes ,  Españoles en la Segunda Guerra Mundial ( Madrid :  Aldaba Ediciones SA ,  1990 ),  11 . 
 4  Most of those Companies, created in 1939 to solve the issue of the thousands of exiled republicans 
arriving in France, were sent to the Maginot Line and to the French-Belgian border, some were sent 
to the Alps and the rest were distributed throughout France. 
 5  Eduardo Pons  Prades ,  El Holocausto de los republicanos españoles: Vida y muerte en los campos de 
exterminio alemanes (1940–1945) ( Barcelona :  Belacqva ,  2005 ),  41 . 
 6  David Wingeate  Pike ,  Spaniards in the Holocaust: Mauthausen, the Horror on the Danube ( New York, 
NY :  Routledge ,  2000 ),  12 . 
 7  However, it seems that neither Spaniards in the Companies nor in the French army were granted 
prisoner-of-war (POW) status during their staying in Stalags, but instead they were treated as anti-Nazi 
elements: Reyes, above n 3, 11–13. But see   Benito  Bermejo and  Sandra  Checa ,  Libro Memorial: Españoles 
deportados a los campos nazis (1940–1945) ( Madrid: Ministerio de Cultura ,  2006 ),  17–19 . 
 8  For a list of sub-camps see  Mauthausen Memorial [website], < http://en.mauthausen-memorial.at/
index_open.php > (accessed 24 February 2013). 
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appointed by the SS to command work details ( Kommandos ). Th ey were usually 
selected because of their physical condition, but they were also sometimes chosen 
because of their expertise concerning the tasks the team was meant to carry out. 
Frequently mistreated by the SS, many chose sadism against fellow inmates as a 
strategy to survive, while others used their position to protect other inmates from 
excessive abuse. 9 Victims and tormentors at once, they were highly controversial 
fi gures inside the camps whose very existence served to destroy social ties among 
prisoners. 10 
 Several objections can be made to the way proceedings were carried out, par-
ticularly in relation to process standards. Although military courts had general 
jurisdiction over crimes committed in the zone of occupation under the control 
of the United States, the fact that Spain had been a neutral state during the war 
generated some hesitation concerning their authority to try the fi ve men. Th e juris-
dictional question was fi nally answered in the affi  rmative, based on the principle of 
universal jurisdiction, among other grounds. In this chapter it is argued that this 
instance marks the fi rst time universal jurisdiction was invoked to try nationals of 
a neutral country, or even stateless people—given the very particular circumstances 
surrounding Spanish Republicans in concentration camps—for war crimes. To that 
end, section II off ers an overview of the legal and jurisdictional framework of the 
Dachau trials that determined the scope of the indictment and the trials against 
the fi ve Spaniards. Section III focuses on whether the alleged neutrality of Spain 
during World War II acted as an obstacle to their prosecution and whether invoking 
universal jurisdiction was thus needed or—as it seems—whether relying on such 
a jurisdictional ground was more of a precautionary measure than a real problem 
of lack of jurisdiction. Section IV argues that this was the fi rst time that such a 
ground was invoked to try stateless people, as in practice Spanish Republicans were 
completely neglected by Franco’s government, who considered them not to be 
Spaniards (nor did they receive any protection from any other country). 
 (II)  US Military Courts’ Trials over the Joint Criminal 
Enterprise in the Concentration Camp Mauthausen 
 Proceedings before US military courts in Dachau were authorized by Joint Chiefs 
of Staff  Directive 1023/10 of 8 July 1945 (JCS 1023/10), 11 which instructed the 
 9  Falk  Pingel ,  ‘Social life in an unsocial environment. Th e inmates’ struggle for survival’ , in  Jane 
 Caplan and  Nikolaus  Wachsmann (eds),  Concentration Camps in Nazi Germany: Th e New Histories 
( New York, NY :  Routledge ,  2010 ),  59 . 
 10  On the role and position of the Kapos at concentration camps, see   Eugen  Kogon ,  Sociología de 
los campos de concentración ( Madrid :   Taurus ,  1965 ),  106–8 ;   Wolfgang  Sofsky ,  Th e Order of Terror: 
Th e Concentration Camp ( Princeton, NJ :  Princeton University Press ,  1993 ),  132 ;   Vincenzo and  Luigi 
 Pappalettera ,  Los S.S. tienen la palabra. Las leyes del campo de Mauthausen reveladas por las Schutz-Staff eln 
( Barcelona :  Laia ,  1969 ),  31 . 
 11  Joint Chiefs of Staff ,  Directive on the Identifi cation and Apprehension of Persons Suspected of War 
Crimes or Other Off enses and Trial of Certain Off enders , 1023/10 (JCS 1023/10).   Draft in Telford 
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commanders in chief of the Allies’ occupation forces to identify and apprehend 
persons suspected of war crimes or other off ences in their respective zones. 12 
It further stipulated that the courts would have jurisdiction ratione materiae over 
(a)  atrocities and off ences against persons or property constituting violations of 
international law, including the laws, rules and customs of land and naval warfare; 
(b) initiation of invasions of other countries and of wars of aggression in violation 
of international laws and treaties; and (c) other atrocities and off ences, including 
atrocities and persecutions on racial, religious or political grounds, committed 
since 30 January 1933. 13 
 Regarding their jurisdiction ratione personae, the directive specifi ed that the 
term ‘criminal’ was meant to include all persons, ‘without regard to their nationality 
or capacity in which they acted, who have committed any of the aforementioned 
crimes’, including those who (a) had been accessories to the perpetration of such 
crimes; (b) had taken a consenting part therein; (c) had been connected with plans 
or enterprises involving their commission; or (d) had been members of organizations 
or groups connected with the commission of such crimes. 14 
 JCS 1023/10 was the jurisdictional basis for the US trials over crimes perpetrated 
at concentration camps in Germany and Austria. Among these trials, two categories 
can be distinguished: (1) the so-called ‘parent cases’, that is to say the initial trials 
against the main leaders in the administration of each concentration camp whose 
personnel were in US custody; and (2)  the ‘subsequent cases’ against any other 
offi  cial or employee involved in the criminal enterprise that each camp was found 
to be. Th e trials against the fi ve Spaniards fell into the latter category. 
 (1)  Th e parent case:  US v Altfuldisch et al 
 Th e parent-case system was intended to facilitate expeditious proceedings:  an 
initial trial concerning one concentration camp was held, and the fi ndings in the 
case were then used to try other participants in the camp in subsequent trials ‘without 
having to re-establish the evidence’. 15 Th e US military courts sitting in Dachau 
held six concentration camp trials. 16 Th e one concerning the Concentration Camp 
Mauthausen,  US v Altfuldisch et al , took place in the spring of 1946 and involved 
Taylor,  Final Report to the Secretary of the Army on the Nuernberg War Crimes Trials Under Control 
Council Law No 10 ( Washington DC :  Government Printing Offi  ce ,  1949 ),  244–5 . 
 12  Th e general authority for criminal procedures against war criminals in Europe, though, is to be 
found in the Moscow Declaration of 1 November 1943. JCS 1023/10 was later used as the basis for 
Control Council Law No 10: Taylor, above n 11, 244. 
 13  JCS 1023/10 , [2] . 
 14  Exceptionally, only persons who had held high political, civil or military (including General Staff ) 
positions in Germany or in one of its allies, co-belligerents or satellites, or in the fi nancial, industrial 
or economic life of any of these countries, were considered to be accountable for invasions and wars 
of aggression:  JCS 1023/10 , [2] . 
 15  Tomaz  Jardim ,  Th e Mauthausen Trial: American Military Justice in Germany ( Cambridge, MA : 
 Harvard University Press ,  2012 ),  49 . 
 16  Concentration Camps Dachau, Buchenwald, Flossenbürg, Mauthausen, Mittelbau-Dora/Nordhausen 
and Mühldorf. 
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sixty-one defendants accused of having committed war crimes. In this case, besides 
the fi ndings as to the charges and particulars, the court also entered the following 
‘special fi ndings’: 17 
 •  Concentration Camp Mauthausen was essentially a criminal enterprise. 
 •  It was impossible for anyone to be employed at or present in the camp without 
acquiring defi nite knowledge of the criminal practices. 
 •  Every military or civil employee or offi  cial connected with the camp, regardless 
of his capacity, was guilty of the crime of violating the laws and usages of 
war. 18 
 Given the fi nding that the mass atrocities which took place at the camp were crimi-
nal in nature and that those involved in them acted in pursuance of a common 
design, military courts trying subsequent proceedings linked to the parent case 
were directed to presume—subject to rebuttal by appropriate evidence—that those 
shown by competent evidence to have participated in the mass atrocity knew of 
the criminal nature of that enterprise. 19 
 Th e Deputy Judge Advocate for War Crimes stated that such special fi ndings 
were ‘no attempt to sentence any individuals as a result of a trial “in absentia” ’. 20 
Equally, if additional participants were brought to trial for their complicity in 
the mass atrocity, that would not mean ‘they have been previously tried because 
of these fi ndings’. 21 Instead, they would have an opportunity to show that 
they were not in Mauthausen. However, the fact that the special fi ndings were 
used to establish guilt in further proceedings regarding crimes perpetrated in 
Mauthausen imposed on the defendants the burden of proof—indeed probatio 
diabolica (‘devil’s proof ’)—of their own innocence, 22 as they would have had to 
show that:
 [T] hey were not in the Mauthausen Concentration Camp, that, if they were there, they did 
not know of the criminal nature of the operation, or that, if they did participate with know-
ledge of the criminal nature of the operation, the nature and extent of their participation was 
negligible and that the criminal operation was not encouraged, maintained, or furthered to 
any substantial degree by such negligible participation. 23 
 17  A court-martial ‘may characterise or explain the fi nding, (or sentence,) or accompany it with 
animadversions, recommendations or other remarks’:   William  Winthrop ,  Military Law and Precedents 
( Washington DC :  Government Printing Offi  ce , 2nd edn,  1920 ),  385 . 
 18  US v Hans Altfuldisch (Review and Recommendations) (Deputy Judge Advocate’s Offi  ce, 7708 
War Crimes Group, European Command, APO 178, Case No 000-50-5, March 1946) ( Altfuldisch 
Review ), 4: ‘any offi  cial, governmental, military or civil, whether he be a member of the Waff en SS, 
Allgemeine SS, or any guard, or civil employee, in any way in control of or stationed at or engaged in 
the operation of the Concentration Camp Mauthausen, or any or all of its by-camps in any manner 
whatsoever, is guilty of crimes against the recognized laws, customs, and practices of civilized nations 
and the letter and spirit of the laws and usages of war, and by reason thereof is to be punished’. 
 19  Letter of the Th eatre Commander,  Mass Atrocity Subsequent Proceedings , 14 October 1946, fi le 
AG 000.5 WCR-AGO, subject: ‘Trial of War Crimes Cases’, US Forces, European Th eatre, [12]. 
 20  Altfuldisch Review , above n 18, 17.    21  Altfuldisch Review , above n 18, 17–18. 
 22  Jardim, above n 15, 49.    23  Altfuldisch Review , above n 18, 18. 
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 Such reasoning by the Deputy Judge Advocate implied an extremely rigid 
application of the common design charge, for it failed to take into consideration 
how a person came to be present in the camp, and did not discriminate between those 
who were military or civilian offi  cials in the Nazi system and those who were inmates 
in the camp. Th is led in 1951 to a review by War Crimes Board of Review No. 1 in 
the case against Karl Horcicka and others (Case No. 000-50-5-32), where it was 
held that an accused who was neither ‘a member of the Waff en SS, Allegemeine 
SS, a guard, or a civil employee’ nor ‘a governmental, military or civil offi  cial of 
the camp’ was not within the class of persons presumed to be guilty by their mere 
presence there. 24 
 (2)  Th e trials against the ‘Spanish Kapos’ 
 Th e trials against the so-called ‘Spanish Kapos’ were among the subsequent cases; they 
targeted offi  cials, guards and civil employees, who might have participated in the 
day-to-day operations of the Concentration Camp Mauthausen or any of its sub- 
camps. According to the special fi ndings in the parent case, their culpability for 
crimes against the laws and usages of the law was understood to be based on their 
knowledge of the criminal acts that took place in the camp. 
 Th e presumption of having participated in a joint criminal enterprise is evident 
in the charge sheet, which is remarkably vague by today’s standards. All fi ve of the 
defendants were accused of violations of the laws and usages of war. In the case against 
Espinosa, three particular incidents formed the basis of the charges: 25 
 •  ‘A killing of two or more non-German Nationals, inmates of the Gusen I 
Concentration Camp, the exact names and numbers of such persons being 
unknown’ (the qualifi cation of ‘killing’ was later substituted for ‘mistreating’ 
by the court); 26 
 •  ‘Assaults upon approximately ten non-German Nationals, inmates of the 
Gusen I Concentration Camp, the exact names and numbers of such persons 
being unknown’ (again, modifi cations to this charge were made by the court, 
which decided to disregard the specifi c number of ten victims); 27 
 •  ‘Assaults upon two or more non-German Nationals, inmates of the Gusen 2 
Concentration Camp, the exact names and numbers of such persons being 
unknown’. 
 In spite of all the ‘unknown’ information, these charges referred, to some extent, 
to specifi c criminal behaviours and incidents. Th at represents a very high level of 
 24  US v Karl Horcicka et  al (War Crimes Board of Review No. 1) (Offi  ce of the Judge Advocate, 
Headquarters, European Command, Case No 0000-50-5-32, 30 April 1948) ( Horcicka Review ), 2. 
 25  US v Joaquín Espinosa (Review and Recommendations) (Deputy Judge Advocate’s Offi  ce, 7708 War 
Crimes Group, European Command, APO 407, Case No 000-Mauthausen-19, 28 January 1948), 
( Espinosa Review ), 1. 
 26  US v Joaquín Espinosa (Trial) (Military Government Court, Case No 000-Mauthausen-19, 9–12 
May 1947) 7/8 ( Espinosa Trial ). 
 27  Espinosa Trial , above n 26, 8/8. 
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precision compared to the charges in the case against Laureano Nava and others, 
where the defendants were charged with having wrongfully encouraged, aided, 
abetted, and participated in the subjection of non-German nationals ‘to killings, 
beatings, tortures, starvation, abuses, and indignities, the exact names and numbers 
of such persons being unknown, but aggregating thousands’, acting in pursuance of 
a common design to do so. 28 Th e only particulars in the indictment were the places 
where the charged acts had taken place (‘at or in the vicinity of the Mauthausen 
Concentration Camp, at Castle Hartheim, and at or in the vicinity of the 
Mauthausen Sub-camps’), the time frame (‘at various and sundry times between 
January 1, 1942, and May 5, 1945’) and the victims’ potential nationality, origin 
or status. 29 Beyond that, no particulars were provided. 
 Proceedings took place in Dachau. Th e trial against Joaquín Espinosa was held 
from 9–12 May 1947, while the trial against Laureano Navas, Indalecio González, 
Moisés Fernández and Domingo Félez was held from 14–21 July 1947. Being 
subsequent trials concerning the criminal operation carried out in Mauthausen, 
the law to be applied in the two cases was to be subject to the special fi ndings in 
the parent case. Th e defence therefore had the burden of proving that these men 
were not aware of the criminal nature of the operation carried out in Mauthausen 
(rather improbable given that they were themselves inmates in the camp, although 
some statements in the records indicate that lack of knowledge might have been 
considered a potential line of defence 30 ) or that the nature and extent of their 
participation was negligible and in no way encouraged, maintained, or furthered 
the criminal operation. Neither the fact that they themselves were victims of the 
Nazi system nor the potential impact of the harsh living conditions on their behaviour 
were considered as a mitigating, if not exonerating, factor. Indeed, in his closing argu-
ment in  US v Lauriano Navas , the Prosecutor took for granted that the defendants 
had been chosen as Kapos due to their criminal nature, 31 and superior orders was 
not a valid defence here ‘for in most of the cases the capo [sic] was in complete 
charge of the detail as far as punishment was concerned’. 32 Instead, the defence 
counsel, while assuming that Kapos were criminal prisoners, claimed that there was 
no evidence that the accused ‘were criminals before they were put in a concentration 
camp by the German authorities’. 33 Th erefore, the whole discussion was focused 
 28  US v Lauriano Navas (Review and Recommendations) (Deputy Judge Advocate’s Offi  ce, 7708 War 
Crimes Group, European Command, APO 407, Case No 000-50-5-25, 14 January 1948)  ( Navas 
Review ), 1. 
 29  ‘Poles, Frenchmen, Greeks, Jugoslavs, Citizens of the Soviet Union, Norwegians, Danes, Belgians, 
Citizens of the Netherlands, Citizens of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Turks, British Subjects, 
stateless persons, Czechs, Chinese, Citizens of the United States of America, and other non-German 
nationals who were then and there in the custody of the then German Reich, and members of the 
armed forces of nations then at war with the then German Reich who were then and there surrendered 
and unarmed prisoners of war in the custody of the then German Reich’:  Navas Review , n 28 above. 
 30  See  US v Lauriano Navas (Trial) (Military Government Court, Case No 000-50-5-25, 14–21 
July 1947) 13/3 ( Navas Trial ) (testimony by Indalecio González stating that he had never heard from 
anyone in the camp that someone beat prisoners to death). 
 31  Navas Trial , above n 30, 16/2 (Prosecutor’s closing argument). 
 32  Navas Trial , above n 30, 16/4. 
 33  Navas Trial , above n 30, 16/4 (Defense Counsel’s closing argument). 
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on the determination whether they would fi t in the defi nition of Kapos as criminal 
prisoners. 
 Furthermore, the cases do not seem to have been especially scrupulous regarding 
basic due process standards. Particularly controversial was the issue of language, as none 
of the defendants had a good command of either English or German, so translation 
into Spanish was needed. Among those appointed as translators was a court reporter 
who claimed that her Spanish was not good enough to perform as a translator in a 
trial where the death penalty might be applied. 34 During the trials, it became evident 
that written declarations were not always made or read in a language that the 
witnesses and/or the defendants could understand. 35 Th ere were also complaints 
regarding the ‘professionalism’ of some witnesses, 36 as well as about the fact that, 
after witnesses’ depositions, visitors attending the trials were leaking to other 
witnesses information about what was going on in the room. 37 Moisés Fernández 
even claimed he had been mistreated during the interrogatories after his refusal to 
plead guilty to two killings. 38 
 Such anomalies could probably have been avoided if Spain had become involved 
in these trials. However, there is no evidence that the Spanish government either 
showed any interest in the course of the proceedings or that the United States 
informed the Spanish authorities about them. Th at lack of communication is in 
no way surprising, given that Spain was clearly much more sympathetic to the 
Axis States than to the Allies. In any case, the aforementioned irregularities did not 
stop the courts fi nding four of the men (Espinosa, Nava, Fernández and González) 
guilty of the charge of violation of the laws and usages of the law, acting in pursu-
ance of the common design that had already been established in the parent case. 39 
 All four admitted during the trial to having performed duties either as Oberkapo, 
Kapo or assistant Kapo. 40 Joaquín Espinosa was specifi cally accused of several inci-
dents –including beatings allegedly resulting in death while acting as an assistant 
Kapo (1942–1943) and a Kapo (1944–1945) in the ‘potatoes detail’ in Gusen. But 
evidence was not suffi  cient to prove the most serious charges, so, in order to adjust 
the charges to the proven facts, the court modifi ed the wording of the indict-
ment by replacing the original reference to ‘killing’ with ‘mistreating’, although 
 34  Th e  Washington Post published a letter to the editor signed with her name, criticizing ‘the callous 
unconcern whether [the Spaniards] understood the proceedings’ and her assignment as a translator 
in the  Lauriano Navas case:  Eve Fridell Hawkins, ‘Ilse Koch’,  Th e Washington Post , 27 September 
1948, 12. However, inquiries on this issue concluded that she had never expressed any protest at the 
time of her appointment or during the trial: letter from Colonel J.L. Harbaugh, Judge Advocate, to 
Chief, War Crimes Branch, Civil Aff airs Division, Department of the Army Special Staff ,  Request for 
Information (US v Lauriano Navas et al , Case No. 000-50-5-25), October 1948, 3. 
 35  See  Navas Trial, above n 30, 4/15 (testimony by Pedro Gómez, witness for the Prosecution) and 
11/15–11/16 (testimony by Moisés Fernández, defendant),  Espinosa Trial, above n 26, 6/14–6/15. 
 36  Navas Trial, above n 30, 14/6.    37  Navas Trial , above, n 30, 4/1. 
 38  Navas Trial , above, n 30, 11/16. 
 39  According to the Orders on Review, the specifi c off ence committed was ‘participation in 
Mauthausen Concentration Camp mass atrocity’. 
 40  Navas Trial , above, n 30, 11/11 (Fernández), 13/11 (González), 14/14 (Navas). As for Joaquín 
Espinosa, see  Espinosa Trial, above n 26, 6/6. 
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according to the prosecutor such a crime did not exist. 41 Espinosa received a 
three-year sentence commencing on 5 May 1945, at Landsberg war crimes prison. 
 Indalecio González, aka ‘Astoria’ or ‘Asturias’, was accused of having been an 
Oberkapo who often beat prisoners, sometimes to death. He was sentenced to 
death, and, although many petitions of clemency were received from the Spanish 
Republican government in exile, he was hanged on 2 February 1949. 
 Laureano Nava was accused of having regularly beaten inmates while performing 
duties as an assistant Kapo. Two prisoners were alleged to have died as a result of 
the hard beatings, in spite of the fact that Nava was crippled in his right hand due 
to a wound he had received in the Spanish Civil War. Sentenced to life imprisonment, 
he requested a revision of the sentence. His lawyer proved that life imprisonment 
had been based on the testimony of just two witnesses. 42 In 1951 his sentence was 
reduced to time served and he was released on 18 January 1952. 
 Moisés Fernández, aka ‘César’ or ‘Caesar’, was accused of having been an assistant 
Kapo and having mistreated prisoners, allegedly causing the death of one of them. 
He was sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment. Without the advice of a lawyer, he 
put all his eff orts into getting his case reviewed. In 1951 the sentence was reduced 
to fi fteen years on the basis that there was not enough evidence to support the sen-
tence. Th e Judge Advocate had supported a reduction after fi nding that Fernández 
had committed, at best, a minor assault, which made the sentence excessive, con-
sidering the case as a whole and comparing it to similar cases. 43 Attention was also 
paid to his delicate health (he suff ered from tuberculosis). Fernández died on 24 
June 1952, before being released. 
 Domingo Félez, who had worked as a camp barber, was accused of marking 
the inmates with letters that would indicate whether they were to be sent to the 
crematory or to the gas chamber and of having struck an inmate once. He was 
initially sentenced by the court to two years’ imprisonment (commencing 13 May 
1945), but immediately released (on 28 July 1947), as he had already been in 
prison for longer than the sentence period. 44 Some months later, in January 1948, 
the Deputy Judge reviewing the case considered the evidence insuffi  cient to show 
that he had encouraged the common design or participated therein. Upon his 
recommendation, the sentence was disapproved. 45 
 41  Espinosa Trial, above n 26, 8/8. 
 42  US v Lauriano Navas (Review of the War Crimes Branch—Accused: Lauriano Navas) (Offi  ce of 
the Judge Advocate, Headquarters, European Command, Case No 0000-50-5-25, 18 April 1951), 
[4.b.2]. 
 43  In the report, the reviewing offi  cer also recalled the aforementioned doctrine established by the 
War Crimes Board of Review at  US v Karl Horcicka —stating that the mere presence in the camp of the 
alleged perpetrator, irrespective of his position there, was not enough to presume his guilt:  Horcicka 
Review , above n 24, 2—( US v Lauriano Navas (Review of the War Crimes Branch—Accused: Fernández, 
Moisés) (Judge Advocate Division, Headquarters, European Command, AFO 403, US Army, Case No 
0000-50-5-25, 18 April 1951), [3.a.2]). Although no further indication as to whether Fernández fell 
into one of the categories to which the presumption of guilt should apply, it might have infl uenced 
the recommendation to reduce the sentence. 
 44  Memorandum from AG 383 JAG to Director, War Criminal Prison, Release of prisoner in the 
Case of the  United States v Lauriano Navas, et al (Case No. 000-50-5-25), 15 March 1948. 
 45  Navas Review , above n 28, 10. 
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 (III)  Th e Trials against the ‘Spanish Kapos’:  
A Challenge to US Military Courts’ Jurisdiction? 
 Th e trials against Joaquín Espinosa, on the one hand, and Laureano Nava, Indalecio 
González, Moisés Fernández as well as Domingo Félez, on the other hand, hold a 
special interest because, not being nationals of an enemy country but of a neutral 
state, they challenged the jurisdiction of the military courts. 
 However, whether Spain was a neutral country during World War II is a matter 
of opinion. Indeed, Franco’s Nationalist regime formally adopted a position of 
neutrality at the beginning of World War II, formalized in two agreements signed 
as early as December 1936 with Italy and in March 1939 with Germany. But 
when a German victory became likely, belligerence was considered by the Spanish 
government, as a means to satisfy certain territorial aspirations. 46 In 1940, after 
the defeats of the Netherlands and Belgium, Spain changed its neutral status into 
one of ‘non-belligerence’, a qualifi ed form of neutrality that in practice was a status 
prior to belligerence. 47 Th is concept was invented by Mussolini in 1939 to express 
Italy’s support (short of participation in the war) for Germany. 48 Only the German 
refusal to meet the conditions imposed by Franco’s government in order for Spain 
to fi ght by Germany’s side prevented Spain from taking the further step towards 
belligerence. Later on, when the United States entered the war and it became obvi-
ous that this could have a negative eff ect on the Spanish interests, 49 a clear position 
from Spain was needed: either join the Axis or adopt genuine neutrality. 50 To that 
end, on 1 October 1943, Franco announced in a speech that Spain had returned 
to ‘watchful neutrality’. 51 
 46  Franco’s government hoped that in exchange Germany would help Spain to expel the British 
from Gibraltar and to expand in Northern Africa. See   Rafael García  Pérez ,  Deuda, Comercio y Nuevo 
Orden: España y el Tercer Reich durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial (1939–1945) ( Madrid :  Ed. de la 
Universidad Complutense de Madrid ,  1993 ),  291–3 ;   Juan Carlos Jiménez  Redondo ,  ‘La política 
española en los años de la II Guerra Mundial’ ,  Bulletin d’Histoire Contemporaine de l’Espagne ,  22 
( 1995 ),  30 . Plans were even made to invade Portugal, see   Gustau  Nerín and  Alfred  Bosch ,  El imperio 
que nunca existió. La aventura colonial discutida en Hendaya ( Barcelona :   Plaza & Janés ,  2001 ),  41 , 
 49 ;   Manuel Ros  Agudo ,  La gran tentación: Franco, el imperio colonial y los planes de intervención en la 
Segunda Guerra Mundial ( Barcelona :  Styria ,  2008 ),  269–79 . 
 47  Manuel Espadas Burgos,  Franquismo y política exterior ( Madrid :  Rialp ,  1987 ),  92 . Th e practice 
concerning non-belligerence during the Second World War is discussed at 92–5. 
 48  Edward R.  Cumming ,  ‘Th e evolution of the notion of neutrality in modern armed confl icts’ , 
 Military Law and Law of War Review ,  17 ( 1978 ),  48 . 
 49  Th e participation of the United States meant increasing economical restrictions, a higher external 
pressure over Franco’s government and the possibility of the Allies attacking the Atlantic islands with-
out Spain having means of defence: Jiménez Redondo, above n 46, 32–3. 
 50  Jiménez Redondo, above n 46, 32. 
 51  Ángeles Egido  León ,  ‘Franco y la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Una neutralidad comprometida’ , 
 Ayer ,  57 ( 2005 ),  122 . 
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 (1)  Overcoming Spanish ‘neutrality’ through universal jurisdiction 
 Debatable as it may be, Spanish ‘neutrality’ during World War II seems to have 
caused some uneasiness in the Deputy Judge Advocate Offi  ce in charge of reviewing 
the sentences and recommending them for approval. Even though the question 
had not been raised by the defence in the trials, the review offi  cer considered that 
the jurisdictional problem merited discussion. Th e following argument was made:
 War criminals, brigands, and pirates are the common enemies of all mankind and all 
nations have an equal interest in their apprehension and punishment for their violations 
of international law. Concerning this question . . . every independent state has the judicial 
power to punish ‘piracy and other off enses against the common law of nations, by whom-
soever and wheresoever committed’. 52 
 According to this reasoning, these cases were to be seen as typical examples of 
universal jurisdiction exercised by a state in absence of any direct link with a crime 
perpetrated neither in the territory of the judging authority nor by or against 
nationals of that state. 53 Given that war crimes were delicta juris gentium, whose 
punishment was an issue of general interest to any country, all states had the juris-
diction to try and punish them. 
 Th ere are some precedents for this in the aftermath of World War II. 54 Th e earliest 
examples, though, concern German defendants or nationals of Axis States, as in the 
 Hadamar trial (8–15 October 1945), the  Dachau  parent case (15 November–13 
December 1945), the  Almelo trial (24–26 November 1945), and the  Zyklon B case 
(1–8 March 1946). 
 Th e  Hadamar  trial took place before a United States Military Commission 
sitting at Wiesbaden (Germany). Th e defendants, German nationals, were accused 
of having taken part in the deliberate killing, by injection of poisonous drugs, of 
hundreds of Polish and Soviet nationals in a sanatorium in Hadamar, Germany. 
Despite the fact that the crimes had been perpetrated by non-United States nationals, 
outside United States territory, and against non-United States nationals, the Military 
Commission decided to assume jurisdiction in the case. One of the reasons adduced 
to take such decision was:
 [T] he general doctrine recently expounded and called ‘universality of jurisdiction over war 
crimes’, . . . according to which every independent State has, under International Law, juris-
diction to punish not only pirates but also war criminals in its custody, regardless of the 
nationality of the victim or of the place where the off ence was committed, particularly 
where, for some reason, the criminal would otherwise go unpunished. 55 
 52  Navas Review, above n 28, 9. See also  Espinosa Review, above n 25, 6. 
 53  Marc  Henzelin ,  Le principe de l’universalité en droit pénal international. Droit et obligation pour 
les états de poursuivre et juger selon le principe de l’universalité ( Basel/Geneva/Brussels :   Helbing & 
Lichtenhahn/Faculté de Droit de Genève/Bruylant ,  2000 ),  29 . 
 54  Henzelin, above n 53, 407. 
 55  US v Alfons Klein (Trial) 1945, 1 War Crimes Law Reports 46, 53 (US Military Commission 
appointed by the Commanding General Western Military District, USFET) ( Hadamar Trial ). 
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 Th is main reasoning was further supported by two other arguments: the United 
States’ direct interest in punishing crimes against nationals of its allies, and the 
assumption of its local sovereignty in the United States zone of occupation (therefore 
deriving its jurisdiction both from the principle of territoriality and the principle 
of active personality). 
 Th e principle of universal jurisdiction was also mentioned in the Dachau camp 
trial to justify the jurisdiction of the United States military court over crimes against 
non-members of its forces that had been committed before the United States took 
control over the territory where they had been perpetrated. 56 In this case, two of the 
defendants were non-German (Johann Schoepp, a Romanian, and Dr Fridolin Karl 
Puhr, an Austrian), 57 but that fact was not taken into consideration when invoking 
the principle. 
 As far as the  Almelo  trial and the  Zyklon B  case are concerned, both took place 
before British courts, sitting in Almelo, Th e Netherlands, and Hamburg, Germany, 
respectively. In the  Almelo  trial, four German nationals were tried for the extra- 
judicial killing of a British prisoner of war and of a Dutch civilian, as well as espionage 
and war treason. Th e jurisdiction of the British court was established once more 
on the basis of universal jurisdiction over war crimes. 58 Th e universal jurisdiction 
argument was again supplemented by the principle of the direct interest of the 
judging state, British sovereignty over its zone of occupation, and the active per-
sonality principle. Th e  Zyklon B case involved three German nationals accused of 
supplying poison gas used to kill Allied nationals (although seemingly non-British) 
interned in concentration camps, knowing that the gas was to be so used. Unlike 
in the  Hadamar  and the  Almelo trials, the main argument put forward to establish 
British jurisdiction was British local sovereignty over its zone of occupation 
(active personality and territoriality). Universal jurisdiction was in this case a 
supplementary ground for jurisdiction, together with the state’s direct interest in 
punishing the crimes perpetrated against Allied nationals. 59 
 To be sure, there had been trials of neutral countries’ nationals, but no arguments 
were made regarding universal jurisdiction. For instance, in the fi rst  Ravensbrück 
 trial, a Swiss citizen, Carmen Mory, was sentenced to death by a British military 
court sitting in Hamburg. 60 However, the court did not invoke universal jurisdiction. 
Th e most probable reason for this seems to have been that no complaints were 
expected to be lodged by the Swiss government which was perfectly aware of the 
steps taken in the proceedings against Mory. A report by Captain John Sigrid da 
Cunha describing a meeting with a representative of the Swiss Ministry of Justice 
 56  US v Martin Gottfried Weiss (Review of Proceeding of General Military Court) (Offi  ce of Judge 
Advocate, Th ird US Army and Eastern Military District, Case No. 000-50-2, 15 November– 
13 December 1945) ( Weiss Review ), 140. 
 57  ( Weiss Review ), above n 56, 2. 
 58  Prosecutor v Otto Sandrock (Trial) 1945, 1 War Crimes Law Reports 35, 42 (British Military 
Court for the Trial of War Criminals, Court House, Almelo, Holland). 
 59  Prosecutor v Bruno Tesch (Trial) 1946, 1 War Crimes Law Reports 93, 103 (British Military Court, 
Hamburg). 
 60  Prosecutor v Johan Schwarzhüber (Trial) (Military Court held at No. 1 War Crimes Court, 
Curiohaus, Rothenbaumhaussee, Hamburg, 5 December 1946–3 February 1947). 
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supports this. According to Captain da Cunha, the Swiss government did not 
object to Mory’s trial and sentence. Given the serious nature of the crimes alleged, 
it was not ‘desired in any way to use diplomatic infl uence or action with a view to 
actively intervening in the legal process’. 61 
 At least two more trials against Spaniards took place in France in 1947, just 
weeks before the trial against Espinosa started. In neither trial was the problem of 
jurisdiction raised. Th e fi rst one was the trial of José Pallejà Caralt by a military 
court in Toulouse. Pallejà Caralt was found guilty of having committed espionage. 
According to the court, inasmuch as he had worked as a Kapo, he had been feed-
ing intelligence to Germany with a view to favouring its enterprises against France 
(‘ en vue de favoriser les entreprises de cette puissance contre la France ’), in particular 
by imposing over the inmates an inhumane work that benefi ted the enemy and 
caused the death of many Frenchmen. He was sentenced to death on 11 March 
1947. 62 Th e second trial, on 25 April 1947, saw Gregorio Lendínez Montes face 
a military court in Paris on charges of murder and ill-treatment. Lendínez was 
acquitted of all the charges. 63 Th e records of Pallejà’s appeal proceedings before the 
Cour de Cassation show that the issue of his Spanish nationality was not contro-
versial. 64 Actually, the court held that crimes against the security of the state could 
be perpetrated both by members of the French Army and by foreigners serving in 
the army, according to a decree-law of 29 July 1939. 65 
 In view of these precedents, it can be concluded that the ‘Spanish Kapos’ trials seem 
to have combined for the fi rst time neutrality and universal jurisdiction regarding 
war crimes. 
 (2)  A real need to invoke universal jurisdiction? 
 Th e interest that these two trials may have in tracking the history of universal 
jurisdiction increases when one considers that there was no call for universal juris-
diction to legitimate the authority of US military courts to try the fi ve Spaniards. 
 To begin with, JCS 1023/10 provided that anybody who had committed any of 
the listed crimes was considered to be a criminal,  regardless of his or her nationality . 
It imposed no Axis nationality requirement for alleged war criminals. Th is did not 
 61  Record of negotiations with regard to the trial of Carmen Mory, Capt. J.W. da Cunha, 4 September 
1946 (UK National Archives, fi le WO 309/684). Th e representative of the Swiss Ministry of Justice 
would have further expressed gratitude on the part of the Political Department of the Foreign Offi  ce 
for the correctness of the British attitude in contacting and informing about the details and facts 
of the forthcoming trial of a Swiss citizen, ‘thus avoiding in advance the possibility of diplomatic 
repercussions’. 
 62  Prosecutor v José Pallejà Caralt (Trial) (Tribunal Militaire Permanent de la 5ème Région, Toulouse, 
25 April 1947). 
 63  Prosecutor v Gregorio Lendínez Montes (Trial) (2ème Tribunal Militaire Permanent de Paris, 
25 April 1947). 
 64  Prosecutor v José Pallejà Caralt (Appeal) (Cour de Cassation de Paris, 23 July 1947), 1. 
 65  Décret-loi portant codifi cation des dispositions relatives aux crimes et délits contre la sûreté extérieure 
de l’État , 29 July 1939. 
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go unnoticed by the Deputy Judge Advocate, who after invoking universal jurisdiction 
in his review of the sentence, added that:
 Military Government Courts have jurisdiction over the nationals of any country who are in 
the United States Zone of Occupation, except as to certain classes of American and other 
nationals, e.g., military personnel, which are not pertinent to the jurisdictional questions 
here involved. Concerning jurisdiction over war crimes, no limitation is imposed. 66 
 Th eoretically, there also existed a number of additional grounds that could have 
been used to justify the jurisdiction of US courts in these cases. For instance, juris-
diction could have been based on ‘the right of a belligerent, on the total breakdown 
of the enemy owing to debellatio, to take over the entire powers of the latter, including 
the power to make laws and to conduct trials’. 67 Such a power was assumed by the 
four Allied powers occupying Germany in the ‘Declaration regarding the defeat of 
Germany and the assumption of supreme authority with respect to Germany by 
the Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, the United Kingdom and the Provisional Government of the French 
Republic’, made in Berlin on 5 June 1945. As indicated above, the local sovereignty 
of the Allied powers over each of their respective zones of occupation was one of 
the reasons given to support British and US jurisdiction to try war criminals in the 
 Hadamar  and  Almelo  trials, as well as in the  Zyklon B  case. Such special sovereignty 
would have allowed them to prosecute crimes perpetrated in their zone of occu-
pation according to the principle of territoriality. A  further reason cited in the 
aforementioned cases which could have applied in the ‘Spanish Kapos’ cases was 
the theory of the direct interest. Th is theory was adduced in the  Hadamar  trial to 
justify the jurisdiction of a US military commission over crimes against non-US 
nationals which were not committed in the US territory nor by US nationals. 
As already mentioned, 68 the military commission answered in the affi  rmative not 
only on the basis of universal jurisdiction over war crimes and the assumption of 
supreme authority in Germany by the four Allied powers after debellatio, but also 
the direct interest that the United States (and  mutatis mutandi every Allied state) 
had in punishing the perpetrators of crimes committed against nationals of allies 
‘engaged in a common struggle against a common enemy’. 69 
 Finally, a slightly more convoluted basis for jurisdiction was the nationality of 
the victims in Mauthausen. As the charges in  Altfuldisch and  Lauriano Navas  indi-
cate, there were US citizens among the inmates in the camp. While this became 
the core argument in favour of the military court’s jurisdiction in the parent case, 70 
in the ‘Spanish Kapos’ cases direct victims of the specifi c crimes committed were 
not US nationals. However, in the same manner as guilt was established as a con-
sequence of the participation in the joint criminal enterprise, the factual elements 
 66  Navas Review , above n 28, 9. 
 67  United Nations War Crimes Commission,  Law Report of Trials of War Criminals (His Majesty’s 
Stationery Offi  ce, 1949) vol 15, 27. See also Henzelin, above n 53, 405. 
 68  See section II.A. of this chapter.    69  Hadamar Trial, above n 55, 53. 
 70  Altfuldisch Review , above n 18, 12. 
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in that wider context could also have been used to justify the jurisdiction of US 
military courts in the subsequent trials. 
 Given the variety of grounds of United States jurisdiction, what makes the 
references to universal jurisdiction in the ‘Spanish Kapos’ cases especially valuable is 
that they provide precedents to support the existence of an international practice 
with respect to this principle and its applicability to nationals of neutral states. 
 (IV)  A Precedent of Universal Jurisdiction 
Regarding Stateless Persons? 
 Th e particular circumstances surrounding the Spanish Republicans in Mauthausen 
further suggest that they were part of the very fi rst cases where universal jurisdiction 
was invoked to try stateless persons. Th e Deputy Judge Advocate decided to justify the 
authority of the court through universal jurisdiction because the defendants were 
nationals of a neutral country. What he did not take into consideration, though, 
was that Spaniards in concentration camps lacked protection from the Spanish 
government, indeed from any other state, which in turn would mean that the fi ve 
defendants were de facto stateless persons. 71 
 (1)  Spaniards who were not Spaniards 
 Th e legal status of the Spanish republicans who left Spain after the Civil War was 
far from clear and confusion spread to the concentration camps where they were 
interned. It is well-known that Nazis used triangles of diff erent colours to classify 
inmates. In most of the concentration camps (such as Dachau, Buchenwald-Dora, 
Sachsenhausen, Bergen-Belsen or Ravensbrück), 72 the  Rotspanier (‘Red Spaniards’, 
as they were called) wore the red triangle that marked them as political prisoners. 
However, those in Mauthausen were marked with the blue triangle with the letter 
S inside. Although blue was supposed to be given to ‘emigrants’ and usually identi-
fi ed foreign forced labourers, its attribution to Spaniards in Mauthausen has been 
interpreted in diff erent ways. 73 
 Th e most widespread theory is that the blue triangle was given to the exiled 
Republicans because of Franco’s refusal to consider them Spanish citizens. Th e story 
goes that, during a conversation between Joachim von Ribbentropp, Reich Minister 
of Foreign Aff airs, and Ramón Serrano Súñer, Spanish Minister of the Interior, in 
September 1940, Ribbentropp asked Serrano Súñer what Germany was to do with 
all the Republicans who had been taken prisoners. Serrano Súñer was said to have 
answered that those people were reds, not Spaniards, 74 thus clearing the way for the 
 71  Paul  Weis ,  ‘Th e Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons’ ,  International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly ,  10 ( 1961 ),  260 . 
 72  Montserrat  Roig ,  Els catalans als camps nazis ( Barcelona :  Edicions 62 , 5a ed,  1987 ),  130 . 
 73  Th e Spanish Republicans and some stateless Russians were the only ones to wear the blue triangle 
in Mauthausen: Wingeate Pike, above n 6, 15. 
 74  Roig, above n 72, 15. 
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Nazis to do anything they pleased with them. 75 Unfortunately, there are no written 
records of such a conversation. 76 Furthermore, the dates do not match, for the fi rst 
convoy carrying Spaniards arrived at Mauthausen in August 1940. 77 
 Still, indications exist that Franco’s government was aware of the fact that there 
were Spaniards in German concentration camps and nothing was done to assist 
them. From August to October 1940, the German Embassy in Madrid sent 
several notes verbales to the Spanish Minister of Foreign Aff airs, asking whether the 
Spanish Government intended to take charge of a thousand Red Spaniards under 
arrest in France. Th e Spanish Government did not respond to this request. 78 Also, 
the Spanish Home Offi  ce did request information on the situation of Indalecio 
González after he had been sentenced to the death penalty, but there is no indication 
of further action taken. 79 Instead, the Republican government in exile sent many 
petitions for clemency on Gonzalez’s behalf, but they were not taken into con-
sideration by US offi  cers both because they ‘contained no new evidence or other 
matters which had any bearing on the case’ and because they could not locate the 
senders (supposedly in Paris). 80 
 Were the Spaniards stateless? Th e charges in  Altfuldisch 81 and in  Lauriano Navas 82 
include a list of national groups that had been subjected to alleged atrocities. 83 
Among them, reference was made to ‘stateless persons’, but surprisingly enough 
not to Spaniards, in spite of the fact that they actually became a relevant group 
in Mauthausen. 84 Th e charges also refer to ‘other non-German nationals’, but that 
seems to be a residual clause, inappropriate for such a large group of inmates as the 
Red Spaniards were. To include them under the heading of stateless persons would 
 75  Th e preliminary report to United Nations on the issue of refugees assumed this version ( Jacques 
 Vernant ,  Les réfugiés dans l’après-guerre: Rapport préliminaire d’un groupe d’étude sur le problème des 
réfugiés ( Geneva :   ONU ,  1951 ),  166 ), although stating that it was the Spanish Minister of Foreign 
Aff airs who intervened (Serrano Súñer held that position from October 1940). 
 76  Roig, above n 72, 16–17. In an interview Roig asked Serrano Súñer whether he had talked about 
this issue with Ribbentropp. Serrano’s answer was that he had dealt with the subject in passing for 
somebody had commented on it on the outward journey, and the Nazis had told him that they were 
not Spaniards but people who had fought against them in France: at 17. See   David Wingeate  Pike , 
 Españoles en el Holocausto: Vida y muerte de los republicanos en Mauthausen ( Barcelona :  Mondadori , 
 2003 ),  42 , quoting a letter by a Nazi offi  cial explaining that the Spanish government refused to repat-
riate the Red Spaniards already in 1940 (such reference is not in the original English version of this 
work, above n 6). 
 77  Wingeate Pike, above n 6, 10. Wingeate Pike suggests that the decision to impose the blue trian-
gle on the Spaniards in Mauthausen was taken on the basis that Spain was not at war with Germany, 
Spanish prisoners did not have a passport and their status was stateless, as well as to thwart their fi ght 
against the Nazis (at 11). Instead, Bernadac describes the decision both as a joke and a big strategic 
mistake by the administration of the camp ( Christian  Bernadac ,  Les 186 marches ( Geneva :   Famot , 
 1976 ),  71–2 ). 
 78  Daniel Díaz  Esculies ,  Entre fi lferrades: Un aspecte de l’emigració republicana dels Països Catalans 
(1939–1945) ( Barcelona :  Edicions de la Magrana ,  1993 ),  193–6 . A facsimile of the notes is available 
at   Rosa  Toran ,  Vida i mort dels republicans als camps nazis ( Barcelona :  Proa ,  2002 ),  299–303 . 
 79  Letter from Wade M.  Fleischer, Chief, International Aff aire Branch, to Judge Advocate, 
22 August 1947. 
 80  Memorandum for Colonel Harbaugh, Inquiry from Secretary General, OMGUS, Concerning 
the Case of Indalecio Gonzalez, 1 November 1948, [3] . 
 81  Altfuldisch Review , above n 18, 1.    82  Navas Review , above n 28, 1.    83  See above n 29. 
 84  See Wingeate Pike, above n 6, 12. 
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therefore seem quite reasonable. On the other hand, the nationalities expressly 
listed in the  Altfuldisch  and  Lauriano Navas  charge sheets referred only to Allied 
states, which may have been a way to emphasize the interest of the United States 
in trying crimes committed against nationals of Allied states. Th ere would have 
been no reason for Spain, considered to be a neutral country, to be on that list. 
Unfortunately, absent an explanation for the selection of nationalities included in 
the charges, no defi nitive conclusions can be drawn on the issue as to whether the 
United States might at some point have considered Spaniards as stateless persons. 
 (2)  Protecting Spanish refugees . . . inside the borders 
 As well as being abandoned by the Spanish government, the Republicans did not 
receive much protection from other foreign states. France granted the Spanish 
Republicans refugee status by a decree of 15 March 1945. Th is decree extended 
the application of the Convention of 28 October 1933 85 to the Spanish refugees. 
According to Article 2 of the decree, persons holding or having held Spanish 
citizenship, not holding another citizenship, and who enjoyed neither de jure nor 
de facto the protection of the Spanish government, would be considered Spanish 
refugees. 86 As a result, they were granted a special status, which included the right to 
an identity and travel certifi cate, similar to the Nansen passport, 87 and the right of 
residence in France, which implied the right to not be expelled from the French ter-
ritory (except on national security or public order grounds) and of non-refoulement 
to Spain. 88 Also, they would have a specifi c legal status regarding their personal statute, 
rights resulting from marriage, and access to court in equal conditions as French 
nationals. However, the recognition of such rights did not mean that the Spanish 
refugees could enjoy diplomatic protection from the French authorities. 
 Disregarded by the Spanish government and enjoying a rather limited refugee 
status inside France that in no way included protection beyond the French bor-
ders, the fi ve Spanish defendants in Dachau lacked any kind of protection from 
their own country or a third one, what made them de facto stateless persons. If 
this circumstance is to be taken into consideration, these two cases would then be 
the fi rst, and presumably the only cases, where universal jurisdiction was invoked 
to try stateless persons for war crimes. Although—as already pointed out—such 
an invocation was unnecessary because the court had jurisdiction regardless of the 
nationality of the defendant. 
 85  Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees , signed 28 October 1933, 159 
LNTS 199. 
 86  Quoted in Comment, ‘In re Galvez’,  Revue Critique de Droit International Privé , 36 (1947), 301. 
 87  Th ey were not provided with the Nansen passport for they were not considered to have lost the 
Spanish nationality ( Estatuto jurídico de los refugiados españoles (Paris: Imprenta Española, 1945), 5–6). 
 88  Estatuto jurídico de los refugiados españoles , above n 87, 18. 
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 (V)  Conclusions 
 In the years following World War II, subsequent cases of low-profi le alleged war 
criminals, like the ‘Spanish Kapos’ trials, could easily go unnoticed, the focus being 
put on major war criminals’ accountability. Even at the domestic level these cases 
were hidden. Propaganda by Franco’s government to discredit its enemies in the Civil 
War or a complaint by the Republican government in exile to denounce the low 
due process standards might have been expected. Nevertheless, silence concerning 
these trials suggests that they made both sides uncomfortable, because they demon-
strated that Spaniards had been interned at concentration camps with Franco’s 
government abandoning them to their fate, while at the same time casting doubt 
on the Republican fi ght for democracy and freedoms. Distance and time allow 
analysing these cases beyond the domestic limits imposed by the confrontation in 
the Spanish Civil War. Instead, when looking at them from an international legal 
approach, it becomes evident that the unusual circumstances surrounding these 
two cases make them interesting in several ways. 
 To begin with, the framing of these cases as part of the joint criminal enterprise 
undertaken in Mauthausen, as established in the parent case, shows how extremely 
rigidly military courts applied the ‘common design’ theory of guilt in the aftermath of 
World War II. Espinosa, Nava, González, Fernández and Félez did not belong to the 
Nazi military or civil administration that designed and put into eff ect the machinery 
of Mauthausen. Rather, they were trapped in it. Victims of the Nazi system them-
selves, their conduct was arguably the result of a combination of self-preservation and 
brutalization, perhaps to be expected given the harsh living conditions they had to 
endure as inmates. However, the judgment did not take this factor into considera-
tion nor any other element related to it that could have allowed for a mitigation of 
the sentence, if not for the exclusion of responsibility. Fortunately, the infl exibility 
of this criterion was later tempered, which enabled a fairer approach when applying 
the theory of joint criminal enterprise. 
 Another interesting feature of these trials is the remarkable disregard for basic due 
process guarantees showed by the military courts trying these two cases. Although 
it is not the aim of this analysis to establish the degree of meticulousness fol-
lowed by military courts and commissions trying war crimes in the years after 
World War II, the due process point nonetheless warrants attention. Th e pressure 
to punish thousands of alleged perpetrators likely led courts to put aside ‘burden-
some’ details such as due process in order to increase effi  ciency. However, it is also 
true that these two cases were more diffi  cult than most of the trials the military 
courts carried out, for two reasons. One was language. Th e United States military 
courts were supposed to try mainly German nationals, so, in the ‘Spanish Kapos’ 
trials, the lack of Spanish-speaking personnel lead to improvization. Th e other 
complicating factor was that the defendants came from Spain, a ‘neutral’ country 
(albeit with Axis sympathies) and one that did not seem to care about the destiny 
of fi ve people who had fought against the government in power. Th erefore, no 
serious cooperation with Spain was possible in order to provide the defendants 
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with lawyers or supervise the course of proceedings. Again, a calmer analysis of the 
circumstances at the review level allowed for the correction of the mistakes made at 
trial, which benefi tted Laureano Nava, who had his sentence to life imprisonment 
reduced after proving that it had been imposed on the basis of only two witness 
testimonies. 
 Th e most remarkable contribution of these cases to international jurisprudence 
concerns jurisdiction. Th e fact that the defendants were not nationals of an Axis 
country but of a neutral state somehow seemed to challenge the authority of US 
military courts. To overcome this hurdle, universal jurisdiction was invoked. Th is 
seems to have been an exceptional use of the principle. In fact, considering that as 
former members of the Republican Army, the fi ve defendants did not get protec-
tion from Spain, or from any other country, they actually faced trial as de facto 
stateless persons. Th erefore, this was arguably the fi rst time that the principle of 
universal jurisdiction was used to justify the trial of stateless persons. 
 Th ere is also a signifi cant lesson to be learned from these cases when it comes 
to the use of universal jurisdiction by third-country courts. Th e ‘Spanish Kapos’ 
cases are a puzzling example of the results yielded by an ‘industrial’ justice system 
such as that set up to deal with the horrors of World War II. Scant consideration 
of individual circumstances is an unfortunate feature of such a justice system. Th is 
can only lead to injustice. Th e possibility of a serious miscarriage of justice might 
go some way to explain why the United States’ main concern was to justify their 
jurisdiction in order to avoid future claims as to the trials’ legitimacy. However, 
a wider and more complex approach to the specifi c circumstances of the Spanish 
defendants would have been desirable. Obviously, circumstances surrounding 
the contemporary use of universal jurisdiction are very diff erent: it is applied by 
domestic courts sitting in countries that do not need to be rapidly reconstructed, 
as Germany was in the aftermath of World War II, nor need justice be done expe-
ditiously. Nevertheless, it implies that foreigners will be tried by a court that may 
not speak the language or may not know the context in which crimes were per-
petrated. As the ‘Spanish Kapos’ trials illustrates, great care must be taken when 
dealing with universal jurisdiction cases in order to guarantee due process and 
provide real justice. 
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 A Narrative of Justice and the 
(Re)Writing of History: Lessons Learned 
from World War II French Trials 
 Dov  Jacobs * 
 (I)  Introduction 
 Issues of post-confl ict justice, broadly defi ned as the study of how new political 
regimes deal with the crimes of previous, were traditionally dealt with in a fragmented 
way by diff erent disciplines. While historians, sociologists and jurists from various 
countries have studied these issues, discussions on post-confl ict justice have only 
relatively recently been taken up by international lawyers and have acquired 
considerable momentum in the past decade. 1 Th is interest from international law 
mirrored the development of a new discipline, that of transitional justice. 2 
 However, despite the bridges that now exist between international law, and more 
specifi cally international criminal law, and other disciplines, there is a surprisingly 
low level of historical self-refl ection among international criminal lawyers on their 
core object of research, namely mass crimes and the diffi  culty of prosecuting them. 
In other words, and to put it more bluntly, international criminal lawyers, and 
more generally a number of transitional justice academics, often give the impression 
of re-inventing the wheel on the methodological and conceptual diffi  culties facing 
them. With the notable exception of the Nuremberg trials, 3 international criminal 
 *  Assistant Professor in International Criminal Law, Leiden University. 
 1  For a precursor and seminal work by international lawyers on this question, see  D.  Alexander 
and  Cherif  Bassiouni (eds),  Post-Confl ict Justice ( Boston, MA and Leiden :  Hotei Publishing ,  2002 ) . 
 2  Neil  Kritz (ed),  Transitional Justice ( Washington, DC :  United States Institute of Peace ,  1995 ) is 
one of the fi rst ‘codifi cations’ of this new fi eld and  Ruti  Teitel ,  Transitional Justice ( Oxford :  Oxford 
University Press ,  2000 ) is considered to be the seminal book on the topic. For a discussion on the diffi  -
culties of actually establishing transitional justice as a coherent new fi eld of research, see  Christine  Bell , 
 ‘Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the “Field” or “Non-Field” ’ ,  International 
Journal of Transitional Justice ,  3 ( 2009 ),  5 . 
 3  See, among a number of works on  Nuremberg, D.  Blumenthal and  T.  McCormack (eds),  Th e Legacy 
of Nuremberg: Civilising Infl uence or Institutionalised Vengeance? ( Boston, MA and Leiden :  Martinus 
Nijhoff  Publishers ,  2008 ) and more recently  Kevin Jon  Heller ,  Th e Nuremberg Military Tribunals and 
the Origins of International Criminal Law ( Oxford :  Oxford University Press ,  2011 ) . 
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lawyers tend to draw little help from historical examples of how to deal with collective 
crimes, and even less so of national examples. 
 Th is chapter will propose to do this in relation to the trials that took place after 
World War II (WWII) in France to prosecute those deemed to have collaborated 
with and actively promoted the agenda of the Nazi occupiers. Th e following sections 
will therefore not be a comprehensive discussion of how France dealt with the 
 épuration  of its private and public sector through a number of administrative and 
judicial sanctions. 4 Th ey will rather try to illustrate the issues that practitioners 
today need to grasp when dealing with past atrocities. To do that, the chapter will 
fi rst deal with the challenges facing the new post-WWII government when trying to 
set up the legal framework to try the collaborators (section II). It will then highlight 
the diffi  culties of such judicial proceedings with two examples, the trials of political 
leaders Pétain and Laval (section III). Th e chapter will conclude with some general 
thoughts, most notably on the evasive question of historical truth (section IV). 
 (II)  Dealing with Acts of Collaboration: 
Setting up the Legal Framework 
 Having exposed the general context of the discussion (1), this section will present 
the legal framework that was set up to try collaborators. Th is included both the use 
of existing provisions of the Criminal Code (2) and the creation of a new off ence, 
that of  indignité nationale , or national indignity (3). 
 (1)  Th e general context 
 Discussions on how to deal with the  épuration of those Frenchmen who had 
collaborated at one level or another with the occupiers started some months before 
the end of war in committees specially created by De Gaulle. Two of those, the 
 Comité Général des Etudes and the  Comité National Judiciaire , worked together to 
produce a memo in February 1944 that outlined the legislation that could be put 
in place after the liberation. 5 As is often the case in such circumstances, the passions 
of the fi ve-year confl ict and occupation created pressure on the committees to show 
the utmost severity in relation to those who had helped the Nazis. 6 However, the 
 4  Th e term ‘ épuration ’, which can be translated as ‘purge’ or ‘purifi cation’, designates the general 
policy of ‘cleaning up’ the country that took place in France after the war. It only partly corresponds 
to the practice of lustration that has been promoted, most notably in the former soviet bloc, to deal 
extra-judicially with former members of the regime and various human rights off enders. In this sense, it 
is preferred to use the French term in the remainder of this chapter, because of its wider scope of applica-
tion and because of the light it sheds on the ‘moral’ state of mind of those who implemented this policy. 
 5  Robert  Aron ,  Histoire de L’épuration , Vol. 3(2) ( Paris :   Fayard  1969 ),  45–71 . Th ese committees 
were also in charge of formulating post-war policies for dealing with the various lawyers and judges 
who tried to minimise the eff ect of Vichy decisions during occupation. 
 6  Such severity can be illustrated by the following draft proposal circulated at the time: ‘[W] ill be 
sentenced to death whoever, by his words, writings or example will have helped the objectives of the 
enemy to bring the French to collaborate in its actions’ (cited in Aron, above n 5, 80). 
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preamble of the joint working document submitted by the committees indicated 
that the drafters had decided to adopt a more balanced approach, and try to reconcile 
the requirements of punishment with respect for the rights of the accused. 7 
 One of the questions that had to be answered by the committees was the legal 
basis for the trials. At the heart of this debate was the principle of  nullum crimen sine 
lege , a recognized principle of criminal law, and in the case of France, a principle that 
had been strongly defended during the French Revolution. Indeed, the Declaration 
of the Rights of Men and of the Citizens of 1789 famously provides that: ‘A person 
shall only be punished by virtue of a law established and promulgated before the 
off ence.’ 8 Th e lesser-known Declaration of the Rights of Men and of the Citizens 
of 1793 presented things in a more emphatic way:
 No one ought to be tried and punished except after having been heard or legally summoned, 
and except in virtue of a law promulgated prior to the off ence. Th e law which would punish 
off ences committed before it existed would be a tyranny: the retroactive eff ect given to the 
law would be a crime. 9  
 Th is principle was enshrined in the French Criminal Code which was in force at 
the time. 10 
 In light of this, the committees elaborated a normative framework that tried to 
satisfy both the requirements of legality and the demand for punishment. It was 
accepted that there were essentially two categories of collaborators: those who had 
directly helped the occupants, to whom the existing Criminal Code was applicable; 
and those who had indirectly helped the occupants, for whom a new legal frame-
work needed to be designed. 11 
 (2)  Th e application of the existing provisions of the 
French Criminal Code 
 For the fi rst category of collaborators, it was deemed that, to a large extent, the existing 
provisions of the Criminal Code on treason and off ences against the security of the 
 7  ‘Th e need for sanctions after the victory against the French who, in one way or another, pro-
vided help to the activities and the manipulations of the enemy is not in doubt. However, repression, 
unfortunately necessary, must, whenever possible, reconcile two contradictory objectives. It must be 
eff ective and swift to satisfy the national conscience and prevent spontaneous reactions that would 
necessarily be rough and would risk being unfair; it must be fair, i.e proportional to the guilt and 
organised in such a way as to allow to determine that guilt with accuracy and that respect for the rights 
of the accused and the defence not be sacrifi ced’ (cited in Aron, above n 5, 82). 
 8  Article 8, Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (1789), available in English at < http://
www.hrcr.org/docs/frenchdec.html > (accessed 3 March 2013). 
 9  Article 14, Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen from the Constitution of Year 
I  (1793), available in English at < http://www.columbia.edu/~iw6/docs/dec1793.html > (accessed 3 
March 2013). 
 10  Although the formulation has changed in the course of several reforms in the past decades, the 
principle remains the same and is today framed as ‘[c] onduct is punishable only where it constituted 
a criminal off ence at the time when it took place’ (Article 112–1, French Criminal Code, available in 
English at < http://195.83.177.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=33 > (accessed 3 March 2013)). 
 11  Aron, above n 5, 83. 
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state could be applied to acts committed during the war. More specifi cally, the general 
framework of Article 75 of the Criminal Code was to be used. Th is Article provided 
for the prosecution of acts of collaboration with a foreign power famously labelled as 
‘intelligence with the enemy’. 
 Several interpretative ordinances were issued by the provisional government to 
ensure the eff ectiveness of the application of the Criminal Code to the situation 
of occupied France. Th ese ordinances illustrate a clear will on the part of their 
drafters to leave as little room as possible for acquittals. First, it was declared 
that the provision of information relating to members of the  résistance should 
be considered as aff ecting national security as provided for by Article 83 of the 
Criminal Code. 12 
 Second, it was considered that, because of the illegality of the Vichy regime 
persons acting according to orders of the government, or in application of a leg-
islative measure, could not benefi t from the traditional defences that would nor-
mally attach to such a situation ‘if the accused personally had the opportunity of 
not executing the order and where his responsibility or his moral authority was 
such that by refusing to act he would be serving the nation’. 13 Th ird, acts committed 
against France’s allies could be assimilated to acts committed against the French 
state itself, thus allowing the consideration of these acts under the relevant provisions 
of the criminal code. Th e Ordinance of 26 June 1944 even went as far as to consider 
that for the purposes of the application of the Criminal Code, the troops of Allied 
forces were to be considered French troops. 14 
 (3)  Indignité nationale : A new off ence to capture the 
essence of the  épuration 
 Th e second category of persons—those that could be considered to have indirectly 
collaborated with the Nazis—gave rise to more diffi  culty than the fi rst. On the 
one hand these were acts that could not, even with a wide interpretation, fall 
within the scope of the existing French Criminal Code. On the other hand, some 
of these acts, even if they could be labelled as off ences against national security, 
would warrant a penalty that would be far too harsh in relation to the minor gravity 
of the actions. In other words, applying the Criminal Code to all instances of 
collaboration would be too lenient in some cases and much too severe in others. 15 
Despite this, the drafters of the laws of  épuration were reluctant to let the ‘small 
fi sh’ get away because they had also, by their actions, or even inaction, contributed 
one way or another to the dishonour of the country. In order to refl ect this, there-
fore, the drafting committee provided the following solution, that of the creation 
of a new off ence of  indignité nationale , defi ned in the proposal as ‘the situation 
in which has placed himself a person who, directly or indirectly, had voluntarily 
 12  Ordinances of 17 and 31 January 1944. 
 13  Peter  Novick ,  L’épuration Française, 1944–1949 ( Paris :  Balland  1985 ),  234 . 
 14  Novick, above n 13, 235.    15  Aron, above n 5, 83. 
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helped Germany or its Allies, or aff ected the unity of the nation or the liberty or 
equality of the French’. 16 
 It goes without saying that this new off ence raises some important questions 
in relation to the legality principle, and the drafters of the Ordinance were aware 
of these diffi  culties. How did they therefore justify the new law in relation to 
non-retroactivity? One can identity three main justifi cations. First, the  indignité 
nationale did not constitute a sanction in the criminal sense, but was rather a series 
of civil sanctions, such as the prohibition to be a state employee, and therefore did 
not fall within the scope of application of the principle of non-retroactivity of crimi-
nal laws. Th is justifi cation is certainly unconvincing in light of how modern human 
rights law defi nes the scope of criminal sanctions, 17 but appeared in the offi  cial 
explanatory memorandum of the law that accompanied its adoption. 18 Th e second 
justifi cation, while accepting that this indeed constituted a new off ence, consid-
ered that it was acceptable because it provided for more lenient sentences than the 
Criminal Code for persons who would be prosecuted under the former rather than 
the latter, and therefore did not violate the principle of non-retroactivity which 
allows for the retroactive application of more lenient laws. 19 Th is explanation, 
put forward, among others by famous jurist and future drafter of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights René Cassin, is somewhat more elegant than the 
fi rst one, but is in fact equally unconvincing. Indeed, for one, it only applies to 
cases that would fall within the scope of both the Criminal Code and the law on 
 indignité nationale . Persons who could not have been prosecuted under the stricter 
provisions on national security cannot seriously be said to be benefi tting from a more 
lenient law, because without that law they would not have been prosecuted at all. 
Second, technically this justifi cation would only work if the new law replaced 
the former one, which was not the case. It was perfectly within the powers of the 
charging authorities to choose to prosecute under the Criminal Code, despite the 
existence of the law on  indignité nationale . Th e argument would be more accept-
able if,  de minimis , the law had provided some form of immunity from prosecution 
under the Criminal Code for persons held responsible under the new off ence. 
 16  Peter Novick, above n 13, 237. Th e new off ence was adopted by an Ordinance dated 26 August 
1944. 
 17  For example, it is settled case-law of the European Convention on Human Rights that what is 
‘criminal’, and therefore triggers the fair trial protections of Article 6 of the Convention and arguably 
the protection against non-retroactivity of criminal laws and sanctions contained in Article 7, can-
not solely depend on the qualifi cation under national law. Instead, the Court established a series of 
independent criteria: (1) the classifi cation of the off ence in the national system; (2) the nature of the 
off ence; and/or (3) the severity of the penalty imposed (see  Engel and others v Netherlands , Judgment, 
8 June 1976, §82–3). Applying these criteria, the Court has more particularly found that the fair 
trial protections apply in lustration cases, even when the national legislation might characterise such 
proceedings as ‘civil’ rather than ‘criminal’ ( Matyjek v Poland , Decision on Admissibility, 30 May 
2006, §42–59). More specifi cally, the Court found that the prohibition of holding certain functions 
or public offi  ce for a long period of time could be considered a sanction of suffi  cient gravity to warrant 
the application of Article 6 ( Matyjek v Poland , Decision on Admissibility, 30 May 2006, §54–6). In 
light of this, there is little doubt that the French law on  indignité nationale would be considered as a 
‘criminal’ matter under the European Convention on Human Rights framework, thus imposing the 
application of the non-retroactivity principle of Article 7 of the Convention. 
 18  Aron, above n 5, 94.    19  Peter Novick, above n 13, 250, n 15. 
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Th e third justifi cation, and probably the least convincing from a legal point of 
view, in fact corresponds most neatly to the drafters’ state of mind. For some, the 
 indignité nationale was not really an off ence, but a fact, or more precisely a ‘state’ in 
which a person found himself after having acted in a certain way. Th is state was not 
to be technically determined by a judge, but rather certifi ed as a given. Th e state 
therefore pre-existed the legal concretisation and therefore could not violate the 
non-retroactivity principle. Th is justifi cation adequately highlights the teleology 
of the  épuration . Some people, through their actions, had brought shame not just 
to themselves, but to France as a nation. It was therefore considered as legitimate, 
if legally dubious, for the French Republic in return to declare that these citizens 
were not worthy of the same rights as other citizens. 
 (III)  Pétain and Laval: Th e Trials of the Leaders 
 Th e trials of Pétain and Laval illustrate the diffi  culties of trying the leaders of a former 
regime, especially when undertaken by political opponents. Both these trials came 
quite late in the process of  épuration , to the concern and frustration of a number 
of commentators who thought that logically, these trials should have come fi rst 
because without the condemnation of those who had led the country to collaboration, 
the trial of all other collaborators did not make sense. However, for pragmatic 
reasons, it was deemed that the new government could not aff ord to wait for the 
complex issues surrounding the trial of such senior political fi gures to be resolved 
before starting the process in the rest of the country. Th e trial of Pétain came fi rst, 
and took place from 23 July until 15 August 1945. Th e trial of Laval followed 
some time later, from 4 October until 9 October 1945. 
 Both trials followed the same format. Th ey were held before the  Haute Cour de 
Justice (High Court), a special body set up within the Senate under the Constitution 
of the Th ird Republic to try high public offi  cials for acts against the state. 20 Th is 
Court was abolished by the Vichy regime 21 and re-instated by the Provisional 
Government by a November 1944 ordinance to try the high-ranking collabora-
tors. 22 However, the Provisional Government did not follow the previous rules 
pertaining to the composition of the High Court. Rather than being composed of 
members of the Senate, the Court had three professional magistrates 23 and a jury 
of twenty-four members. 24 It is interesting to note in relation to the composition 
of the jury that half were drawn from the Parliament, while the other half were 
 20  Loi du 24 février 1875 relative à l’organisation du Sénat , Article 9. 
 21  Acte constitutionnel no 5 du 30 juillet 1940 relatif à la Cour suprême de justice . 
 22  Maurice  Garçon ,  Le Procès Pétain, Compte-Rendu sténographique du Procès ( Milan :   De Vecchi 
 2007 ),  30 . 
 23  Judge Mongibeaux, First President of the  Cour de Cassation , Judge Donat-Guigne, President 
of the Criminal Section of the  Cour de Cassation and Judge Picard, First President of the Appeals 
Chamber. Th ese three judges sat on both trials. 
 24  Th is derogatory composition of the High Court was raised, to no avail, by Pétain’s defence as a 
challenge to the legality of the proceedings (Garçon, above n 22, 17). 
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chosen from citizens who ‘during the war, demonstrated a patriotic and resistant 
attitude towards the enemy’. 25 Th is composition certainly helps to explain the apparent 
lack of impartiality of the proceedings. 26 
 Th e study of these trials and the circumstances surrounding them highlights a 
number of features that are common to proceedings of this nature in any transitional 
setting. More specifi cally, one can identify the following issues of interest: the 
symbolic dimension of the trials (1); the related desire of the accusers to (re)write 
history (2); and fi nally the ambiguity of the process (3). 
 (1)  Th e symbolic dimension of the trials 
 Trials of high-level leaders always carry a symbolic charge and situate themselves 
at the crossroads of a number of extra-legal stakes of a political, sociological and 
performative dimension. 27 Th e trials of Pétain and Laval were no diff erent. However, 
while both trials provided the opportunity for the new government to tell its own 
story of the war, 28 their symbolism was performed on diff erent levels. 
 Pétain’s trial was in many respects more symbolic of the general failure of France. 
Pétain represented the regime and its systemic illegality. In this sense, Pétain was in 
a way just an excuse to point out that Vichy was an illegitimate government and 
that De Gaulle represented the ‘true’ France that fought on. Th is collective dimen-
sion of the Pétain trial is illustrated by the will of the government to hold a trial  in 
absentia . Indeed, it appears that Pétain’s absence (he was being held in Germany) 
was seen as a positive development rather than as an obstacle. Conducting the 
proceedings without Pétain ‘would have allowed for the French justice to issue a 
national judgment without the opportunity for the defendant to explain himself 
or be represented’. 29 Th e desire not to have Pétain present was all the more strong, 
that a number of opinion polls done in the early months of 1945 showed that 
French public opinion was not uniform in relation to what to do with the former 
leader of the Vichy regime and that he was in fact a divisive fi gure. 30 Pétain himself 
clearly expressed his desire to face his responsibilities 31 and returned to France 
 25  Garçon, above n 22, 9.    26  See section III (3) below. 
 27  For comprehensive studies on the multi-faceted dimensions of war crime trials, see more particu-
larly:  Mark  Drumbl ,  Atrocity, Punishment and International Law ( Cambridge :  Cambridge Univeristy 
Press,  2007 ) ;  Mark  Osiel ,  Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory and the Law ( Piscataway, NJ :  Transaction 
Publishers,  1999 ) and  Gerry  Simpson ,  Law, War and Crime ( Cambridge :  Polity,   2007 ) . 
 28  See section III (2) below. 
 29  Aron, above n 5, 451. 
 30  Roger  Maudhuy ,  Les Grands Procès de la Collaboration ( Saint-Paul ;  Souny ,  2009 ),  207 . (Describing 
how, when Pétain walked into the court on the fi rst day of the trial, those present rose, and the guards 
stood to attention ( garde à vous ) out of respect). Th is risk of divisiveness was felt by De Gaulle himself, 
who wrote in his memoirs that ‘[a] lthough it appeared to me necessary from a national and inter-
national point of view that the French judicial system issued a solemn verdict, I wished that some 
incident would keep away from French territory this 89-year-old defendant, this leader previously 
adorned with signifi cant dignity, this old man in whom, during the catastrophe, a number of French 
citizens had put their trust and for whom, despite everything, they still felt respect or pity’:  Charles  de 
Gaulle ,  Mémoires , Tome III ( Paris :  Plon,  1959 ),  111 . 
 31  In a letter to Hitler dated 5 April 1945, Pétain declared: ‘I cannot, without violating my honour, 
let it be believed, as is suggested by some propaganda, that I sought refuge in a foreign land to escape 
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through Switzerland in late April 1945. 32 Th e ambivalent public opinion found its 
way in the actual judgment of the High Court, which, while condemning Pétain 
to death, also expressed the ‘wish’ that he in fact not be executed. Th e judgment 
itself only mentions Pétain’s age as the reason for this rather peculiar ‘wish’, but it 
appears that in fact it was the result of a broader disagreement during the delibera-
tions, with the judges suggesting a term of fi ve years of banishment and the death 
penalty only being imposed by a one-vote majority among the jurors themselves. 33 
 As a fi nal testimony to the fact that for a number of people, it was the regime, 
not the man himself that was on trial, it is interesting to read De Gaulle’s take on 
the trial. While he considered that it was absolutely necessary to hold it because 
Pétain ‘had symbolised what was the surrender and, even if he himself had not 
exactly wanted it, the collaboration with the enemy’, he nonetheless recognised 
that the man himself deserved some indulgence for the services he had rendered to 
France over his life. 34 Th is attitude explains why De Gaulle eventually commuted 
Pétain’s death sentence, following in this way the ‘wish’ expressed by the High 
Court. 
 Such lenience was not extended to Laval. While Pétain represented treason in a 
broad sense, Laval represented, in addition to treason, the more active spirit of col-
laboration. While French public opinion was divided on Pétain:
 in 1945, [Laval] was still one of the most hated men in France. He is seen as the most 
responsible of the debasement and troubles of the country: choice of collaboration and its 
procession of compromises, temptation of military collaboration, forced labour, requisitioning, 
police abuses . . . all sides agreed on his faults. 35 
 In addition, his case was not helped by the fact that he had been dismissed by 
Pétain in December 1940, only to be invited back as head of government in April 
1942 at the urging of the Nazis, thus confi rming the impression that he was a willing 
agent of the occupant. 
 (2)  Th e narrative goals of the prosecution 
 Th e way both trials were conducted highlights the motives behind the prosecution 
case. Th e main goal was to provide a two-pronged narrative. On the one hand, 
Pétain and Laval had wanted the defeat of France and had acted in that direction 
before the war. On the other hand, the regime that was set up as a result was illegal 
and illegitimate. 
my responsibilities. It is in France alone that I can answer to my actions and I am the only judge of the 
risks that this attitude could carry’: reproduced in  Bénédicte  Vergez-Chaignon ,  Histoire de L’épuration 
( Paris :  Larousse,  2010 ),  491 . 
 32  It appears that upon hearing news of the arrival of Pétain in Switzerland, De Gaulle made infor-
mal requests to the Swiss government that they in fact refuse to extradite him, so that the trial  in 
absentia could take place, but that this was not followed with eff ect:  Jacques  Isorni ,  Pétain a sauvé la 
France ( Paris :  Flammarion,  1964 ),  14 . 
 33  Maudhuy, above n 30, 214. 
 34  Charles  de Gaulle ,  Discours et Messages , Vol. 2 ( Paris :  Plon  1974 ),  293–4 . 
 35  Bénédicte  Vergez-Chaignon ,  Histoire de l’épuration ( Paris :  Larousse   2010 ) . 
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 Th e fi rst aspect of the story was necessary in the context of the narrative that 
aimed at fi nding those responsible for the defeat. Th is is a natural tendency of any 
regime. Th ere is no luck in defeat, neither is the answer to be found in the success of 
the enemy. Someone within the country is responsible. Th is is why a large portion 
of both trials was devoted to identifying conduct before the war that might be read 
as preparing for defeat at the hands of the Nazis. In relation to Pétain, the prosecution 
argued that in the years preceding the war, he had organised a conspiracy to estab-
lish a dictatorship in France, inspired by Franco, and with the fi nancial help and 
promise of military support from the Nazis. 36 Th is theory appears, in hindsight, 
to be based on no tangible evidence. Th e accusation was based on the statement 
of a person that had been found to be lying repeatedly in other instances 37 and, 
according to one of the members of the jury at the time, no proof of such a 
conspiracy was ever put forward during the rest of the trial. 38 In fact, the judgment 
itself, while it generally condemns Pétain for his collaboration with the Nazis, and 
for the dubious choice of men to lead the country with him, also states that ‘even 
if strong presumptions can be drawn against Pétain because he invited into his vari-
ous governments men that were part of factious movements, there is not suffi  cient 
proof that there was between him and them a real conspiracy against the security 
of the State’. 39 As for Laval, he was, on the fi rst day of his trial, asked to explain his 
anti-war stance before the war which had been a ‘policy of annoyance, of reduction 
of the war potential of France’, 40 and his declarations that predicted the victory of 
Germany and the defeat of the United Kingdom. 
 Th e diff erence in approaches in both trials can be easily explained by the fact 
that, while Pétain was essentially absent from political life in the years preceding 
the war, and could therefore not be found to have made suspicious statements 
pointing to a conspiracy, Laval was an active member of several governments and 
had therefore a clear political position that he could be held accountable for in 
hindsight. 
 Th e second aspect of the story was equally crucial for the new government, both 
politically and legally. From a political perspective, it could not be accepted that 
the French Republic had voluntarily relinquished power to Pétain and Laval. Th is 
would lend the Vichy government a legitimacy that was not compatible with the 
idea that the real government of France was represented by De Gaulle and his 
supporters in exile. Th is is why both trials went to considerable length to show that 
power was acquired by political manoeuvring. Interestingly, the date chosen for 
what the prosecutor in the Laval trial called a ‘ coup d’état ’ 41 was not Pétain’s acquisi-
tion of the full powers by the Assembly on 10 July 1940, but his accession to the 
Presidency of the Council at the invitation of the then President of the Republic, 
Reynaud, on 16 June 1940. Th is had the corollary eff ect of voiding the Armistice 
that was signed on the 25 June, which was one of the main narrative goals of the 
 36  Garçon, above n 22, 33–4.    37  Aron, above n 5, 454.    38  Maudhuy, above n 30, 212. 
 39  Th e full judgment is on fi le with the author. Th is fi nding of the High Court once again shows that 
Pétain, as a person, was never in fact the real target of his own trial. See section III (1) of this chapter. 
 40  Garçon, above n 22, 44.    41  Garçon, above n 22, 12. 
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new government, as explained by De Gaulle in his memoirs 42 and confi rmed by 
Delattre, one of the jury members for the Pétain trial: ‘[Th e Trial] must be resituated 
in its context: in 1945, in the eyes of the  gaullistes , the armistice was a crime and 
the main crime committed by Pétain.’ 43 
 Th is narrative also had legal consequences. As previously outlined, 44 it allowed the 
drafters of the laws of  épuration to provide that a person could not raise as a defence 
that he had acted in accordance with a law enacted under the Vichy Government. 
Moreover, the nullity of the Armistice had equally far ranging consequences. For 
one, it directly allowed the application of the provisions of the Criminal Code on 
intelligence with the enemy. If the Armistice was legal and put an end to the war, 
this could not be invoked. 45 Second of all, and more theoretically, it meant that De 
Gaulle himself could not be prosecuted for his actions during the war that were in 
contradiction to the terms of the Armistice. 46 
 (3)  Th e ambiguities of the process 
 A common feature of both trials, and of many of the trials of the  épuration , was the 
diffi  culty of establishing a fair process. Th is diffi  culty had two dimensions: the fi rst 
one relating to the partiality of the proceedings and the second one, which is partly 
linked to the fi rst, relating to the role of the accusers during the war. 
 In relation to the partiality of the proceedings, it appears that the investigations 
were hasty and incomplete. Th e Pétain trial had been prepared with the absence 
of the accused in mind, and with therefore little work done on the provision of 
defence rights because no opposition was expected. His return to France led to the 
reopening of the fi le and the haphazard addition of a number of documents. 47 
It even appears that some evidence was removed because it would not have resisted 
examination by the defence. 48 In the Laval trial, the accused complained repeatedly 
that he was not allowed to request additional investigations to bolster his case, to 
which the prosecutor amazingly and unashamedly responded that ‘the Pierre Laval 
aff air could have been brought to court without the need to have it preceded with 
a judicial investigation, because, the investigation started the day of the accession 
to power of Pétain and Laval, as his second-in-command’. 49 Th is was hardly an 
indication of the fairness of the proceedings. 
 42  ‘What in the indictment appeared fundamental for me, was less so for many. For me, the capital 
off ence of Pétain and of his government was to have concluded with the enemy, in the name of France, 
the so-called “armistice” ’: reproduced in Aron, above n 5, 533. 
 43  Maudhuy, above n 30, 210.    44  Section II (2) of this chapter. 
 45  Th is was raised by Georges Suarez, a journalist sentenced to death for intelligence with the enemy. 
Th e French Cour de Cassation found, however, with reference to the Hague Conventions, that an 
armistice was only a suspension of hostilities and therefore still constituted a war for the purpose of 
the application of Article 75 of the Criminal Code. 
 46  Aron, above n 5, 90.    47  Vergez-Chaignon, above n 35, 491. 
 48  Aron, above n 5, 453–4. 
 49  Garçon, above n 22, 13. Th e Prosecutor repeated this statement in his closing arguments, 
stating that no investigation was necessary to establish the obvious criminal nature of the acts of 
Vichy: at 268–9. 
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 Th is lack of fairness was made more obvious by the passion surrounding the 
trials, which surely infl uenced its active participants. In that respect, the Laval trial 
stands out once again for its partiality. Two examples can be given. At the end of 
the fi rst day of hearings, when Laval was taken from the courtroom, someone in 
the audience clapped. Th e Presiding judge asked for that person to be removed, at 
which point, one of the jury members cried out ‘he deserves, like Laval, to receive 
twelve bullets’. Th ere were no consequences for the juror. 50 Given the composition 
of the jury which, as explained previously, contained individuals who had actively 
fought against the Vichy regime during the war, such statement is not surprising. 
However, any minimal attachment to notions of impartiality should at least have led 
to the removal of this particular jury member. Th e second example can be found in 
the prosecutor’s closing address, in which he lamented that Laval was not summarily 
killed through an act of ‘popular justice’ when visiting Paris in August 1944. 51 
 In relation to the accusers, both Pétain and Laval pointed out repeatedly that 
they were being tried by persons who had held their positions during the Vichy 
Government. In his opening statement, one of Pétain’s lawyers pointed out that 
Pétain was being judged by those who had sworn allegiance to him. Th ese judges 
had, during the period of the war, ‘rendered judgments and pronounced sentences 
in the name of [Pétain], head of the French state; speaking in his name and in 
application of the powers that he had conferred upon them, they ordered that the 
representatives of the police forces execute the judgments they were issuing’. In this 
context, how could the judges not be perceived as being partial? 52 In a similar fash-
ion, Laval interrupted the opening statement of the prosecutor with the following 
remark: ‘But you were all under the orders of the government at that time, you 
who are judging me, magistrates, and you, General Prosecutor’. 53 Th is perceived 
partiality of the judges explains Pétain’s position at the outset of the trial, where he 
declared in an opening statement that:
 [I] t is the French people who, through its representatives, brought together in the parliament, 
on the 10 July 1940, brought me to power. It is to this people that I came to answer to. Th e 
High Court, as it is currently composed, does not represent the French people, and it is to it, 
and only it, that the  Maréchal de France and the Head of State speaks today. 54 
 (IV)  Lessons (to be) Learned 
 Th is fi nal section will bring together the preceding analysis and try to draw some 
general lessons both for the evaluation of the system of the  épuration and, in line 
with the objective outlined in the introduction, for situations that may arise today. 
Th ese lessons relate both to the legal dimension of post-confl ict trials (1) and to the 
narrative function of these trials (2). 
 50  Garçon, above n 22, 99.    51  Garçon, above n 22, 307.    52  Garçon, above n 22, 25. 
 53  Garçon, above n 22, 13.    54  Garçon, above n 22, 41. 
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 (1)  Th e legal dimension of post-confl ict trials 
 What becomes apparent from this impressionistic overview of the way that France 
dealt with the  épuration of those who had collaborated with the Nazi occupiers, is 
that those who conceived and implemented the legal framework were faced with 
some universal dilemmas that required the balancing of a number of issues. As 
indicated earlier, there was a need to satisfy the collective desire for vengeance with 
the requirements of justice. 
 In relation to the applicable law, the analysis shows the diffi  culty in achieving 
this balance. Th e trials required the setting up of a legal framework that had to 
compromise the principle of legality and required, for it to be operational, some 
creative reappraisal of the situation that existed at the time, as is the case with the 
nullity of the Armistice. 
 Th ese conclusions fi nd an obvious echo in debates that have surrounded the 
retroactive application of international criminal law. While the creation of the 
International Criminal Court and its explicit application only to acts committed 
after its entry into force 55 has alleviated some concerns in relation to this problem, the 
issue still arose and arises in cases where ad hoc tribunals are created. Th e Nuremberg 
Judgment famously held that the principle of legality was:
 [Generally] a principle of justice. To assert that it is unjust to punish those who in defi ance 
of treaties and assurances have attacked neighbouring states without warning is obviously 
untrue for in such circumstances the attacker must know that he is doing wrong, and so 
far from it being unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his wrong were allowed to go 
unpunished. 56 
 In other words, the principle of legality is merely a relative principle that needs to 
give way to the requirements of justice. Th e way this issue was resolved in relation 
to the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals was to claim that the existence of 
the crime under customary law satisfi ed the requirements of the principle of legal-
ity. 57 Th is line of reasoning was validated at the European Court of Human Rights. 58 
 While this intellectual construction can be questioned in a number of ways, 59 the 
increased codifi cation of international crimes and their growing implementation in 
national legal orders means that the issue is less likely to arise in the future. It is 
nonetheless important to recall it as an illustration of the grey zone between law and 
 55  Article 11(1), Rome Statute. 
 56  Th e Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War Criminals 
(30 September and 1 October 1946), 217. 
 57  See  Report Of Th e Secretary-General Pursuant To Paragraph 2 Of Security Council Resolution 808 
(1993) UN Doc. S/25704, 3 May 1993 at §34 (‘In the view of the Secretary-General, the application 
of the principle nullum crimen sine lege requires that the international tribunal should apply rules of 
international humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt part of customary law’). 
 58  Kononov v Latvia , ECtHR Grand Chamber, 17 May 2010. 
 59  From a very pragmatic perspective, the documentary and methodological complexities that a 
number of international tribunals have been faced with when establishing the content of custom-
ary law in a number of cases makes the argument that the defendant should therefore have known 
that his acts were criminal at the time highly theoretical. Only if he himself had at his disposal an 
army of legal assistants to assess the national legislation of dozens of countries and the specifi c (and 
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morality that more generally permeates the fi elds of human rights and international 
criminal law. 
 In relation to the fairness of the proceedings, it becomes apparent from the 
examples given that there is a very fi ne line between what is now being called ‘local 
ownership’ of the process and partiality of the process. Th e thinly veiled call for 
murder from the prosecutor in the Laval trial highlights the passion that accompa-
nies such proceedings. Moreover, the fact that the trials were conducted by judges 
who had served under the Vichy regime is equally representative of the risks of 
partiality. Th e study of such cases is therefore of interest for those studying the 
interaction between national and international courts in prosecuting mass crimes, 
and who are trying to fi nd a balance between local ownership and the distance 
necessary for the process to be deemed fair. 
 (2)  Th e narrative function of post-confl ict trials 
 Beyond the legal dimension, the most important insight that can be drawn from 
the preceding discussion is how trials can be used to shape the narrative of a confl ict. 
As discussed, behind the laws of  épuration and behind the legal proceedings of the 
trials, lay a narrative that the new government wanted to promote. Th is narrative 
was that of the lack of continuity of the French state during the Vichy regime. 
Pétain had set up an illegal and illegitimate dictatorship, with the political, but also 
intellectual support of a number of French citizens. Th e obvious objective of such 
a narrative was to solidify the legitimacy of the new government of De Gaulle, and 
even more importantly, its legitimacy as the continuance of the French Republic 
throughout the war. Several comments can be made in relation to this narrative. 
 First of all, this is a clear example of re-writing of history with the benefi t of hind-
sight. It is only with the victory of Germany, for example, that the pre-war fascist 
musings of an intellectual such as Brasillach take on a premonitory and conspiratorial 
dimension. 60 Equally, had the communists not become such a political force during 
the war, and the British such close allies, anti-communist and anti-British pronounce-
ments would not have been held against a certain number of accused in the  épura-
tion trials. 61 
 Secondly, the trials are a somewhat clear example of the victor writing history to 
fi t his own narrative. Th e political and sociological reality of pre-war France was a 
sometimes progressive) interpretations of a number of treaties and declarations of states, would the 
reasoning have any validity. For a comprehensive and critical discussion of the principle of legality in 
international criminal law, see  Dov  Jacobs ,  ‘Positivism and International Criminal Law: Th e Principle 
of Legality as a Rule of Confl ict of Th eories’ in  Jean  d’Aspremont and  Jörg  Kammerhofer (eds), 
 International Legal Positivism in a Post-Modern World , ( Cambridge University Press,  forthcoming ) . 
Available at SSRN: < http://ssrn.com/abstract=2046311 > (accessed 20 December 2012). 
 60  On the trial of Robert Brasillach, see  Alice  Kaplan ,  Th e Collaborator: Trial and Execution of Robert 
Brasillach ( Chicago :  University of Chicago Press,   2001 ) . 
 61  On the various off ences that were established based on a certain opinion, see  François  Rouquet , 
 Une Epuration Ordinaire ( Paris :  CNRS Editions  2011 ),  145–62 . 
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far more complex web of interests and tensions and the French defeat in 1940 was 
the result of more than the policies of a few ‘traitors’. 
 Th irdly, it is a selective narrative. Indeed, in the same way that Nuremberg was 
essentially (at least at the beginning) about crimes against peace, the trials of the 
 épuration , as illustrated by those studied in this chapter, were about treason and, 
more specifi cally, the crime that was the capitulation to the Nazis in 1940. Th ere is, 
somewhat strikingly, very little mention of the Holocaust. Th e Laval indictment, 
and only then in an annex, mentions the anti-Jewish law merely as an example of 
the will of Laval in adapting the French regime to Nazi policy. Th e Pétain indictment 
does not even mention the persecution of Jews and the Court seemed unconcerned 
by the issue. When, after one week of discussions on the Armistice, a juror asked 
whether there would be any evidence of crimes committed in relation to the Jewish 
population, the prosecutor responded that:
 We will hear here some representatives of associations of victims that came out safe and sound—
and I congratulate them for that—from the camps of Buchenwald, Dachau, etc. Th eir 
testimony will constitute what I call ‘courtroom impression’ more than actual arguments, 
because what matters in this trial, is to make a demonstration. 62 
 Th ese fi ndings highlight the complex relationship between trials and history. While 
trials can be instrumental in historical work, they certainly cannot be considered as 
establishing history, as is sometimes argued today. Even if some of the anomalies 
of the post-war French trials are not reproduced in today’s trials, there is a limit to 
the capacity of criminal trials to set a reliable (and complete) record of the past. 63 
Th is diffi  culty is compounded by the fact that perceptions of history and expectations 
of the outcomes of criminal trials are fragmented. Th e narrative of the trials was 
not only selective, it was the selective choice of the new government, which only 
represented a fraction of the variety of interests of the French population at the 
time. In this sense, the ‘local ownership’ of the criminal process, as considered 
previously, is made more complex by the possibly confl icting hopes of what the 
process should achieve. Th is was illustrated by the diffi  culty experienced by the 
jury in fully adhering to the prosecutorial strategy in the Pétain trial. It was also 
impossible for journalists reporting on the trials to convey to their readership the 
complexities of a narrative that was essentially political, when they were expecting 
one that would mirror more closely their individual suff ering. 64 
 In light of this, while the initial reaction to the French trials, given the current 
success of the ‘truth paradigm’, could be criticism, one can wonder, taking a step 
back, whether truth is in fact such a relevant factor for the reconciliation that is 
sought by the trials. Not only is truth a relative concept, 65 but over-reliance on 
 62  Vergez-Chaignon, above n 35, 495. 
 63  Richard Ashby  Wilson ,  Writing History in International Criminal Trials ( Cambridge :  Cambridge 
University Press ,  2011 ) . 
 64  Vergez-Chaignon, above n 35, 492. 
 65  Manuel  Garcia-Carpintero and  Max  Kölbel (eds),  Relative Truth ( Oxford :   Oxford University 
Press,   2008 ) . 
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truth ignores the fact that national unity, which is one of the bases for reconciliation, 
is based not on truth, but on broadly accepted myths. In France, the myth of the 
 résistance and the illegality of the Vichy regime was central to national identity. Th e 
fact that it took fi fty years for a French president to recognise that the acts of Vichy 
were indeed the acts of France illustrates this. 66 One must wonder if, at the time, 
such a myth was not necessary for the country to move forward. 
 In other words, post-confl ict periods must be seen in a diachronic rather than 
synchronic dimension, where diff erent periods might require diff erent narratives 
and institutional frameworks. France, again, exemplifi es this. Following the initial 
push for harsh treatment, a number of ‘softening’ initiatives were introduced in 
subsequent years. A general amnesty was enacted in 1953. 67 Further, as mentioned 
above, the strict anti-Vichy narrative promulgated during the trials eventually gave 
way to a more nuanced historical record and the recognition that Vichy was also 
part of French history. Insisting on some form of objectifi ed truth can in some cases 
lead to the reproduction of the societal tensions that were at the heart of the confl ict 
in the fi rst place. Only a reasoned analysis of the importance of post-confl ict 
narratives, with their ambiguities, rather than an over-reliance on an illusory objective 
truth, can help academics and practitioners advance in the direction of the desired 
reconciliation. 
 66  Declaration of President Chirac on the 16 July 1995, < http://www.nytimes.com/1995/07/17/
world/chirac-affi  rms-france-s-guilt-in-fate-of-jews.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm > (accessed 3 March 
2013). 
 67  Aron,  Histoire de L’épuration , above n 5, 45–71. 
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 Th e Bordeaux Trial: Prosecuting the 
Oradour-sur-Glane Massacre 
 Frédéric  Mégret * 
 On 10 June 1944, a German column advanced towards the small village of Oradour- 
sur-Glane in the department of Haute-Vienne, Limousin region, in the south-west of 
France. It was composed of the 3rd company of the 1st battalion of Panzergrenadier 
of the 4th SS-Panzer-Regiment ‘Der Führer’ of the 2eSS-Panzer-Division ‘Das 
Reich’. Th e division had left for Normandy almost as soon as news of D-Day had 
arrived. Th e Limousin region had been the theatre of many FFI ( Forces françaises 
de l’intérieur ) attacks, which had led to bloody reprisals. In Tulle alone, ninety-nine 
men had been hanged. 
 Oradour-sur-Glane was methodically surrounded. Villagers were ordered to 
assemble in the village square with their identifi cation papers. Th ose who tried to fl ee 
were shot. Women and children were put on one side, men on the other. Th e men 
were then dispatched to six diff erent locations, in front of which heavy machine 
guns were placed. At the sound of an explosion, they were gunned down, with the 
shooters often aiming for their legs. Some were then fi nished off  at point blank 
range. Th e dead and dying were set on fi re. At around the same time, the women 
and children were locked into the village church. A canister of asphyxiating gas 
was set up, which promptly exploded. Th e church was fi lled with black smoke. 
Th e Germans shot indiscriminately. Grenades were thrown in. Th e bodies were 
subsequently covered with straw and church chairs, and set on fi re. Th e church bell 
melted under the temperature. Th e rest of the village was systematically plundered 
and set on fi re. 
 Altogether, 648 people (245 women, 207 children including six below six months, 
and 196 men) were killed, although only fi fty could be identifi ed. A dozen managed 
to escape before being caught; fi ve men managed to run away from a burning barn 
after being shot. One woman survived the church massacre after jumping from a 
church window, breaking her leg, and being shot by an SS soldier in the process (she 
 *  Associate-Professor, Faculty of Law, McGill University; Canada Research Chair in the Law of 
Human Rights and Legal Pluralism. I am grateful to Diane Le Gall and Anna Shea for their precious 
research assistance. 
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was found the next day). She had lost her husband, her son, her two daughters and 
her seven-month-old grandson. Th e massacre was the worst in occupied France, 
one of the worst in Western Europe and on a scale comparable to some of the most 
dramatic mass executions of the Eastern Front. 
 In 1953, eight years after the massacre, the trial of Oradour-sur-Glane opened 
before a military tribunal in Bordeaux, composed of one professional civilian 
magistrate and six military adjuncts (who, according to law, had to be drawn in 
majority from the ranks of the resistance). Twenty-one members of the third com-
pany, out of sixty-four who had been identifi ed as having been involved and still 
alive, were accused of being co-authors or accomplices to crimes of murder, acts of 
barbarity, voluntary arson and plunder. Th e trial elicited a passionate response in 
France and attracted considerable press interest. Of the twenty-one, fourteen were 
Frenchmen from Alsace-Lorraine who had been conscripted into the SS, thirteen 
by force. One German was sentenced to death, four to sentences of forced labour, 
and one was acquitted. Of the Alsatians, only the volunteer was condemned to 
death, nine to forced labour, and fi ve to jail terms. Forced labour and prison 
sentences ranged from fi ve to twelve years. Under very tense circumstances, a law 
of amnesty was voted by Parliament on 19 February 1953, which led to the libera-
tion of those Alsatians who had been forcefully conscripted. Th is chapter analyses 
the legacy of the Bordeaux trial, a trial that is today somewhat forgotten even in 
France, but which is remarkably modern in terms of the dilemmas it raised. 
 (I)  Historiography and the Problem of Context 
 Th e telling of the Oradour massacre is a delicate historiographical exercise. 1 Apart 
from the occasionally frankly revisionist writing, all accounts agree on the essentials 
of what happened, even though all concede that some facts must necessarily be the 
object of speculation. Th e survival of some key witnesses makes certain facts incon-
trovertible—for example, Mrs Marguerite Rouff anche provided a unique insight 
into what happened in the church since she was its sole survivor—whilst the death 
of many others means that some elements remain forever shrouded in mystery; the 
vast majority of victims, but also many of the key perpetrators, died in the months 
of combat that followed. 
 More signifi cantly, all accounts must walk a fi ne conceptual line between focusing 
entirely on the massacre and trying to contextualize it. Too little context will not 
serve the needs of history, pedagogy or memory. Th e massacre was not a random 
event in the sense of being entirely arbitrary. It fi tted into a pattern of actions 
 1  Th ere is a vast literature, mostly in France, dedicated to the Oradour massacre, although far fewer 
books on the Bordeaux trial itself. Leading examples of the latter on which this chapter draws are 
 Jean-Jacques  Fouché ,  Oradour: la politique et la justice ( Saint-Paul :  Souny ,  2004 ) ;  Guillaume  Javerliat , 
 Bordeaux 1953, le deuxième drame d’Oradour: entre histoire, mémoire et politique ( Saint-Paul :  PULIM , 
 2008 ) ;  Jean-Laurent  Vonau ,  Le procès de Bordeaux: les Malgré-Nous et le drame d’Oradour ( Strasbourg :  La 
Nuée Bleue ,  2003 ) ;  Douglas W  Hawes ,  Oradour–Th e Final Verdict: Th e Anatomy and Aftermath of a 
Massacre ( Bloomington, IN :  Authorhouse ,  2007 ) . 
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against civilians, for example, characteristic of the violence of Nazi occupying 
troops, perhaps more common on the Eastern Front but increasingly transposed to 
the Western fringes of Europe as well. To miss that element would not do historical 
justice to the events of 10 June. Yet context is also tricky, and what one fi ts in that 
loose category as having been somehow relevant can raise delicate questions about 
what exactly was the meaning of that fateful day in 1944. Th ere can also be such a 
thing as too much context, if an episode becomes disconnected from the genealogy 
of crimes against humanity, so particularized and over-explained by a sequence of 
events as to be trivialized. 
 At any rate, the massacre was not, so to speak, committed in a day. Rather, it 
was directly and indirectly linked to a complex series of circumstances. First and 
foremost, perhaps, the massacre is linked to the history of occupation, of which 
it constitutes one of the fi nal, most desperate and bloodiest episodes. Germany 
occupied the northern half of France in 1940, with the Vichy Government being 
given formal authority over the southern zone as little more than a puppet regime. 
Nazi troops operated in occupied territory, in a context where signifi cant sections 
of French society and the French ‘state’ were willing to cooperate with them, but 
where they also encountered signifi cant resistance from a minority and a sullen 
opposition from many. Th e Limousin region was in that respect not unlike many 
regions of occupied France. It had signifi cant maquis 2 presence, yet there were also 
many—including, most likely, the inhabitants of Oradour—who were simply 
trying to get on with their lives. Almost from the beginning, occupation was a 
ruthless aff air, designed to subjugate and plunder the occupied areas. 
 A second element of context that seems crucial is the nature of the Waff en SS, 
since it provides the crucial link between the two regions that would prove so central 
to the Bordeaux trial: the Limousin and Alsace. Th e Waff en SS was the military 
arm of the SS, which had originally been created as a protection group for Hitler 
but had morphed into a veritable state within the state after his accession to power. 
It was an elite corps that demanded absolute allegiance to the Fuhrer. By 1944, 
the Waff en SS was not quite what it had once been as a fi ghting force, although it 
proved in Oradour and elsewhere that it was certainly a murdering force. It had 
suff ered extensive casualties on the Eastern Front, where many of its regiments had 
been decimated. Although it may seem paradoxical that an elite unit traditionally 
based on rigorous selection of volunteers should have enrolled members forcefully 
and against their will, such was the situation by 1943 that it had to be less ideologi-
cally and racially rigorous. Given the SS’s ambition to showcase Aryanism, it was 
natural that in occupied territory it would look for recruits who conformed to its 
racial stereotypes. 
 A third contextual element that is perhaps most problematic is Alsace. Some treat-
ments of the Oradour massacre focus on Alsace more than others, in ways that seem 
to suggest that the crimes initially committed there by the Germans were the cause 
of subsequent atrocities that occurred 500 miles to the south-west; others portray 
Alsace as factually relevant but ultimately incapable of explaining something such 
 2  Literally, ‘scrub’, where the  Résistance retreated to operate against the Germans. 
07_9780199671144c7.indd   139 10/3/2013   4:05:08 PM
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in 
any way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
European Histories I: Prosecuting Atrocity140
as Oradour. Th is tension between those who place an emphasis on the problematique 
of Alsace and those who do not is still felt today, either implicitly or explicitly, and 
works on Oradour are still judged by many in the regions concerned on the basis of 
which side of the line they fall on. It is, at any rate, this fi ne line that the Bordeaux 
military court itself sought to tread, one that repeatedly threatened to engulf the trial 
and that would test reconciliation and national unity in post-war France. 
 Alsace was long a part of the Holy Roman Empire, but had gradually become a 
French province in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, particularly following 
the French Revolution. In 1871, after the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian 
War, it was annexed by the Prussians who proceeded to Germanize it. It was partly 
over Alsace and its sister province, Lorraine, that World War I was fought between 
France and Germany. Alsatians were conscripted by Germany in 1914, although 
many managed to escape to the French lines and switch sides. Alsace was returned 
to France in 1919 under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles following which it 
underwent a rigorous process of Francization. Th e diff erence between Alsace and 
the rest of France during World War II was that it was not merely occupied: it was de 
facto  annexed  by Hitler to Germany in 1940, thus fulfi lling an old German desire 
for revenge, as well as fi tting well with the Nazi idea of uniting all ‘ Volksdeutsche ’ 
(ethnic Germans). 
 Needless to say, such forced national incorporation was in contravention of 
international law. Extraordinarily, and even though the Armistice said nothing 
to that eff ect, Maréchal Pétain, the World War I hero whose eff orts largely led to 
Alsace (and Lorraine) coming back into the French fold, hardly protested this incor-
poration into Germany. Th is led many Alsatians to feel betrayed by France. Th e 
annexation was swift and brutal: civil servants were forced to swear allegiance to the 
Reich; the French language was banned (including French names); membership in 
the Hitler Youth was compulsory for those under eighteen and a border was set up 
with France. A re-education and security camp was created at Schirmeck-Labroque 
to deal with those resisting Germanization to which many suspected ‘francophiles’ 
were promptly sent, some on their way to further deportation. 
 (II)  Th e Court and its Procedure 
 Defence for the German accused argued that only an international tribunal 
composed of the victors, the defeated and neutrals could judge them. Yet there 
was little doubt that, in the spirit of Nuremberg, the crimes had been committed 
in a specifi c location and should therefore be judged by domestic French courts. 
France had been quite keen to prosecute Germans and in the years following the 
war many had already been convicted. 3 Th e French framework for the prosecu-
tions was attacked by the accused as incompatible with the London Agreement 
 3  Claudia  Moisel ,  ‘Des crimes sans précédent dans l’histoire des pays civilisés:  l’Occupation 
allemande devant les tribunaux français, 1944–2001’ ,  Mémoires/Histoire ,  1 ( 2006 ),  186 . 
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and the Nuremberg judgment. In rejecting this challenge, the Cour de Cassation, 
the highest French jurisdiction, found that it ‘belongs to the French nation . . . to 
ensure through its tribunals and according to its legal rules the repression of those 
crimes that were committed on French territory, or against French nationals’. Th e 
French ordinance of 1944 and the law of 1948 contravened no provision of inter-
national law, since neither the London Agreement nor the Nuremberg verdict 
anticipated how crimes should be prosecuted in France, and in fact emphasized 
that they should be judged in the countries where the crimes had been committed 
‘according to the laws of these countries’. 
 A substantial amount of time had elapsed since 1944 when the trial began, which 
created opportunities even as it raised problems. On the one hand, the atmosphere 
was calmer than it would have been immediately after the war when thousands 
were executed in France outside any judicial process as a result of the sombre 
episode known as  épuration . One Alsatian who had early on been identifi ed as a 
participant at Oradour was tried, condemned to death, and almost lynched by a 
crowd in Limoges (he was subsequently released on appeal because he was a minor 
at the time of the events, but was retried in 1953 before the military court on a new 
legal basis). On the other hand, the passage of time meant that the overall political 
context was less favourable to prosecutions, and that even though the suff ering was 
still very much alive in the Limousin (it arguably still is even today), some memories 
of actual facts had begun to blur. Th e Bordeaux trial also raised what have become 
familiar problems of pre-trial detention. Seven Germans and two Alsatians had, by 
the time the trial began, been held for nine years, whilst those not detained had 
gone on with their lives. Th e President of the tribunal was visibly irritated at trial 
by how long the accused had had to wait for their day in court. 
 Th e trial was conducted in a classic inquisitorial vein, characteristic of the 
French criminal procedure that has been somewhat less infl uential in contemporary 
international criminal justice. Th e  instruction (judicial investigation) had occurred 
before the trial and led to a signifi cant  dossier d’instruction (judicial investigation 
fi le). It had started early after the massacre, the Vichy Government having protested 
to the Germans about the killings, and the Wehrmacht Command in France having 
complained to the SS about them. However, its work had been marred by the fact 
that it unfolded in a country in the midst of hostilities where questioning those 
involved was out of the question, and evidence was rapidly being lost. Moreover, 
the Wehrmacht had no jurisdiction over the SS, and even though SS General 
Lammerding apparently initiated an investigation, it predictably led nowhere. Th e 
investigation subsequently struggled to fi nd those responsible in prisoner of war 
camps throughout Europe. 
 Th e presiding judge was omnipresent, at times cajoling and at times threatening. 
Prosecution and defence were consulted by him almost on a need basis. Th ere was 
much direct, unmediated contact between the judge and the defendants, none of 
whom had the option to be silent. Interrogation of the defendants was on the basis 
of the  dossier d’instruction . It has been claimed that the judge’s fi rst statement in the 
courtroom was for the gendarme to ‘let the guilty enter’. Much of the defendants’ 
interrogation by the judge was devoted to verifying things that they had said to 
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their interrogators (British and French) and which were in the dossier. Statements 
made years earlier by the defendants to military police and which they had since 
withdrawn were often held against them. 
 Th e defendants often claimed that they had never said some of the things that were 
in the dossier, or that they had not read their deposition at the time of signing it. 
Th ere was evidence that some had consulted to come up with a common version that 
would exonerate them. Many changed their version of events during the investiga-
tion and during trial. Some hinted at having been brutalized by their interrogators, 
notably the British military police, but these claims were not pursued in court and 
their defence lawyers did not even seek to exclude the evidence supposedly thus 
obtained. Th ey claimed that their recollection of events was sketchy, except when 
it came to evidence that might exculpate them. With the passage of time, however, 
some witnesses’ own recollections had blurred. 
 As in previous and subsequent war crimes trials, both defendants and victim 
witnesses were tempted to make grand declarations about what they saw as the 
issues at stake rather than simply answer the judges’ factual questions. Some of 
the defendants or their counsel emphasized the price Alsace had paid to remain 
French, whilst victims insisted that this issue was strictly irrelevant to what had 
occurred in Oradour. Th e President of the tribunal ignored them or cut them off , 
but it was hard not to get a sense of the deeper animosities and contradictions 
implicit in the testimonies. For the rest, much of the trial was dominated by factual 
issues and the complex attempt at reconstituting who had been where, when and 
doing what. Th e fact that there were so few survivors made it very diffi  cult to ascer-
tain who had done what, underscoring the sinister paradox that the more ruthless 
of war criminals—those who left none behind to testify—might also be those who 
stood the best chance of escaping conviction. Perhaps equally importantly, the trial 
focused on who knew what in advance, with a view to establishing premeditation 
or the lack thereof. 
 Contrary to the French tradition and because the court was a military one, victims 
were not represented and could not avail themselves of the  parties civiles institution. 
Only a few seats were reserved for them, and they had none of the procedural rights 
that would normally have been associated with  parties civiles , such as addressing the 
court or examining the investigatory fi le on which the case was based. Nonetheless, 
they had been closely associated at the earlier investigative stage and the presiding 
judge addressed them directly on several occasions, as if to recognize their huge 
stake in the trial. 
 Another forty-four defendants were also tried  in abstentia , although they were 
hardly mentioned during trial and were seen as guilty by the prosecutor largely 
under the Law of Collective Responsibility, 4 even if they did not individually 
participate in killings. In some ways, this part of the proceedings would confi rm 
the worst suspicions about the  in absentia procedure for a lawyer trained in the 
common law tradition and wary of defendants eff ectively not in a position to 
defend themselves: all were condemned to the death penalty. Nonetheless, had 
 4  See ‘Organizational Guilt’, Section VI below. 
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any been caught subsequently (none were), they would have been entitled to a 
retrial. 
 (III)  Anti-Insurgency and Crimes against Humanity 
 To this day, the exact reason why the massacre was ordered remains unknown. 
In part this merely illustrates its absolute gratuitousness and horror. However, it 
did fi t into a pattern of orders and strategies, quite characteristic of the ‘general 
and systematic attack against civilian populations’ that has become the litmus 
test for crimes against humanity. Th e head of the division, General Lammerding, 
had been ordered to assist Wehrmacht units in the south-west to ‘rid the region 
of its communist bands and lastingly impress the populations by acting with no 
restraint whatsoever’. Th e massacre was committed against the background of the 
Sperrle order, which instructed occupation troops on how to deal ruthlessly with 
‘terrorist’ action. Th e Waff en SS had honed their murderous skills on the Eastern 
Front, and their modus operandi in Oradour refl ected a pattern long evident in 
Ukraine or the Balkans that was being transposed on the Western Front as resist-
ance networks sprung into action after D-Day. In the days preceding the events, 
the Germans had become increasingly impatient with attacks on troops and par-
ticularly the kidnapping by the French resistance of a German offi  cer. Th is was in 
the overall context of the Allied landing in Normandy and probably a realization 
among the Germans that the tide was turning. Th e goal may have been to terror-
ize the population into submission, especially after an uprising in neighbouring 
Tulle (the city had briefl y, but precariously, been retaken from the Wehrmacht 
and was brutally punished), and to limit guerrilla action against German columns. 
Evidence presented at trial of exchanges between SS offi  cials in the hours that pre-
ceded the massacre suggested a punitive expedition was in the making. Yet even 
that explanation fails to be entirely convincing: if reprisals or a warning had been 
intended, why was so much eff ort put into hiding the crime rather than publiciz-
ing it as an example? 
 Why Oradour was chosen despite its lack of apparent link to the maquis also 
remains unclear. It was at one point argued that it may have been confused with 
Oradour-sur-Vayres, a neighboring village which was a signifi cant centre for resist-
ance, although that thesis now tends to be discredited. In fact, rather than being 
targeted because it was a maquis-supporting village, it may well have been chosen 
precisely because the Germans knew it had no maquis, and would therefore prove 
a particularly defenceless target. If nothing else, it was relatively small (for example, 
compared to neighbouring Saint Junien, a town of 10,000) and thus made for a 
feasible, well planned one-day murderous expedition. Another possible motivation 
was that Oradour, as a relatively well-off  village that had remained somewhat apart 
from the war, was a prime plunder target. 
 Th ese doubts about the precise motivation for the operation ultimately made it 
hard to characterize it criminologically. Was it fi rst and foremost a manifestation 
of an excess of violence in war but nonetheless, even in a distorted way, part of the 
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pursuit of war in that it responded to specifi c military incidents? Did it exemplify 
the dangers of anti-insurgency warfare in a context where partisans had a tendency 
to blend with the local population? Or was it more gratuitously sadistic and extermi-
natory—more reminiscent, except for its lack of discriminatory or racist character, of 
the Einsatzgruppen’s reign of terror behind Eastern lines? 
 Whilst there is no entirely satisfactory answer to these questions, victims provide 
an interesting prism through which to address them. Victims were characteristi-
cally ambivalent about the testimony presented in court. In part, they did not 
want Oradour to be simply presented as an act of folly, one entirely irreducible to 
human rationality, because of the risk that folly might somehow excuse what 
happened, and make the events less representative of German barbarity. In addition, 
folly was not particularly credible given the number of individuals involved and 
the meticulous organization of the massacre. It was important to victims’ perception 
of that day’s evil that it had been premeditated. 
 However, nor did victims want the massacre to be attributed to even a distorted 
military rationality. In fact, victims were wary of attempts to ‘explain’ the massacre 
too much, in particular by those who would have drawn a link with maquis activity, 
something that might have made it look more like an operation of reprisal than 
an act of unprovoked barbarity. It was important in the public debate to make the 
killing appear entirely unnecessary from a military point of view, even if that led 
to some very twisted logic, 5 if only because the massacre must have had some mar-
ginal chilling eff ect on the resistance (or could somewhat rationally be thought of 
in that way by Nazi tacticians). In the end, Oradour had to be suffi  ciently planned 
that it could not be dismissed as a psychopathic aberration, yet not so rational that 
it might fi nd apologists. Th is line between reason and folly was arguably one of the 
fi nest navigated by the trial. 
 (IV)  Collectivization and Moral Hierarchy 
 Although the focus of a trial such as the one in Bordeaux was to establish the guilt 
or innocence of select individuals, and although survivors and relatives of victims 
insisted that this was all there should be to it, it proved extremely hard to abstract 
these individual issues from the complex ways in which they related to group respon-
sibility. Th e argument in Alsace was very much framed as one of that region’s own 
grievances emerging from the war. Alsatian public opinion, of course, condemned 
the massacre. Th e accused even had Pierre Zackenberg as their lead lawyer, an 
Alsatian résistant who had been held by the Germans from 1942 to the end of the 
war, and who could hardly be suspected of sympathy with collaboration. Moreover, 
 5  For example, one of the most bizarre (and unconvincing) arguments heard in this context was that 
Dresden and Hiroshima were not criminal because their very magnitude showed them to have been 
necessary to the belligerents’ war eff ort, whereas localized, ‘incomplete’ massacres such as Oradour 
betrayed something more sinister. See (disagreeing)  Jean Pierre  Maunoir ,  ‘Le Procès d’Oradour’ ,  Revue 
de droit international, de sciences diplomatiques et politiques ( 1953 ),  186 . 
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by a bizarre twist of fate, a number of Alsatians (nine, including two children, 
to which should be added fourteen children from neighbouring Lorraine) were 
among the victims at Oradour, having been evacuated there by the French authorities 
prior to the outbreak of hostilities in 1939. 
 Th is did not prevent Alsatian public opinion from seeing considerable injus-
tice in the particular case that was unfolding in Bordeaux. Th e Alsatians thought 
that they had equally been victims of the Germans and that the trial essentially 
prosecuted victims. Th ey could point to the fact that the German Gauleiter in 
Alsace, Robert Wagner, had been convicted and executed for war crimes, partly 
on the basis of the forced recruitment of 130,000 Alsatian men. Of those, 30,000 
had died, 20,000 had disappeared, 10,000 were gravely wounded, and many of 
the rest were traumatized forever by what they had seen and done on the Eastern 
Front. No Alsatian family was immune from the consequences of forced enrol-
ment (one defence lawyer did not hesitate to compare the 600 victims of Oradour 
to the 40,000 victims in Alsace). In fact, and by another curious twist of his-
tory, Karl Buck, the sadistic SS-Hauptsturmführer and head of the Schirmeck 
camp, was being tried in Metz simultaneously, further infl aming Alsace’s sense of 
victimhood. 
 Th ere was also a feeling that Alsace was doubly victimized by France, having been 
largely abandoned to its Germanization by the Vichy Government, and then being 
made to pay for some of the tragic events that followed. Th e Alsatians went as far 
as to suggest that they were equally victims of Oradour-sur-Glane, something which 
provoked considerable indignation in the Limousin, where forced recruitment was 
seen as incommensurable with the wanton killing of the innocent. Nonetheless, 
there was a deep-seated feeling of being ill-understood by the rest of France, and of 
resentment for French society and the state for overlooking the tragic circumstances 
of forced enrolment. For many in Alsace, the co-presence of  malgré nous (literally 
‘despite ourselves’—this is how the French describe those forcibly conscripted into 
the German army) and German SS in the docket in Bordeaux was tantamount to 
prosecuting tormentor and victim simultaneously. 
 Foremost in the minds of many Alsatians was also a specifi c matter of what 
one might call judicial aesthetics. It had proved very diffi  cult to fi nd or arrest the 
German offi  cers suspected of being most responsible for the massacre. It was not 
immediately known after the war that the commander of the Das Reich division, 
General Lammerding, was living in Düsseldorf, in the British-occupied zone. After 
1948, the offi  cial British policy was to only extradite Germans accused of homicide. 
At any rate, the French seemed to have failed to make a formal extradition request. 
It has been argued since that Lammerding received CIA protection in exchange for 
intelligence. At any rate Lammerding subsequently thrived as an entrepreneur in 
Germany, his name adorning the trucks of his construction company. Similarly, 
there were some doubts about how persistently French authorities had pursued 
the extradition of Captain Kahn, commander of the third company. Defence law-
yers in Bordeaux claimed that he was hiding in Sweden, but that no demand for 
extradition had been made by the French government. By contrast, the surviving 
Alsatian members of the third company had been much easier to locate and the 
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irony was that, even though their case may have been more ambiguous, no issue 
of state cooperation or extradition arose in their case. Th is led to a widely shared 
perception in Alsace that the forcefully conscripted foot soldiers were being made 
to pay for the high ranking fugitive Nazi fanatics. 
 Th e net result was also that fourteen of the accused were from Alsace whilst only 
seven Germans were in the dock. Th is gave the appearance that two thirds of those 
involved in the crime were from Alsace. Th is ratio was largely accidental, and based 
on who had been identifi ed, who had survived and who could be arrested (a total 
of fi fty-two Germans had been indicted, and at least 150 had been involved). Th e 
actual ratio on the day of the massacre was closer to one Alsatian for every fi ve or 
six Germans. Nonetheless the perception was very much that Alsatians were made 
to bear a disproportionate share of the blame, something which only reinforced the 
Alsatian sense of victimization. As in subsequent trials, it would prove very diffi  cult 
to shift attention away from this symbolism simply by insisting that the trial was 
only about individual guilt. 
 (V)  Joinder and Disjoinder 
 Th e perceived problem of having the  malgré nous stand trial next to the German 
SS translated into successive challenges to the trial all of which sought to juridi-
cally diff erentiate the situation of the Alsatians from that of the Germans. At the 
outset, there had been hopes that the Alsatians would be tried entirely separately, 
and in a diff erent court than the Germans. Th e French war crime legislation (an 
 ordonnance ) of 28 August 1944, which provided the framework for post-war pros-
ecutions, only applied to foreign nationals, as a result of the fi ction that war crimes 
could not be committed by French nationals in occupied France. Th e idea was that 
French collaborators should fall under a diff erent jurisdiction for treasonous acts. 
In fact, one of the Alsatian accused (Grienenberger) claimed the protection of the 
 non bis in idem principle arguing that he had already been prosecuted for treason 
in 1947. 
 At the same time, there was a strong preference for all the Oradour events to 
be prosecuted in a single trial. In today’s parlance, one might say this made sense 
from the point of view of transitional justice. If nothing else, it made sense from 
the point of view of the prompt and diligent administration of justice. Whatever 
other political considerations may have come into play, it was extremely diffi  cult 
to distinguish between ‘French’ and ‘German’ acts at Oradour, and certainly the 
victims had faced a group of men all equally donning the SS uniform and, as far 
as they were concerned, all equally murderous. Victims also strenuously argued 
against the attempt to equate the prosecution of  les douze (‘the twelve’) with that of 
Alsace, insisting that only individual criminal liability was at stake. Th e Alsatians 
might even gain from being judged side-by-side with the much more evidently 
guilty German SS. Following a visit to Oradour by the French President Vincent 
Auriol in 1947 and with the full support of the then very powerful Communist 
Party, a new law was promised that would remedy the loophole. Th e law, adopted 
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on 5 September 1948, made the repression of war crimes applicable to the French 
as well, and made them susceptible to trial before a military court. Th e Cour de 
Cassation rejected Grienenberger’s argument that he would be judged twice for 
the same acts, since the treason accusation and the Oradour accusations under the 
1948 law were entirely irreducible. 
 Having failed to obtain a separate trial before ordinary French courts, the 
Alsatian counsel for the accused subsequently did everything they could to have 
their case disjoined from that of the Germans. Some went as far as to suggest 
that trying the Alsatians and Germans together amounted to fulfi lling Hitler’s 
annexionist project by showing them as intimately bound. Th e Cour de Cassation 
refused the disjoinder in August 1950, and sent both Germans and Alsatians to 
trial together. Several other attempts to obtain a disjoinder during the trial failed, 
despite having obtained the support of the prosecutor (apparently under pressure 
from Paris) and the neutrality of German counsel. Apart from the need to respect 
the 1948 law, whatever criticisms had been levelled at it, the fear expressed by the 
presiding judge was that disjoinder, albeit presented as a mere symbolic and proce-
dural move, would require the court to decide on the issue of forced enrolment (if 
it had occurred, then the 1948 law might be inapplicable) and thus prejudge the 
substance of the verdict (to which one might respond that joinder also seemed to 
prejudge something). 
 Ultimately, however, the adoption of a 1953 law essentially reversing the 1948 
law as far as the French accused were concerned (their personal participation had to 
be proved henceforth and could not be assumed, whereas the Germans remained 
under the less favourable regime of being presumed to have joined willingly and 
participated in the crimes of their units) made the case for separation stronger. At 
the trial, the fact that the German and Alsatian defendants sat on opposite sides 
had already reinforced the sense that quite diff erent predicaments were at stake. 
Since the trial had already reached the pleading stage by the time the 1953 law was 
adopted, securing the presence of the Alsatians at the Germans’ trial and vice-versa 
seemed less important than when opportunities to confront versions might be nec-
essary. Th e presiding judge ultimately ordered a ‘division’ of the trial rather than a 
full ‘disjunction,’ which would have required retrials. 
 (VI)  Organizational Guilt and the Reversal 
of the Presumption of Innocence 
 Th e 1944 and particularly the 1948 law on which the trial was based was a highly 
contentious piece of legislation. It seemed ideally suited to the circumstances of 
Oradour and anticipated diffi  culties about establishing individual guilt given the 
dearth of testimony about individual acts. Its key Article proclaimed that when 
the war crimes enumerated in the earlier 1944 law ‘can be attributed to the col-
lective action of a group or military formation that belongs to an organization 
declared criminal by the international military court (which included the Waff en 
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SS) . . . then all individuals belonging to this formation or this group may be con-
sidered coauthors’. 6 
 In addition, according to Article 2 of the law:
 For the purposes of applying the previous article, acts are considered imputable to the col-
lective action of the relevant formation or group, war crimes committed by its members 
in the same region, even in isolation or out of their own initiative when, because of their 
importance, their gravity, their repetition, or the number of victims, these acts constitute 
the elements of a collective action. 7 
 Th is was ‘joint criminal enterprise’ (JCE) 8  avant la lettre , mixed in with organi-
zational guilt, a particularly tenuous and opportunistic construct from the point 
of view of fundamental principles of criminal law, which would certainly appear 
shocking by today’s even imperfectly liberal standards. Th e law, often designated as 
the ‘Law of Collective Responsibility’, made little attempt to appear less extreme. 
In truth, however, it merely generalized to Frenchmen a series of presumptions 
introduced as early as 1944 for the prosecution of German war criminals. As long 
as only Germans were involved, the French legal world had lived quite well with 
the presumptions, which conformed to a sense of German willing participation in 
both the war eff ort and some of the crimes that ensued. Th e presumptions were 
destined to appear more unfair when the  malgré nous were involved and part of 
French public opinion became much more painfully aware of how exorbitant such 
a provision was. 
 At the time the law provoked outraged reactions and was denigrated in the 
Alsatian press. Within the legal fi eld, none other than Henri Donnedieu de Vabres, 
the French Prosecutor at Nuremberg, argued both in specialized law journals and 
in the press that the law had misunderstood the intentions of the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo tribunals when criminalizing organizations, which had never been to ignore 
the principle of individual guilt and the presumption of innocence. 9 Several doctri-
nal articles at the time underlined the fragility of the law from a human rights point 
of view, the feeling being that the law was at any rate largely superfl uous given that 
French law allowed for the possibility of convicting individuals for a crime they 
had committed in  reunion as part of a group with a common intention, even when 
the precise circumstances of their participation could not be elucidated. 10 
 6  Loi No. 48-1416 of 15 September 1948 on war crimes (my translation). 
 7  Loi No. 48-1416 of 15 September 1948, above n 6. 
 8  A.M.  Danner and  J.S.  Martinez ,  ‘Guilty Associations: Joint criminal enterprise, command respon-
sibility, and the development of international criminal law’,  California Law Review ,  93 ( 2005 ),  75 . 
 9  Th e judgment did make membership in certain ‘criminal’ organizations a crime, but only so long 
as membership had been voluntary and the individuals had known that the crimes were committed. 
Th e 1948 law essentially reversed the burden by considering that members of such organizations 
were to be presumed to have joined willingly and to have known the crimes committed. Although 
the language of the Nuremberg judgment remained superfi cially, in eff ect the 1948 law was much 
harsher:   Henri Donnedieu  de Vabres ,  ‘Note, Cour de cassation, 3 août 1950’ ,  Recueil Dalloz ,  40 
( 1950 ),  706 . 
 10  Maurice  Patin ,  ‘La France et le jugement des crimes de guerre’ ,  Revue de science criminelle et de 
droit comparé ( 1951 ),  393 . 
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 Th e biggest problem was the way in which the law seemed to depart from cardinal 
principles of French criminal law concerning individual guilt, among which were 
some of the very principles that the Vichy regime had strikingly departed from, 
and whose pre-eminence had been re-established by the Libération. Th e notion of 
collective guilt was also said to contravene the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the recently adopted European Convention on Human Rights, and the 
principle of individual responsibility. Moreover, the law shifted the burden of 
proof onto the accused rather than the prosecution. To make matters worse, it was 
retroactive, in violation of French criminal law principles (and in ways that were 
perhaps reminiscent of the Vichy regime’s own infamous legislation). Its adoption 
certainly did not help legitimize the trial in Alsatian public opinion. Because of 
the way it threw a broad mantle of opprobrium on a large class of individuals, it 
seemed to echo France’s broad stigmatization of Alsace for the crimes. 
 Nonetheless, the law was found to be compatible with France’s international 
obligations by the Cour de Cassation in 1950, upon challenge to the order send-
ing the defendants to trial before the Bordeaux military court. It was said to 
merely implement what had been the London Charter (Articles 9 and 10) and the 
Nuremberg Judgment’s recognition that certain organizations were per se criminal. 
Th e international tribunal, in accordance with its mandate, had not shied from 
recognizing that participation in several Nazi organizations was per se criminal, 
even though that was not necessary for the conviction of any particular defend-
ant. In transferring into French law not only the provisions relating to the guilt of 
organizations, but also the essence of the safeguards for non-criminal individual 
members, the French legislator had conformed to its international obligations. 11 At 
any rate, no source of general international law mandated that domestic prosecu-
tions be carried out in any particular way, and considerable latitude was granted 
to states who exercised their sovereignty in such matters. 12 It may have mattered 
also that the Nuremberg judgment was, strictly speaking, only concerned with a 
‘participation in a criminal organization’ off ence, whereas the French law dealt 
with the repression of war crimes 13 (although if anything one might think this 
made matters worse). 
 It is true that the law did ultimately provide a way to prove their innocence for 
individuals who could establish that they had been forcefully enrolled and did 
not participate in the crime, and not merely for those who could prove they had 
‘opposed’ the crimes as had initially been suggested in Parliament, which would 
have placed a very heavy burden on the defendants. In other words, aside from the 
 11  At any rate it was not for judges to ‘appreciate . . . the value of a text that has been regularly debated 
by legislative assemblies and promulgated by the executive’. Th is points to the lack of constitutional 
judicial review available to ordinary courts in France, let  alone the possibility of reviewing a law’s 
compatibility with international human rights law. 
 12  Donnedieu de Vabres nonetheless argued, probably rightly, that it was not open to the French 
legislator to invoke the authority of the Nuremberg Judgment, and then to reinterpret one of its key 
concepts (the criminality of certain organizations) in a way that was at odds with the tribunal’s own 
interpretation: de Vabres, above n 9, 706. 
 13  Patin, above n 10, 400. 
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issue of burden of proof, at least merely belonging to a group involved in crimes 
was not suffi  cient for a conviction, provided one could prove the absence of an 
 actus reus (but how was one to prove conclusively that one had been forcefully 
enrolled and not participated in the crimes one was accused of?). Th e presump-
tion of criminality was refutable. In addition, even within the framework of the 
1948 law’s notion of collective responsibility, the Cour de Cassation made it clear 
that the actual criminal acts of each participant had to appear in the indictment 
(if nothing else, this would prove crucial for sentencing). 14 Th e Cour de Cassation 
also picked up the fact in 1950 that some of the defendants had been given insuf-
fi cient time and means to collect evidence to rebut the 1948 law’s presumptions 
and ordered a remedy. 
 Moreover, the law did not  oblige the judge to consider the impugned acts 
collectively and was not exclusive of ordinary French law on criminal participation, 
something which turned out to be crucial in due course. Th roughout the trial, the 
presiding judge, Nussy Saint-Saëns, seemed wisely committed to not using the 1948 
law to make his case. By the time the law was abrogated (see below), there was 
little choice for the prosecution but to try to prove some form of ordinary crimi-
nal participation rather than rely on the presumptions of collective responsibility. 
Nonetheless, even the 1948 law’s  refutable and  optional presumptions of guilt did 
more to discredit the prosecutions in light of part of French public opinion and 
legal intelligentsia than any other provision. 15 
 (VII)  Orders, Forced Enlistment, Duress 
 Given the broad arsenal of presumptions available to the prosecution, the debate 
quickly shifted to defences, in a way that was to resurrect some of the burning 
issues at the heart of the national debate. Only one of the accused acknowledged 
his participation in the massacre. Many of the others confessed to having been at 
Oradour, but all claimed, to the presiding judge’s disbelief, that they had taken no 
active part in the killing, and in some cases not even heard gunshots or explosions. 
Rather, everyone had been standing guard outside the village or taken away sick. 
Blame was placed by the  malgré nous on Sergent Boos, the widely despised Alsatian 
SS volunteer, and, of course, on the Germans themselves. Yet even as they sought 
to minimize their own participation, legal defences were hinted at on several poten-
tially exculpatory overlapping levels. 
 At the most extreme, the argument could be made that the defendants were 
only following orders. Th is was an argument most clearly made by the German 
defendants. It was clear that the Company enforced harsh discipline and some of 
the defendants, even among the Germans, could show that they had been on its 
 14  de Vabres, above n 9. 
 15  Donnedieu de Vabres, in particular, was sceptical that it made any diff erence that the presump-
tions were optional. Th eir very existence as tools of the judiciary off ended the legal canon, went 
against the idea of the judicial discretion (‘intime conviction’), and there was no guarantee that they 
would not be used: Donnedieu de Vabres, above n 9, 706. 
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receiving end. Some of the testimony heard on the defence side insisted on the 
habits of blind obedience and practices close to brainwashing that the Hitler youth 
inculcated to young recruits prior to their enrolment. A bizarre incident also threw 
an unwelcome light on the events: a letter sent by SS General Lammerding from 
his German retreat in which he argued that the Germans should be freed since they 
had merely respected orders. Even the French prosecutor seemed to recognize that 
an army could not function merely on the basis of some loose subordination, and 
that discipline and obedience were the cornerstones of military life. Th e defence 
insisted that soldiers could not be philosophers and could not inquire into the just-
ness of acts they were ordered to commit. Moreover, there was some evidence that 
at least the subordinates may have been led to believe that the civilians were in fact 
 résistants or  Résistance sympathizers 16 and that any action undertaken in Oradour 
was already covered by general orders. At any rate, by the time they might have 
had an awakening of conscience, there would have been very little time to decide 
to disobey, and even less to survive in doing so, so that disobedience was by any 
standard unrealistic. 
 In spite of all this, the defence was bound to fail given the very strong Nuremberg 
precedent and the idea that superior orders can never be a defence. Th e Lammerding 
letter was wisely never produced in court by counsel for the German defendants, 
and would probably have done little in terms of minimizing their guilt. Th e French 
prosecutor insisted that due obedience did not extend to acts that were manifestly 
illegal, such as the killing of women and children. Th e killings of Oradour went 
far beyond any presumption of legality. Nothing had been found during the pro 
forma searches carried out by the SS in the village (which probably had more to do 
with looting than seriously looking for weapon caches) that could have suggested 
to those present that they were involved in anything other than a wanton massacre, 
and those who had any doubts should have shed them by the time it was clear that 
hundreds of women and children were targeted. 
 Something more than merely following orders was therefore necessary, and 
much was made of the fact that twelve of the Alsatians, like 130,000 of their peers, 
had been forcibly enlisted. Th is involved a problematic confl ation of the issue of 
the personal responsibility of the defendants and the collective fate of Alsace as a 
region, which counsel for the defence actively promoted. Compulsory military 
service had been introduced in 1942. Th ere was a lingering suspicion in France 
that Alsatian SS members were not entirely hostile to the goals of Nazism (some-
thing which German propaganda certainly encouraged by presenting Alsatians as 
SS  volunteers ), reinforced by the fact that a small minority had clearly volunteered 
including, notably, Sergeant Boos, a defendant at the trial. 
 In reality, however, most of the Alsatian defendants and the Alsatian recruits in the 
SS were hardly fanatical Nazis. Some had served with the French army in 1939–40. 
Many went to extremes to avoid compulsory labour or service in the German military 
or SS (self-mutilation was not unheard of ). Several had accomplished minor acts of 
 16  Th e  Résistance is the generic name given by the French already at the time to all eff orts at overthrowing 
German rule and ending occupation. It included eff orts within France and outside it. 
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resistance before and after being enlisted (smashing a window featuring a picture of 
Hitler, for example, or warning people about to be arrested), and some may even 
have been forced into the SS precisely because of their ‘Frenchness’. In fact, forced 
enrolment was organized in Alsace largely because of the disappointing number of 
Alsatians volunteering for the SS (at most 2,000). Francophile sentiment ran strong 
in the region. Th e  malgré nous were treated harshly by their German superiors and 
Alsatian volunteers because of their supposed lack of genuine Nazi sympathies and 
a suspicion that they were always on the verge of deserting (hence the apparent 
instruction that they never be left alone). Indeed the German General Staff  had 
objected to including Alsatians in the Wermacht on account of their unreliability. 
Th eir weapons were apparently often checked after military action to verify that they 
had been used. Once captured in Normandy, one of the accused had subsequently 
participated with the Free French in the invasion of Germany and, for the trial, two 
had to be repatriated from Indochina where they were fi ghting for France. 
 Th e argument was that the initial element of compulsion made the subsequent 
following of orders a defence since constraint (other than general and habitual 
respect for the law) was involved at the outset. Indeed, the 1948 Law of Collective 
Responsibility anticipated as one possible defence that the accused ‘bring proof 
of having been forcibly drafted’. Th is was all the more so since forced enrolment 
was itself a war crime. Hence the  malgré nous could be regarded as themselves 
victims of a crime, a situation that evokes the status today of child soldiers accused 
of war crimes. It is worth highlighting the nature of that constraint. In annexed 
Alsace-Lorraine, the young were forced to join the Hitler youth, to attend the Reich 
school of Germanization, to enrol into the army, and were drilled Prussian-style. 
New recruits were given German nationality. Furthermore, the re-education camp 
in Schirmeck was available to deal with recalcitrants and torture them into sub-
mission. Crucially, Wagner also implemented the system of Sippenhaft, ie reprisals 
against the family based on the idea of ‘blood’ or ‘clan’ responsibility. Many of the 
defendants knew of men in Alsace whose entire family had been deported after 
they refused to serve in the SS. Th is led to a culture of blind obedience. 
 Of the fourteen Alsatians tried in 1953, twelve had been forcefully enrolled at 
the age of seventeen or eighteen, so that some today would count as child soldiers. 
In fact, the Alsatian who had been condemned to the death penalty in 1946 for 
his participation in at least one murder at Oradour was eventually acquitted on the 
basis that he was not eighteen at the time. Because the 1948 law did not, unlike 
ordinary French law, anticipate a specifi c regime for minors, they were tried with 
those who were adults at the time before the Bordeaux military court. Nonetheless 
their youth and immaturity were frequently mentioned as factors that would have 
made them extremely vulnerable to pressure and intimidation. Witnesses testifi ed 
in Bordeaux about how diffi  cult it would have been for anyone to oppose orders 
or desert the SS. It was repeatedly argued that one could not expect teenagers to 
be heroes and to sacrifi ce their lives rather than follow an order to kill. Moreover, 
given the contempt in which SS (especially French SS) were held in the region, it 
would likely have been diffi  cult for them to surrender safely to the maquis (the 
 malgré nous who deserted on the Eastern Front invariably ended up in gulags 
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where they were treated harshly). Th is vision of particularly harsh conditions being 
brought to bear on young shoulders was given renewed credibility by the fact that 
several of the witnesses testifying in the accuseds’ favour were  résistants in good 
standing, especially Alsatian  résistants , who knew very well the risks they or others 
had taken to escape German enrolment. 
 Yet one of the characteristics of these Alsatian testimonies was that few seemed 
to have anything to do directly with the actual facts of Oradour, and were instead 
awkwardly about a much more general problem occurring far removed from the 
scene of the crime. Moreover, the circles of the French resistance were wary of the sug-
gestion that ‘collaboration’ was acceptable as long as it had been coerced, and that 
forced enrolment might provide a blanket defence. After all, one might be initially 
coerced to join an organization yet later, through peer pressure or group bonding, 
become one of its enthusiastic executioners. At the very least one ought to be able 
to prove continuing pressure beyond the initial pressure of forced enrolment. 
 As many as 40,000 Alsatians had managed to escape compulsory military service 
by fl eeing to France or Switzerland. Alphonse Adam, the head of the Alsatian student 
resistance, was executed as a result of his refusal to join the SS. Th e veterans’ 
association of Lorraine, the region neighbouring Alsace, insisted that desertion 
had always been an option, perhaps to better distinguish themselves from the 
Alsatian  malgré nous . One might argue that this was particularly so in the case of 
the third company which, contrary to normal SS practice, had had the ‘chance’ 
of being deployed in their own country, a terrain which would presumably have 
been more hospitable for them than, say, Soviet Russia. Th e South West Federation 
of the  Forces Françaises Combatantes  emphasized, rightly or not, that there were 
plenty of local maquis to which the SS could have deserted. Indeed, at least one 
Das Reich member had escaped to the maquis after Oradour and had subsequently 
died fi ghting for France’s liberation. It seemed impossible to entirely exclude the 
possibility of moral choice, and the fact that it could be rational or simply brave 
rather than implausibly heroic. 
 Pointedly, the Alsatians were asked why if, as they professed, they hated being 
in the SS, they had failed to desert; or, even more problematically, why they 
stayed when their work consisted only in persecuting civilians, but in some cases 
fl ed when faced with the harsh reality of combat in Normandy. Th e line between 
constraint and  libre arbitre was also a tenuous one. After all, it may well have 
been, as their lawyer suggested and as the German press insisted much later on 
when the Alsatians were amnestied, that not even the German indictees had 
joined the SS freely. Th is argument in defence of the Germans tended to weaken 
the same argument being made in favour of the Alsatians, for the obvious reason 
that it was not something that French and international post-war public opinion 
was willing to contemplate (it would have unravelled the one thing on which all 
agreed: Nazi monstrosity). Moreover, the gap between forced enrolment months 
or years earlier and the commission of atrocities one June day in 1944 simply 
seemed too large to sustain a convincing defence that the crimes were entirely 
unintentional. Staying and complying with orders to participate amounted to 
endorsing the massacre. At best, the prosecutor argued, forced enrolment should 
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be an extenuating circumstance relevant for sentencing, not one that would 
exclude guilt. 
 Alternatively, the argument was made that the defendants were not only (or really) 
following orders, as much as responding to a threat of death if they refused to execute 
them. Th e defence of superior orders, in that case, really becomes a defence of duress, 
which could nullify intent even more eff ectively than forced enrolment. It was a 
defence that was and continues to be anticipated by Article 64 of the French Criminal 
Code. Th ere was certainly evidence that refusal to obey an order during operations 
might lead to a court martial and an execution, possibly immediately. However, again 
the issue of desertion ‘at the earliest possible moment’ arose. It was viewed as inher-
ently risky but certainly not more so than remaining with a unit destined for the 
Eastern Front or Normandy. Moreover, there was damning evidence during the trial 
of the third company having gone quite happily to the massacre (including hints of an 
orgy of drinking and, possibly, rape in the night that followed), and having executed it 
with a cruelty against specifi c victims that belied any notion of duress. Although this 
evidence was not related to any specifi c defendants, it did nothing to improve their 
individual cases. 
 (VIII)  Sentencing 
 In terms of sentencing, it appears that lack of direct participation in some of the worst 
killings (fi ring squads, church massacre, individualized killing), young age, forthright-
ness with the tribunal, remorse and contrition were all considered mitigating factors 
resulting in simple prison sentences, which in some cases amounted to very little, 
given time already served. Conversely, rank (particularly the German and the Alsatian 
non-commissioned offi  cers), direct participation in killings and unrepentance led 
straight to death sentences or forced labour convictions. Overall the sentences of the 
Alsatians were marginally less harsh than those of the Germans for comparable facts, 
and were adopted by a majority of judges rather than unanimously, a nod at least in 
the direction that their situation was not quite comparable (although of course not 
enough of a nod from the Alsatian point of view). 
 In that respect, it seems that the tribunal judged German failure to stand up to their 
superiors and disobey orders more harshly than it did the  malgré nous. Th e suggestion 
may have been that Alsatian presence among SS ranks was based on pure coercion 
making a gesture of defi ance highly implausible; whereas it may be that the Germans 
were seen as having more of a special responsibility given that they were operating 
among their own. Yet even this distinction (which was not explicated and is merely 
proposed hypothetically here) is peculiar in its generality. Surely some Germans might 
be able to argue that their being in the SS was largely based on a similar type of coer-
cion, a point raised by some in the Bundestag at the time. 17 Moreover, if one was 
serious about one’s war crimes justice cosmopolitanism, should it really have made 
 17  Norbert  Frei ,  Adenauer’s Germany and the Nazi Past:  Th e Politics of Amnesty and Integration 
( New York, NY :  Columbia University Press,  2002 ),  139 . 
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much of a diff erence, sheer duress being equal, that one was a national or not of the 
country behind the crimes? Th e Alsatians’ fate may have been a cruel one, but if 
anything their claim to having been radically victimized by the Nazis might have been 
stronger had at least some risen up in Oradour at the point of being asked to commit 
the most Nazi-like of acts. 
 A peculiar twist nonetheless made the sentences of the  malgré nous much harder 
to stomach: the Germans had all been detained since the end of the war and were 
therefore close to liberation when time already served in pre-trial detention was 
discounted (the majority were in fact freed soon after the verdict). Conversely, 
the Alsatians, who had all appeared as free men and had gone on with their lives 
since the end of the war, faced the beginning of lengthy sentences. Predictably, 
the sentences left all French sides profoundly unhappy. Alsace was convinced that 
the Court had largely failed to hear its arguments, and that a few of its sons were 
scapegoated and further victimized. Limousin public opinion found the sentences 
completely inadequate, the expectation being that only the death penalty could 
have made sense of the horror of the crimes committed. Th e misunderstanding 
was complete and created considerable political strains. 
 (IX)  Politics and Amnesty 
 Th e Bordeaux trial presents a unique case in which debates in Court were paralleled 
before the French Parliament in almost real time, in ways that challenged the sep-
aration of power between the legislature and the judiciary. Th e Law of Collective 
Responsibility had itself been adopted with the Oradour massacre in mind, a law 
almost tailor-made for the Bordeaux trial and the claims of victims. Once the trial 
had begun, however, the powerful Alsace  incorporés de force organizations, relayed 
by local elected offi  cials and Alsatian members of Parliament, successfully lobbied 
for the Law of Collective Responsibility to be debated anew. Th ere were in other 
words two parallel tracks, one judicial and one parliamentary, dealing with the 
exact same questions. Debates were launched in Parliament following court deci-
sions, as though the legislature sought to intervene in judicial proceedings. Whereas 
arguments on Alsatian martyrdom could only be secondary in the courtroom, they 
received a full airing in Parliament. Th e Alsatian members of parliament proposed 
an amendment to the 1948 law. Th e Communists, who emerged from the war and 
occupation as some of the most reliable  résistants , were almost alone in opposing 
any changes. 
 Geographically, the fact that the trial occurred in Bordeaux, within a bus ride 
of Oradour, meant that considerable local pressure came to bear, sometimes in 
the form of protests outside the courtroom. Th e judge made it known via the 
press present in the courtroom that he disapproved of such demonstrations, and 
thought that they did not help the victims. However, the general context was one 
of popular and political pressure on both sides. Th e trial was also intensely covered 
by the media in a way that was relatively new at the time. 
07_9780199671144c7.indd   155 10/3/2013   4:05:09 PM
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in 
any way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
European Histories I: Prosecuting Atrocity156
 Ultimately, the pressure of the Alsatian members of Parliament carried the day 
and the Law of Collective Responsibility was abrogated, in the midst of the trial, 
by 372 votes to 279. Th is gave rise to the curious and quite unique situation where 
a trial was deprived, in mid-course, of the very instrument on which it had partly 
been based. Th e trial continued because the law still needed to go through vari-
ous stages to become formally binding and because ordinary French criminal law 
remained an option to convict the accused. However, there is little doubt that the 
trial’s vitality had already been fatally compromized, and that future developments 
were already contained in this turning of Parliament against its own creature. 
 Th e result of the vote only reinvigorated Alsatian eff orts to bring the trial to 
a halt. Général de Gaulle weighed in favour of more understanding for Alsace. 
A mere ten days after the verdict, an amnesty was adopted in the Assembly by 319 
votes for, 211 against and fi fty-fi ve abstentions, the only of its kind in the history 
of the French legal system. It was a considerable victory for Alsace, which in the 
space of a year had managed to obtain the vote of two laws nullifying the Bordeaux 
trial. It is best understood as a pacifying measure designed to further a form of 
regional reconciliation in France. Politically, such had been the Alsatian reaction 
to the initial verdict that some feared that it would reinforce the region’s autono-
mist aspirations—and some promoters of the amnesty subtly raised that prospect. 
National reconciliation was hailed as the overriding goal by the centre right. Th is 
was not the only initiative that seemed to have reconciliation as a superior goal: the 
lack of diligence with which French authorities pursued the extradition of the 
German offi  cers at large could also be attributed to the onset of the Cold War and 
a desire to move closer to Germany. 
 Th e amnesty was criticised by victims who were left with an extremely bitter taste 
in their mouths and the impression of having been betrayed. It also represented 
an unprecedented meddling by the legislature with a court decision. It was feared, 
although this probably proved unfounded, that the amnesty law had handed 
former collaborators a new defence of having been coerced into collaboration. 
Th e fact that the two defendants who had been sentenced to death (the Alsatian 
volunteer and the German Sergeant) were pardoned did nothing to restore faith in 
the justice system. By 1958, all were free men. 
 (X)  Legacy and Epilogue 
 Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of the Bordeaux trial was the reverbera-
tions it created in France, and the way every judicial stage had a tendency to spill 
beyond the courtroom. Following the initial condemnation of the  malgré nous , 
for example, Alsace reacted strongly. In Strasbourg, a 6,000-strong demonstration 
was organized, replicated by several smaller events elsewhere in Alsace; the  Place 
de Bordeaux was renamed; the  Monument aux Morts was draped in black. Local 
elected offi  cials claimed they would cease to sit and carry out their functions until 
Alsace’s honour had been restored. 
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 Yet the reaction of Oradour to the amnesty was in some ways even more drastic. 
In 1945, Général de Gaulle had visited the village and decided it should have 
a special place in French national memory. Th e old village was to be preserved 
and granted a special status in French law, whilst a new Oradour would be built 
next to it. Th e Oradour authorities clearly supported the project and conceived of 
themselves as guardians of its legacy. Following the Bordeaux verdict, however, the 
village engaged in a decades-long symbolic retaliatory action against the French 
state: it sought the return of the commemorative site from the government; the 
association of survivors and the village sent back the medals that they had received; 
state offi  cials were denied access to commemorations (no French President was 
received there until François Mitterand); the village refused to transfer the ashes of 
the martyrs to the crypt built by the state for that purpose. Perhaps most strikingly, 
a list of all the members of Parliament who had voted for the amnesty was dis-
played prominently at the entrance of the village for several years below the phrase 
 Oradour, souviens toi! (Oradour, remember!). Th us did the village drape itself in its 
pride and for several years manifest its extreme repulsion at the outcome of the trial 
through various retaliatory measures. 
 Th ese reactions are no doubt part of the fabric of transitional justice, even though 
they are not formally juridical. Only a legally pluralist sensitivity to how non-legal 
gestures inform the normative outcomes of transitional justice processes can make 
sense of what is at stake. Although there has been some subsequent reconciliation 
with the French state, the issue is still a tense one, as shown by a succession of inci-
dents in the last decades. 
 More than fi fty years later, criminal justice fi nally caught up with Heinz Barth, 
the sole surviving Nazi offi  cer implicated in the massacre, who had been found in 
East Berlin in 1983 under an assumed name. It seems that the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) at the time saw that a prosecution might buttress its anti-Nazi 
credentials against those of the German Federal Republic. On trial, Barth admitted 
that he had initiated the shooting and personally killed about fi fteen people. But 
he argued that as an offi  cer he was forced to follow orders. He was sentenced to life 
imprisonment but was freed fourteen years later on medical grounds. He would go 
on to live another ten years. 
 In 2003, a French man, Vincent Reynouard was condemned by the Tribunal 
Correctionnel de Limoges to one year imprisonment for ‘apology of war crimes’ 
(denialism) following the publication of a book that challenged key aspects of the 
Oradour-sur-Glane massacre, including the fact that it had been planned. 
 Since 2004, a former Bordeaux defence lawyer has sought a revision of the judg-
ment on the basis that the amnesty law, whilst it expunged the crime, did not render 
null and void the legal fi ndings. Th e reasoning is that if the French Parliament could 
amnesty those convicted one week after the trial, then the judiciary should also follow 
suit, its own decisions having been cast into doubt by the legislature. 
 In 2004, a Corrèze organization unsuccessfully opposed the Senate’s 2008 
Draft Law Implementing the Rome Statute on the grounds that it anticipates a 
thirty-year limitation period, which would amount to a second amnesty for those 
responsible for the massacre. 
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 In 2010, two Alsatian  malgré nous organizations sued Hébras, one of only two 
surviving victims of Oradour, for claiming in a book he had published on the 
massacre that among the massacre’s executioners were ‘some Alsatians  supposedly 
forcibly enrolled in SS units’. Th e Strasbourg Tribunal de Grande Instance rejected 
the claim. Subsequently Hébras received anonymous hate mail claiming that he 
‘did not deserve his identity card, whereas the Alsatians fought and paid dearly 
with their blood to become French again’. 
 Th en on 5 December 2011, the German police, at the request of the German 
Federal War Crimes Offi  ce, carried out searches in the houses of six elderly 
Germans who had been identifi ed as having participated in the massacre following 
the release of GDR political police documents. Th e searches do not seem to have 
yielded any leads further linking these individuals to Oradour, and the last two 
surviving victims have tended to dismiss such late German activism as coming far 
too late for justice. 
 Th ese distant legal judicial and political ripples, whilst minor, testify to the diffi  culty 
of ever ‘moving out of ’ or ‘beyond’ transitional justice, and the very long legal trail 
of frustration, pain and antagonism that a blundered judicial process can produce. 
 (VI)  Conclusion 
 Th e Bordeaux trial is a stark illustration of some of the well-known challenges of 
carrying out criminal trials for atrocities, even in a country otherwise dedicated 
to prosecuting those responsible, as post-war France surely was. It suggests the 
importance of unintended eff ects in even the most scripted and well-intentioned 
judicial proceedings. Th e trial meant to condemn Nazi barbarity, the one thing 
on which all seemed to agree; for that purpose it benefi ted from a tailor made law 
that was to have made justice if not swift at least severe. Instead it mostly ended up 
raising some diffi  cult questions about France, Alsace, forced incorporation, duress, 
and justice between communities; all issues for which, to make matters worse, the 
Bordeaux tribunal turned out to be ill-equipped to address. 
 It was in the end almost impossible to bridge the gap between two narratives of 
what had happened: on the one hand a vision of irredeemable crime, made per-
haps even worse by the fact that the Alsatians had been involved in killing fellow 
citizens; on the other hand, a vision of a tragedy which led young men to commit 
reprehensible acts, but as a result of a sophisticated machinery of persecution and 
violence that left them little choice and made them into emblems of a region’s 
tragic experience of the war. Th e trial was so caught up in demands for recognition 
of collective suff ering that it could not mediate without leaving at least one side 
unhappy. Perhaps the only thing that everyone agreed on was the evil of the Nazis, 
but even that did little to cement national consensus. 
 Ultimately, the Oradour victims were sacrifi ced for the sake of a hypothetical 
national unity and the need to move on with a reconciliation process that was simply 
decreed unilaterally from above. Parliament reasserted its democratic prerogatives 
but in a way that was so heavy handed and opportunistic that its actions seemed 
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destined to antagonize. Th e judiciary, after being given what seemed to be a free 
hand to try those responsible, was twice reined in: fi rst by having the law on which 
the trial had been based pulled from under its feet; and then, when it nonetheless 
successfully managed to convict those responsible under ordinary French law, having 
its entire eff ort reduced to nothing through amnesty. 
 Here was the one trial that could not fail:  abominable acts, a polity ripe for 
justice, a strong international framework—yet which foundered on the rock of 
radically incompatible narratives, and served only to open up further abysses of 
misunderstanding. Even radical evil, it seems, could have its reasons and, recast 
as merely the absence of heroism, it may have suddenly looked strangely familiar 
to a France that had itself been deeply compromised in collaboration—forced or 
not. As such, the whole eff ort is a familiar caution about the limits of criminal 
justice within transitional justice processes when it operates from uncertain com-
mon premises and is asked to precede rather than follow collective exercises of 
soul-searching. Th us stands the Bordeaux trial, a particularly French tragedy, yet 
one that contains a more general lesson on the disheartening powerlessness of 
humanity in the presence of moral disasters. 
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 Capitalism’s Victor’s Justice? Th e Hidden 
Stories Behind the Prosecution of 
Industrialists Post-WWII 
 Grietje   Baars * 
 (I)  Introduction 
 It is well known that in the ‘subsequent trials’ held in Nuremberg by the US mili-
tary, the directors of three of Germany’s largest industrial combines (and one bank) 
were prosecuted for their roles in the Nazis’ aggressive wars and the Holocaust. 
What has remained largely hidden is how the rapidly changing geopolitical land-
scape infl uenced the decision to try industrialists for their war responsibility, the 
articulation of the ‘economic case’ at the International Military Tribunal (IMT), 
the conduct of the industrialists’ trials at the US Military Tribunals at Nuremberg 
(NMT) and eventually the early release and rehabilitation of the convicted busi-
ness leaders. Th e US and USSR had at one point both understood World War II 
(WWII) as a war of economic imperialism in which industrialists had played a 
key role—both in planning and waging. With the commencement of the Cold 
War this idea became a point of sharp ideological divide. Th e economic story of 
WWII gradually moved over to ‘hidden history’ in the West, while remaining 
visible only in the German Democratic Republic and Soviet discourse. Likewise, 
the omission of  zaibatsu leaders from the Tokyo International Tribunal hid the 
Allies’ expressed conviction that also the war on the Eastern front had been one of 
economic imperialism. Over time, the way international confl ict is conceptualized 
and explained in mainstream Western (legal) discourse has changed, as has the 
role that international criminal law (ICL) is accorded in world politics, and whose 
 *  Drs (Utrecht), LLM (UCL), PhD (UCL), Lecturer (City University London, UK). Th is chapter 
draws on my PhD, entitled ‘Law(yers) Congealing Capitalism: On the (Im)possibility of Restraining 
Business Involvement in Confl ict through International Criminal Law’ (2012), and specifi cally, on 
research carried out during my time as a Visiting Researcher at Das Franz-von-Liszt-Institut for 
International Criminal Law, Humboldt University, Berlin (guest of Prof. Florian Jeßberger). I  am 
grateful to Catherine Redgwell, Kamil Majchrzak, Immi Tallgren, Ioannis Kalpouzos, Mark Kilian, 
Gerry Simpson, Kevin Jon Heller and all participants of the ‘Hidden Histories’ workshop for their 
comments and support. All errors and omissions are mine alone. 
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accountability is sought through ICL. Together, these facts refl ect capitalism’s hid-
den victor’s justice. 
 In contrast to mainstream liberal-legal and positivist accounts of ‘Nuremberg’, 1 
in this chapter I tell the story—in particular the specifi c story of the ‘economic 
case’ and the industrialists—as situated in the material context and relations of 
the time. Doing so shows the direct eff ect of specifi c turns of events not only on 
the legal processes, but also on how ICL was interpreted and applied. Th rough a 
historical materialist reading of Nuremberg, we can explain, for example, how the 
NMT trials turned from an ostensible morality play to a performance of  théâtre 
de l’absurde . 
 It is hoped that through highlighting the processes and contradictions at 
Nuremberg this chapter will give impetus to investigating precisely how  current 
use of ICL also seeks to ‘spirit away’ economic causes of contemporary confl ict and 
thus forms an integral element of capitalist imperialism. 2 
 Section II begins with an examination of the Allied (eff ectively, US and USSR 3 ) 
consensus on the nature of WWII as imperialist, on the role of the industrialists in 
Hitler’s aggressive war, the formulation of the ‘economic case’ and the indictment, 
trial and judgment at the IMT. I tell this history focusing on the US perspective 
because the main international trial was very much a US-directed aff air. 4 It served 
to simultaneously legitimize and showcase the US’s role as the rising hegemon of 
the ‘free world’. While the US leadership’s desire to prosecute industrialists and 
discipline the German economy played an instrumental role in its decision to hold 
subsequent trials at Nuremberg, 5 the appetite for this declined with the turna-
round in US foreign and economic policy that gradually materialized after WWII. 
Section III traces this turnaround—the start of the Cold War—and its impact on 
US political and economic involvement in Europe. In Section IV, I go on to show 
how this turnaround manifested itself in the conduct and outcomes of the trials 
 1  See, eg, those contained in  Guénaël  Mettraux ,  Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial ( Oxford :  Oxford 
University Press,  2008 ) . Among the off -mainstream accounts are,  Florian  Jeßberger ,  ‘Die I.G. Farben 
vor Gericht: Von den Ursprüngen eines “Wirtschaftsvölkerstrafrechts” ’ ,  Juristenzeitung ,  19 ( 2009 ), 
 924 ;  Florian  Jeßberger ,  ‘On the Origins of Individual Criminal Responsibility Under International 
Law for Business Activity: IG Farben on Trial’ ,  Journal of International Criminal Justice ,  8 ( 2010 ),  783 ; 
 J. A.  Bush ,  ‘Th e Prehistory of Corporations and Conspiracy in International Criminal Law: What 
Nuremberg Really Said’ ,  Columbia Law Review ,  109 ( 2009 ) . 
 2  According to Arthur, the task of the legal academic ‘is that of tracing . . . both the relationships 
that are expressed in the legal superstructure and those that it ideologically spirits away’:  C.  Arthur , 
 ‘Introduction’ in  E.  Pashukanis ,  Law and Marxism:  A  General Th eory ( London :   Ink Links, Ltd, 
 1978 ),  31 . 
 3  I use ‘US’, ‘USSR’ etc as shorthand for the leading members of the government at any given 
moment—in other words, the momentary ‘winners’ of the constant competition between various 
sectors of a state administration (for a similar approach, see  Nikolai  Bukharin ,  Imperialism and World 
Economy ( London :  Bookmarks,  2003 ),  137 ). 
 4  See, eg,  Telford  Taylor ,  Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir ( New York, NY :  Little, 
Brown & Company  1992 ),  634 and generally,  F.  Hirsch ,  ‘Th e Soviets at Nuremberg: International 
Law, Propaganda and the Making of the Postwar Order’ ,  American Historical Review ,  113 ( 2008 ),  730 . 
 5  Taylor, above n 4, 161; Bush, above n 1, 1112–29;  Donald  Bloxham ,  Genocide on Trial: War 
Crimes Trials and the Formation of Holocaust History and Memory ( Oxford :  Oxford University Press, 
 2001 ),  24 . 
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of the industrialists at Nuremberg. Section V compares the US trials to the largely 
forgotten post-WWII international trials of industrialists by the French, British 
and Soviet military tribunals, and with the decision of the Military Tribunal for 
the Far East not to indict Japanese  zaibatsu leaders. Finally, Section VI connects 
the aftermath of the trials, the ‘McCloy clemency’ and subsequent reinstatement 
of most of the industrialists to their former positions, with contemporary debates 
around ICL, the economic causes of confl ict and ‘corporate impunity’. 
 (II)  Th e Economic Causes of WWII at the International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 
 Th e ‘Trial of the Major War Criminals at Nuremberg’ commenced at a moment 
when the role of the German industrial combines in Hitler’s aggressive war was 
emphasised by US political leaders in public statements, declarations and reports. 
Th e US leadership considered the aggressive, expansive war to have been orches-
trated by the ‘unholy trinity’ of corporatism, Nazism and militarism, 6 for the mar-
kets and resources of the neighbouring countries, and indeed, with the eventual 
aim of ‘world conquest’. 7 Th e American administration had scrutinized the nature 
and activities of German industry in this respect since the beginning of the war. In 
his memoirs, Josiah Dubois (a State Department lawyer who was to become the 
lead prosecutor in the  IG Farben case) tells of travelling the Western Hemisphere 
with Bernard Bernstein of the Treasury Department in the early 1940s to seek out 
and freeze IG Farben’s fi nancial interests. 8 Th e German industrial and banking 
giants had been discussed in depth in the US Senate, for instance in the Kilgore 
Committee, and formed a major site of investigation for the Offi  ce of Strategic 
Services (OSS), the forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency. 9 German 
chemicals giant IG Farben appears to have been a main object of interest for the 
 6  Telford Taylor in  Flick , below n 51, 32. See also, Jackson's June 1945 Report—this report con-
tained the ‘basic features of the plan of prosecution’ written at the request of the US President by 
the (then) US Representative and Chief Counsel for War Crimes:  Justice Jackson’s Report to the 
President on Atrocities and War Crimes; 7 June 1945, available from Yale Law School,  Th e Avalon 
Project:  Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy [website], < http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imt_
jack01.asp >, (Jackson June 1945 Report) (accessed 27 February 2013). 
 7  Th is view is expressed, for example, in the US Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Aff airs, 
Cartel Practices and National Security, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee 
on Military Aff airs, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1944. Vol. 16; IG Farben Material Submitted by the War 
Department, 79th Cong. (1945) (Bernstein Farben Report), 941 and 953–57;  Christopher  Simpson 
(ed),  War Crimes of Dresdner and Deutsche Bank:  Offi  ce of the Military Government (US) Reports 
( Teaneck, NJ :  Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc .,  2001 ) (original report produced November 1946). 
 8  Josiah  Dubois ,  Th e Devil’s Chemists:  24 Conspirators of the International Farben Cartel who 
Manufacture Wars ( Boston, MA :  Th e Beacon Press,  1952 ),  14–15 . 
 9  See, eg, Offi  ce of the US Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Staff  Evidence 
Analysis (Gen. Th omas), Fundaments for a History of the German War and Armament Economy 
(1944),  Cornell Donovan Archive, Vol. II, 6.15; Offi  ce of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis 
Branch, German Military Government over Europe:  Economic Controls in Occupied Europe, 
Washington 28 August 1945,  Cornell Donovan Archive , Vol. CVIII. 
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Americans. Th e OSS investigated the concealment of ownership of IG Farben 
subsidiaries operating in Allied jurisdictions, the identity and role of the German 
bankers and fi nanciers and the precise mechanisms of economic warfare employed 
by the Reich. 10 Intensive investigation into the global span of the IG Farben cartel 
led the US leadership to fear that German imperialism would not be confi ned 
to the European continent. 11 In 1945 the Congressional Subcommittee on War 
Mobilization, chaired by Senator Kilgore, heard evidence to the eff ect that one 
of Farben’s key objectives was to drive the US out of the European market. It also 
learnt how IG Farben managed to exclude US companies from acquiring necessary 
resources on the Latin American market and so signifi cantly curbed US war pro-
duction and thus military potential. 12 Th rough US subsidiaries, IG Farben gathered 
important intelligence on US war production and through ingenious patenting 
and subcontracting arrangements it excluded American industry from important 
military technologies. 13 Th e US investigation found that, besides Standard Oil, 
dozens of US companies had agreements with IG Farben—and this was without 
counting Farben-owned subsidiaries. 14 Bernstein’s Farben Report quotes Farben 
witnesses who profess to have been fully aware of, and in complete agreement with, 
Hitler’s plans for aggressive war, with Farben director Von Schnitzler even going 
so far as to state ‘IG Farben [was] completely responsible for Hitler’s policy’. 15 As 
a household name, producing both Aspirin and Nylon stockings and present in 
every American home, Farben spoke to the imagination of the American public. 16 
Th ere can be little doubt that this played a role in the US government’s later deci-
sion to prosecute the Farben directors. 
 Furthermore, the Finance Division of the Offi  ce of the Military Government of 
the US (OMGUS) (which had its headquarters in the former IG Farben complex 
in Frankfurt) produced a series of reports totalling over 10,000 pages detailing 
the investigations into German banks and other fi nancial institutions. 17 Together, 
the sources paint a picture of highly sophisticated and eff ective economic warfare 
 10  See, eg, US Group CC/Finance Division, ‘Preliminary Report:  Concealment of Ownership 
of Some I.G. Farben Selling Companies’,  Cornell Donovan Archive , Vol. VII, Section 13.18. Th e 
OSS investigation was led by Franz Leopold Neumann, a German intellectual and who had fl ed to 
New York in the 1930s with other Frankfurt School members Otto Kirchheimer and Herbert Marcuse. 
His 1944 book  Behemoth: Th e Structure and Practice of National Socialism served as the blueprint for 
the US leadership’s understanding of the Nazi ‘apparatus’ (Franz Leopold Neumann,  Behemoth: Th e 
Structure and Practice of National Socialism (London: Octagon Books 1963)). Other US authors had 
also analysed—already during WWII—Germany’s ‘industrial off ensive’, see, eg,  Joseph  Borkin and 
 Charles  Welsh ,  Germany’s Master Plan: Th e Story of Industrial Off ensive ( New York, NY :  Duell, Sloan 
and Pearce  1944 ) . Borkin was economic advisor to the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice 
in Washington (T. Arnold, ‘Introduction’, in Borkin and Welsh (eds),  Germany’s Master Plan , xvi), and 
responsible for this offi  ce’s investigation into IG Farben during WWII. See further  Joseph  Borkin ,  Th e 
Crime and Punishment of IG Farben ( New York, NY :  Th e Free Press,   1978 ) . 
 11  Donny  Gluckstein ,  A People’s History of the Second World War:  Resistance Versus Empire 
( London :  Pluto Press,  2012 ),  10 . 
 12  Bernstein Farben Report, above n 7, 947, 952; US Congress, Senate, Committee on Military 
Aff airs, above n 7; 79th Cong. (1945), Part 10, IG Farben Exhibits (Kilgore Farben Exhibits). 
 13  Bernstein Farben Report, above n 7, 945.    14  Bernstein Farben Report, above n 7, 993. 
 15  Bernstein Farben Report, above n 7, 957.    16  Dubois, above n 8, 3. 
 17  Simpson, above n 7, 1. 
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carried out by the German industrial leaders in collusion with military and Nazi 
leaders. 18 Th e Soviet leadership shared this understanding of imperialism; respon-
sible for WWII was a band of ‘ “unconscionable adventurers and criminals”—com-
prising the Nazi party and military leaders as well as the directors of the larger 
banks and corporations’. 19 Th ere was broad agreement on the imperialist nature of 
Germany’s aggressive war and the role of the constellation Eisenhower was later to 
call ‘the military-industrial complex’. 20 With WWII typifi ed as a quarrel between 
Allied and Axis governments about who should dominate the world economy, 21 
it appears Hitler’s economic objectives troubled the US and USSR more than the 
Holocaust and the other atrocities carried out by the Nazis. 22 
 In a number of places this US/USSR meeting of minds led to concrete articu-
lation and action. 23 Among the sites where the Allies’ understanding of the eco-
nomic causes of the war were clearly articulated and responded to was the Potsdam 
Agreement. 24 Th is agreement, concluded on 2 August 1945 by the USSR, USA, 
and UK leaderships, de facto incorporated the ‘Morgenthau Plan’—the plan for 
a pastoralized Germany drawn up by US Secretary of State Henry Morgenthau. 25 
Th e Potsdam Agreement stipulated the destruction of Germany’s future war poten-
tial through the ‘decartellization’: breaking up of the main German cartels through 
expropriation of physical property but also share ownership including ownership 
of foreign subsidiaries of German companies, demolition of factories and ship-
ping off  of heavy machinery to the Allies in the form of reparations in kind. 26 
Signifi cant parts of the Potsdam Agreement were carried out by the US and other 
 18  Some authors follow an ‘agency theory’ approach to argue that Hitler was a mere puppet in the 
employ of German industrialists but the better view is one of control by the German elites from 
all three sectors, which, particularly after the ‘nazifi cation’ of industrial leadership and according 
of military ranks to industrialists, became diffi  cult to distinguish clearly and can be said to have 
formed a ‘state-capitalist trust’ (see, eg, Bukharin, above n 3, 127). For an overview of theories of ‘war 
responsibility’ between ‘primacy of politics’ and ‘primacy of economics’ see  Norbert  Frei and  Tim 
 Schanetzky (eds),  Unternehmen im Nationalsozialismus: Zur historisierung einer Forschungskonjunktur 
( Göttingen :  Wallstein Verlag,   2010 ) . 
 19  Jörg Osterloh, ‘Die Monopole und ihre Herren:  Marxistische Interpretationen’, in Frei and 
Schanetzky, above n 18, 36 (my translation). 
 20  Eisenhower farewell address (17 January 1961), Press release containing the text of the address, 
 Dwight D. Eisenhower: Presidential Library and Museum [website], < http://www.eisenhower.archives.
gov/research/online_documents/farewell_address.html > (accessed 26 February 2013). 
 21  Indeed, ‘the belief of ordinary people, that the issue was fascism versus anti-fascism, was largely 
irrelevant for rulers on both sides of the Axis/Allied divide’: Gluckstein, above n 11, 9. 
 22  Bloxham, above n 5, 57–90;  Kevin Jon  Heller ,  Th e Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins 
of International Criminal Law ( Oxford :  Oxford University Press,  2011 ),  4 . 
 23  See, eg, Section V of the Yalta (Crimea) Conference Agreement reached on 11 February 1945 
between Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt, published in  A Decade of American Foreign Policy:  Basic 
Documents, 1941–49 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Offi  ce, 1950). 
 24  Potsdam Agreement of 2 August 1945 between the USSR, the USA and the UK (Potsdam 
Agreement): Yale Law School,  Th e Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy [website], 
< http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decade17.asp > (accessed 27 February 2013). 
 25  Hans  Morgenthau ,  Germany is Our Problem ( New York, NY :  Harper & Brothers,   1945 ) . 
 26  Potsdam Agreement, Part IIB (Article 12) and Part III. 
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Allied occupation authorities in Germany. 27 In the Eastern Soviet Occupation 
Zone most industries were nationalized. 28 
 In the execution of the plan, ‘Morgenthau Boys’—young German-speaking 
mainly Jewish men who had fl ed to the US during the war—were deployed to 
Germany by OMGUS to investigate the state of industry after the war, and to 
interview the key industrialists in each sector. 29 In the immediate post-war period 
hundreds of industrialists were interned by the Allies, with the British for example 
detaining 120 business leaders in the banking, chemical, electrical and automobile 
sectors from the Ruhr area in the autumn of 1945. 30 
 It is in this context, where the emphasis was on disabling Germany’s potential 
as a competing empire, that the US and the other Allies decided to hold an inter-
national trial at Nuremberg. 
 (1)  Th e IMT and the ‘economic case’ 
 Th e international trial to be held at the IMT formed a cornerstone of the Allies’ 
post-WWII policy. It was the main public spectacle, or ‘morality play’, aimed at 
justifying the sacrifi ce of Allied manpower and resources. It also papered over the 
Allies’ own failure to act sooner and more eff ectively against aggressive Nazism, to 
stop the Holocaust and also its failures with regard to Jewish refugees. 31 Moreover, 
the role of ‘Nuremberg’ was to help establish US moral authority as the rising 
superpower. 32 Henry Stimson, who is credited as the main driver for trials within 
the US government, ‘saw the moralist agenda of outlawing war as one way to 
ensure greater security for an American-dominated economic empire’. 33 To 
achieve this objective, the main international trial at Nuremberg had to produce 
an historical record of war responsibility. 34 Th ere was to be an emphasis on the 
 27  See, eg, the Military Government of Germany, ‘Control of IG Farben’, in  Special Report of 
Military Governor US Zone (1 October 1945) which details the measures taken to disable Farben’s 
‘war potential’. 
 28  A.  Hilger ,  ‘Die Gerechtigkeit nehme ihren Lauf ’? Die Bestrafung deutscher Kriegs—und 
Gewaltverbrecher in der Sowjetunion und der SBZ/DDR’ , in  Norbert  Frei (ed),  Transnationale 
Vergangenheitspolitik:  Der Umgang mit deutschen Kriegsverbrechern in Europa nach dem Zweiten 
Weltkrieg ( Göttingen :  Wallstein Verlag,  2006 ),  180 . 
 29  K. Majchrzak, interview with Peter Weiss, 12 October 2008, Berlin. Peter Weiss, now 
Vice-President of Board of the Centre for Constitutional Rights in New York, in this interview relates 
his own experience as one of the ‘Morgenthau Boys’. 
 30  Tim  Schanetzky ,  ‘Unternehmer: Profi teure des Unrechts’ , in  Norbert  Frei (ed),  Hitlers Eliten nach 
1945 ( Munich :  Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag,  2003 ),  74 . 
 31  Richard D.  McKinzie, interview with Josiah E.  Dubois, 29 June 1973, Camden, NJ:   Harry 
S.  Truman Library and Museum [website], < http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/duboisje.htm > 
(accessed 27 February 2013) (Dubois Interview). 
 32  Elizabeth  Borgwardt ,  A New Deal for the World: America’s Vision for Human Rights ( Cambridge, 
MA :   Th e Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,  2005 ) . Cf.  Martii  Koskenniemi ,  ‘Between 
Impunity and Show Trials’ ,  Max Planck UNYB ,  6 ( 2002 ),  10 . 
 33  Borgwardt, above n 33, 75. 
 34  Famously, Robert Jackson, IMT Opening Address,  International Military Tribunal, Th e Trial of 
German Major War Criminals by the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg Germany 
(commencing 20 November 1945). 
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totality of the war rather than on the detail. 35 Chief Prosecutor Robert Jackson 
stated:
 Our case against the major defendants is concerned with the Nazi master plan, not with 
individual barbarities and perversions which occurred independently of any central plan. 
Th e groundwork of our case must be factually authentic and constitute a well-documented 
history of what we are convinced was a grand, concerted pattern to incite and commit the 
aggressions and barbarities which have shocked the world. 36 
 What became known as the ‘economic case’ was included as part of the over-
arching conspiracy charge. Th e Soviets agreed with the US on the importance of 
holding individuals responsible for aggressive war. 37 Th e shared understanding of 
the nature and causes of WWII as described above persisted at the IMT trial. Th e 
‘ Leitmotif of the IMT trial was exposing Nazism, militarism, economic imperial-
ism in an “orgy of revelation” ’. 38 
 In the US’s offi  cial view, what had enabled WWII to be started, and thus all its 
atrocities to be committed, had been the ‘captur[e of ] the form of the German 
state as an instrumentality for spreading their [Nazi] rule to other countries’. 39 Th is 
was to be refl ected in the choice of defendants:
 Whom will we accuse and put to their defence? We will accuse a large number of individu-
als and offi  cials who were in authority in the government, in the military establishment, 
including the General Staff , and in the fi nancial, industrial and economic life in Germany 
who by all civilised standards are provable to be common criminals. 40 
 Th e Soviet representative at Nuremberg, Aron Trainin stated that the industrial-
ists and fi nanciers’ ‘political position is clear: these were the masters for whom the 
Fascist State machine was zealously working’, adding, ‘the German fi nancial and 
industrial heads must also be sent for trial as criminals’. 41 
 From the very start it was clear that the ‘economic case’—the part of the pros-
ecution dealing with the economic causes of, and motivations for, the war and 
the responsibility of economic actors and policy-makers—would be key in the 
Nuremberg Trial. 42 Frankfurt School intellectual Franz Neumann was employed 
by the prosecution team, and his book  Behemoth:  Th e Structure and Practice of 
 35  A delicate balance had to be drawn between showing the barbarity of the Nazis and retaining pop-
ular support for the trial. Th e fi lm made about the trial,  Nuremberg: Its Lessons for Today , was prevented 
from being fi nished and shown in the US, apparently because it was feared it would aff ect popular 
support also for the Marshall Plan (below). Th e fi lm was recently fi nished: Schulberg Productions and 
Metropolis Productions,  Nuremberg: Its Lessons for Today [website], < http://www.nurembergfi lm.org/ > 
(accessed 27 February 2013). 
 36  Jackson Negotiations Report, Part III, above n 6. 
 37  Hirsch, above n 4, 701. See also,  Franz Leopold  Neumann ,  ‘Th e War Crimes Trials’ ,  World 
Politics ,  2 ( 1949 ),  135 , 139 . 
 38  Bloxham, above n 5, 203. 
 39  Jackson Negotiations Report, Part III, above n 6. 
 40  Jackson Negotiations Report, Part III, above n 6. 
 41  Aron Naumovich  Trainin ( Andrey Yanuaryevich  Vishinksi , ed),  Hitlerite Responsibility under 
Criminal Law ( London :  Hutchinson & Co. Ltd,  1945 ),  84 ,  85 . 
 42  See, eg, Bush, above n 1, 1110–15. 
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National Socialism —which emphasized the role of economic actors in causing 
WWII—was a must-read for Nuremberg prosecutors. 43 Th e leading defendant at the 
IMT was Hermann Göring, Hitler’s second-in-command, who had been in charge of 
readying the German economy for war. For the US prosecution, the key issue to be 
addressed was ‘the Nazi plan to dominate the world and to wage aggressive war’, 44 as 
had been partly discovered through the Kilgore Farben investigations. 
 When Justice Jackson and his staff  commenced work in preparation for the trial, 
four indictment-drafting committees were established each dealing with a diff erent 
core aspect of the war for which charges were to be brought. Committee One (Britain) 
dealt with the aggressive war charge; Committee Two (USSR) with war crimes and 
crimes against humanity in the East; and Committee Th ree (France) with equivalent 
crimes in the West. Th e Americans would prepare the ‘common plan and conspiracy’ 
charge. 45 Th e latter charge was to cover the pre-WWII story of Nazism, Hitler’s sei-
zure and exploitation of power, his plans and steps to occupy much of Europe, and 
his design to attack the United States. As the fi rst count of the indictment, it would 
comprise the basic narrative of the case as a whole. 46 Th is committee was headed by 
Justice Jackson himself. As a vital part of this charge, the ‘economic case’ was entrusted 
to American lawyer Frank Shea. 47 Shea produced a memorandum in which he pro-
posed for prosecution Hjalmar Schacht (former head of the Reichsbank and Minister 
of Economics, who had provided the fi nancing for war production), Fritz Sauckel (a 
primary fi gure in the foreign forced labour programme), Albert Speer (an architect 
and later Minister of Armaments and Munitions), Walter Funk (Schacht’s successor) 48 
as well as Alfried Krupp and six other German industrial and fi nancial leaders. Shea 
considered the guilt of the industrialists and fi nanciers lay in the fact that ‘they had 
given Hitler the material means to rearm Germany,  with full knowledge that Hitler 
planned to use these armaments to carry out a program of German aggrandizement 
by military conquest’. 49 
 From the mid-1930s the German economy had been geared towards heavy 
industry, which comprised the mining of coal (Germany’s main natural resource) 
and the manufacture of iron and steel products. Th ese industries were controlled 
by small number of large industrial and mining combines including Krupp, Flick, 
Th yssen, the state-owned Reich-Werks-Hermann-Göring and IG Farben. By a law 
of 15 May 1933, individual enterprises were compulsorily combined into cartels, 
while by a law of 30 January 1937, enterprises with a capital of less than 100,000 
marks were subject to liquidation, and henceforth only companies with a capital 
of not less than 500,000 marks were permitted. 50 Th e concentration of capital in 
fewer hands gave rise to a powerful group of fi nancial and industrial magnates. 51 
 43  Above n 7, and Bush, above n 1, 1108, fn 36.    44  Bloxham, above n 5, 6. 
 45  Taylor, above n 4, 79–80.    46  Taylor, above n 4, 80. 
 47  Taylor, above n 4, 90–2.    48  Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. I, Ch. VIII. 
 49  Taylor, above n 4, 81 (emphasis in original). 
 50  Trainin, above n 41, 83. 
 51  United States v Friedrich Flick et al ( Flick ), US Military Tribunal Nuremberg,  Judgment of 20 
August 1947, in  Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council 
Law No. 10 , Vol. VI, Prosecution Opening Statement, 35–6. 
08_9780199671144c8.indd   170 10/7/2013   12:09:01 PM
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in 
any way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
Capitalism’s Victor’s Justice? 171
 Other aspects of the ‘economic case’ in the IMT Indictment included war crimes 
and crimes against humanity. Göring and the other defendants had to a greater or 
lesser extent been involved in the ‘aryanization’ of industries in the occupied coun-
tries in the expansion of the German  Lebensraum . Th is involved the expropriation 
of foreign businesses and resources, as well as the recruitment and deployment of 
around fi ve million slave labourers, part of whom had been work-to-death labour 
supplied by the Nazi extermination camps. 52 
 Th e economic case gathered criticism from the start, with one critic arguing it 
was not the US’s job to ‘reform European economics’ or ‘turn a war crimes trial into 
an anti-trust case’. 53 Th e gradual change in attitude vis-á-vis Nuremberg must be 
seen in the context of the change in US leadership at this crucial time. On 12 May 
1945 Roosevelt died and was succeeded by Truman—a more business-oriented 
leader:
 Of the 125 most important government appointments made by President Truman in the 
fi rst two post-war years, 49 were bankers, fi nanciers and industrialists, 31 were military 
men and 17 lawyers, mostly with Big Business connections. Th e eff ective locus of govern-
ment seemed to shift from Washington to some place equidistant between Wall Street and 
West Point. 54 
 Th e prosecution list was whittled down to twenty-four defendants. 55 In relation 
to the ‘economic case’, only the former ministers Sauckel, Funk and Speer were 
indicted, with Schacht, the ‘redoubtable banker’ 56 and Krupp as the sole industri-
alist, despite the fact that the prosecution teams, supported by OMGUS staff , had 
gathered much evidence to support the ‘economic case’. 57 
 Th e retention of Krupp, the ‘main organiser of German industry’, in the indict-
ment made him the  pars pro toto for German industry. However, there was disa-
greement among the diff erent teams of lawyers working on the indictment as to 
whether Gustav Krupp, the man who had run the Krupp concern until 1941, or 
Alfried Krupp, his son, who had been the company’s executive director before 
becoming sole owner in 1943, was the intended defendant. Eventually, Gustav the 
elder was selected, but his British captors, by way of a ‘catastrophic blunder’, failed 
to discover until days before the trial was to commence that he was—at 80 years 
of age—too ill and demented to stand trial. 58 Th e US immediately requested the 
court replace Gustav with his son Alfried on the indictment. Th e prosecution of at 
least one Krupp family member was in the public interest, explained in the words 
of Justice Jackson:
 Th e Krupp infl uence was powerful in promoting the Nazi plan to incite aggressive warfare 
in Europe. Krupps were thus one of the most persistent and infl uential forces that made this 
 52  Offi  ce of United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, I  Nazi Conspiracy 
and Aggression 349 (1946), esp. ‘Chapter VIII—Economic Aspects of the Conspiracy’ (Economic 
Aspects). 
 53  Taylor, above n 4, 81. 
 54  Howard K.  Smith ,  Th e State of Europe ( New York, NY :  Knopf,  1949 ),  83 ,  95 . 
 55  Partly also due to British eff orts to keep the list short and the trial brief (Taylor, above n 4, 90). 
 56  Taylor, above n 4, 591.    57  Economic Aspects, above n 53.    58  Taylor, above n 4, 630. 
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war . . . Once the war was on, Krupps, both Von Bohlen and Alfried being directly respon-
sible therefor, led German industry in violating treaties and international law by employ-
ing enslaved labourers, impressed and imported from nearly every country occupied by 
Germany . . . Moreover, the Krupp companies profi ted greatly from destroying the peace of 
the world through support of the Nazi program . . . Th e United States respectfully submits 
that no greater disservice to the future peace of the world could be done than to excuse the 
entire Krupp family. 59 
 Th e request was rejected. Apparently the British objected on the grounds that 
allowing it would delay the start of the trial. 60 Although what might have been 
the fi rst ever international trial of an industrialist was thus curtailed, its shadow 
was still present at Nuremberg. Th e IMT decided against formally trying Krupp 
 in absentia , but  did retain the charges against him in the indictment, 61 which were 
read out in court on the fi rst day of the trial. Moreover, the case against Krupp 
was still explicitly made, for example in the US Prosecution team’s presentation on 
Count One on day four of the trial. 62 
 In addition, the economic case more generally featured prominently in the evi-
dence presented by the US team at Nuremberg. Prosecutor Sidney Alderman, for 
example, presenting on the aggressive war charge cited the ‘Hossbach Notes’ in 
evidence to show that Hitler himself had also conceptualized the war as one of 
economic imperialism—the objective was conquest of a suffi  cient living space for 
food production for the German people plus the dominance of global trade and 
commerce. 63 
 Where the trial had focused on Göring’s role as, ‘in theory and in practice . . . the 
economic dictator of the Reich’, 64 the IMT Judgment illustrates this role while 
strongly implicating the absent industrialists. Th e judges recount how, in November 
1932, a petition signed by leading industrialists and fi nanciers had been presented 
to President Hindenburg, calling upon him to entrust the Chancellorship to 
Hitler. 65 Subsequently, according to evidence submitted to the Tribunal:
 59  Answer of the United States Prosecution to the Motion on Behalf of Defendant Gustav Von 
Krupp Von Bohlen, 12 November 1945,  Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military 
Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10 , 134ff . 
 60  Order of the Tribunal Rejecting the Motion to amend the Indictment, dated 15 November 1945, 
in I TWC, 146, and see, Memorandum of the British Prosecution on the motion, in I  Trials of War 
Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10 , 139. Th ey had 
promised instead to cooperate on a second international trial in which Krupp could be tried ( Donald 
 Bloxham ,  Genocide on Trial: War Crimes Trials and the Formation of Holocaust History and Memory 
( Oxford :  Oxford University Press,  2003 ),  24 ). 
 61  Indictment of the International Military Tribunal, I  Th e Trial of German Major War Criminals by 
the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg Germany 27, 1947 (IMT Indictment). 
 62  Nuremberg Trial Proceedings, Volume II, Day Four—Continuation of Colonel Storey’s 
Presentation on Count 1, 222–3 and see the underlying prosecution fi le, a summary of which is pub-
lished in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 2, Chapter XVI, Part 13. 
 63  Nuremberg Trial Proceedings, Volume II, Day Five—Sidney Alderman’s Presentation on 
Aggressive War, 261–5. 
 64  IMT Judgment in International Military Tribunal, Judgment of 1 October 1946, in I  Th e Trial 
of German Major War Criminals by the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg Germany 
171, 1947 (IMT Judgment), 183. 
 65  IMT Judgment, 177. 
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 On the invitation of Goering, approximately 25 of the leading industrialists of Germany, 
together with Schacht, attended a meeting in Berlin on 20 February 1933. Th is was shortly 
before the German election of 5 March 1933. At this meeting Hitler announced the con-
spirators’ aim to seize totalitarian control over Germany, to destroy the parliamentary sys-
tem, to crush all opposition by force, and to restore the power of the Wehrmacht. Among 
those present at that meeting were Gustav Krupp, four leading offi  cials of the I.G. Farben 
Works, one of the world’s largest chemical concerns; Albert Vogler, head of United Steel 
Works of Germany; and other leading industrialists. 66 
 At this meeting, Göring opened an election fund (into which the industrialists 
contributed) to support Hitler in the March elections. Göring predicted these 
elections would be Germany’s last. 67 
 A month after the meeting between Göring and the industrialists, Krupp 
submitted to Hitler—on behalf of the Reich Association of German Industry—a 
plan for the reorganization of German industry. Krupp is cited in the Judgment as 
having stated that the plan was ‘characterised by the desire to coordinate economic 
measures and political necessity’, and that ‘the turn of political events is in line 
with the wishes which I myself and the board of directors have cherished for a long 
time’. 68 Th e industrialists’ plan was adopted. 69 
 So while the US administration’s support for the economic case waned, its legal 
offi  cers still followed through on the initial sentiment. Th e IMT Judgment 
surmised, ‘[i] n this reorganization of the economic life of Germany for military 
purposes, the Nazi Government found the German armament industry quite will-
ing to co-operate’. 70 Moreover, the Judgment related how industrialists picked the 
rich fruits of aggressive war and participated directly in the Holocaust. Th is was 
exemplifi ed by Krupp’s extensive use of slave labour at his plant in Essen, where 
‘punishments of the most cruel kind were infl icted on the workers’. 71 
 Th e lingering wish (strongest among the US Prosecution team) to actually 
prosecute industrialists became one of the reasons the US went ahead with the 
‘subsequent proceedings’ at the NMT. 72 Both Robert Jackson and his successor 
as Chief Prosecutor, Telford Taylor, pushed hard for the opportunity to try rep-
resentatives of all sections of the German elite, including members of relevant 
professional groups, including the industrialists. However, by now the tide was 
irrepressibly turning, and the US lawyers started to face more resistance from 
the US government—supported in this respect by the increasingly hostile home 
media. 73 
 66  Economic Aspects, above n 52. 
 67  IMT Judgment, above n 64, 184. Schacht was acquitted (Soviet judge Nikitchenko dissenting), as 
the Court found his knowledge of an impending aggressive war not proven beyond reasonable doubt 
(IMT Judgment, above n 64, 506–7). On the impact of Schacht’s acquittal on the industrialists’ cases, 
see Bush, above n 1, 1124. 
 68  IMT Judgment, above n 64, 183.    69  Economic Aspects, above n 52. 
 70  IMT Judgment, above n 64, 419.    71  IMT Judgment, above n 64, 462. 
 72  Above n 8; Bush above n 1, 1239. 
 73  See, eg,  Donald  Bloxham ,  ‘British War Crimes Trial Policy in Germany, 1945–
1957: Implementation and Collapse’ ,  Journal of British Studies ,  42 ( 2003 ),  97 . 
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 (III)  Th e Turnaround: From Germany is our Problem 
to Germany is our Business 
 In the spring of 1947 clearer signs started appearing of a changing Allied policy 
towards Germany, from one where Germany was to be publicly castigated and 
disabled (in trials and through economic policies as envisaged in the Morgenthau 
Plan) to one where Germany was to be rehabilitated into the world community 
of states and its economy rebuilt. 74 Here I focus on how this change (eff ectively, 
the start of the Cold War) was refl ected in the US leadership’s decision-making 
regarding the industrialists’ trials, and subsequently (Section IV) on the clearly 
perceptible impact it had in the proceedings and the decisions of the tribunals. 
 Individual members of the US administration disagreed strongly on appro-
priate US policy towards Germany. 75 Morgenthau relates how already during 
WWII orders were given to the military to spare German industrial plants. 76 
In his memoirs, Dubois describes a secret State Department memorandum set-
ting out its ‘post-war program’ relating to in kind reparations payments from 
Germany. 77 Such reparations could form a public justifi cation for sparing, and 
where necessary rebuilding, Germany’s productive capacity, as well as retain-
ing US-German trade ties. However, the programme remained secret as at that 
point public and key political support was still behind the pacifi c, ‘pastoral-
ized’ Germany as proposed in Morgenthau’s plan. Morgenthau, sensing support 
for his plan waning, reinforced his stance by publishing it as a book entitled 
 Germany is our Problem . 78 
 Over time, however, Morgenthau lost ground. 79 Dubois tells of seeing a second 
secret memorandum, circulated within the US delegation at Potsdam. According 
to this memo, the US goal now was ‘rebuilding a strong Germany as a buff er 
against Communism’. 80 While the Potsdam Agreement (and occupation directive 
JCS1067, on which much of Potsdam was based) 81 mirrored the Morgenthau Plan, 
Dubois states, ‘of course, it was never followed through. Th e US offi  cials did do just 
 74  See generally,  John  Gimbel ,  ‘On the Implementation of the Potsdam Agreement: An Essay on 
U.S. Postwar German Policy’ ,  Political Science Quarterly ,  87 ( 1972 ),  242–69 . 
 75  Generally, see Gimbel, above n 74. According to Maguire, the US Nuremberg Prosecution staff  
‘included a disproportionate number of Harvard Law School graduates, former New Dealers, and 
liberal democrats’:  Peter  Maguire ,  Law and War: International Law and American History ( New York, 
NY :  Columbia University Press,  2010 ),  117 . 
 76  H.  Schild (ed),  Das Morgenthau Tagebuch—Dokumente des Anti-Germanismus ( Leoni am 
Starnberger See :  Druff el Verlag,  1970 ),  64 . 
 77  Dubois Interview, above n 31, 13.    78  Morgenthau, above n 25; Schild, above n 76, 64. 
 79  Exceptions made to Law No.56 to allow for the rehabilitation of German industry are 
detailed in:  Offi  ce of the Military Government for Germany (US),  Special Report of the Military 
Governor: Ownership and Control of the Ruhr Industries, November 1948. 
 80  Dubois Interview, above n 31, 34. 
 81  Directive to Commander-in-Chief of United States Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military 
Government of Germany, April 1945 (JCS1067);  US Department of State,  Foreign Relations of 
the United States: European Advisory Commission: Austria, Germany , Vol. III ( Washington DC :   US 
Government Printing Offi  ce  1945 ),  484 ; and generally, Dubois Interview, above n 31. 
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what Morgenthau was afraid of, and in eff ect what the State Department memo-
randum recommended’. 82 A strong, indentured economy was more attractive than 
a pastoralized state. Shortly after Potsdam Morgenthau was ‘in eff ect . . . fi red by 
Truman’. 83 
 Th e turnaround was not complete at this point, though, and elements of the plan 
persisted for some time. For example, the work of the OMGUS Decartelization 
Branch—staff ed by, the ‘Morgenthau Boys’ 84 —continued for two years after Henry 
Morgenthau’s departure. Many items of machinery were shipped to the United 
States and the other Allies by way of reparations payment. Th e IG Farben Control 
Commission, which was run by all four occupation powers, split the Farben cartel 
into forty-seven parts, including the four sections that had only come together 
years before: Hoechst, Agfa, Bayer and BASF. 85 Th e entire German economy came 
to be strictly controlled by the occupation authorities. OMGUS passed anti-cartel 
laws that considered any enterprise with more than 10,000 employees prima facie 
in violation. 86 Secret programmes were underway to control and harvest German 
scientifi c development. Th ousands of industrial patents, as well as hundreds of 
scientists were transferred to the US in ‘Operation Paperclip’. 87 
 Th e ‘Restatement of Policy on Germany’ was US Secretary of State James Byrnes’ 
public announcement of the turnaround on 6 September 1946. In his speech, 
Byrnes raised the issue of the political and economic future of Europe: ‘Germany 
is a part of Europe and recovery in Europe, and particularly in the states adjoin-
ing Germany, will be slow indeed if Germany with her great resources of iron 
and coal is turned into a poorhouse’. 88 In this statement Byrnes eff ectively echoed 
Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov’s speech on Germany’s economic future at the 
Paris Peace Conference in July 1946. However, unlike Molotov, Byrnes omitted 
mention of the industrialists’ role in WWII, a notion that by then was starting to 
disappear from ‘Western’ discourse, and would disappear all but completely after 
the subsequent trials. 89 
 In March 1947 Truman announced the ‘Truman Doctrine’ promising economic 
support to those ‘states resisting attempted subjugation’ (read: to communism). 90 
Soviet representative Zhdanov responded with the ‘two camps’ speech in which 
he repeated the view that capitalist imperialism, personifi ed in the directors of 
 82  Dubois Interview, above n 31, 32, 33. 
 83  J.  Blum (ed),  From the Morgenthau Diaries , Vol. 3 ( Boston, MA :  Houghton Miffl  in  1967 ),  400–
20 ,  451 ; Dubois Interview, above n 31, 25. 
 84  Richard D. McKinzie, interview with Bernard Bernstein, 23 July 1975, New York, NY:  Harry 
S.  Truman Library and Museum [website], < http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/bernsten.htm > 
(accessed 27 February 2013); Bernstein Farben Report, above n 7. 
 85  ‘Control of IG Farben’,  Special Report , above n 27.    86  Special Report , above n 85. 
 87  Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group,  Final 
Report to the United States Congress , April 2007. 
 88  US Department of State,  Documents on Germany 1944–1985 ( Washington DC :  Department of 
State,  1985 ),  91–9 . 
 89  Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich  Molotov ,  Speeches of V.M. Molotov, Minister for Foreign Aff airs of the 
USSR and Head of the Soviet Delegation at the Conference ( London :  Soviet News,   1946 ) . 
 90  John  Merriman ,  A History of Modern Europe , Vols. 1 & 2 ( New York, NY : 3rd edn,  W.W. Norton 
& Co  2009 ),  119 . 
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the cartels, was the true perpetrator of WWII. 91 By this point hunger was wide-
spread in Germany 92 and there was real fear Germans would turn to communism. 
Acheson remarked that the US was at ‘the point where we see clearly how short 
is the distance from food and fuel either to peace or to anarchy’. 93 In July 1947 
JCS1067 was replaced with JCS1779, which codifi ed the turn in US policy and 
stated that ‘[a] n orderly, prosperous Europe requires the economic contributions 
of a stable and productive Germany’. 94 German and generally Western European 
recovery took off , largely through the Marshall Plan announced on 5 June 1947, 95 
which aimed to modernize Western European industry and remove barriers to 
trade among European countries and between Europe and the US. 96 According to 
the US leadership, the objective of the Marshall Plan was only in part humanitar-
ian—rather, it was ‘chiefl y . . . a matter of national self-interest’. 97 Th e Plan both 
stimulated the dollar and US industry and services (as the aid largely took the form 
of fi nancing of purchases to be made from US corporations) and provided leverage 
for building ‘political and economic stability’. 98 For example, Marshall Aid was 
used to pressure French and Italian governments not to appoint communists to 
ministerial posts. 99 Combining this with a leadership position in the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund and 
the nascent international trade regime, the US was able to remake the economic 
confi guration of the world in its image. 100 
 When Marshall presented Molotov at the Paris Economic Conference with 
a plan to stimulate only agricultural development in Eastern Europe, Molotov 
walked out of the meeting in one of the fi rst major public clashes of the Cold 
War. On the Eastern side, the Cominform, the coordinating mechanism for all 
communist parties, was inaugurated in September 1947 as the successor to the 
Comintern, and Zhdanow was installed as its chair. Zhdanow also expressed 
opposition to the Marshall Plan, which to communists (in Western and Eastern 
Europe alike) enabled American imperialism through the medium of US 
 91  H.  Wentker ,  Die juristische Aufarbeitung von NS-Verbrechen in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone 
und in der DDR ( Baden-Baden :  Kritische Justiz,  2002 ),  63 . 
 92  Lucius  Clay ,  Decision in Germany ( London :  William Heinemann,  1950 ),  262–84 . 
 93  D. Acheson, ‘Th e Requirements of Reconstruction’, address made before Delta Council 
at Cleveland, MS on 8 May 1947,  Department of State Bulletin (18 May 1947), 992 (Acheson 
Reconstruction). 
 94  Directive to the Commander in Chief of United States Forces of Occupation of Germany (JCS 
1779), Germany 1947–1949, 33–41,  Department of State Bulletin (27 July 27 1947), 186–93. 
 95  G. Marshall, ‘European Initiative Essential to Economic Recovery’, remarks by the Secretary of 
State at Harvard University on 5 June 1947,  Department of State Bulletin (15 June 1947). 
 96  Merriman, above n 90, 1120–1.    97  Acheson Reconstruction, above n 93, 992. 
 98  Acheson Reconstruction, above n 93, 992–3.    99  Merriman, above n 90, 1120. 
 100  See  Ernest  Mandel ,  Th e Meaning of the Second World War ( New  York, NY :   Verso,  1986 ), at 
 168 : ‘US imperialism could restrain itself because it had a way out economically. Th e option it chose 
in 1946–48 was to concentrate its eff orts on the political and economic consolidation of capitalism 
in the main imperialist countries, and to grant them suffi  cient credit and space for development to 
initiate a world-wide expansion of the capitalist economy, on the basis of which capitalism would be 
politically and socially stabilised in its main fortresses.’ 
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corporations. 101 Soviet power in Eastern Europe grew as Soviet troops took con-
trol of the Czech government in January 1948 and in June 1948 blocked foreign 
trains and truck routes into Berlin, in protest against US, British and French 
plans for a self-governing Western German zone. Th e latter sent shockwaves 
through the US trial teams at Nuremberg and some made the decision to take 
their families home. 102 West German commentator Friedhelm Kröll summarizes 
the  Umorientierung (turnaround) as follows: ‘With the re-formation of political 
camps during the Cold War and the open warfare in Korea, the involvement of 
the young Federal Republic into the Western alliance weighed heavier than crime 
and punishment of Nazi crimes.’ 103 East German commentators accused the US 
of ‘liquidating Potsdam’. 104 
 It is against this backdrop that we must imagine the eff orts of US lawyers such 
as Jackson and Taylor to persuade the US political leadership to allow further tri-
als. 105 Th at these took place at all can partly be brought down to the tenacity of 
these lawyers. 106 Justice Jackson, in his report on the IMT Judgment, reminded the 
US government that:
 Th e war crimes work that remains to be done, is to deal with the very large number of 
Germans who have participated in the crimes [and who] remain unpunished. Th ere are 
many industrialists, militarists, politicians, diplomats, and police offi  cials whose guilt does 
not diff er from those who have been convicted except that their parts were at lower levels 
and have been less conspicuous. 107 
 Jackson noted that his successor, Brigadier General Telford Taylor, had already 
‘prepared a programme of prosecutions against representatives of all the important 
segments of the Th ird Reich including a considerable number of industrialists and 
fi nanciers, leading cabinet ministers, top SS and police offi  cials, and militarists’. 108 
Th e initial proposal had been for a second international trial. 109 British Foreign 
Secretary Orme Sargeant, however, feared that such a trial would become a ‘battle 
 101  United States Economic Cooperation Administration,  A Report on Recovery Progress and United 
States Aid (February 1949), 142–4 and generally, Chapter VI: ‘Communist Opposition to the ERP’, 
141–50. 
 102  Dubois, above n 8, 338. 
 103  Friedhelm  Kröll ,  ‘Fall 10: Der Krupp-Prozess’ , in  G. and  R.  Blasius (eds),  Der Nationalsozialismus 
vor Gericht: Die alliierten Prozesse gegen Kriegsverbrechen und Soldaten 1943–1952 ( Frankfurt :  Fischer 
Taschenbuch Verlag,  1999 ),  176 . 
 104  S.  Kahn ,  ‘Preface’ , in  Richard  Sasuly ,  IG Farben ( Berlin :  Volk und Welt,  1952 ),  6 . 
 105  On US domestic opposition to trying Nazis, see Maguire, above n 75, 119–20; Bush, above n 
1, 1230–1. 
 106  Bloxham, above n 60, 55. 
 107  ‘Jackson Report to the President of October 7’, 1946, attached to  Report of Robert H. Jackson, 
United States Representative to the International Conference on Military Trials (London, 1945) (Jackson 
Final Report). 
 108  Jackson Final Report, 435. 
 109  Telford Taylor, Final Report to the Secretary of the Army on the Nuernberg War Crimes Trial 
Under Control Council Law No. 10 (Washington, DC:  US Government Printing Offi  ce, 1949), 
22–7. For Jackson’s view on international versus US military trials, see Jackson Final Report, above 
n 108. For commentary see Heller, above n 22, 9–24; Bush, above n 1, 1123–9;  Donald  Bloxham , 
 “Th e Trial that Never Was”: Why Th ere Was No Second International Trial of Major War Criminals 
at Nuremberg’ ,  J. Hist. Ass’n ,  87 ( 2002 ),  46–7 . 
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between capitalism and communism’. 110 Jackson’s response shows industrialists 
were the prime target of further trials: ‘[I] f [the other Allies] were unwilling to take 
the additional time necessary to try industrialists in this case . . . [t]he quickest and 
most satisfactory results will be obtained, in my opinion, from immediate com-
mencement of our own cases according to plans which General Taylor has worked 
out’. 111 Th is is what happened. 
 In the trials of the industrialists at the US NMT we can see the change in 
the broader geopolitical landscape and US attitude refl ected. On a very practical 
level, for example, General Clay was ordered by JCS1779 to ‘make every eff ort to 
facilitate and bring to early completion the war crimes program’. 112 In 1947 he 
put direct pressure on Taylor to wrap up the NMT trials—before they had even 
begun. 113 Taylor’s original plan to prosecute up to four hundred individuals had to 
be revised to 177. 
 Th e wish—and decision—to try individual industrialists in this changing 
landscape may seem contradictory at fi rst glance. It is less so when we contrast 
the idea of trying them with what actually happened in the trials and decisions, 
as I illustrate in the next section. Below the surface, a deeper US need can be dis-
cerned: the need to reassure American industrialists, perhaps counter-intuitively 
 through these trials , that production for the Korean and other, potentially  aggres-
sive , wars would not lead to their prosecution. 114 From this perspective, the 
Tribunals’ task was to distinguish culpable involvement with an evil regime from 
innocent ‘business’. 115 
 (IV)  Th e Trials of the Industrialists: From Morality Play to 
 Th éâtre De L’absurde 
 Th e trials at the NMT were based on Control Council Law No. 10 (CCL10) of 
December 1945, which authorized each of the four German Occupation Zone 
Commanders to arrest suspected war criminals and to establish ‘appropriate tribu-
nals’ for their trial. 116 Of the trials carried out by the Allies and eventually also the 
German courts, 117 those of the US, which took place in the same Nuremberg court-
house as the IMT trial, are by far the best documented and most widely known. 
 110  Donald  Bloxham ,  Genocide, the World Wars, and the Unweaving of Europe ( Middlesex :  Vallentine, 
Mitchell and Co.,  2008 ),  149 . 
 111  Jackson Final Report, above n 109, 436.    112  JCS 1779, [10]. 
 113  Clay, above n 94, 252.    114  Dubois, above n 10, 21. 
 115  Dubois, above n 10, 20. See also, Jeßberger, ‘Die I.G. Farben vor Gericht’, above n 1; Jeßberger, 
‘On the Origins of individual criminal responsibility under international law for business activity: IG 
Farben on Trial’, above n 1. 
 116  Control Council Law No. 10 (CCL10), Article II 2, 20 December 1945, reprinted in Taylor, 
Final Report, above n 109, 250. 
 117  As per CCL10, Article III, the French, British and Soviet commanders granted German courts’ 
jurisdiction. 
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It is these trials that are now once again cropping up in the literature around busi-
ness and international criminal law, 118 and indeed in recent legal practice. 119 
 My task in this section is to show how the realignment of the geopolitical 
landscape and internal dynamics of the US state-capitalist trust manifested them-
selves directly in the trials and their aftermaths. Of the trials held at the NMT, 
this occurs most clearly in the  trials of the industrialists . Here, the recent realign-
ment manifests in four distinct, interrelated ways. First, the trials were marked 
by excessively conciliatory language employed by the judges towards, or about, 
the defendants. Second, facts and charges that were admitted by the defendants 
were considered ‘not proven’ or ignored by the judges, and third, the necessity and 
superior order defences were allowed to be used in ways specifi cally contradicting 
the main IMT decision and CCL10. Apart from the liberal application of exculpa-
tory legal doctrines, the NMTs in the industrialists’ cases were generous in other 
areas. For example, the NMTs accepted the defendants’ ignorance regarding the 
plans for aggressive war and the fact of the Holocaust. Finally, these factors added 
up to the passing of very light sentences when compared to similar CCL10 con-
victions. Moreover, it was in the aftermath of the trials, in the extrajudicial review 
of sentences carried out by High Commissioner for Germany McCloy 120 and the 
reinstatement of many of the industrialists in their old positions, that capitalism’s 
victor’s justice was sealed. 
 As a general point, it can be said that the trials turned from a morality play into 
 théâtre de l’absurde .  Th éâtre de l’absurde , a genre that emerged in the early post-war 
years, is characterized by a lack of formal structure or logical dialogue in the after-
math of a sudden loss of meaning or purpose. For example, Samuel Beckett’s 
 Waiting for Godot (1952) represents the impossibility of purposeful action and the 
paralysis of human aspiration. 121 Below, I give only some representative examples 
from the three industrialists’ trials, the  Flick case, 122  Farben 123 and  Krupp . 124 Th ere 
are many more. 125 I have added some factual context to each of the examples so 
 118  See, eg,  K.R.  Jacobson ,  ‘Doing Business with the Devil: Th e Challenges of Prosecuting Corporate 
Offi  cials whose Business Transactions Facilitate War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity’ ,  Air Force 
Law Review ,  56 ( 2005 ),  167 ;  G.  Skinner ,  ‘Nuremberg’s Legacy Continues: Th e Nuremberg Trials’ 
Infl uence on Human Rights Litigation in US Courts under the Alien Tort Statute’ ,  Albany Law 
Review ,  71 ( 2008 ),  321 . Many recent works on Nuremberg perpetuate incorrect or incomplete facts 
about the trials (Bush, above n 1, 1237). 
 119  See, eg, the Nuremberg Scholars Amicus brief in support of the petitioners in  Kiobel v Royal 
Dutch Petroleum , USSC 10-1491. 
 120  Under Military Ordinance No. 7 (which established the tribunals) Article XVII (a), the Military 
Governor was authorized to reduce, mitigate or otherwise alter (but not raise) a sentence passed by the 
tribunals. While General Clay reviewed and confi rmed sentences, his successor McCloy constituted a 
clemency board which would re-review sentences without involving or even informing the judges and 
prosecutors (see Maguire, above n 75, 166–8). 
 121  Th e Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 1–2. 
 122  United States v Friedrich Flick et al ( Flick ), above n 51. 
 123  United States v Carl Krauch et al ( Farben ),  Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military 
Tribunals under CCL10 , Vol. VII. 
 124  United States v Alfried Krupp et al. ( Krupp ),  Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military 
Tribunals under CCL10 , Vol. IX. 
 125  G. Baars, ‘Law(yers) Congealing Capitalism:  On the (Im)possibility of Restraining Business 
in Confl ict through International Criminal Law’, Doctoral Th esis (University College London, 
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as to illustrate the role the leaders of these companies were said to have played in 
WWII and the Holocaust. 
 (1)  Excessively conciliatory language 
 Th roughout the three judgments, examples of the judges’ use of excessively con-
ciliatory language can be found, which stands in stark contrast with the language 
of the prosecution. Th e fi rst example here is from the  Flick case. Friedrich Flick 
and fi ve other offi  cials of the Flick Concern were accused of participation in the 
deportation of thousands of foreigners including concentration camp inmates and 
prisoners of war to forced labour in inhuman conditions including in the Flick 
mines and plants; spoliation contrary to the Hague Conventions of property in 
occupied France and the Soviet Union; participation in the persecution of Jews 
in the pre-war years through securing Jewish industrial and mining properties in 
the ‘Aryanization’ process, and knowing participation (of defendants Flick and 
Steinbrinck) in SS atrocities through membership in the ‘Circle of Friends of 
Himmler’ (a select group of industrialists and SS offi  cers). 126 Th e Flick group of 
enterprises included coal and iron mines, steel producing and fabricating plants. 
It was, at the time, the largest steel combine in Germany, rivalled in size only by 
Krupp AG. 127 Chief Prosecutor Telford Taylor opened this fi rst industrialist case to 
be tried by the Americans with the nature of industry’s responsibility:
 What we are here concerned with is no mere technical form of participation in crime, or 
some more or less accidental fi nancial assistance of the commission of crimes. Th e really 
signifi cant thing . . . is the fact that the defendants assisted the SS and the Nazi regime with 
their eyes open and their hearts attuned to the basic purposes which they were subsidising. 
Th eir support was not merely fi nancial. It was part of a fi rm partnership between these 
defendants and the Nazi regime that continued from before the Nazi seizure of power to 
the last days of the Th ird Reich. 128 
 Th e fi nal judgment in the  Flick case (and the other industrialists’ cases) stands in 
stark contrast to this indictment. On the count of participation in the SS crimes 
through membership of the Himmler Circle, Flick and Steinbrinck were found 
guilty. As one of its most absurd proposals, the Tribunal suggested, that rather than 
forming an active part of the deliberations about the upcoming aggressive war, the 
defendants may just have attended the Himmler Circle’s meetings for its ‘excellent 
dinner’. 129 
 Moreover, the Tribunal attempted to show how Flick and company—despite 
attending these regular dinners—had not had the required knowledge to render 
them guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity in relation to the killings 
and other atrocities carried out in the Nazi extermination camps. It recounted how:
2012) includes detailed treatment of the  Ministries Case and  Pohl as well as the other zonal trials (at 
119–74). 
 126  Flick, above n 51, 3 (Indictment). 
 127  Flick, above n 51, 34 (Opening Statement for Prosecution).    128  Flick, above n 51, 104. 
 129  Flick, above n 51, 1218 (Judgment). 
08_9780199671144c8.indd   180 10/7/2013   12:09:01 PM
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in 
any way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
Capitalism’s Victor’s Justice? 181
 [i] n 1936 [Himmler] took members of the Circle on an inspection trip to visit Dachau con-
centration camp which was under his charge. Th ey were escorted through certain buildings 
including the kitchen where they tasted food. Th ey saw nothing of the infamous atrocities 
perhaps already there begun. But Flick who was present got the impression that it was not 
a pleasant place. 130  
 Again, this section bears an excessively conciliatory tone, which here interferes 
with the fi nding of knowledge with regards to the facts of the Holocaust, which 
had been deemed (including by the IMT) common knowledge among the German 
people at the time. 131 
 Th e other ‘reconciliation’ that appears in the trials is that between German 
and US industry.  Farben  prosecutor Dubois had been instructed by the US War 
Department, before taking up his role, not to charge the  Farben defendants with 
aggressive war. 132 Th e US Government feared DuPont and other US industrial-
ists’ reaction. However, Dubois went ahead with the charge. It is clear from their 
statements that the industrialists on trial were aware of criticism of the trials voiced 
by US business leaders in the media—in particular, since Farben had had close 
relationships with Standard Oil, this trial had been watched closely by the home 
public. 133 Th e defendants were aware that the US in changed political times would 
come to rely on its own industrialists, evidenced in Krauch’s closing statement:
 When I heard the fi nal plea of the prosecution yesterday, I often thought of my colleagues 
in the United States and in England and tried to imagine what these men would think, 
when they heard and read these attacks hurled at us by the prosecution. For after all, they, 
too, are scientists and engineers; they had similar problems. Th ey, like us, were called upon 
by the state to perform certain duties. Th at was true then, before the world war, and that is 
true now, as we know from information received from the United States. A citizen cannot 
evade the call of the state. He must submit and must obey. 134 
 Seemingly in agreement with Krauch, the Tribunal acquitted the defendants of the 
charge of conspiracy to wage wars of aggression, fi nding that they had acted merely 
like ordinary citizens, who, although the majority of them supported the waging 
of war in some way, were not the ones who planned the war and led a nation. Th e 
Tribunal placed itself in opposition to the IMT on the role of industrialists, hold-
ing that the  Farben defendants merely followed their leaders and off ered no contri-
bution to the war eff ort greater than any other normally productive enterprise. 135 
 Most controversially, the Tribunal stated ‘[w] e reach the conclusion that com-
mon knowledge of Hitler’s plans did not prevail in Germany, either with respect 
to a general plan to wage aggressive war, or with respect to specifi c plans to attack 
 130  Flick, above n 51, 1218 (Judgment).    131  IMT Judgment, above n 64, 480. 
 132  Dubois, above n 8, 20.    133  Taylor, Final Report, above note 109, 79. 
 134  Farben , above n 123 1055 (Final Statements by the Defendants: Krauch). Krauch’s lawyer had 
also said, ‘I have to harp again on the old subject: that is, did not other countries and other peoples 
act in the same way? Replace IG by I.C.I. (Imperial Chemical Industries) for England, or du Pont for 
America, Montecatini for Italy, and at once the similarity will become clear to you’: at 921 (Closing 
Statements for Defendant Krauch). 
 135  Farben, above n 125, 1126. 
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individual countries’. 136 Here we can see another direct contradiction of the IMT, 
both regarding Germans’ general knowledge and the  Farben defendants’ specifi c 
knowledge. 137 As briefl y noted above, the IMT had detailed the planning and strat-
egy meetings of Himmler’s circle of Friends, of which  Farben  defendant Buetefi sh 
had been a part (with Flick and Rasche, amongst others). 138 
 Th e  Farben Tribunal played down the common interest between the industrial 
and political leaders. In support of the claim that the Farben leaders were well 
aware of, and perhaps more directly involved in planning the aggressive war for 
their own purposes, the prosecution had produced a letter in which Krauch argued 
for the takeover of neighbouring countries’ industries, ‘peaceably at fi rst’:
 It is essential for Germany to strengthen its own war potential as well as that of its allies to 
such an extent that the coalition is equal to the eff orts of practically the rest of the world. 
Th is can be achieved only by new, strong, and combined eff orts by all of the allies, and by 
expanding and improving the greater economic domain corresponding to the improved 
raw material basis of the coalition, peaceably at fi rst, to the Balkans and Spain. 139 
 Contrast this with the Tribunal’s view:
 Th e defendants may have been, as some of them undoubtedly were, alarmed at the acceler-
ated pace that armament was taking. Yet even Krauch, who participated in the Four Year 
Plan within the chemical fi eld,  undoubtedly did not realise that, in addition to strengthen-
ing Germany, he was participating in making the nation ready for a planned attack of an 
aggressive nature. 140 
 Eventually the Tribunal concluded summarily on the further evidence submitted 
to it: ‘Th is labour has led to the  defi nite conclusion that Krauch did not knowingly 
participate in the planning, preparation or initiation of an aggressive war.’ 141 If 
Krauch’s level of knowledge did not suffi  ce to fi nd him guilty, then DuPont and 
the other US industrialists could rest assured. 
 (2)  Facts and charges admitted considered not proven or ignored 
by the judges 
 One of the most absurd features of the trials was how certain facts and charges that 
were admitted in court by the defendants were considered ‘not proven’ or ignored 
by the judges. Th e  Farben case was by far the most absurd case in this respect. 142 In 
this case the way facts and law are twisted, and the tone of the judges’ statements, 
almost give the impression that the judges believed themselves to be involuntary 
actors in a play. 143 Th e judgment stands in stark contrast to evidence reported 
 136  Farben, above n 125, 1107.    137  See, eg, IMT Judgment, above 64, 480. 
 138  See also,  Farben , above n 123, 1200.    139  Farben, above n 123, 1116. 
 140   Farben , above n 123, Vol. VIII, 1114.    141  Farben, above n 123, 1117 (emphasis added). 
 142  For a sustained critique, see Dubois, above n 8, 338–56. 
 143  Th is impression is raised in the private papers of Judge Hebert:  see, eg, Paul Hebert, ‘Draft 
Dissent’,  Nuremberg Trials Documents (1948), Louisiana State University Law Centre Digital 
Commons, < http://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/nuremberg_docs/1 > (accessed 27 February 2013). 
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in the US Congress and presented during the trial. 144 Von Schnitzler’s extensive 
admissions made in interrogations 145 eventually ‘did not mean anything, not even 
against himself ’. 146 
 On the slave labour charge, only in the Auschwitz context did the Tribunal 
fi nd some evidence of the  Farben defendants’ initiative, but the area of criminal 
liability was still constructed very narrowly. Having considered many potential 
locations for a new synthetic rubber plant, on the recommendation of defendant 
Ambros, the small Polish village of Oś wię cim was selected. 147 Th is became the site 
for Farben’s main manufacturing plant, as well as for the Auschwitz concentration 
and extermination camp. Ambros visited the camp at Auschwitz in the winter of 
1941–2 in company with some thirty important visitors (perhaps the Himmler 
Circle), and ‘he saw no abuse of inmates and thought that the camp was well 
conducted’. 148 Once again, in the face of the overwhelming evidence presented at 
the IMT and NMT in relation to Auschwitz (including, for example, that as of 
the beginning of 1942 ‘the smell of death emanating from the crematorium would 
pucker the nose of anyone within half a mile’ 149 ), it appears odd for the judgment 
to adopt such description uncritically. 
 ‘Work-to-death labour’ 150 at Farben’s Auschwitz factory is described by the 
Tribunal in its judgment euphemistically as ‘[t] hose [workers] who became unable 
to work or who were not amenable to discipline were sent back to the Auschwitz 
concentration camp or, as was more often the case, to Birkenau for extermina-
tion in the gas chambers’. 151 Also, it is noted, ‘[t]he plant site was not entirely 
without inhumane incidents’. 152 Nevertheless the Tribunal adds, ‘[i]t is clear that 
Farben did not deliberately pursue or encourage inhumane policy with respect to 
the workers. In fact, some steps were taken by Farben to alleviate the situation. 
It  voluntarily and at its own expense provided hot soup for the workers on the site 
at noon’. 153 When utilizing free ‘work-to-death labour’, however, this appears lit-
tle like generosity and even less an exculpatory factor for the  Farben defendants. 
Th e fact remained, as stated by the Tribunal, that ‘the labour for Auschwitz was 
procured through the Reich Labour Offi  ce at Farben’s request. Forced labour was 
used for a period of approximately three years, from 1942 until the end of the 
war’. 154 Only fi ve of the twenty-four defendants were found guilty under count 
three. Dubois’ fi nal comment on the Tribunal’s ‘greatest exaggeration’ in the case 
of defendant Ilgner was, ‘[t]he tribunal rewrote into innocence even the aggressive 
deeds he admitted, raising the clear implication that any society could be fi lled 
with such men with no danger whatever to the peace of the world’. 155 As well as 
falling into the current category of absurdism, the Tribunal also alludes to the next 
 144  See, eg, Bernstein Farben Report, above n 7.    145  See Osterloh, above n 19, 75. 
 146  Farben Indictment, above n 123, 47–9; Dubois, above n 8, 339. 
 147  Farben , above n 123, 1180.    148  Farben , above n 123, 1181. 
 149  Dubois, above n 8, 341. 
 150  Dubois notes worker deaths amounted to over 50,000: Dubois, above n 8, 342. 
 151  Farben, above n 123, 1183.    152  Farben , above n 123, 1184. 
 153  Farben , above n 123, 1185 (emphasis added).    154  Farben , above n 123, 1185. 
 155  Dubois, above n 8, 355. 
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category, that of fi nding the defendants had simply, innocently, been doing as they 
were told, or carrying on ‘business as usual’ in unusual circumstances. 
 (3)  Howling with the wolves: Necessity used as a defence contrary 
to Nuremberg principles 
 Flick described his ostensible agreement with Nazi ideology as self-protective 
‘howling with the wolves’. 156 Th e Tribunal accepted the view that the defendants 
(except Flick and Weiss) acted under necessity, 157 forced by the ‘reign of terror’ 
employed by the Nazi regime:
 Th e Reich, through its hordes of enforcement offi  cials and secret police, was always ‘pre-
sent’, ready to go into instant action and to mete out savage and immediate punishment 
against anyone doing anything that could be construed as obstructing or hindering the 
carrying out of governmental regulations or decrees. 158 
 Th is blanket interpretation of necessity could well be used to excuse any crime 
committed under order or decree of the Nazis. Th e  Flick judgment in this aspect 
stands in sharp contrast to other non-industrialist decisions of the NMT. 159 
 Th e generous use of necessity as a complete defence in these cases appears to 
be aimed at circumventing the bar on use of the ‘superior orders’ defence as a 
fundamental principle at Nuremberg. 160 CCL10 states, ‘[t] he fact that any person 
acted pursuant to the order of his Government or of a superior does not free him 
from responsibility for a crime, but may be considered in mitigation’. 161 At the 
IMT, ‘the true test [for such mitigation], which is found in varying degrees in the 
criminal law of most nations, is not the existence of the order, but whether moral 
choice was in fact possible’. 162  Farben defendant Schneider had told interrogators 
that no one in government forced Farben to build the factories at Auschwitz or 
to operate them. 163 Th e rubber quota had been set by Krauch himself and Farben 
produced in excess of government requirements. 164 Yet, the Tribunal found ‘[t]here 
can be but little doubt that the defi ant refusal of a Farben executive to carry out 
the Reich production schedule or to use slave labour to achieve that end would 
 156  Telford  Taylor ,  ‘Nuremberg Trials: War Crimes and International Law’ ,  International Conciliation , 
 450 ( 1949 ),  304 . 
 157  Th e NMTs do not employ a uniform understanding of the concept of necessity, which is also 
at times used interchangeably with ‘duress’. For an overview, see,  E.  Van Sliedregt ,  Th e Criminal 
Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International Humanitarian Law ( Th e Hague :  TMC Asser 
Press  2003 ),  279–83 . 
 158  Flick , above n 51, 1200. 
 159  For example in the Einsatzgruppen case necessity was understood to require an ‘imminent, real 
and inevitable threat’ ( US v Ohlendorf et al .  VII Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military 
Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10 , 91). 
 160  Nuremberg Charter, Article 8. See, for example IMT Judgment, above n 65: ‘Superior orders, 
even to a soldier, cannot be considered in mitigation where crimes as shocking and extensive have been 
committed consciously, ruthlessly and without military excuse or justifi cation’: at 493 (in relation to 
Keitel). 
 161  CCL10, Article II4(b).    162  IMT Judgment, above n 64, 447. 
 163  Dubois, above n 8, 341.    164  Dubois, above n 8, 341. 
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have been treated as treasonous sabotage and would have resulted in prompt and 
drastic retaliation’. 165 
 In his dissent on the charges of slave labour, Judge Hebert disagreed with the 
necessity fi nding in the strongest terms, concluding that Farben directors had initi-
ated rather than followed orders, and that Farben directors’ will coincided with the 
government. Hebert called the Tribunal’s fi nding of a Nazi threat to Farben ‘pure 
speculation’. 166 
 In the  Krupp case we can see a remarkable variation of the IMT’s reasoning 
on economic imperialism. Here, the Prosecution did not argue that the  Krupp 
defendants were part of the ‘Nazi conspiracy’ in the meaning of the IMT decision, 
but that they had been part of a ‘ Krupp conspiracy ’. Th is was a manifestation of 
something altogether bigger:
 Nazism was, after all, only the temporary political manifestation of certain ideas and atti-
tudes which long antedated Nazism, and which will not perish nearly so easily. In this case, 
we are at grips with something much older than Nazism; something which fused with 
Nazi ideas to produce the Th ird Reich, but which has its own independent and pernicious 
vitality. 167 
 To ensure Krupp’s own continually increasing profi tability, it was said to have 
driven the state and military to colonial expansion. 168 Dismissing the charge, Judge 
Wilkins considered that Krupp’s expansionism since the 1920s merely meant 
Krupp had acted  in the fi rm’s fi nancial interest as behoves a businessman. 169 From 
the condemnation of the state-corporate economic imperialism in the IMT (see 
above) to this decision, it appears the NMT came full circle: Krupp’s ‘conspiracy’ 
was simply business as usual. 170 
 Th e  Krupp Tribunal then considered the remaining spoliation and forced labour 
charges. Th e Tribunal found, in contrast to the  Farben decision (above), in terms 
of  knowledge with regard to the Krupp fi rm’s activities at Auschwitz that the per-
secution of Jews by the Nazis was ‘common knowledge not only in Germany but 
throughout the civilised world’ and that the fi rm’s offi  cials, could not  not  have 
known. 171 
 165  Farben , above n 123, 1174. 
 166  Farben , above n 123, 1306 (Judge Hebert’s Dissenting Opinion on Count Th ree of the 
Indictment). 
 167  See  Krupp, above n 124, 412 (Judge Wilkins’ Separate Opinion on Counts 1 and 4). 
 168  Kröll connects this with Max Weber’s ‘Wilhelminismus’:  ‘die Allianz zwischen Großindustrie 
und Pseudoaristokratie mit der Folge der Derationalisierung der deutschen Weltpolitik’:  F.  Kröll ,  Fall 
10: Der Krupp-Prozeß , in  G.  Ueberschär ,  Der Nationalsozialismus vor Gericht: die alliierten Prozesse 
gegen Kriegsverbrecher und Soldaten 1943–1952—Nazism up in court: the Allies’ trials against war crimi-
nals and soldiers from 1943 to 1952 , ( Frankfurt am Main :  Fischer Taschenbuch Verl,   1999 ) . 
 169  Krupp , above n 124, 412. See also, Taylor, above n 156, 309. 
 170  Likewise, the  Farben Tribunal considered that company a ‘simple prototype of “Western capital-
ism” ’: Dubois, above n 8, 355. 
 171  Krupp , above n 124, 1434. 
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 (4)  ‘Sentences light enough to please a chicken thief ’ 
 Compared to sentences in cases where similar facts were alleged and established, 
the industrialists in  Flick and  Farben  received, as Dubois put it in his comment on 
the  Farben judgement, ‘sentences light enough to please a chicken thief ’. 172 Flick 
was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment, Steinbrinck to fi ve, and Weiss to 
two-and-a-half, while the other three defendants were acquitted on all counts. 173 
In his report, Taylor calls the  Flick judgment ‘exceedingly (if not excessively) mod-
erate and conciliatory.’ 174 In the  Farben case, Krauch was sentenced to six years, 
Ambros to eight, and the others received sentences between one-and-a-half and 
eight years. Four were acquitted. Th e defendant Ilgner was considered innocent 
even of the aggressive deeds he had admitted. 175 By comparison, in the  Justices 
case, that same week, four life sentences were imposed, and in the  Pohl case against 
the SS Economic and Administrative Offi  ce (who had handled the logistical and 
administrative side of slave labour) four death sentences were imposed, and no 
prison sentence below ten years with four of twenty or more. 176 Dubois surmises, 
‘no doubt [the  Farben  judges] were infl uenced somewhat by our foreign policy’. 177 
 Th e comparatively heavy sentences in  Krupp ranged between six and twelve years 
for ten defendants, and three years for one, and included the forfeiture of Alfried 
Krupp’s real and personal property. 178 After the IMT’s ‘Krupp  snafu ’, Taylor had 
commented that ‘Alfried Krupp was a very lucky man, for, had he been named, he 
would almost certainly have been convicted and given a very stiff  sentence by the 
International Military Tribunal’. 179 With this in mind, the Krupp defendants’ trial 
seems ‘amicable’ indeed. 180 
 Th e NMT also convicted one banker, Rasche, the director of the Dresdner 
Bank, as part of the  Ministries case. 181 His trial also featured the four factors of the 
NMT  théâtre de l’absurde . 182 Th e popular German conception of his role is encap-
sulated in the saying, ‘ Wer marschiert da hinter dem ersten Tank? Das ist Doktor 
Rasche von der Dresdner Bank .’ 183 
 Th e NMT trials of the industrialists left both prosecutors and judges with much 
agonized soul-searching, evidenced in their writing on the matter. 184 According 
 172  Dubois, above n 8, 339.    173  Krupp , above n 124, 1223. 
 174  Taylor, above n 156, 187.    175  Dubois, above n 8, 355. 
 176  United States v Josef Altstoetter et al. ( Justice ) in  Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military 
Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10 , Vol. III;  United States v Oswald Pohl et al. ( Pohl ) in  Trials 
of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10 , Vol. V. 
 177  Dubois, above n 8, 357.    178  Krupp , above n 124, 1450. 
 179  Taylor, above n 4, 94. 
 180  Th is is the term used in Jeßberger, ‘Die I.G. Farben vor Gericht’, above n 1 and Jeßberger, ‘On 
the Origins of Individual Criminal Responsibility’, above n 1. 
 181  United States v Ernst Weizsaecker et al ( Ministries ) in  Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg 
Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10 , Vol. XIV. 
 182  Heller comments on the ‘unprincipled lenience’ of the tribunal towards Rasche, based on his 
status as a private businessman (Heller, above n 22, 5, 288–9). 
 183  ‘Who is that marching behind the fi rst tank? Th at’s Dr Rasche of the Dresdner Bank’ (my trans-
lation). I am grateful to Fabian Schellhaas, PhD Candidate, Humboldt University Faculty of Law for 
this phrase. 
 184  See, generally, Taylor, above n 156; Dubois, above n 8; Sasuly, above n 104. 
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to Dubois, Judge Hebert had been writing a dissenting opinion on the Farben 
aggressive war charge up to the very last day, stating that ‘by the time we reached 
the end [of the trial] I felt that practically every sentence of the indictment had 
been proved many times over’. 185 According to Dubois, Hebert probably changed 
his mind about submitting his dissent out of fear of communism, considering the 
trend of events in 1948. 186 Taylor also considered the evidence against Farben, 
especially on the aggressive war charge, to have been the strongest of all the indus-
trialist trials. 187 In the opinion Hebert eventually fi led, six months after the major-
ity judgment, he states:  ‘Th e issues of fact are truly so close as to cause genuine 
concern as to whether or not justice has actually been done because the enormous 
and indispensable role these defendants were shown to have played in the building 
of the war machine which made Hitler’s aggression possible.’ 188 
 What I have tried to show in this section is how international criminal law was 
shaped and manipulated to produce outcomes that were materially desirable—
resulting in, at times, absurd contradictions. Th e outcomes of the trials are not 
the result of some putative ‘autonomous’ legal process, but rather, follow the logic 
of capitalism and bear the imprint of the changing facts and relationships of the 
material base. Yet, the contradictions inherent in the fact that these trials took 
place at all, their outcomes, and salient details such as the fact that throughout 
their trial detention the accused’s companies were still running (with the help of 
powers of attorney and board meetings in prison cells) 189 were to give rise to some-
thing bigger, international criminal law’s eff ective deployment in the service of 
capitalism’s victor’s justice. 
 (V)  Aftermath: Capitalism’s Victor’s Justice 
 Elsewhere I  have compared the US trials to the little-known post-WWII trials 
on the Eastern front. Although the US and USSR governments had also stated 
that the Eastern front war had been a joint military-industrial war for markets 
and resources (again revealed in the documentation), 190 the International Military 
Tribunal in Tokyo omitted to indict any of the leaders of the Japanese  zaibatsu . 
While later Allied military trials of camp guards also revealed the extent of forced 
labour employed by the  zaibatsu , the US occupation authorities opted to aban-
don prosecution plans and instead to utilize the industrial elites (in a ‘shock 
doctrine’ economic reform programme) to mobilize against a Japanese turn to 
communism. 191 
 185  Dubois, above n 8, 347.    186  Dubois, above n 8, 355.    187  Taylor, above n 156, 314. 
 188  Farben , above n 123, 1212 (concurring opinion of Judge Hebert on charges of crimes against 
peace). 
 189  Dubois, above n 8, 37; Schanetzky, above n 30, 77. 
 190  See further Baars, above n 125, esp. Chapter 3B (175–210) and also generally,  Yuma  Totani , 
 Tokyo War Crimes Trial: Th e Pursuit of Justice in the Wake of World War II ( Cambridge, MA :  Harvard 
University Press,   2008 ). 
 191  Baars, above n 125, 175–210. 
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 In Germany, the other Allies also tried industrialists in their respective zones 
of occupation. Each of the Allies’ own political priorities fi nds its refl ection in 
these trials. For France, for example, it was important to fi nd a balance between 
a ‘business-friendly’ judgment and creating a precedent that would enable expro-
priation of business assets from those who had collaborated in the War. 192 Th e 
Saar magnate Hermann Röchling and several associates were tried by the French 
military tribunal for, among others, participating in the war of aggression. 193 Th eir 
indictment stated that:
 [i] f the ‘Directors of German Enterprises’ . . . plead that they only attached themselves to 
Hitler in order to oppose communism or ‘Social Democracy’, there exists no doubt that the 
profound reason for their attitude can be sought in their desire, long before the coming of 
national socialism, to extend their undertakings beyond the frontiers of the Reich. 194 
 Hermann Röchling was accused of,  inter alia , urging Hitler to invade the Balkans 
so as to appropriate the Balkan enterprises. 
 While convicted of waging aggressive war in the fi rst instance, on appeal in 
1949, the Supreme Court of the French Military Government in the French Zone 
of Occupation 195 acquitted Hermann Röchling. According to the French court, 
the IMT had set the bar for this charge very high by acquitting Speer of this charge 
and holding that only those involved in policy-making and planning could be 
convicted. 196 Th e  Röchling defendants’ sentences were signifi cantly reduced in their 
appeal, 197 showing a softening of French attitudes also. 
 For the British, the main motivator for zonal trials was prosecuting those who 
had killed or otherwise harmed Allied nationals and British servicemen in par-
ticular. 198 Despite British unwillingness to try industrialists, 199 in a ‘minor, insig-
nifi cant’ case, 200 Tesch and his colleagues, the suppliers of Zyklon B produced 
by Farben to the death camps, were tried. Two were sentenced to death, while a 
third defendant was later pardoned by Prime Minister Eden. 201 Th e Brits also tried 
Professor Wittig of the Steinöl company, which had benefi tted from camp labour 
supplied through Pohl’s offi  ce. While the Neuengamme camp inmates consisted 
almost entirely of Allied nationals and POWs, Wittig escaped a death sentence. 202 
Th e British appeared to have tried these businessmen not as members of their 
class or professional group, but conversely, as part of a series of scapegoats for 
harm to British national interest. Th e war crimes trials were unpopular with the 
 192  Bloxham, above n 73, 24. 
 193  Th e Government Commissioner of the General Tribunal of the Military Government of the French 
Zone of Occupation in Germany v Hermann Roechling et al ( Roechling )  Trials of War Criminals before the 
Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10 , Vol. XIV 1062. 
 194  Roechling , 1062. 
 195  Under CCL10 each occupying authority was entitled to set its own rules of procedure for military 
trials. Th e French—unlike the Americans—allowed defendants to appeal against conviction. 
 196  Roechling , above n 193, 1109–10.    197  Roechling , 1142–3. 
 198  Bloxham, above n 73, 106.    199  Bush, above n 1, 1134. 
 200  In re Tesch & Others ( Zyklon B Case ), British Mil. Ct. 1946, in 1 UN War Crimes Comm’n,  Law 
Reports of Trials of War Criminals , 93 (1947). 
 201  UK National Archives, File No. WO 235/283. 
 202  UK National Archives, File No. WO 235/283. 
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British establishment, for several reasons including widespread anti-semitic and 
anti-communist attitudes among the UK leadership. 203 
 For the Soviets, the zonal trials appeared to be about  Systemkritik , or an oppor-
tunity to publicly condemn capitalism (as the cause/source of fascism) and its 
amoral agents. Among the estimated 70,000–72,000 persons tried by the Soviets 
under CCL10 204 were the directors and functionaries of Töpf & Sohne, who sup-
plied ovens to Auschwitz and were sent to perform hard labour. 205 
 Lawyers like Dubois and Sasuly, and to a lesser extent Taylor, left Germany 
frustrated and enraged. 206 On coming home, the case they had been fi ghting was 
now taboo. Th e tables had turned, the capitalists emerged as victors and the pros-
ecutors became persecuted. Tellingly, Kuehne, in his fi nal statement to the  Farben 
Tribunal, cited the  New York Herald Tribune of 4 October 1947, from a report on a 
speech held by the Secretary of Defence, Forrestal, as follows: ‘Mr. Forrestal denied 
that there was any historical validity for the Marxist theory according to which indus-
trialists desired war for the sake of material gains. Mr. Forrestal said that there was no 
group anywhere that was more in favour of peace than the industrialists’. 207 
 Th e point on which the Allies had agreed before, and at the IMT, was now a 
‘Marxist theory’. 208 On their return to the US, several members of the American pros-
ecution team and OMGUS staff  were investigated for possible ‘bolshevist’ sympathies 
by McCarthy’s regime. 209 Th e preface to the German edition of Sasuly’s book, states 
that this text, for political reasons, has not been available in the US for many years. 210 
Th e legacy of this has been the ‘legal amnesia’ through which the industrialists’ trials 
were forgotten until relatively recently. 211 
 On 21 September 1949 John McCloy replaced General Clay as civilian supervisor 
(High Commissioner) of what was now the Federal Republic of West Germany. By 
September 1950, the US was at war with Korea. McCloy and Acheson strongly advo-
cated that West Germany be rearmed. 212 According to Maguire, ‘[o] nce it became 
 203  A.  Rogers ,  ‘War Crimes Trials Under the Royal Warrant: British Practice, 1945–1949’ ,  ICLQ ,  39 
( 1990 ),  780–800 . 
 204  A.  Hilger ,  ‘Die Gerechtigkeit nehme ihren Lauf? Die Bestrafung deutscher Kriegs- und 
Gewaltverbrecher in der Sowjetunion und der SBZ/DDR’ , in  N.  Frei (ed),  Transnationale 
Vergangenheitspolitik:  Der Umgang mit deutschen Kriegsverbrechern in Europa nach dem Zweiten 
Weltkrieg ( Gottingen :  Wallstein Verlag,  2006 ),  191 . 
 205  ‘Protokolle des Todes’, ‘Verhörprotokolle der Auschwitz-Ingenieure Prüfer, Sander und Schultze’, 
 Der Spiegel , 47:40 (1993), 151–62, < http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-13679718.html > 
(accessed 27 February 2013) and < http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-13679727.html > (accessed 
27 February 2013). See also generally Hilger, above n 204. Hilger argues that the release of German 
prisoners in 1953–6 signifi ed a breach with the Stalinist policy of collective punishment for Germany’s 
‘unjust war’ (at 245). 
 206  Th is is evident in the tone and content of their post-war writing: Dubois, above n 8; Taylor, above 
n 156; Sasuly, above n 104. 
 207  Farben , above n 123, 1073 (Final Statements of Defendants: Keuhne). 
 208  US Senator William Langer called the industrialist cases part of a communist plot (Maguire, 
above n 75, 169). 
 209  See, eg, Bush, above n 1, 1232; Interview with Bernard Bernstein, above n 84. See also a letter by 
Telford Taylor to Philip Young (successor to McCarthy) demanding a note on Taylor’s fi le fl agging ‘unre-
solved question of loyalty’: Letter from Telford Taylor to Philip Young, ‘Telford Taylor Papers’, Arthur 
W. Diamond Law Library, Columbia University Law School, New York, NY, TTP-CLS: 10-0-3-45. 
 210  Sasuly, above n 104, 5.    211  Bush, above n 1, 1240.    212  Maguire, above n 75, 167–9. 
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offi  cial that West Germany would be rearmed, questions pertaining to the war crimi-
nals took on new signifi cance as West German leaders from all political parties pointed 
to America’s paradoxical role as occupying ally’. 213 German industrialists united in 
reconstituted trade associations again began to exert their infl uence, including for 
the release of their colleagues. 214 US and German leaderships shaped two American 
policies vis-à-vis the war crimes convicts: a public one to defend the validity of con-
victions from German attack, and a private one aimed at releasing war criminals as 
quickly and quietly as possible. 215 On 31 January 1951 clemency boards constituted 
by McCloy carried out ‘extrajudicial’ re-reviews of sentences handed down by the 
Allied occupation courts. 216 McCloy commuted twenty-one death sentences, reduced 
the sentences of sixty-nine other individuals and released thirty-three other war crimi-
nals, including Alfried Krupp. Th e  Flick and  Farben defendants had already been 
released or had completed their sentences by this point. 217 Th is review greatly upset 
Taylor, who wrote to Eleanor Roosevelt in protest. Among the main problems Taylor 
found was that the clemency board based its decision on a reading of the judgments 
and hearing of fi fty defence lawyers but not a review of the evidence nor hearing any-
one from the prosecution. 218 Moreover, the authority (or legality) of the reviews per se 
was questioned. 219 Similarly in the UK, ‘immediately on his return to Downing Street 
[in 1951] Churchill moved to release all remaining Germans’. 220 Wittig was released 
in 1955. 221 Th e early releases are criticized as completely discrediting the original tri-
als 222 and ‘confi rm[ing] the failure of Nuremberg’. 223 Jeßberger writes (specifi cally 
about the IG Farben managers—but this could apply to the industrialists in general), 
‘[the industrialists] had a soft fall, from the ranks of the Wehrmacht into the warm 
bosom of the Western powers’. 224 
 So, while ‘[t] he masses of peoples liberated from the yoke of fascism demanded 
the trial of the most evil cartel leaders, in Nuremberg’, 225 even those who had 
received sentences were soon to be freed again, and by 1952 many were already 
 213  Maguire, above n 75, 168.    214  Schanetzky, above n 30, 80. 
 215  Maguire, above n 75, 162. 
 216  ‘Landsberg: A Documentary Report’,  Information Bulletin , Offi  ce of the US High Commissioner 
for Germany Offi  ce of Public Aff airs, Public Relations Division, APO 757, US Army, February 1951, 
2–8, 55–67. 
 217  ‘Landsberg: A Documentary Report’, above n 216, 6. For Clay’s original review and confi rmation, 
see  Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10 , 
Vol. XV, 1144–5; Taylor, Final Report, above n 109, 95–7; Heller, above n 22, 332. 
 218  Letter to Eleanor Roosevelt dated 19 June 1951, ‘Telford Taylor Papers’, Arthur W. Diamond 
Law Library, Columbia University Law School, New York, NY, TTP-CLS: 14-4-3-53 (Taylor Letter 
to Roosevelt). 
 219  Heller, above n 22, 356–8.    220  Bloxham, above n 73, 116. 
 221  UK National Archives, WO 235/283.    222  Taylor Letter to Roosevelt, above n 218. 
 223  Maguire, above n 75, 178. ‘Instead of discussing the shocking atrocities committed by many of 
the high-ranking convicts, American offi  cials were forced to defend the basic legal legitimacy of the 
trials’: at 207. 
 224  Jeßberger, ‘On the Origins of Individual Criminal Responsibility’ above n 1, 802. 
 225  IG Farben:  Mächtiger und Gefährlicher denn je, Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus and der 
Technischen Hochschule für Chemie Leuna-Merseburg, 1960. 
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back in power at their companies. 226 Indeed, the IG Farben ‘parts’ BASF, Bayer, and 
Hoechst quickly became leading companies in their sector. 227 Th ese soon began to 
produce military materials again which were used by the US in their war against 
Korea. 228 Further, former manufacturer of German military uniforms Neckermann 
became a fashion mail-order giant, symbolizing the rising consumer culture, while 
the former Reich ambassador to Italy became CEO of the Coca Cola Germany, 
a symbol of US–German reconciliation. 229 While German industry was rebuilt, 
the Cold War deepened, the UN, the European Coal and Steel Community, the 
General Agreement on Tariff s and Trade regime and the Bretton Woods institu-
tions took shape. 230 From this perspective, Nuremberg was not a failure. Rather, by 
producing capitalism’s victor’s justice it played an important part in this process of 
further congealing capitalism and institutionalizing international law. 231 
 (VI)  Conclusion 
 A qualitative change came out of the contradictions of Nuremberg:  the way in 
which the war was understood had altered. Th e ‘economic case’ all but disappeared 
from the mainstream narrative of WWII, which today focuses almost entirely 
on what Frei calls the ‘Hitler-factor’. 232 Th e ‘economic case’, once central to the 
Nuremberg prosecution, while persisting in the German Democratic Republic and 
Soviet literature, is now described as propaganda by Western scholars. 233 
 International criminal law was born out of the great contradictions that existed 
in the aftermath of WWII. Its potential as a powerful way of shaping narratives—
highlighting some relations and ‘spiriting away’ others; concealing what must 
remain hidden—was soon realized. Th rough Nuremberg, international criminal 
law as ‘commodifi ed morality’ 234 helped spirit away the material causes at the base 
of WWII. At the same time, something fundamental had changed on the ground 
in Europe, where economic actors came to be seen as essentially peaceful, and 
where economic development became synonymous with peace. 235 Combined, 
these two moves cemented capitalism’s victor’s justice, functioning as a means of 
 226  Along with almost all other members of ‘Hitler’s elite’:  Norbert  Frei (ed),  Hitlers Eliten nach 1945 
( Munich :   Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag,  2003 ) , esp. T. Schanetzky, ‘Unternehmer: Profi teure des 
Unrechts’ (at 87). 
 227  Schanetzky, above n 30, 87. 
 228  IG Farben: Macht und Verbrechen: Ein auf exaktem Material beruhender Beitrag zur nationalen 
Frage in Deutschland un dem Weg zu ihrer Lösung, Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus and der 
Technischen Hochschule für Chemie Leuna-Merseburg, 1962. 
 229  Schanetzky, above n 30, 88. 
 230  In an ironic turn, McCloy was appointed to lead the World Bank (Bush, above n 1, 1193). 
 231  Grietje  Baars ,  ‘Th e Making of an International Criminal Law’ , in  Christine  Schwöbel (ed.)  Critical 
Approaches to International Criminal Law: An Introduction , ( Oxford :  Routledge , forthcoming,  2014 ) . 
 232  Generally, Frei, above n 18. 
 233  Frei, above n 18, front inside jacket and 10; Osterloh, above n 20, 37. 
 234  Baars, above n 125. 
 235  See, for example,  Th omas  Friedman’s  ‘Golden Arches Th eory of Confl ict Prevention’ , in  Th e Lexus 
and Th e Olive Tree ( New York, NY :  Anchor Books,   2000 ) . 
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creating a narrative that hides the economic story of confl ict, and constructs what 
we would now call corporate impunity. 
 Post-Cold War and the global spread of capitalism, renewed impetus for inter-
national cooperation in the sphere of international criminal law, has not led to the 
application of that law to war’s economic actors. Instead, international criminal 
law continues to draw our focus to individual deviancy rather than confl ict pro-
duced by the mode of production, hiding economic grounds behind nationalist, 
racial, religious, etc explanations. 236 Elsewhere I have employed Pashukanis’ ‘com-
modity form theory of law’ 237 to argue that law’s function reaches beyond mere 
capitalist instrumentalism and is, by virtue of its form, an essential element of the 
capitalist mode of production. 238 Th us, rather than suggesting ‘corporate account-
ability in ICL’ is a real possibility, 239 the hidden history of Nuremberg may give us 
cause to investigate more deeply exactly how and why international criminal law 
constructs  de facto ‘corporate impunity’ as a necessary ingredient of today’s capital-
ist imperialism. 
 
 236  For a discussion of this eff ect in the context of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, 
and Rwanda see Baars, above n 125, 255–85. Bukharin also makes this point: Bukharin, above n 3, 
117–18: ‘[Th e theory that war comes out of “the struggle of races”] is assiduously cultivated both in 
the press and in the universities, for the sole reason that it promises no mean advantages for Master 
Capital’: at 118. 
 237  Pashukanis, above n 2, and  China  Miéville ,  Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Th eory of International 
Law ( London :  Pluto Press,   2006 ) . 
 238  Baars, above n 125;  Grietje  Baars ,  ‘Reform or Revolution?’ Polanyian v Marxian Perspectives on 
the Regulation of “Th e Economic” ’ ,  Northern Ireland Law Quarterly ,  62 ( 2011 ),  415–31 . 
 239  As some contemporary authors on Nuremberg do, see, for example, Bush, above n 1. 
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 Eisentrager ’s (Forgotten) Merits: Military 
Jurisdiction and Collateral Habeas 
 Stephen I.  Vladeck * 
 No pre-September 11 decision by the US Supreme Court has fi gured more 
prominently in contemporary debates over the extraterritorial scope of the US 
Constitution than the Court’s 1950 ruling in  Johnson v Eisentrager . 1 Although 
 Eisentrager  has been vigorously debated, its  result is undisputed:  twenty-seven 
German nationals 2 captured in China were tried by a US military commission 
for war crimes based on their continuing participation in hostilities in support of 
the Japanese military after Germany’s 8 May 1945 surrender (and before Japan’s 
surrender on 15 August). 3 Twenty-one of the defendants were convicted by the 
commission and sentenced to prison terms ranging from fi ve years’ to life impris-
onment. 4 After being transferred back to Germany to serve their sentences, the 
twenty-one convicted defendants sought habeas relief in the US courts, only to 
have the Supreme Court ultimately reject their claims by a six to three vote. 5 
 Th e diffi  culty arises in ascertaining  how the Supreme Court reached that 
result. In his 1990 opinion in  United States v Verdugo-Urquidez , 6 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist described  Eisentrager as ‘reject[ing] the claim that aliens are entitled 
 *  Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Scholarship, American University Washington College 
of Law. My thanks to Kevin Jon Heller and Gerry Simpson for inviting me to participate in the sym-
posium from which this chapter derives, and for their near-infi nite patience thereafter. 
 1  Johnson v Eisentrager , 339 US 763 (1950). 
 2  Th e defendants were Lothar Eisentrager (also known as Ludwig Ehrhardt), Franz Siebert, 
Herbert Gleitsch, Johannes Otto, Erich Heise, Oswald Ulbricht, Hanz Niemann, Ingward Rudloff , 
Bodo Habenicht, Hans Dethleff s, Wolf Schenke, Heinz Peerschke, Hans Mesberg, Johannes Rathje, 
Siegfried Fuellkrug, Walther Heissig, Jesco von Puttkamer, Alfred Romain, Ernst Woermann, Wilhelm 
Stoller, Elgar von Randow, Walter Richter, Hermann Jaeger, Felix Altenburg, Herbert Mueller, August 
Stock, and Maria Muller. 
 3  Th e facts in this chapter are derived from three primary sources: (1) the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
 Eisentrager , see 339 US 765–8; (2) the Transcript of Record therein, see Transcript of Record,  Johnson v 
Eisentrager , 339 US 763 (1950) (No. 306); and (3) the report on the  Eisentrager commission proceedings 
in Volume 14 of the United Nations War Crimes Commission’s multivolume set on the  Law Reports of 
Trials of War Criminals , see  XIV UN War Crimes Commission,  Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 8–22 
(1949) (LRTWC). To avoid redundancy, I cite to specifi c sources only when quoting from them directly. 
 4  Glietsch, Otto, Randow, Schenke, Steller, and Woermann, were acquitted, leaving twenty-one 
defendants who ultimately petitioned for writs of habeas corpus in the US courts. 
 5  See  Eisentrager , 339 US 763.    6  494 US 259 (1990). 
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to Fifth Amendment rights outside the sovereign territory of the United States’. 7 
Relying on that passage, a number of contemporary US courts and commenta-
tors routinely cite  Eisentrager for the proposition that non-citizens detained out-
side the territorial United States have no rights under the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment. 8 In a similar vein, still others have described  Eisentrager as 
holding that the US Constitution’s Suspension Clause, which protects a detainee’s 
access to judicial review via writs of habeas corpus, does not apply to the extrater-
ritorial detention of non-citizens. 9 Th us, one of the most common criticisms of 
the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in  Boumediene v Bush , which held that the 
Suspension Clause ‘has full eff ect’ with regard to the detention of non-citizens at 
Guantánamo Bay, 10 is a lack of fealty to  Eisentrager . 11 
 And yet, as then-Solicitor-General Paul Clement so succinctly put it during the 
oral argument before the Supreme Court in  Hamdan v Rumsfeld , 12  Eisentrager is 
a case with ‘an awful lot of alternative holdings’. 13 Although the majority opinion 
was authored by Justice Robert H. Jackson—routinely hailed as one of the Court’s 
greatest writers—its analysis comes off  as disjointed, if not internally inconsist-
ent. 14 Indeed, whatever else one may say about the majority opinion in  Eisentrager , 
it seems diffi  cult to read the decision as articulating a categorical rule concerning 
the extraterritorial constitutional rights of non-citizens in light of the careful and 
repeated attention that the Court paid to the specifi c circumstances of the case. 15 
 But why did those circumstances matter? In this chapter, I  aim to answer 
that question—and to explain why  Eisentrager has been so unclear to contem-
porary readers—by focusing on the one source almost completely neglected by 
present-day discussions of the 1950 Supreme Court decision: the underlying mili-
tary commission proceedings. 16 Indeed, for as much attention as  Eisentrager has 
received, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the war crimes trial from 
which the litigation arose—even though at least some records of the proceedings are 
 7  Verdugo-Urquidez , above n 6, 269 (‘[T] he Court held that enemy aliens arrested in China and 
imprisoned in Germany after World War II could not obtain writs of habeas corpus in our federal 
courts on the ground that their convictions for war crimes had violated the Fifth Amendment and 
other constitutional provisions.’). 
 8  See, eg,  United States v Ali , 71 MJ 256, 267–268 (CAAF, 2012);  Rasul v Myers , 563 F 3d 527, 
529 (DC Cir, 2009) ( per curiam );  J. Andrew  Kent ,  ‘A Textual and Historical Case Against a Global 
Constitution’ ,  Georgetown Law Journal ,  95 ( 2007 ),  474 . 
 9  See, eg,  Ibrahim v Dep’t of Homeland Sec. , 669 F 3d 983, 995 (9th Cir, 2012). 
 10  553 US 723, 771 (2008).    11  See, eg, ibid, 834–42 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 12  Hamdan v Rumsfeld , 548 US 557 (2006). 
 13  Transcript of Oral Argument 72, Hamdan, 548 US 557 (No. 05-184) (statement of Solicitor 
General Paul Clement), < http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/ 
05-184.pdf > (link directs to Supreme Court website, accessed 28 February 2013). 
 14  See, eg,  Stephen I.  Vladeck ,  ‘Th e Problem of Jurisdictional Non-Precedent’ ,  Tulsa Law Review , 
 44 ( 2009 ),  595–600 . 
 15  See, eg,  Johnson v Eisentrager , 339 US 763, 785–90 (1950). 
 16  Indeed, contemporary commentators routinely ignore the fact that the habeas petitioners before 
the Supreme Court had already been convicted by a military commission, which dramatically changes 
the circumstances of their case from those of individuals held without charges. See, eg,  Rasul v Bush , 
542 US 466, 475–7 (2004) (articulating some of the key diff erences between  Eisentrager and the 
Guantánamo habeas litigation). 
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easily accessible; and even though, as I explain in the pages that follow, a full apprecia-
tion of the proceedings sheds signifi cant light on Justice Jackson’s analytical approach. 
 Th us, Section I begins by providing a detailed overview of the  Eisentrager  military 
commission. As Section I explains, the central contention made by the petitioners 
in  Eisentrager was not that they had been deprived of constitutional rights during 
their military commission trial; rather, their claim was that, for various reasons, the 
commission lacked jurisdiction to try them. 17 Indeed, even in front of the commis-
sion itself, the defendants’ ‘main argument’, as the offi  cial report on the proceedings 
later summarized, 18 challenged the tribunal’s power to try them, and not whether the 
defendants in fact had supported Japanese forces in China subsequent to Germany’s 8 
May surrender. No arguments were made at any point in the commission concerning 
the defendants’ constitutional rights; that issue only arose once the DC Circuit rested 
its jurisdiction to  reach the merits on its view of the defendants’ constitutional entitle-
ment to judicial review. 19 
 Th e signifi cance of the  Eisentrager defendants’ jurisdictional argument becomes 
clearer in Section II, which turns to the jurisprudential background against which 
 Eisentrager was decided. Indeed, in 1950, it was black-letter law that the only claim 
US federal courts could adjudicate in a collateral attack upon a conviction by a mili-
tary court was whether the military had properly exercised jurisdiction—regardless of 
whether the defendant was a citizen or a foreign national, or whether the military trial 
took place within or without the territorial United States. 20 As Chief Justice Stone 
wrote for the Court in 1946 in  In re Yamashita :
 [O] n application for habeas corpus we are not concerned with the guilt or innocence of the 
petitioners. We consider here only the lawful power of the commission to try the petitioner for 
the off ence charged. In the present cases it must be recognised throughout that the military tri-
bunals which Congress has sanctioned by the Articles of War are not courts whose rulings and 
judgments are made subject to review by this Court. Th ey are tribunals whose determinations 
are reviewable by the military authorities either as provided in the military orders constituting 
such tribunals or as provided by the Articles of War. Congress conferred on the courts no power 
to review their determinations save only as it has granted judicial power ‘to grant writs of habeas 
corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of the restraint of liberty’. Th e courts may 
inquire whether the detention complained of is within the authority of those detaining the 
petitioner. If the military tribunals have lawful authority to hear, decide and condemn, their 
action is not subject to judicial review merely because they have made a wrong decision on 
disputed facts. Correction of their errors of decision is not for the courts but for the military 
authorities which are alone authorised to review their decisions. 21 
 17  See, eg, Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari 1-4,  Eisentrager , 339 US 763 
(No. 306). 
 18  XIV LRTWC, above n 3, 15.    19  See  Eisentrager v Forrestal , 174 F 2d 961 (DC Cir, 1949). 
 20  See, eg,  Hiatt v Brown , 339 US 103, 111 (1950) (‘It is well settled that by habeas corpus the 
civil courts exercise no supervisory or correcting power over the proceedings of a court-martial . . . Th e 
single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction.’ (omission in original; internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 21  327 US 1, 8 (1946) (citations omitted). Th is model of review stands in contrast to the model 
that Congress pursued in the Military Commissions Acts of 2006 and 2009, which provide for direct 
appellate review of military commissions in an intermediate military court (the ‘Court of Military 
Commission Review’), followed by the US Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and, potentially, the 
US Supreme Court. See 10 USC §§ 950f, 950g. 
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 Th ree years after  Eisentrager , the Court expanded the scope of habeas review of 
courts-martial in  Burns v Wilson , 22 a holding that likely applies as well to collat-
eral review of military commissions. 23 But at least at the time that  Eisentrager was 
decided, the only question that the federal courts had the power to adjudicate was 
whether the military commission properly exercised jurisdiction. 
 Section III turns to the proceedings before the Supreme Court in  Eisentrager 
in light of the factual background provided in Section I and the legal background 
provided in Section II. Although there are any number of statements in Justice 
Jackson’s majority opinion that, out of context, may well support the broad view of 
 Eisentrager embraced by Chief Justice Rehnquist in  Verdugo-Urquidez and popular 
among numerous contemporary commentators, the Court’s focus on the com-
mission’s ‘jurisdiction’ in Parts III and IV of the majority opinion drives home the 
crucial point—that  Eisentrager was ultimately a merits decision, that is, a holding 
by the Court that the commission that convicted the petitioners properly exer-
cised jurisdiction. 24 Because of that conclusion, the petitioners’ entitlement to due 
process and/or habeas corpus was moot; there was nothing more for the federal 
courts to do. 
 Ultimately, then,  Eisentrager ’s history is hiding in plain sight in the nature of 
the arguments made by the military commission defendants. And that hidden his-
tory provides a far more convincing and compelling explanation for the Supreme 
Court’s disposition of the defendants’ claims—and for an exceedingly limited view 
of the 1950 decision’s future doctrinal relevance. 
 (I)  United States v Eisentrager et al 
 Th e only truly unusual aspect of the military commission proceedings in  United 
States v Eisentrager was the nature of the charges. Although the US government 
convened hundreds of military commissions to try Axis war criminals after the 
end of World War II, the  Eisentrager proceedings were, from the start, unique. 
Indeed, the factual idiosyncrasies may help to explain why, of all the post-war US 
military commission proceedings,  Eisentrager would be one of only two that drew 
the attention of the US Supreme Court. 
 (1)  Factual background 
 At the heart of the prosecution’s case in  Eisentrager was the role of the ‘Bureau 
Ehrhardt’, which the US government claimed was a ‘unit of the German High 
Command’, and which the defendants claimed was a civilian agency of the 
 22  346 US 137 (1953) (plurality opinion). 
 23  Th e issue has never formally arisen, but the Supreme Court has consistently treated the scope of 
collateral review of military commissions as following the same for courts-martial. See, eg,  Yamashita , 
327 US 8. 
 24  Johnson v Eisentrager , 339 US 763, 781–90 (1950). 
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German government. Whether de facto or de jure, it was undisputed that Bureau 
Ehrhardt was an intelligence agency run by Ludwig Ehrhardt—also known 
as Lothar Eisentrager—who himself was employed by the German Embassy in 
Japanese-occupied China during the war. Th rough a combination of offi  cial and 
unoffi  cial channels, Bureau Ehrhardt eff ectively served as the intelligence and 
propaganda apparatus for German interests in China throughout the hostilities 
in Asia. And although some of the twenty-seven defendants were not directly 
employed by the Bureau, all were allegedly involved in its operations in some way. 
 Th e central claim that gave rise to the  Eisentrager  war crimes trial was the alle-
gation that, after Germany’s unconditional surrender on 8 May 1945, Bureau 
Ehrhardt continued to operate in Shanghai, Canton (present-day Guangzhou), 
and Peking (Beijing), by furnishing various forms of aid (including the facilitation 
of Japanese access to German-owned materiel) and military intelligence directly 
to Japanese armed forces stationed in China. Indeed, the government introduced 
a telegram Ehrhardt/Eisentrager sent to all of his subordinates on 8 May 1945, 
which specifi cally provided: 
 (1)  that the organization ceased to exist and its members were to be 
demobilized; 
 (2)  that equipment should be turned over to Japanese authorities who were to 
be instructed how to use it; and 
 (3)  that the question of continuing work in cooperation with the Japanese was 
left to the discretion of every individual member of the organization. 25 
 Although Erhardt argued that the telegram was meant to be taken at face value 
(and, as such, proved that the Bureau had formally demobilized), the government 
introduced substantial evidence proving that the Bureau’s employees took it to 
mean exactly the opposite—that ‘the telegram was so worded as to suggest that 
co-operation with the Japanese was desirable, or even ordered’. 26 Th e government 
also introduced evidence of a series of ongoing contacts between Bureau employees 
and the Japanese military, which apparently sought only to expand the role that 
the Bureau played both in providing intelligence to support Japanese manoeuvres 
in China throughout June and July 1945 and in designing propaganda intended 
to reach US troops engaged with Japanese forces throughout the Pacifi c Rim. 
To that end, the government proff ered a single charge against all twenty-seven 
defendants—that they:
 [k] nowingly, wilfully and unlawfully, violate[d] the unconditional German surrender by 
engaging in and continuing military activity against the United States and its allies, to 
wit by furnishing, ordering, authorising, permitting and failing to stop the furnishing of 
aid, assistance, information, advice, intelligence, propaganda and material to the Japanese 
armed forces and agencies, thereby by such acts of treachery assisting Japan in waging war 
against the United States of American in violation of the laws and customs of war. 27 
 25  XIV LRTWC, above n 3, 11.    26  XIV LRTWC, above n 3, 11. 
 27  Transcript of Record 25–6,  Johnson v Eisentrager , 339 US 763 (1950) (No. 306). 
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 Th e defendants were taken into custody by US forces sometime after the Japanese 
surrender in China in September 1945. In January 1946, the US military issued an 
order creating military commissions to try war criminals captured in the Chinese 
theatre for off ences committed therein. Th e trial in  Eisentrager itself took place 
in Nanking between 3 October 1946, and 14 January 1947. Other than the dis-
pute over whether they acted independently or under continued coordination, the 
defendants did not materially contest the factual allegations. Instead, they off ered 
three distinct sets of defences—one jurisdictional, and two on the merits. 
 Th e jurisdictional objection was three-fold. First, the defendants argued that, 
as German nationals living in China, they could only be subject to German or 
Chinese law in German or Chinese courts. Second, and relatedly, the defendants 
argued that the 1943 abrogation by treaty of the US Court for China deprived 
the United States of any alternative basis to assert jurisdiction over the defend-
ants. Finally, the defendants claimed that the agreement between the United States 
and China on which the military commission’s jurisdiction was predicated was 
irrelevant, both because (1) it was never ratifi ed by the Legislative Assembly of the 
Republic of China; and (2) the authority it conveyed could only be exercised by an 
‘occupation’ force, and not by an expeditionary force on allied soil (as the United 
States military necessarily was once Japan surrendered to China). 
 On the merits, the defendants also off ered three arguments in favour of a motion 
to dismiss the charges. First, the defendants claimed that the charges did not state 
suffi  cient facts to support a violation of the laws of war. Second, and related, the 
defendants argued that even if the charges were factually suffi  cient, ‘a violation of 
certain terms by individuals although punishable, does not constitute a war crime 
unless the acts constituting the violation thereof are such as in themselves consti-
tute a violation of the laws and customs of war’. In other words, even if defendants 
violated the surrender, that by itself was not enough to render them subject to trial 
by military commission. Finally, the defendants attacked the charges for failing to 
allege that the defendants had received ‘offi  cial’ notice of Germany’s 8 May sur-
render, even though they conceded that they had actual notice. 
 (2)  Th e Commission’s rulings 
 Th e jurisdictional argument to which the commission devoted the most atten-
tion was the fi rst one—that the defendants could only be subjected to German or 
Chinese law for crimes committed on Chinese soil. Relying on the earlier military 
commission decision in the  Sawada case, the  Eisentrager commission ruled that 
‘[t] he laws and usages of war are of universal application, and do not depend for 
their existence upon national laws and frontiers’. 28 Th is conclusion proved disposi-
tive of the defendants’ two other jurisdictional challenges; from the commission’s 
perspective, it followed that, once the Chinese government invited US forces onto 
Chinese soil, that invitation rendered beside the point whatever constraints would 
 28  XIV LRTWC, above n 3, 15. 
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otherwise have existed on the US government’s power over the defendants. Relying 
heavily on the US Supreme Court’s holding in the  Yamashita case that prosecuting 
war criminals is an inherent incident to the war power more generally, the commis-
sion thereby dismissed the jurisdictional objections. 
 As for the defendants’ claims on the merits, the heart of their legal argument 
went to the contention that violating the terms of Germany’s surrender was not 
a war crime. In responding to this contention, the commission’s analysis appears 
to have rested on a series of interrelated conclusions. First, the 8 May 1945 Act of 
Military Surrender was explicit and unambiguous in its applicability in ‘all thea-
tres of war’ against forces of the ‘United Nations’. Second, the conduct Bureau 
Ehrhardt allegedly engaged in subsequent to the 8 May surrender appeared to 
fall within the scope of the Act of Military Surrender’s defi nition of hostilities, 
Article 9 of which provided that ‘[p] ending the institution of control by the Allied 
Representative over all means of communication, all radio and telecommunication 
installations and other forms of wire or wireless communications, whether ashore 
or afl oat, under German control, will cease transmission except as directed by the 
Allied Representatives’. 29 
 Th ird, both custom and usage supported the conclusion that post-surrender 
hostilities constituted a war crime when such hostilities were committed by assist-
ing the forces of an allied belligerent who had not yet surrendered. Th us, the offi  -
cial report of the commission invoked Articles 40 and 41 of the 1907 Hague 
Convention; the then-leading international law treatise; and the decision in the 
 Scuttled U-Boat Case , in which a lieutenant in the German navy was convicted of 
violating the Act of Military Surrender by scuttling a pair of U-Boats rather than 
surrendering them to the Allies. 30 As the reporter summarized, the defendants tried 
to distinguish that precedent by suggesting that hostilities were ongoing in the 
Pacifi c theatre, and so, unlike the defendant in  Scuttled U-Boat , they had a ‘perfect 
right’ to join forces with the Japanese (who had not participated in the European 
theatre). Th e commission rejected the argument, and its decision was subsequently 
read as establishing that:
 members of the armed forces of a belligerent whose entire armed forces have surrendered 
must abstain from all hostilities wherever they may fi nd themselves on the date of such 
surrender[,] and that by co-operating with an allied belligerent and  a fortiori by joining 
the forces of such belligerent, they violate the terms of surrender and thus commit a war 
crime. 31 
 Fourth, and fi nally, the commission rejected the argument that some of the 
defendants were not bound by the surrender because they were civilian employ-
ees of the German government, and therefore not within the military chain of 
command. Indeed, given that some of the defendants were convicted despite the 
fact that they were not formally part of the Bureau Ehrhardt, the commission’s 
 29  XIV LRTWC, above n 3, 19–20. 
 30  See XIV LRTWC, above n 3, 18–20; see also Trial of Oberleutenant Gerhard Grumpelt (Th e 
Scuttled U-Boats Case) (Brit. Mil. Ct. 1946), I LRTWC, above n 3, 55, 56. 
 31  XIV LRTWC, above n 3, 21. 
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decision established that ‘the terms of surrender applied to all nationals of the sur-
rendering belligerent and not only to the armed forces’. 32 Since ‘all such nationals 
must . . . refrain from activities which are either considered to be military activities 
or contrary to the terms of surrender’, 33 the only remaining question was whether 
the prosecution could establish that each of the defendants had in fact engaged in 
such conduct between 8 May and 15 August 1945. Presumably, in the cases of the 
six defendants who were acquitted at the close of the prosecution’s case-in-chief 
(Glietsch, Otto, Randow, Schenke, Steller, and Woermann), the government was 
not able to adduce suffi  cient proof. Th e other twenty-one defendants were found 
guilty at the close of the defence case. 
 Although Ehrhardt/Eisentrager himself was sentenced to life imprisonment, 
the other twenty defendants were sentenced to prison terms ranging from fi ve to 
thirty years. After their convictions, the twenty-one defendants were transferred to 
Landsberg Prison in Germany to serve their sentences. Th ree of the sentences were 
subsequently reduced by the Reviewing Authority, Major General John P. Lucas, 
who confi rmed the remaining judgments on 10 May 1947. 34 Less than one year later, 
habeas petitions were fi led on behalf of the twenty-one convicted defendants in the 
US District Court for the District of Columbia by A. Frank Reel, the same Boston 
lawyer who had defended General Yamashita before a US military commission in 
1945, and then unsuccessfully appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court. 35 
 (3)  Habeas proceedings in the lower courts 
 Th e habeas petition in  Eisentrager v Forrestal was fi led in the DC District Court on 
26 April 1948 against a rather complex (and evolving) jurisprudential backdrop. 
For obvious reasons, the US federal courts had begun to receive a number of habeas 
petitions from individuals held overseas beginning in early 1946. 36 Although the 
fi rst cases involved US soldiers challenging their courts-martial for abuses commit-
ted while serving abroad, convicted German and Japanese war criminals began to 
seek relief in the US courts as early as October 1947—when Field Marshal Erhard 
Milch sought to challenge his conviction by the Nuremberg Military Tribunal 
(NMT) in the US Supreme Court. Th e Justices denied review by a four to four 
vote (Justice Jackson, the lead US prosecutor before the International Military 
Tribunal, understandably recused), 37 at least largely because it was unclear whether 
the Supreme Court had the power to entertain such an ‘original’ action. 38 
 32  XIV LRTWC, above n 3, 21.    33  XIV LRTWC, above n 3, 21–2. 
 34  See Transcript of Record 42–3,  Johnson v Eisentrager , 339 US 763 (1950) (No. 306). 
 35  See  In re Yamashita , 327 US 1 (1946); see also  A. Frank  Reel ,  Th e Case of General Yamashita 
( Chicago :  University of Chicago Press ,  1949 ) . 
 36  For discussions of this litigation, see  Charles  Fairman ,  ‘Some New Problems of the Constitution 
Following the Flag’ ,  Stanford Law Review ,  1 ( 1949 ),  587 ; and  Stephen I.  Vladeck ,  ‘Deconstructing 
Hirota: Habeas Corpus, Citizenship, and Article III’ ,  Georgetown Law Journal ,  95 ( 2007 ),  1497 . 
 37  See  Milch v United States , 332 US 789 (1947) (memorandum). 
 38  Th e US Constitution limits the Supreme Court’s ‘original’ jurisdiction to a small class of cases, 
which generally do not include habeas petitions brought by US detainees. Technically, those limits 
are not implicated when the Supreme Court is at least functionally asked to review the decision of a 
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 If the claims could not be brought directly in the Supreme Court, the next 
candidate would be to fi le in the lower federal courts, and then potentially appeal 
an unfavourable decision to the Justices (who would have had statutory appel-
late jurisdiction in such cases). But on 21 June 1948, at almost the exact same 
time as the  Eisentrager petitioners fi led their suit, the Supreme Court created a 
new jurisdictional obstacle. Specifi cally, the Court held in  Ahrens v Clark that the 
federal habeas corpus statute only authorized jurisdiction in a detainee’s ‘district 
of confi nement’. 39 While such a rule served merely as a choice-of-venue provision 
for individuals detained  within the United States, it necessarily raised the question 
of whether district courts could not thereby exercise statutory jurisdiction over 
habeas petitions brought by individuals detained outside the territorial jurisdic-
tion of  any district court, such as the petitioners in  Eisentrager . And although the 
Justices in  Ahrens were clearly aware of the pending war crimes cases, they expressly 
punted on this question, noting only that ‘[w] e need not determine the question 
of what process, if any, a person confi ned in an area not subject to the jurisdiction 
of any district court may employ to assert federal rights’. 40 
 Whereas  Ahrens may have purported to leave the question open, analysis by con-
temporaneous (and future) commentators suggested that its reasoning compelled 
the same answer. As Professor Charles Fairman put it in the  Stanford Law Review , 
‘if the statute makes the presence of the petitioner a requisite to jurisdiction, how 
can it make any diff erence whether the detention is in no district rather than a dif-
ferent district?’ 41 Unfortunately, in ruling on the  Eisentrager habeas petition, Judge 
Edward Tamm did not even reach that question, incorrectly concluding instead 
that ‘[t] he facts at issue were directly raised before the Supreme Court’ in  Ahrens , 
and that ‘the Supreme Court has specifi cally passed upon the question of law pre-
sented to this Court’. 42 Although the Supreme Court had done no such thing, Judge 
Tamm’s ruling thereby provoked an unnecessary constitutional question: Does the 
Constitution itself require access to a habeas remedy for all individuals in US cus-
tody, such that courts must act even in the absence of statutory jurisdiction? 
 Rather than reverse the district court for misreading  Ahrens (as it quite clearly 
had), the DC Circuit on appeal reached out to decide the constitutional question. 
As Judge E. Barrett Prettyman wrote for a unanimous three-judge panel:
 Th e question here is not whether a court, either state or federal, can exercise its judicial 
power within the jurisdiction of another and independent government. Th e question is 
whether it can exercise that power upon those Government offi  cials within its territorial 
jurisdiction who have directive power over the immediate jailer outside the United States 
but acting solely upon authority of this Government. We think that it can, if that be the 
only means of applying the Constitution to a given governmental action. 43 
‘lower’ court, but it hardly followed that the tribunals at issue in these cases were examples of such. 
See generally Vladeck, above n 36. 
 39  335 US 188 (1948).    40  335 US 188 (1948), 192, n 4.    41  Fairman, above n 36, 632. 
 42  Eisentrager v Forrestal , unpublished opinion (DDC, Oct 6 1948), reprinted in Transcript of 
Record 16–17,  Johnson v Eisentrager , 339 US 763 (1950) (No. 306). 
 43  Eisentrager v Forrestal , 174 F 2d 961, 967 (DC Cir, 1949) (footnotes omitted). 
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 Th us, the Court of Appeals held that the Suspension Clause of the US Constitution 
required the court to read the habeas statute as  not foreclosing jurisdiction—that, 
in eff ect, the Suspension Clause protected access to the US courts for  all individu-
als in US custody anywhere in the world. Decided in April 1949, at a time when 
the US military continued to detain hundreds of thousands of enemy soldiers 
around the world, it is little surprise that the Truman Administration expeditiously 
sought review from the US Supreme Court. 
 (II)  Th e US Supreme Court and the Scope of Collateral Habeas 
 Th e sweeping rhetoric of the DC Circuit’s analysis helped obfuscate the narrow-
ness of the detainees’ substantive claim on the merits—that the US military com-
mission that convicted them was without jurisdiction to try them. Th at nuance is 
critical, given that  Eisentrager reached the Supreme Court just as the Justices were 
in the midst of dramatically expanding the scope of collateral review of criminal 
convictions in other contexts (and debating the proper scope of collateral review 
of military courts). 44 Th us, to understand why the ‘jurisdictional’ nature of the 
challenge in  Eisentrager was so central, this section provides a broader introduction 
to the Supreme Court’s evolving approach to the scope of collateral review—and 
where things stood on 14 November 1949, when the Justices accepted the govern-
ment’s appeal of the DC Circuit’s decision in  Eisentrager . 45 
 (1)  Collateral review of state court convictions 
 Since at least the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, if not before, the federal courts 
unquestionably had statutory jurisdiction to entertain habeas petitions by indi-
viduals in custody pursuant to a  state court conviction, so long as their petition 
alleged that they were in custody in violation of federal law. 46 And there was no 
question that  federal prisoners similarly could repair to habeas as a means of col-
laterally attacking a federal conviction. 47 Th e more signifi cant issue was the scope 
of review federal courts could undertake in exercizing that jurisdiction. 
 Initially, and into the 1930s, federal courts generally followed the same rule 
in collateral habeas proceedings that they followed in other collateral attacks on 
judgments. Th e only basis on which a judgment could collaterally be invalidated 
 44  In 1942, the Supreme Court for the fi rst time formally recognized the right of state prisoners to 
use federal habeas petitions to challenge the legality of their state court convictions on grounds that 
did not necessarily go to the state court’s ‘jurisdiction’. See  Waley v Johnston , 316 US 101, 104–5 
(1942) ( per curiam ). See generally  Stephen I.  Vladeck ,  ‘Th e New Habeas Revisionism’ ,  Harvard Law 
Review ,  124 ( 2011 ),  984–5 (summarizng the signifi cance of this development).  Waley opened the 
door, but did not settle, whether non-jurisdictional challenges could also be litigated in habeas peti-
tions challenging  military convictions, as well. See  Burns v Wilson , 346 US 844 (1953) (Frankfurter, 
J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing). 
 45  See  Johnson v Eisentrager , 338 US 877 (1949) (memorandum) (granting certiorari). 
 46  See 28 USC § 2241(c).    47  See 28 USC § 2255. 
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was if the court that rendered the judgment acted without jurisdiction. 48 Any 
non-jurisdictional errors, no matter their extent, could not furnish an appropri-
ate basis for habeas relief, because ‘the writ of habeas corpus cannot be used as a 
writ of error’. 49 Th us, the Supreme Court’s two famous habeas corpus decisions 
from the early decades of the twentieth century— Frank v Mangum 50 and  Moore v 
Dempsey 51 —both turned on claims that the state court was unable properly to exer-
cise its jurisdiction because of the mob violence surrounding the underlying trials. 
 In 1938, the Supreme Court took the fi rst tentative but critical step toward a 
broader scope of collateral review in  Johnson v Zerbst . 52 Th ere, the Court held that 
it had the power in a habeas proceeding to reach the merits of the defendant’s claim 
that he had been denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, even though such 
a right had not previously been thought to implicate the ‘jurisdiction’ of the trial 
court. 53 Writing for a 5-2 majority, Justice Black explained that, ‘[s] ince the Sixth 
Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged with crime to the assistance of 
counsel, compliance with this constitutional mandate is an essential jurisdictional 
prerequisite to a federal court’s authority to deprive an accused of his life or lib-
erty’. 54 Of course, one could make similar arguments about a host of other consti-
tutional rights, and so the holding in  Zerbst , despite its ‘kiss [of ] the jurisdictional 
book’, 55 may just as much have spelled its demise. 
 So it was less than four years later that the Court in  Waley v Johnston 56 dropped 
any requirement that a claim be ‘jurisdictional’ in order to form a proper basis 
for collateral relief via habeas. Instead, the Court concluded, albeit without much 
discussion, that:
 the use of the writ in the federal courts to test the constitutional validity of a conviction for 
crime is not restricted to those cases where the judgment of conviction is void for want of 
jurisdiction of the trial court to render it. It extends also to those exceptional cases where 
the conviction has been in disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused, and where 
the writ is the only eff ective means of preserving his rights. 57 
 To be fair, it would only be  subsequent Supreme Court decisions—including those 
allowing  de novo re-litigation of constitutional claims rejected by state courts 58 and 
the  de novo litigation of claims never even  raised in the state courts 59 —that would 
receive fame (or infamy) for so dramatically expanding the federal courts’ role in 
supervising state criminal trials. But it was  Zerbst and  Waley that ‘blazed a new trail’ 
(as Justice Frankfurter put it in 1953), 60 and opened the door for the jurisprudence 
that followed. 
 48  See  Randy  Hertz and  James S.  Liebman ,  Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure ( Dayton, 
OH :  LexisNexis , 5th edn,  2005 ), § 2.4d,  42–82 . 
 49  Woolsey v Best , 299 US 1, 2 (1936) ( per curiam ).    50  237 US 309 (1915). 
 51  261 US 86 (1923).    52  304 US 458 (1938).    53  304 US, 465–7. 
 54  304 US, 467. 
 55  Henry J.  Friendly ,  ‘Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments’ ,  University 
of Chicago Law Review ,  38 ( 1970 ),  151 . 
 56  316 US 101 (1942) ( per curiam ).    57  316 US, 104–5. 
 58  See, eg,  Brown v Allen , 344 US 443 (1953).    59  See, eg,  Fay v Noia , 372 US 391 (1963). 
 60  Burns v Wilson , 346 US 844, 846 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing). 
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 (2)  Collateral review of courts-martial 
 Until the decision in  Zerbst , the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence concerning the 
scope of collateral review of convictions by  military courts was no diff erent from its 
approach to civilian courts. As Chief Justice Fuller explained in 1900:
 Courts Martial are lawful tribunals, with authority to fi nally determine any case over which 
they have jurisdiction, and their proceedings, when confi rmed as provided, are not open 
to review by the civil tribunals, except for the purpose of ascertaining whether the military 
court had jurisdiction of the person and subject matter, and whether, though having such 
jurisdiction, it had exceeded its powers in the sentence pronounced. 61 
 It may not have made sense to use the same standard as in collateral review of 
civilian courts since, unlike their civilian brethren, military courts were not at the 
time subject to appellate review by  any civilian court—including the US Supreme 
Court. 62 Nevertheless, the Court repeatedly held fast to the view that, in collat-
eral challenges to convictions by courts-martial ‘[t] he single inquiry, the test, is 
jurisdiction’. 63 
 Tellingly, even as the Court was expanding the scope of collateral review of civil-
ian courts in  Zerbst  and  Waley , it left the scope of collateral review of military tri-
bunals alone. It wasn’t until 1947 that  any federal court purported to apply  Zerbst ’s 
broader conception of ‘jurisdiction’ to collateral review of a court-martial, 64 and 
no decision appears to have applied  Waley . More to the point, in  Hiatt v Brown , 
decided by the Supreme Court just over one month before it heard oral argument 
in  Eisentrager , the Justices applied the classical ‘jurisdictional’ rule to a collateral 
attack on a court-martial without any discussion of  Zerbst  or  Waley . 65 Writing for 
the Court, Justice Clark chastised the DC Circuit for:
 extending its review, for the purpose of determining compliance with the due process 
clause, to such matters as the propositions of law set forth in the staff  judge advocate’s 
report, the suffi  ciency of the evidence to sustain respondent’s conviction, the adequacy of 
the pretrial investigation, and the competence of the law member and defence counsel. 66 
 As Clark explained, ‘the court-martial had jurisdiction of the person accused and 
the off ence charged, and acted within its lawful powers. Th e correction of any 
errors it may have committed is for the military authorities which are alone author-
ized to review its decision’. 67 
 Th e law with regard to courts-martial would change in 1953 when, in  Burns v 
Wilson , the Court expanded the scope of review to claims that the military court 
failed to give ‘full and fair consideration’ to the defendant’s constitutional objec-
tions. 68 Th e ‘full and fair consideration’ standard has not gone un-criticized, but 
 61  Carter v Roberts , 177 US 496, 498 (1900). 
 62  See, eg,  Ex parte Vallandigham , 68 US (1 Wall.) 243 (1864). See generally  Burns , 346 US 844–7 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing) (questioning why military courts should 
receive  less review than their civilian counterparts). 
 63  In re Grimley , 137 US 147, 150 (1890). 
 64  See  Shapiro v United States , 69 F Supp 205, 207–8 (Ct Cl, 1947). 
 65  339 US 103 (1950).    66  339 US, 110.    67  339 US, 111. 
 68  Burns v Wilson , 346 US 137 (1953). 
09_9780199671144c9.indd   204 10/3/2013   4:10:12 PM
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in 
any way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
Eisentrager’s (Forgotten) Merits: Military Jurisdiction and Collateral Habeas  205
whereas it is beyond question that it represents a broader scope of review than that 
which had previously been available, the critical point for present purposes is the 
state of the law in the spring of 1950. At least with regard to courts-martial,  Hiatt 
demonstrated that it was crystal clear—and limited to ‘jurisdictional’ challenges in 
the classical sense. 
 (3)  Collateral review of military commissions 
 Although the Supreme Court circa 1950 had considered far fewer cases involv-
ing collateral attacks on the judgments of military commissions (as opposed to 
courts-martial), there was no reason to suspect that the scope of review diff ered 
as between the two. Indeed, in both  Ex parte Quirin 69 and  In re Yamashita , 70 the 
Court had framed the question before it as whether the military commission prop-
erly exercised jurisdiction, invoking its court-martial jurisprudence as precedent. 71 
To similar eff ect, the Court’s Civil War-era decisions in  Ex parte Vallandigham 72 
and  Ex parte Milligan 73 refl ected identical jurisdictional precepts, with the Justices 
rejecting their jurisdiction to entertain an ‘appeal’ from a military commission 
in  Vallandigham , 74 and concluding on collateral review that the commission in 
 Milligan lacked jurisdiction. 75 
 Indeed, the only wrinkle that appeared in the World War II-era cases arose 
in instances in which defendants were convicted by military commissions argu-
ably convened under international, rather than US, authority. Th us, the US 
Supreme Court rejected its jurisdiction to entertain a habeas petition challenging 
the judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in  Hirota 
v MacArthur , 76 even if the Justices were (deliberately) unclear as to whether the 
defect went solely to their power to hear such an ‘original’ claim, or to the power 
of the federal courts more generally to review such international tribunals. 77 And 
shortly after the DC Circuit decided  Eisentrager , a separate panel of that interme-
diate appellate court turned away a habeas petition seeking to challenge one of the 
judgments of the Nuremberg Military Tribunal, holding that the NMT was, in 
eff ect, an international court, and so  Hirota (which had not been clear on the issue) 
foreclosed  all federal jurisdiction. 78 
 In  Eisentrager , though, there was no question that the commission that con-
victed the defendants acted exclusively under the auspices of US authority. Th us, 
the only claim the petitioners could have brought on the merits in their habeas 
petition was that the commission itself lacked jurisdiction to try them. If the com-
mission properly exercised jurisdiction, that would necessarily have been the end 
of the matter. 
 69  317 US 1 (1942).    70  327 US 1 (1946). 
 71  See, eg, Yamashita , 327 US 8;  Quirin , 317 US 25.    72  68 US (1 Wall.) 243 (1864). 
 73  71 US (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).    74  See 68 US (1 Wall.) 250–3. 
 75  See 71 US (4 Wall.) 127–31; see also  Ex parte Yerger , 75 US (8 Wall.) 85, 102–3 (1869). 
 76  See 338 US 197 (1948) ( per curiam ). 
 77  See generally Vladeck, above n 36, 1518 and n 107. 
 78  See  Flick v Johnson , 174 F 2d 983 (DC Cir, 1949). Th e Supreme Court declined to review  Flick on 
the same day it agreed to review  Eisentrager .  See Flick v Johnson , 338 US 879 (1949) (memorandum). 
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 (III)  Johnson v Eisentrager 
 Of course, the lower federal courts never reached the  Eisentrager petitioners’ claim 
that the military commission that tried them lacked the jurisdiction to do so. As 
noted above, the district court dismissed the petitions on the ground that the 
Supreme Court’s 1948 decision in  Ahrens v Clark divested the federal courts of 
statutory jurisdiction over extraterritorial habeas petitions, 79 and the DC Circuit 
reversed, holding that the Constitution required access to the writ of habeas cor-
pus for  anyone in US custody. 80 Not surprisingly, then, the briefi ng before the 
Supreme Court focused on the lower courts’ jurisdictional analysis—especially the 
DC Circuit’s articulation of a global constitutional right to the habeas remedy. 
Indeed, one is hard-pressed to fi nd in the hundreds of pages of briefi ng before the 
Supreme Court a solitary mention of the merits of the petitioners’ claims anywhere 
other than the discussion of the factual background. 
 Th us, when the Court heard oral argument on 17 April 1950, the Justices’ focus 
was necessarily on the decision below, and the question whether enemy aliens 
convicted by a US military commission were constitutionally entitled to access to 
the federal courts via habeas corpus. When the opinion came down six weeks later, 
on 5 June, six of the nine Justices answered that question in the negative, albeit 
somewhat obtusely. 81 
 (1)  Th e Supreme Court’s decision 
 As I have explained elsewhere, 82 Justice Robert Jackson’s opinion for the majority 
had four major analytical parts. In Part I, Jackson retraced the various legal and 
historical precedents with regard to the legal rights of citizens versus non-citizens, 
and, in particular, ‘friendly’ versus ‘enemy’ aliens. 83 As Jackson explained, consti-
tutional protections for non-citizens fl owed from their physical presence within 
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, as opposed to any more basic prin-
ciples of protection owed to them by the US government. During time of war, 
in particular, Jackson invoked the Alien Enemy Act of 1798 84 to underscore the 
dramatic distinction between the rights of non-citizens who owe allegiance to allies 
of the United States and those who owe allegiance to its enemies. 85 Th us, Jackson 
concluded, no historical precedent supported the conclusion reached by the DC 
Circuit below—ie that the Constitution confers rights even upon enemy aliens 
convicted by a US military commission overseas. 86 
 Having laid the historical foundation in Part I, Jackson turned in Part II to the 
practical diffi  culties that the DC Circuit’s opinion might provoke, especially given 
the number of enemy aliens then in US custody overseas. 87 As he explained:
 79  See above text accompanying notes 39–42.    80  See above text accompanying n 43. 
 81  See  Johnson v Eisentrager , 339 US 763 (1950).    82  See Vladeck, above n 14, 595–600. 
 83  See  Eisentrager , 339 US 768–77.    84  50 USC §§ 21–4.    85  Eisentrager , 339 US 773. 
 86  Eisentrager , 339 US, 777.    87  Eisentrager , 339 US, 777–80. 
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 To grant the writ to these prisoners might mean that our army must transport them across 
the seas for hearing. Th is would require allocation of shipping space, guarding personnel, 
billeting and rations. It might also require transportation for whatever witnesses the prison-
ers desired to call as well as transportation for those necessary to defend legality of the sen-
tence. Th e writ, since it is held to be a matter of right, would be equally available to enemies 
during active hostilities as in the present twilight between war and peace. Such trials would 
hamper the war eff ort and bring aid and comfort to the enemy. Th ey would diminish the 
prestige of our commanders, not only with enemies but with wavering neutrals. It would 
be diffi  cult to devise more eff ective fettering of a fi eld commander than to allow the very 
enemies he is ordered to reduce to submission to call him to account in his own civil courts 
and divert his eff orts and attention from the military off ensive abroad to the legal defensive 
at home. Nor is it unlikely that the result of such enemy litigiousness would be a confl ict 
between judicial and military opinion highly comforting to enemies of the United States. 88 
 To conclude to the contrary, Jackson continued, would be to recognize a consti-
tutional right to habeas relief despite six distinct facts: that each of the petitioners:
 (a) is an enemy alien; (b) has never been or resided in the United States; (c) was captured 
outside of our territory and there held in military custody as a prisoner of war; (d) was tried 
and convicted by a Military Commission sitting outside the United States; (e) for off ences 
against laws of war committed outside the United States; (f ) and is at all times imprisoned 
outside the United States.’ 89 
 Explaining why such a result did not follow from the Court’s earlier decisions in 
 Ex parte Quirin , 90  In re Yamashita , 91 and  Hirota v MacArthur , 92 Jackson concluded 
Part II with a tellingly ambiguous sentence: ‘After hearing all contentions they have 
seen fi t to advance and considering every contention we can base on their applica-
tion and the holdings below, we arrive at the same conclusion the Court reached 
in each of these cases,  viz. that no right to the writ of habeas corpus appears’. 93 
 But the reason why ‘no right to the writ of habeas corpus’ appeared in  Quirin 
 and  Yamashita was not because it was jurisdictionally unavailable; to the contrary, 
the Court in both cases was at pains to emphasise that it  could decide at least 
whether the military commissions in each case had jurisdiction to try the defend-
ants. 94 Instead,  Quirin  and  Yamashita were  merits decisions; no right to the writ 
of habeas corpus appeared in those cases because the Court ultimately concluded 
that both of the underlying military commissions validly exercised jurisdiction 
over the defendants. 95 Jackson thereby obfuscated whether a ‘right to the writ of 
habeas corpus’ was a right to judicial review in the fi rst place (which the  Quirin 
 and  Yamashita petitioners clearly had), or a right to  release following meritorious 
judicial review. 
 To be sure, this ambiguous phrase might not be so blurry to modern eyes had 
that been the denouement of Justice Jackson’s opinion for the  Eisentrager  Court. As 
I have written elsewhere, ‘[b] ased on the analysis in Parts I and II alone, Jackson’s 
opinion could reasonably have been understood, at bottom, to deny to all enemy 
 88  Eisentrager , 339 US, 778–9.    89  Eisentrager , 777.    90  317 US 1 (1942). 
 91  327 US 1 (1946).    92  338 US 197 (1948) ( per curiam ).    93  Eisentrager , 339 US 781. 
 94  See above n 21 and accompanying text.    95  See  Yamashita , 327 US 1;  Quirin , 317 US 1. 
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aliens outside the territorial United States a constitutional right to habeas corpus. 
But Jackson did not stop there’. 96 Instead, Parts III and IV of the  Eisentrager  major-
ity opinion turned to the merits of the petitioners’ claims—and the question of 
whether the commission that tried them properly exercised jurisdiction. 97 Th us, 
Part III focused on the petitioners’ claim that they were not generally subject to 
military jurisdiction, concluding that ‘the Constitution does not confer a right of 
personal security or an immunity from military trial and punishment upon an 
alien enemy engaged in the hostile service of a government at war with the United 
States’. 98 And Part IV focused on the specifi c challenges to the jurisdiction of the 
commission that convicted the petitioners. 99 
 To that end, Justice Jackson briefl y rehashed (and implicitly rejected) the detain-
ees’ argument that their underlying conduct was not a war crime, 100 before turning 
to the jurisdiction of the commission. On that issue, Jackson rejected the conten-
tion that the United States lacked the power to convene a military commission 
in China, holding that the President necessarily had the power to station troops 
there, and that, even if China objected, ‘China’s grievance does not become these 
prisoners’ right’. 101 
 Jackson then dismissed the argument that anything in the 1929 Geneva 
Convention precluded the assertion of military jurisdiction, noting in a foot-
note that ‘[r] ights of alien enemies are vindicated under it only through protests 
and intervention of protecting powers as the rights of our citizens against foreign 
governments are vindicated only by Presidential intervention’. 102 Finally, Jackson 
quickly sidestepped the two potential procedural irregularities that might have 
undermined the tribunal’s jurisdiction. Th e fi rst defect (concerning the Geneva 
Convention’s requirement of pre-trial notice to the protecting power) had already 
been resolved against the detainees, he explained, by  Quirin and  Yamashita . 103 As 
to the second irregularity—that the commission followed procedures that diff ered 
too signifi cantly from those of court-martial proceedings—Jackson observed that 
‘no prejudicial disparity is pointed out as between the Commission that tried pris-
oners and those that would try an off ending soldier of the American forces of 
like rank’. 104 In other words, Jackson dismissed the contention as form without 
substance. Th us, he concluded, ‘[w]e are unable to fi nd that the petition alleges 
any fact showing lack of jurisdiction in the military authorities to accuse, try and 
condemn these prisoners or that they acted in excess of their lawful powers’. 105 
 As with the key sentence at the end of Part II of his opinion, this sentence, 
too, is revealing. If the rule for which  Eisentrager meant to stand was one barring 
habeas to all non-citizens held outside the territorial United States, or even to all 
 enemy aliens so detained, the jurisdiction of the commission that convicted the 
 Eisentrager petitioners would have been utterly irrelevant. Indeed, if the federal 
 96  Vladeck, above n 14, 597–8.    97  See  Eisentrager , 339 US 781–90. 
 98  See  Eisentrager , 339 US, 785.    99  See  Eisentrager , 339 US, 785–90. 
 100  See  Eisentrager , 339 US, 785–6.    101  Eisentrager , 339 US, 789. 
 102  Eisentrager , 339 US, 789 n 14.    103  Eisentrager , 339 US, 790. 
 104  Eisentrager , 339 US.    105  Eisentrager , 339 US. 
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courts categorically lacked jurisdiction simply by virtue of the fact that the detain-
ees were non-citizens held outside the United States, it would have been lawless for 
Jackson to even  reach the merits of the petitioners’ jurisdictional challenge to their 
military commission, let alone reject them. 106 
 At the same time, as Justice Black pointed out in his opinion for the three dis-
senters, 107 there was something apparently inconsistent when taking together the 
diff erent pieces of Justice Jackson’s analysis:
 [T] he Court apparently bases its holding that the District Court was without jurisdiction 
on its own conclusion that the petition for habeas corpus failed to show facts authorising 
the relief prayed for. But jurisdiction of a federal district court does not depend on whether 
the initial pleading suffi  ciently states a cause of action; if a court has jurisdiction of subject 
matter and parties, it should proceed to try the case, beginning with consideration of the 
pleadings. Th erefore Part IV of the opinion is wholly irrelevant and lends no support what-
ever to the Court’s holding that the District Court was without jurisdiction. 108 
 In fairness to Justice Jackson, there  is a coherent way to explain his analysis: Th e 
district court held that it lacked statutory jurisdiction; the DC Circuit held that 
such a conclusion raised constitutional diffi  culties. Th us, one could understand 
Justice Jackson’s majority opinion to hold that, (1)  because the detainees’ claim on 
the merits was ultimately unsuccessful, (2)  the DC Circuit erred in concluding 
that the absence of statutory jurisdiction to hear their case raised constitutional 
concerns. Indeed, in a noteworthy decision less than two years earlier, the Second 
Circuit had employed just that kind of analysis in upholding an Act of Congress 
that took away federal jurisdiction.  Because the constitutional claim the Act barred 
the federal courts from entertaining was itself without merit, the Act taking away 
the courts’ power to say so did not raise constitutional concerns. 109 Perhaps that is 
what Justice Jackson had in mind in  Eisentrager —because the detainees would not 
win on the merits anyway (as Parts III and IV established), there was no reason 
for the DC Circuit to controvert the historical norms identifi ed in Parts I and II 
against enemy alien access to the courts, and no constitutional problem arising out 
of the absence of statutory jurisdiction. 
 (2)  Eisentrager ’s (properly reassessed) implications 
 We will never know what Justice Jackson meant for sure. 110 If nothing else, though, 
a careful reading of his opinion belies each of the categorical rules for which it is 
routinely cited. Clearly,  Eisentrager did not mean categorically to foreclose access 
to habeas corpus for  all non-citizens detained outside the territorial United States. 
 106  As the Supreme Court had already explained in  Ex parte McCardle , ‘[w] ithout jurisdiction the 
court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases 
to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the 
cause’. 74 US (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868). 
 107  Eisentrager , 339 US 791–8 (Black J).    108  Eisentrager , 339 US, 792 (citations omitted). 
 109  See  Battaglia v General Motors Corp , 169 F 2d 254 (2d Cir, 1948). 
 110  Even his notes and draft opinions provide little evidence of his intentions. See Vladeck, above 
n 14, 596 n 56. 
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Just as clearly, it did not mean categorically to foreclose Fifth Amendment due 
process rights for all non-citizens detained outside the territorial United States. 
Instead,  Eisentrager may stand for as little as the proposition that enemy aliens con-
victed overseas by a US military commission that properly exercised jurisdiction 
have no basis for collaterally attacking that conviction via habeas corpus. And even 
 that rule may not survive the Court’s subsequent expansion of collateral review of 
military courts in  Burns v Wilson , 111 under which defendants may raise via habeas 
arguments that the military courts failed to give full and fair consideration to their 
constitutional claims. 112 
 For non-citizens outside the territorial United States (who, regardless of 
 Eisentrager , may have little in the way of freestanding constitutional protections), 
that may prove no better as a standard of review. Nevertheless, the underlying 
point remains:   Eisentrager only makes sense as a holding if one gives value to 
Justice Jackson’s analysis of the military commission’s (proper) exercise of jurisdic-
tion. Other decisions may stand for more categorical rules regarding the extrater-
ritorial constitutional rights of non-citizens, but it is a misreading of  Eisentrager 
itself to group it in that category—a misreading that is only exacerbated by the 
failure fully to appreciate the military commission proceedings that gave rise to the 
federal court litigation. 
 (IV)  Conclusion 
 For many—if not most—of the war crimes trials surveyed in this volume, the lack 
of historical attention to the prosecution has obscured relevant lessons in legal 
history, politics, substantive international criminal law, or some combination of 
all three. In retrospect, it is hard to say the same about the military commission 
proceedings in  United States v Eisentrager . Although the facts of  Eisentrager were 
unique, the decision ultimately created little in the way of  new substantive law 
going forward; it merely confi rmed that certain already established principles also 
applied to the particular defendants in that case. 
 Instead, the hidden history of the  Eisentrager proceeding matters for an alto-
gether diff erent reason. Understanding that the crux of the issue before the com-
mission was its jurisdiction, and not any more specifi c question arising out of the 
charges, helps to illuminate Justice Jackson’s opinion for the Supreme Court in 
 Johnson v Eisentrager , and in particular the signifi cance of his discussion in Parts 
III and IV of the appropriateness of military jurisdiction in that case. And whereas 
that revelation in and of itself serves to clarify the historical record and thereby 
undermines broad readings of  Eisentrager (along with criticisms of the Supreme 
Court’s  Boumediene  decision for its lack of fealty thereto), it may go even further. 
 Although the Supreme Court has never been forced to reach the issue, there is 
a non-frivolous argument that collateral challenges to the jurisdiction of military 
 111  346 US 137 (1953).    112  See above text accompanying n 68. 
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courts are protected by the Constitution’s Suspension Clause, given that a convic-
tion by a military tribunal acting without jurisdiction is, in eff ect, another form of 
executive detention. Nevertheless, Congress in the Military Commissions Act of 
2006 sought to bar such claims, enacting 10 USC § 950j(b):
 [N] otwithstanding any other provision of law (including section 2241 of title 28 or any 
other habeas corpus provision), no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear 
or consider any claim or cause of action whatsoever . . . relating to the prosecution, trial, or 
judgment of a military commission under this chapter, including challenges to the lawful-
ness of procedures of military commissions under this chapter. 
 Th is provision was repealed sub silentio by the Military Commissions Act of 2009, 
and so its constitutionality was never judicially tested. But had the issue been 
litigated, or if Congress enacts a similar jurisdiction-stripping provision in the 
future,  Eisentrager would undoubtedly fi gure prominently in the legal analysis. 
And whereas the government might invoke the Supreme Court’s 1950 decision as 
standing for the proposition that ‘no right to the writ of habeas corpus appears’, 
the reality is far more complicated—and should ultimately depend on whether the 
collateral challenge to the assertion of military jurisdiction has any merit. 
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 Making Peace with the Past: Th e Federal 
Republic of Germany’s Accountability for 
World War II Massacres Before the Italian 
Supreme Court: Th e  Civitella  Case 
 Benedetta Faedi  Duramy * 
 (I)  Introduction 
 During World War II, the Hermann Göring Division settled in Civitella in Val di 
Chiana, a small village in Tuscany. Partisan groups also surrounded the area. On 
18 June 1944, four German soldiers went to Civitella’s town centre for a drink. 
Among the other customers were some Italian partisans who suddenly opened fi re 
on the soldiers. Two soldiers died instantly, while a third died later. Th e German 
command threatened retaliation against the local population within twenty-four 
hours if they did not reveal the names of the partisans. Most of the inhabitants 
of Civitella and the nearby villages of Cornea and San Pancrazio hastily left their 
homes, fearing reprisals. 
 On 19 June, Wilhelm Schmalz, chief of the German command, invited civilians 
to return to their houses, assuring them that no retaliation would follow. However, 
on 29 June—the Saint Peter and Paul public holiday—three German squadrons 
suddenly stormed the crowded Civitella church, attacking the worshippers who 
had come from the nearby countryside to attend Mass. Th e death toll reached 244 
civilians, including many women and children. 
 Th e massacres of Civitella, Cornea and San Pancrazio were forgotten until 10 
October 2006, when the Italian Military Court of La Spezia convicted Max Josef 
Milde, a sergeant from the Hermann Göring Division, for his role in the massacre. 
Two years later, in October 2008, the Italian Supreme Court ruled that the Federal 
Republic of Germany had to pay one million dollars in reparations to the families 
of the victims. 
 *  Associate Professor of Law, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
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 Th is chapter examines the untold story of the Civitella, Cornea and San Pancrazio 
massacres as revealed in the testimony of survivors and the relatives of the victims. 
Th e chapter also provides a detailed analysis of the much-anticipated war crimes 
trial before both the Italian Military Court of La Spezia and the Italian Supreme 
Court. 
 (II)  Italian Massacres at the end of World War II 
 Between 1943 and 1945 several Italian villages and cities suff ered massacres at the 
hands of the German army. Some of these were ruthless retaliations against partisan 
attacks, whiles others were part of a war against civilians that aimed at intimidating 
and terrorizing the entire population. 1 Slaughters were often carried out using a 
specifi c method. German soldiers would arrive at the villages very early in the 
morning, burst into the houses, drag all the men out of their beds, and then shoot 
them one by one in the main square. 2 In many cases, the true reason for the massacre 
was not always clear, leaving survivors haunted by the search for meaning and 
someone specifi c to blame. 
 According to several studies on the memories of Italian wartime massacres, the 
victims’ families often identifi ed local partisans as scapegoats. 3 Indeed, well known 
by the local community because of their renowned resistance to the fascist regime, 
partisans were best suited to being placed in the scapegoat role. For example, Contini 
reported that the son of one of the victims of the Civitella massacre declared: ‘I can 
never forgive the partisans who have determined the massacre, but if I got to see 
the German who killed my father, I would forgive him today’. 4 Although in some 
cases massacres were carried out in response to the partisans’ killing of German 
soldiers, in many other incidents the slaughter of civilians, including women and 
children, was not preceded by any partisan attacks. 
 Some historical circumstances may explain the cause of Italian wartime massacres. 
By the summer of 1943, the coalition of Germany, Italy and Japan was con-
fronting the prospect of defeat. 5 Following the landing of British and American 
troops in Sicily in September 1943, Italy decided to break its military alliance 
with Germany. Th e Italian capitulation was viewed as an act of betrayal by the 
German army, thus fostering the idea that all Italians, both disarmed soldiers and 
civilians, were traitors to Germany. 6 Explicit orders demanded and approved retali-
atory measures against civilians that engendered a series of massacres throughout 
Tuscany and in Rome. 
 1  Johan  Foot ,  Italy’s Divided Memory ( Basingstoke :  Palgrave Macmillan ,  2009 ),  125–46 . 
 2  Foot, above n 1, 125. 
 3  Giovanni Contini, ‘Memorie in confl itto,’  l’impegno, 2 (agosto 2001). 
 4  Contini, above n 3. 
 5  Elizabeth Zimmermann (2004), ‘German war crimes in Italy,’  World Socialist Web Site , < http://
www.wsws.org/articles/2004/oct2004/germ-o07.shtml > (accessed 25 February 2013). 
 6  Foot, above n 1, 125. 
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 In particular, in the case of Civitella, the German action was likely motivated 
by the strategic location of the village. 7 Indeed, by the late spring of 1944, Allied 
troops were advancing through the valleys surrounding Civitella toward Rome, 
which they liberated on 4 June. Breaking through the German defences in the area 
thus became strategically important for the Allied march. As it turned out, the 
hills around Civitella endured numerous confrontations between the British and 
the German forces during the fi rst two weeks of June. Such historical analysis may 
thus explain the ruthless reprisals of the German army toward the population of 
Civitella and the nearby villages and farms. 
 (III)  Th e Massacre of Civitella 
 After the massacre itself, survivors reported that they were so terrifi ed that they 
decided to hide themselves in the forests nearby to avoid German retaliation. One 
witness to the massacre reported:
 [M] y brother in law . . . informed us that the partisans had killed two Germans and seriously 
wounded another . . . Terrifi ed about the consequences, we took a few belongings and, in 
a heavy rainfall, we used a ladder to get out over the city walls. Many other people from 
Civitella were with us. Th rough the woods, we arrived at the house of a farmer and we 
stayed there for fi ve days in great anxiety. Later people told us that the two nearby command 
posts had said that we could return without fear and we did so. 8 
 Indeed, on 19 June, Wilhelm Schmalz, chief of the German command, issued his 
invitation. Many townspeople did not believe him and decided to stay away from 
their houses for a few days. After several days had passed without any retaliatory 
actions from the Germans, on 29 June—the Saint Peter and Paul public holiday—
the population fi nally returned to their towns to celebrate the feast day and go to 
church. 
 At that point, the Göring Division surrounded the village and advanced through 
the town gates. Moving from house to house, the German soldiers broke down 
doors and opened fi re on the men as they leaped from their beds. Th e widow of 
one of the victims of the massacre recalled:
 On the morning of 29 June 1944, I was home dressing my youngest daughter to take her 
to mass. My two other children had already left for church and my husband had gone to 
get mushrooms in the woods. Around 7 o’clock I thought I heard gunshots. I went to the 
door with my little daughter to see what was going on. I saw the villagers horrifi ed, running 
from all sides shouting: ‘Th e Germans are killing all the men!’. 9 
 7  Victoria  de Grazia and  Leonardi  Paggi ,  ‘Story of an Ordinary Massacre: Civitella della Chiana, 29 
June, 1944,’  Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature ,  3 ( 1991 ),  153–69 . 
 8  Accounts from   Anna  Cetoloni ,  ‘Th e Witnesses of Civitella,’  Cardozo Studies in Law and 
Literature ,  3 ( 1991 ),  171–95 . 
 9  Accounts from   Ada  Sistini ,  ‘Th e Witnesses of Civitella,’  Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature , 
 3 ( 1991 ),  173 . 
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 Survivors reported that the German soldiers primarily targeted the men. Some 
of them were brutally massacred on their doorsteps in front of their families. After 
killing all the townsmen they could fi nd, the soldiers looted and burned their 
houses. A survivor remembered:
 Th e Germans banged on the door enough to break it down. I summoned up my courage 
and went to open the door. My husband had stayed in the bedroom with the children. 
When I opened the door, there were four Germans armed with rifl es and grenades on the 
threshold. Two of them came into the kitchen and the other two went upstairs. I said to 
them: ‘Don’t go up. Sick child. You frighten.’ Th ey answered ‘Child, no!’ A moment later 
I heard two shots . . . When I got to the bedroom, I saw that they had aimed at my husband’s 
head and that he was taking his last breath. My son was already dead. Th ey had killed him 
with a bullet in the head. My God! Where did I fi nd my strength! I took a handkerchief and 
wiped his face where the wound was. I called him several times, but he showed no sign of 
life. I didn’t know if I was dreaming or if it was true. I opened the window of my bedroom 
and started calling for help but people were running around madly and no one was listen-
ing to me. When I realised that fl ames were rising from the fl oor below I did not know what 
to do. I was no longer conscious of anything . . . I remember that two women passing by told 
me: ‘Get out! Your house is on fi re!’ 10 
 A widow of one of the victims of the massacre also recalled the torment of that 
morning:
 [T] he terror began. Shots, bursts of machine gun fi re, wild shouting, pounding on doors. 
And we three, there, completely terrorised, hugging one another until the moment we 
heard someone climb the stairs . . . and so my husband said: ‘Th is time, it’s our turn. Who 
knows what they will do to us?’ At that moment, our bedroom was entered by a man—a 
demon—I couldn’t say which—covered from head to toe with grenades, and ammunition, 
and a rifl e in his hand. Frightening to see! He signalled my husband to get up. Th en I went 
up to him and begged him to leave my husband alone. I told him he was sick and couldn’t 
get up. I asked him if he had a heart inside him, to have pity on me and my child whose 
father he wanted to take away. I asked him if he had a mother and whether he remembered 
her now. But neither my begging nor my tears had any eff ect. He started to shout ‘Raus! 
Raus!’, howling so violently and savagely that I still hear it in my ears. Th en my husband 
said to me: ‘Give me my clothes, you see there’s nothing to be done.’ He was so upset and 
so pale that he couldn’t even get dressed . . . Finally, I had to help my husband so he could 
go out and get killed. 11 
 When they reached the main square, the three German squadrons suddenly stormed 
the crowded Civitella church, attacking the worshippers who had come from the 
nearby countryside to attend Mass. 12 A widow of one of the victims recalled:
 [W] hen the mass was over, our priest turned toward the parishioners and said, ‘My children, 
I think that this morning is going to be a bad morning. Give them whatever they ask of 
 10  Accounts from   Giuseppa  Marsili ,  ‘Th e Witnesses of Civitella,’  Cardozo Studies in Law and 
Literature ,  3 ( 1991 ),  179 . 
 11  Accounts from   Uliana  Merini ,  ‘Th e Witnesses of Civitella,’  Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature , 
 3 ( 1991 ),  174–5 . 
 12  De Grazia and Paggi, above n 7. 
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you so that nothing may happen. Courage!’ Th en the church fi lled with Germans. Germans 
stationed themselves behind the priest. Papa, Mama, myself and others hid behind an altar 
where we considered ourselves safe. But a German came, saw us, and told us to get out. 
Outside, people were yelling and many were already dead and the houses were starting to 
blaze. I placed myself between Papa and Mama, begging for mercy, my hands raised. Th ey 
brought us to the middle of the square and Papa could no longer stand up . . . Th e square 
was fi lled with machine gunfi re, fl ames were already coming out of the houses, dead bodies 
were lying in the streets. 13 
 Sparing women and children, the German soldiers lined up all the men, including 
the parish priest—who cried out in vain: ‘Kill me, but save the lives of my people’ 14 —
and shot them to death. Survivors reported that, after the slaughter, the Germans 
hid the bodies inside the houses and then burned all of the dwellings. In the end, 
the town of Civitella was completely destroyed. 
 Meanwhile, most of the women and children hastily left town, headed toward the 
nearby village of Poggiali, where some of them found shelter in the orphanage. Others 
took refuge with relatives or friends in the surrounding countryside. Following 
the slaughter in Civitella, the German squadrons moved aggressively into the sur-
rounding villages of Burrone, Cornia, Gebbia, and San Pancrazio. 15 As was the 
case in Civitella, the German soldiers spared women and children in Gebbia and 
San Pancrazio, but killed all the men by shooting them in the head. In Cornia, by 
contrast, the action devolved into a wild massacre, with women and children being 
murdered along with the men. Ultimately, the death toll in the massacres reached 
approximately over 250 civilians. 16 
 Over the following days, some women returned to Civitella to recover and bury 
the bodies of their loved ones. Th ey remembered being ‘among women alone’ and 
‘giving each other a helping hand’. 17 One of them reported:  ‘I don’t know how 
we had enough strength, we women, to do what we did; we transported our dead 
to the church all cooperating and helping one another.’ 18 Another of the widows 
recalled:
 It was I, his wife, who made him his coffi  n and when his coffi  n was made as best as possible 
we took a cart on which we placed my husband and two other men and we took them to 
the cemetery where I dug his grave myself. 19 
 During the following years, Civitella became a ghost town, primarily inhabited by 
women who had lost their men in the tragedy and orphaned children. 20 Having 
 13  Accounts from   Maddalena  Scaletti ,  ‘Th e Witnesses of Civitella,’  Cardozo Studies in Law and 
Literature ,  3 ( 1991 ),  176–7 . 
 14  Accounts from   Maria Assunta  Menchetti ,  ‘Th e Witnesses of Civitella,’  Cardozo Studies in Law 
and Literature ,  3 ( 1991 ),  193 . 
 15  Michael  Geyer ,  ‘Civitella delle Chiana on 29 June 1944,’ in  Hannes  Heer and  Klaus  Naumann 
(eds),  War of Extermination: Th e German Military in World War II 1941–1944 ( Oxford and New York, 
NY :  Berghahn Books,  2000 ),  176 . 
 16  De Grazia and Paggi, above n 7, 154. 
 17  De Grazia and Paggi, above n 7, 163. 
 18  Accounts from   Lucia  Treppi ,  ‘Th e Witnesses of Civitella,’  Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature , 
 3 ( 1991 ),  190 . 
 19  Treppi, above n 18.    20  De Grazia and Paggi, above n 7, 160. 
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the disadvantage of being a hill town, with no skilled men left and all the women 
traumatized by the death and war, Civitella faced a long period of economic 
struggle. Survivors reported that, initially, everybody wanted to leave the town and 
start their lives again somewhere else. Eventually, thanks to the women’s resilience, 
Civitella was rebuilt. Nevertheless, the massacre left behind deep scars in the collec-
tive memory. People continued to remember the atrocities by sharing events that 
they had witnessed or accounts that others had experienced with one another. 21 
By engaging continuously in a struggle against forgetting, survivors attempted to 
overcome the past and helped build a living memory of the traumatic events. 
 Local remembrance began to develop on 16 July 1944, when American and British 
troops fi nally liberated Civitella. 22 After the German ravages and the Allied 
bombardments, the town was a pile of ruins and burned dwellings. Arriving at the 
scene, an English military commission began a special investigation into the causes 
of the massacre. 23 Hundreds of surviving witness testimonies were compiled into 
a massive dossier of inquiry, which was sent to Rome but promptly disregarded by 
the transitional government. Some of the surviving widows’ accounts were published 
in 1946 in Florence by the novelist Romano Bilenchi and others were published 
later in France. 24 In contrast, eff orts to reconstruct the German side of the massacre 
failed due to the lack of records and documentation of the events, as well as the 
lack of testimony from the perpetrators. 25 
 (IV)  Accountability for the Massacre of 
Civitella before the Italian Supreme Court 
 Aside from a few historians’ analyses and some commemorative monuments, the 
massacres of Civitella, Cornea and San Pancrazio, as well as their victims, have 
been forgotten for decades. 26 Only on 10 October 2006, did the Italian Military 
Court of La Spezia convict Max Josef Milde, a sergeant from the Hermann Göring 
Division, for his role in the massacre and sentence him to life imprisonment. 27 In the 
same ruling, the court also upheld the petitions for compensation for material and 
moral damages 28 as well as the legal expenses fi led by the relatives of the victims, 
who had intervened in the criminal trial as a civil party. 29 In so doing, the Military 
 21  Francesca  Cappelletto ,  ‘Memory of Extreme Events: From Autobiography to History,’  Journal of 
Royal Anthropological Institute ,  9 ( 2003 ),  241–60 . 
 22  De Grazia and Paggi, above n 7, 155.    23  Contini, above n 3. 
 24  Geyer, above n 15, 177.    25  Geyer, above n 15, 178.    26  Foot, above n 1, 128. 
 27  Max Josef Milde was found guilty of ‘violence with murder against civilian enemies’ under Article 
185 of the Italian Military Criminal Code Applicable in Time of War, which provides for the crime of 
violence of members of Italian military forces against civilian enemies, in combination with Article 13 
that extends the applicability of such a provision to crimes committed by members of enemy armed 
forces against the Italian State or individuals. 
 28  Under civil law, moral damages are designed to compensate the physical or mental suff ering and 
any similar harm unjustly caused to a person. 
 29  Tribunale Militare di la Spezia, Judgment no. 49 of 10 October 2006. 
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Court of La Spezia held that the defendant and the Federal Republic of Germany 
were jointly and severally liable to pay reparations of about one million euros to 
the victims of the massacre. 
 According to Italian criminal procedure, civil claims can be brought within a 
criminal proceeding if the victim of the crime or any of the successors thereof asks 
for restitution in their capacity as a civil party. Th e eventual obligation to compensate 
the victims rests with the defendant and any other person the court might hold 
civilly accountable for the damage caused by the crime. Both the defendant and 
the person held civilly responsible are liable for paying the full amount, including 
material and moral damages as well as any legal expenses. Th e victim of the crime 
and any successors thereof may recover all the damages from either of them in 
accordance with the principle of joint and several liability. 
 Following the decision of the Military Court of La Spezia, the Federal Republic 
of Germany objected to the judgment on the grounds that it violated the interna-
tional commitments undertaken by Italy under the Peace Treaty of 1947 and the 
Bonn agreements between Germany and Italy of 1961, as well as the ‘jurisdic-
tional immunity of Germany as a sovereign state’. 30 On 18 December 2007, the 
Italian Military Court of Appeal confi rmed the previous decision, thus holding 
the Federal Republic of Germany and the defendant Max Joseph Milde jointly 
and severally liable to pay reparations to the victims of the massacre. 31 Finally, on 
21 October 2008, the Italian Court of Cassation (as the court of last instance) 
rejected the appeal fi led by the Federal Republic of Germany against the decision 
of the Military Court of Appeal, providing  inter alia a pivotal interpretation of the 
principle of state immunity. 32 
 It should be noted that the  Civitella case is the fi rst Italian case involving a civil 
action against a foreign state and its offi  cials within a criminal proceeding. 33 In 
a previous case, the applicant, Luigi Ferrini, an Italian citizen who was captured 
by German troops near Arezzo and deported to a German slave labour camp in 
1944, brought civil claims against the Federal Republic of Germany requesting 
compensation for physical and psychological harm due to inhumane treatment 
and forced labour. 34 However, Ferrini petitioned for restitution against the Federal 
Republic of Germany in a civil proceeding, rather than bringing a civil claim 
within a criminal trial. In the  Civitella case, the victims of the massacre as civil 
parties specifi cally initiated a civil action for restitution against both the defendant 
and the Federal Republic of Germany within the context of a criminal prosecution 
of the wrongdoers. 
 30  International Court of Justice,  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State ( Germany v Italy )—Application 
of the Federal Republic of Germany, 23 December 2008. 
 31  Corte Militare di Appello, Judgment no 72 of 18 December 2007. 
 32  Corte Suprema di Cassazione, sez. I penale, Judgment no 1072 of 21 October 2008,  Rivista di 
diritto internazionale  92 (2009). 
 33  See   Annalisa  Ciampi ,  ‘Th e Italian Court of Cassation Asserts Civil Jurisdiction over Germany 
in a Criminal Case Relating to the Second World War,’  Journal of International Criminal Justice ,  7 
( 2009 ),  597–615 . 
 34  Tribunale of Arezzo, Judgment no 1403/98 of 3 November 2000. 
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 (V)  Th e Italian Supreme Court’s Notion 
of the Principle of State Immunity 
 In the  Civitella case, the Italian Supreme Court faced the question of whether the 
customary norm of international law that acknowledges the jurisdictional immunity 
of states for acts committed in the exercise of their sovereignty should also be 
applied in the event of conduct that amounts to an international crime. 35 Th e 
traditional position of the Italian courts recognized the customary international 
law principle of ‘restrictive and relative immunity’, meaning that foreign states are 
exempted from civil jurisdiction with respect to acts committed in the exercise of 
their state sovereignty ( iure imperii acts), but not with respect to acts carried out 
by the state in a private capacity, independent of its sovereign power ( iure gestionis 
or  iure privatorum acts). 36 
 Th is traditional position on the doctrine of state immunity had already been 
overturned by the Italian Supreme Court in the  Ferrini judgment (no 5044 of 11 
March 2004). 37 In that case, the Civil Plenary Session of the Court held that the 
principle of restrictive immunity should be subject to limitation in the event that 
state conduct, even if related to the exercise of sovereign powers (such as those 
performed in the course of war operations), constitutes such a serious violation 
of human freedom and dignity that it qualifi es as an international crime. Indeed, 
the Court acknowledged that the protection of human rights is a fundamental 
principle of international law, thus decreasing the signifi cance of other principles, 
including the recognition of state immunity from any foreign civil jurisdiction. 
Th erefore, the customary norm of international law that obligates states to abstain 
from exercising their jurisdictional power over foreign states is not absolute, insofar 
as it does not grant them total immunity from civil jurisdiction in the case of serious 
violations of universal values and fundamental human rights norms. 38 
 Based on that reasoning, the Italian Supreme Court overturned the decisions of 
both the Tribunal of Arezzo and the Court of Appeal in Florence, which had 
dismissed Ferrini’s petition on the ground that Italian courts had no jurisdiction 
over acts committed by foreign states in the exercise of their sovereign authority. 39 
Th e Court went on to acknowledge Italian jurisdiction with respect to the civil 
 35  Corte Suprema di Cassazione, sez. I penale, Judgment no 1072 of 21 October 2008, [3] . 
 36  Corte Suprema di Cassazione, above n 35. 
 37  Corte Suprema di Cassazione, sezioni unite civili, Judgment no 5044 of 6 November 2003, 
Ferrini,  Rivista diritto internazionale 87 (2004), 539. See also   Pasquale  De Sena and  Francesca  De 
Vittor ,  ‘State Immunity and Human Rights:  Th e Italian Supreme Court Decision on the Ferrini 
Case,’  Th e European Journal of International Law ,  16 ( 2005 ),  89–112 ;   Carlo  Focarelli ,  ‘Denying 
Foreign State Immunity for Commission of International Crimes: Th e Ferrini Decision,’  International 
Comparative Law Quarterly ,  54 ( 2005 ),  951–8 ;   Andrea  Gattini ,  ‘War Crimes and State Immunity 
in the Ferrini Decision,’  Journal of International Criminal Justice ,  3 ( 2005 ),  224–42 ;   Andrea  Gattini , 
 ‘Ferrini’ , in  Antonio  Cassese et  al (eds),  Th e Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice 
( Oxford :  Oxford University Press ,  2009 ),  668–70 . 
 38  Ferrini , above n 37. 
 39  See Tribunale di Arezzo, decision no 1403/98 of 3 November 2000; and Corte d’Appello di 
Firenze, decision no 41/02 of 14 January 2002. 
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claims brought against the Federal Republic of Germany by Ferrini, holding that 
Ferrini’s deportation and subjugation to forced labour should be considered war 
crimes under international law. 40 
 In addition to mentioning the  Ferrini precedent in its reasoning in the  Civitella 
case, the Italian Supreme Court referred to other rulings that confi rmed the pivotal 
juncture marked by  Ferrini itself. 41 In particular, the Supreme Court made reference 
to its own ruling in the  Lozano case, which held that servicemen who commit 
war crimes amounting to severe breaches of international humanitarian law while 
performing offi  cial duties cannot enjoy functional immunity from foreign criminal 
courts. 42 Th e Court thus concluded that a suffi  ciently unambiguous trend has 
emerged in the previous years, one that excluded the immunity of foreign states 
from civil jurisdiction with respect to international crimes. 43 Th e Court expressed 
its full support for this hermeneutical position, holding that the customary principle 
of jurisdictional immunity of states is not absolute, and does not apply in cases 
of confl ict with the principle of customary international law that permits judicial 
remedies for damages caused by international crimes arising from serious breaches 
of human rights. 44 
 Th e Federal Republic of Germany objected to this conclusion, arguing that, 
according to various rulings of numerous national supreme courts, the principle of 
state immunity from civil jurisdiction was an absolute value that could not be 
subject to any limitation, including in the case of international crimes. In its view, 
the Italian Supreme Court’s position on the doctrine of state immunity under the 
 Ferrini decision and subsequent rulings did not conform to international practice 
and did not comply with the international norm eff ectively in force among states. 45 
In response, the Court insisted that it had already conducted an accurate analysis 
of foreign courts’ decisions, both those upholding the principle of state immunity 
and those where courts held that the principle of jurisdictional immunity could 
not paralyse the exercise of judicial remedies for international crimes arising from 
the violation of fundamental human rights. 46 
 Th e Italian Supreme Court also emphasized that the solution to the issue could 
not be found merely through a quantitative analysis, nor could it depend solely on 
tallying the number of decisions that support one position or the other. Th e exami-
nation of foreign states’ case law, it acknowledged, is indeed an important tool for 
ascertaining the eff ectiveness of customary norms of international law. Nevertheless, 
 40  Corte Suprema di Cassazione, sezioni unite civili, Judgment no 5044 of 6 November 2003; 
 Ferrini , above n 37. 
 41  Corte Suprema di Cassazione, Sezioni Unite Civili, Judgment no 14199 of 6 May 2008, 
‘ Repubblica Federale di Germania v Amministrazione Regionale of Vojotia ’, in  Rivista di diritto interna-
zionale , 92 (2009), 594. With this decision, the Italian Supreme Court recognised in Italy the civil 
judgment of the Greek Special Supreme Court against the Federal Republic of Germany in relation to 
a massacre committed by the German troops in Greece during World War II. 
 42  Corte Suprema di Cassazione, Judgment no 31171/2008 of 24 July 2008. For a critical comment 
on the Court’s decision, see   Antonio  Cassese ,  ‘Th e Italian Court of Cassation Misapprehends the 
Notion of War Crimes,’  Journal of International Criminal Justice ,  6 ( 2008 ),  1077–89 . 
 43  Corte Suprema di Cassazione, sez. I penale, Judgment no 1072 of 21 October 2008. 
 44  Corte Suprema di Cassazione, above n 43.    45  Corte Suprema di Cassazione, above n 43[4] . 
 46  Corte Suprema di Cassazione, above n 43. 
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the Court pointed out that the function of the interpreter cannot be reduced to 
an arithmetic calculation of data obtained from international practice. Instead the 
interpreter must grapple with verifying the real existence of customs and norms, their 
qualitative consistency, the interrelationships among them, as well as the practical 
nexus of their interdependence and hierarchical collocation within the range of values 
generally accepted by the international system. 47 
 Considering the above, the crucial question before the Court was whether the 
principle of jurisdictional immunity of foreign states constituted an unconditional 
and unlimited rule, or whether other customary norms protecting the supreme 
values of human beings should ultimately prevail. Th e complexity of answering 
such a question arises from the coexistence of diverse customary norms of international 
law, whose diff erent areas of application should be coordinated by ascertaining 
whether they are compatible or whether the application of one should prevail over 
the other. 48 In fact, the principle of jurisdictional immunity of states represents a 
customary norm generally recognized by the international community in relation 
to activities that constitute a direct externalization of sovereign powers. Likewise, it 
is indisputable that customary norms aimed at protecting the freedom and dignity 
of human beings have long been considered to be fundamental values and inalienable 
rights within the international system. 49 
 It follows that the violations of human rights protected by such customary norms 
constitute international crimes, which must be prosecuted and punished by any 
state inasmuch as they undermine the primary interests of the international system. 
Of particular concern within the categories of international crimes are crimes against 
humanity, whose connotations include the following: they entail a serious violation 
of human dignity and severe humiliation of one or more civilians; they are not occa-
sional or isolated incidents, but rather constitute a systematic practice of atrocity; and 
they must be prosecuted and punished equally if committed during armed confl ict 
or if committed in peacetime. 50 In the words of the Court, the norms protecting 
fundamental human rights convey the supremacy of the fundamental principle for 
the respect of human dignity, whose violation also marks a tolerable breaking point 
for state sovereignty. Th erefore, the principle of the sovereign equality of states 
must not apply in the event of crimes against humanity or in the case of serious 
criminal actions that constitute an abuse of state sovereignty. 
 Th e Court further acknowledged that the coexistence in the same case of 
international customary norms regarding, on the one hand, the immunity of the 
states from jurisdiction and, on the other hand, the restitution of serious violations of 
fundamental human rights requires their respective coordination in order to ascertain 
which norms should prevail. Such a confl ict of norms can only be resolved by 
balancing interests, giving precedence to the ius cogens principle, thus ensuring 
that the most serious crimes against human freedom and dignity will not remain 
unpunished. 51 
 47  Corte Suprema di Cassazione, above n 43.    48  Corte Suprema di Cassazione, above n 43, [5] . 
 49  Corte Suprema di Cassazione, above n 43.    50  Corte Suprema di Cassazione, above n 43. 
 51  Corte Suprema di Cassazione, above n 43, [6] . See also Corte di Cassazione Sezione I, Lozano, 
19 June 2008. 
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 If it is true that the customary norms protecting fundamental human rights are 
based on universal and binding principles recognized by the entire international 
community, the internal coherence of the system requires that the violation of such 
fundamental values should be followed by an eff ective reaction on the part of both 
the international system and the victims themselves. As the Court noted, it would 
make no sense to proclaim the primacy of fundamental human rights and then 
restrict access to justice, thus preventing the victims from resorting to the remedies 
that are indispensable to ensure the eff ectiveness and primacy of those fundamental 
rights. 52 
 Finally, the Italian Supreme Court acknowledged that, in accordance with 
Article 10 of the Italian Constitution, the Italian legal system complies with the 
norms generally recognized under international law. 53 It also clarifi ed that Italy’s 
internal legal system must automatically and continuously conform to the cus-
tomary rules and general principles accepted by the international community. 54 
However, the Court also emphasized that such compliance cannot infringe the 
essential foundations of the Italian legal system, which are essential to the current 
constitutional structure, absolutely binding, and thus unchangeable. Fundamental 
human rights are among such constitutional principles and cannot be derogated 
by international norms. 55 
 (VI)  Developments Following the Italian 
Supreme Court’s Decision in the  Civitella Case 
 Following the decision of the Italian Supreme Court in the  Civitella case, on 23 
December 2008 the German government instituted proceedings against Italy 
before the International Court of Justice, contending that ‘through its judicial 
practice . . . Italy has infringed and continues to infringe its obligations toward 
Germany under international law’. 56 Th e Federal Republic of Germany argued that 
since the  Ferrini judgment of 11 March 2004, ‘Italian judicial bodies have repeat-
edly disregarded the jurisdictional immunity of Germany as a sovereign State’. 57 
It also stressed that subsequent to the  Ferrini judgment, victims of World War II 
had instituted numerous other proceedings before Italian tribunals. Th e German 
government expressed concern that many additional legal actions might similarly 
follow the  Civitella decision. 58 
 52  Corte Suprema di Cassazione, sez. I penale, Judgment no 1072 of 21 October 2008, above n 43, [7] . 
 53  See the  Italian Constitution , Article 10. 
 54  Corte Suprema di Cassazione, sez. I penale, Judgment no 1072 of 21 October 2008, above n 43, [7] . 
 55  Corte Suprema di Cassazione, above n 43. 
 56  United Nations Sixty-fi fth Session,  Report of the International Court of Justice , 1 August 2009–31 
July 2010, A/65/4, 37. 
 57  International Court of Justice,  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State ( Germany v Italy )—Application 
instituting proceedings fi led in Registry of the Court on 23 December 2008, 4. 
 58  Germany v Italy , above n 57. 
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 In light of the above, the German government argued that ‘the recourse to the 
International Court of Justice represent[ed] the only remedy available to Germany 
in its quest to put a halt to the unlawful practice of the Italian courts, which infringes 
its sovereign rights’. 59 In particular, the Federal Republic of Germany sought to 
obtain a decision from the International Court of Justice stating that the claims 
related to the serious violations committed by German troops against Italian civil-
ians during World War II constitute a breach of international law and agreements 
between the two countries. Indeed, Germany argued that, according to the Peace 
Treaty signed in Paris on 10 February 1947, between Italy and the Allied Powers, 
Italy waived on its own behalf and on behalf of its nationals all claims against 
Germany in relation to compensation for damages incurred during World War II. 60 
 Furthermore, Germany contended that the Italian claims were inadmissible 
by virtue of the Bonn agreement concluded on 2 June 1961 between Italy and 
the Federal Republic of Germany, which settled all outstanding claims of Italian 
nationals based on rights violations and other incidents that occurred between 1 
September 1939 and 8 May 1945. 61 It is interesting to note that the Italian Supreme 
Court held that the 1947 Peace Treaty should not apply because the Federal 
Republic of Germany was not a signatory party to the treaty itself. Moreover, in 
relation to the Bonn Agreement of 1961, the Italian Supreme Court reasoned that 
because the agreement applied only to the disputes that were already pending at the 
time of signature, it did not settle claims that had not been instituted at that date, 
as was the case for  Civitella . 62 
 In its application, Germany lamented that a special team of lawyers had to be 
appointed to deal specifi cally with such complaints, requiring burdensome fi nan-
cial and intellectual expenditures. Furthermore, Germany claimed that, through its 
judicial practice, Italy has been infringing Germany’s jurisdictional immunity, thus 
breaching the principle of sovereign immunity and sovereign equality under interna-
tional law. 63 In concluding its application, the Federal Republic of Germany urged 
the International Court of Justice to recognize the international responsibility of 
Italy, to declare that its judicial decisions in relation to the claims brought by Italian 
nationals should remain unenforceable, and to ensure that no future legal actions 
based on similar claims will be pursued by Italian courts against Germany. 64 
 On 29 April 2009, Italy fi led its counter-claim, asking the International Court of 
Justice to reject the claims presented by Germany and to recognise its international 
responsibility for denying Italian victims adequate and eff ective reparations for the 
crimes committed during World War II by German troops. 65 Two years later, on 
13 January 2011, Greece fi led an application before the International Court of 
 59  Germany v Italy , above n 57. 
 60  International Court of Justice,  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State ( Germany v Italy )—Counter- 
Claim, 6 July 2010, 4. 
 61  Germany v Italy , 5.    62  Ciampi, above n 33, 612.    63  Ciampi, above n 33, 18. 
 64  Ciampi, above n 33. 
 65  United Nations Sixty-fi fth Session,  Report of the International Court of Justice , 1 August 2009–31 
July 2010, above n 57, 39. 
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Justice requesting permission to intervene in the proceedings. 66 Indeed, following 
the claims brought by Italian nationals against Germany for crimes committed 
during World War II, Greek nationals attempted to ‘enforce in Italy a judgment 
obtained in Greece on account of a similar massacre committed by German mili-
tary units during their withdrawal in 1944 ( Distomo case)’. 67 In fi ling the appli-
cation, the Hellenic Republic thus sought to inform the International Court of 
Justice that the legal rights and interests of Greek nationals could be aff ected by the 
decisions of the Court in relations to the claims advanced by Germany. 68 
 (VII)  Conclusion 
 On 3 February 2012, the International Court of Justice found that Italy violated 
its obligation to respect the Federal Republic of Germany’s immunity under inter-
national law by allowing civil claims to be brought against it based on violations 
of international law committed by the German regime during World War II. 69 
Moreover, it held that Italy had to ensure, by enacting appropriate legislation or 
by resorting to other methods of its choosing, that the decisions of its courts and 
those of other judicial authorities infringing the immunity of the Federal Republic 
of Germany ceased to have eff ect. 70 According to the International Court of 
Justice, in other words, the Italian Supreme Court’s decision in the  Civitella case 
was incompatible with international law and represented a breach of international 
agreements between the two countries, making the Italian courts’ decisions unenforce-
able. Indeed, the International Court of Justice clarifi ed that, ‘under customary 
international law as it presently stands, a State is not deprived of immunity by 
reason of the fact that it is accused of serious violations of international human 
rights law or the international law of armed confl ict’. 71 A similar conclusion thus 
appertains to Greece’s attempt to protect legal claims and interests of its nationals 
for massacres committed by Germany during the confl ict. 
 Human rights organizations protested that the International Court of Justice 
ruling represented a great step backwards for international law by placing state 
sovereignty above the protection of international human rights. Despite the unfavour-
able outcome, the Italian Supreme Court’s decision in the  Civitella case constitutes 
a signifi cant attempt to restrict the principle of sovereign immunity with respect to 
serious violations of international law. Indeed, the judgment suggests that, in the 
event of egregious breaches of international law, a human rights exception should 
 66  International Court of Justice,  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State ( Germany v Italy )—Greece 
requests permission to intervene in the proceedings, 13 January 2011. 
 67  International Court of Justice,  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State ( Germany v Italy )—Application 
instituting proceedings fi led in Registry of the Court on 23 December 2008, 16. 
 68  Germany v Italy , above n 67. 
 69  International Court of Justice,  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State ( Germany v Italy, Greece 
Intervening )—Judgment of 3 February 2012. 
 70  Germany v Italy, Greece Intervening , n 69 above. 
 71  Germany v Italy, Greece Intervening , n 69 above, 37. 
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apply, preventing the responsible state from enjoying jurisdictional immunity. If 
the International Court of Justice had concluded that the Federal Republic of 
Germany was liable for the damages caused to the victims of the Civitella massacre, 
customary norms protecting fundamental human rights and freedoms would have 
prevailed in case of confl ict with the principle of state immunity and thus would 
have qualifi ed as peremptory norms under international law. 72 
 72  Francesco Moneta, ‘State Immunity for International Crimes: Th e Case of Germany versus Italy 
before the ICJ— Jurisdictional Immunities of the State ( Germany v Italy ),’  Th e Hague Justice Portal , 3. 
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 Trying Communism through International 
Criminal Law? Th e Experiences of the 
Hungarian Historical Justice Trials 
 Tamás  Hoff mann * 
 Th is chapter aims to critically analyse the attempts of the Hungarian judiciary to 
address crimes committed during the 1956 revolution through the use of interna-
tional law. 1 Th ese so-called historical justice trials undertook to uncover the true 
history of the mass atrocities perpetrated against civilians suppressed during the 
communist regime and bring the perpetrators to justice. However, the Hungarian 
judiciary proved unable to apply international criminal law, which led to a series 
of contradictory judgments that left the general populace confused. Coupled with 
the absence of a popular desire to confront the country’s past, the predominantly 
technical approach of the trials not only could not fulfi l their purpose but might 
have exacerbated the general indiff erence. Th is chapter will thus have a two-fold 
goal: to demonstrate the inherent problems associated with the direct application 
of international criminal law in a domestic legal environment, and to tell the story 
of an unsuccessful attempt to substitute criminal procedures for social reconcilia-
tion. In this sense, this is the untold story of the Hungarian historical justice trials 
that tried to confront the public with their hidden history of mass atrocity. 
 (I)  Introduction—Crimes of Past, Dilemmas of Transition 
 Following a short period of unprecedented democracy between 1945 and 1949, 
Hungary became a communist country in 1949. Th e ensuing brutal oppression 
 *  Assistant Professor at Corvinus University of Budapest. Initial research was made possible by the 
Scholarship for Research Excellence of the Corvinus University of Budapest (TÁMOP Project No 
4.2.1/B-09/1/KMR-2010-0005). Th e author gratefully acknowledges the support of the János Bolyai 
Research Fellowship in the completion of the paper. 
 1  Th is chapter builds on and develops concepts set out in  Tamás  Hoff mann ,  ‘Individual Criminal 
Responsibility for Crimes Committed in Non-International Armed Confl icts—Th e Hungarian 
Jurisprudence on the 1956 Volley Cases’ , in  Stefano  Manacorda ,  Adán  Nieto (eds),  Criminal 
Law Between War and Peace:  Justice and Cooperation in Criminal Matters in International Military 
Interventions ( Castilla-La Mancha :  Cuenca ,  2009 ),  735 . 
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under the leadership of Mátyás Rákosi was characterized by nationalizations, mass 
deportations, the persecution of ‘class enemies’ and show trials. Even though the 
repression subsided in 1953, after the death of Stalin, in 1955 the reformist prime 
minister, Imre Nagy, was dismissed and the coterie of Rákosi returned to power. 2 
 On 23 October 1956 the population’s general disappointment with the Rákosi 
leadership manifested itself in peaceful demonstrations throughout the country. 
Th ese rallies, however, escalated into violence prompting the spontaneous emergence 
of insurgent groups fi ghting against government troops. While these hostilities 
remained localized, with their main centre in Budapest, they ostensibly achieved their 
ambition: Imre Nagy took the helm again on 28 October. However, the interven-
tion of the Soviet army on 4 November sealed the fate of the short-lived revolution 
and gave power to János Kádár, who controlled the country until 1988. 3 Th e Kádár 
regime quickly consolidated its authority. Between 1957 and 1962 about 22,000 
people were tried for participating in the revolution. Hundreds of revolutionaries 
were sentenced to death and executed, including Imre Nagy, and thousands were 
incarcerated. Yet despite the harsh and wide-ranging retribution, the communist 
leadership’s policy of gradually increasing the average standard of living resulted in 
general support for ‘goulash communism’. Until the economic hardships of the 
1980s, the communist leadership was regarded as legitimate by the majority of the 
population. 
 Th e transition to democracy was peaceful and took place formally in the context of 
‘Roundhouse Talks’, where representatives of the opposition and the ruling Hungarian 
Socialist Workers’ Party agreed on the design of the constitutional framework. In the 
meantime, the reburial of Imre Nagy turned out to be a massive anti-communist 
demonstration, which indicated the general desire of the people for regime change. 4 
 In 1990, the fi rst free election brought about victory for a right-wing coalition, 
which attempted to redress the injustices of the communist era. Beyond the lim-
ited restitution of nationalized property 5 and the adoption of a lustration law, 6 the 
‘historical justice debate’ largely focused on the potential prosecution of persons 
responsible for crimes committed during the communist era. 7 Th ese debates had 
highly political overtones. Th e liberal opposition questioned the prudence of criminal 
 2  Latvinia  Stan ,  ‘Hungary’ , in  Latvinia  Stan (ed),  Transitional Justice in Eastern Europe and the 
Former Soviet Union ( London :  Routledge ,  2009 )  102 ,  104–7 . 
 3  For a more detailed background see  Csaba  Békés ,  Malcolm  Byrne ,  János M.  Rainer (eds),  Th e 
1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents ( Budapest and New York, NY :  CEU Press ,  2002 ) . 
 4  Renáta  Uitz ,  ‘Instead of Success:  Hope for Truth—At Best’ , in  Peter  Jambrek (ed),  Crimes 
Committed by Totalitarian Regimes, ( Slovenian Presidency of the Council of Europe ,  2008 )  286 ,  287 . 
However, it must be pointed out that the burial of János Kádár, which took place just a few weeks 
after the Imre Nagy reburial, also attracted a huge crowd. Presumably many—if not most—people 
attended both events. 
 5  See  Csongor  Kuti ,  Post-Communist Restitution and the Rule of Law ( Budapest and New York, 
NY :  CEU Press ,  2009 ) . 
 6  Mark S.  Ellis ,  ‘Purging the Past: Th e Current State of Lustration Laws in the Former Communist 
Bloc’ ,  Law and Contemporary Problems ,  59 ( 1996 ),  183–5 . 
 7  Other post-communist countries faced similar dilemmas. See for example  Adrienne M.  Quill , 
 ‘To Prosecute or Not to Prosecute: Problems Encountered in the Prosecution of Former Communist 
Offi  cials in Germany, Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic’ ,  Indiana International and Comparative 
Law Review ,  7 ( 1996 ),  165 . 
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trials decades after the fact 8 and feared that criminal prosecution could be used as 
a tool to engage in ‘decommunization’, eff ectively singling out persons holding 
infl uential positions in the previous regime. 9 However, it was pointed out that 
punishing ‘comrades’ during the communist era was hardly feasible since the party 
exercised complete control over all legal accountability mechanisms, which went 
so far that ‘the chief prosecutor issued written ‘top secret’ orders requesting all law 
enforcement bodies to get approval from the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party 
before the arrest or prosecution of communist offi  cials on any grounds.’ 10 
 In practice, the initiation of criminal investigations was hindered by the fact that 
substantive criminal provisions in force at the time of the commission of the acts, 
the Offi  cial Compilation of Penal Regulations in Force, 11 and the subsequently 
adopted Criminal Codes 12 specifi ed a rule of prescription of fi fteen years and later 
twenty years for voluntary manslaughter. Conventionally, statutory limitations 
serve the important role of preventing prosecutions that would involve signifi cant 
resources and would present huge practical diffi  culties after a considerable passage 
of time. 13 However, in the view of the parliamentary majority, the objective of 
ensuring the accountability of communist criminals warranted extraordinary meas-
ures. In an attempt to overcome this obstacle, the legislature adopted an act that 
stipulated that in case of treason, voluntary manslaughter and infl iction of bodily 
harm resulting in death committed between December 1944 and May 1990, 
prescription resumes ‘provided that the state’s failure to prosecute said off ences 
were due to political reasons’. 
 Th e law generated much controversy due to its vague language and the inclusion 
of the crime of treason. It was feared that the law would allow the courts to use it 
against the supporters of the previous regime. However, the proposal was found 
unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court, which interpreted the principle of 
legality as covering ‘every aspect of criminal liability’ and therefore concluded that 
the modifi cation or reactivation of an already lapsed statute of limitation would 
violate this principle. Th e Court made clear that ‘conviction and punishment can 
only proceed according to the law in force at the time of the commission of the 
crime’. 14 
 8  For the background of the historical justice debate and the moral implications involved see  János 
 Kis ,  ‘Töprengés az Időről—Sortűzperek Előtt’ [Meditation on Time—Before Firing Squad Trials], 
 Kritika ,  5 ( 1994 ),  5 . 
 9  Krisztina  Morvai ,  ‘Retroactive Justice Based on International Law: A Recent Decision by the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court’ ,  East European Constitutional Review ,  3 ( 1994 ),  32 . 
 10  Morvai, above n 9, 33. 
 11  In 1952, the Ministry of Justice published the Offi  cial Compilation of Penal Regulations in Force 
(Hatályos Büntetőjogi Szabályok Hivatalos Összeállítása), which compiled the existing laws concern-
ing criminal acts. While it was not a statute, it was still utilized as such in the absence of a codifi ed 
Criminal Code proscribing criminal off ences. 
 12  1961. évi V. Törvény a Magyar Népköztársaság Büntető Törvénykönyvéről [Law No V of 1961 on the 
Criminal Code of the People’s Republic of Hungary] (Hungary) and  1978. évi IV. Törvény a Büntető 
Törvénykönyvről [Law No IV of 1978 on the Criminal Code] (Hungary) (Criminal Code). 
 13  Ilias  Bantekas ,  International Criminal Law ( Oxford :  Hart , 4th edn,  2011 ),  28 . 
 14  A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánybírósága [Constitutional Court of the Republic of Hungary], 
No 11/1992, 5 March 1992 (Decision 11/1992) [Hungarian Constitutional Court] (Hungary) 
(translation), < http://www.mkab.hu > (accessed 28 February 2013). 
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 To circumvent the problem of retroactive eff ect, legislators opted to rely on crimes 
under international law, where the statute of limitations was supposedly no longer 
an obstacle. Th e Parliament adopted a statute on 16 February 1993 entitled ‘Th e 
Procedure to Follow in Case of Certain Crimes Committed During the 1956 War 
of Independence and Revolution’. Th is draft law penalized a mixture of interna-
tional and common crimes, including violation of personal freedom and terrorist 
acts, whose retroactive application had already been found unconstitutional by the 
Constitutional Court. Consequently, it did not come as a surprise when the Court 
reiterated its previous judgment regarding the eff ect of statutory limitations on com-
mon crimes and found that in that respect the statute of limitation had run out. 15 
Yet the Constitutional Court developed a line of argument that enabled the prosecu-
tion of international crimes. It relied on Article 7(1) of the Hungarian Constitution, 
which states that ‘[t] he legal system of the Republic of Hungary accepts the generally 
recognized principles of international law, and shall harmonise the country’s domestic 
law with the obligations assumed under international law’. 16 
 According to this interpretation, customary law,  jus cogens , and possibly general 
principles of law become part of the Hungarian legal system automatically, without 
any implementing legislation. Incorporation occurs via a rule of ‘general transforma-
tion’ prescribed by Article 7(1) of the Constitution. 17 Other interpretations, however, 
assert that international treaties still have to be incorporated into the Hungarian legal 
order by way of publication upon ratifi cation in the Offi  cial Gazette. 18 
 Th e Constitutional Court declared that crimes against humanity and war crimes 
are ‘undoubtedly part of customary international law; they are general principles 
recognised by the community of nations’. 19 As a result, the problem of statutory 
limitations is resolved, since:
 International law applies the guarantee of  nullum crimen sine lege to itself, and not to the 
domestic law. ‘Customary international law’, ‘legal principles recognised by civilised nations’, 
‘the legal principles recognised by the community of nations’, is such a lex, or a body of written 
and unwritten laws, which classifi es certain behaviour prosecutable and punishable according 
to the norms of the community of nations (via international organisations or membership in 
a given community of states), irrespective whether the domestic law contains a comparable 
criminal off ence, and whether those off ences have been integrated into an internal legal system 
by that country’s accession to the pertinent international agreements. 20 
 15  Duc V.  Trang ,  ‘Beyond the Historical Justice Debate: the Incorporation of International Law and 
the Impact on Constitutional Structures and Rights in Hungary’ ,  Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational 
Law ,  28 ( 1995 ),  1 . 
 16  1949. évi XX.  törvény a Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmányáról [Law No XX of 1949 on Th e 
Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] (Hungary) Article 7(1) [Hungarian Constitutional Court] 
(Hungary) (translation), < http://www.mkab.hu > (accessed 28 February 2013). 
 17  A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánybírósága [Constitutional Court of the Republic of Hungary] 
(Hungary), No 53/1993, 13 October 1993. (Decision No 53/1993) [International Committee of the 
Red Cross] (translation), < http://www.icrc.org > (accessed 28 February 2013). 
 18  See more in detail  Pál  Sonnevend ,  ‘Verjährung und Völkerrechtliche Verbrechen in der 
Rechtsprechung des Ungarischen Verfassungsgerichts’ [Statutory Limitations and the Prosecution of 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Jurisprudence of the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court] ,  Zeitschrift für Ausländisches Öff entliches Recht und Völkerrecht ,  57 ( 1997 ),  195 . 
 19  Decision No 53/1993, section V.    20  Decision No 53/1993, section V. 
11_9780199671144c11.indd   232 10/9/2013   1:32:43 PM
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in 
any way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
Trying Communism through International Criminal Law? 233
 Th e Court concluded that since Hungary has ratifi ed the 1968 Convention on 
the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against 
Humanity, 21 the perpetrators of crimes falling within the purview of the Convention 
could be prosecuted by the authorities; moreover, the authorities were under an 
obligation to carry out investigations. 22 Even though this interpretation was not 
entirely free of constitutional diffi  culties, 23 it off ered a way out of the historical 
justice conundrum. Th e Court found that the prosecution of crimes concerning 
the 1956 revolution was constitutional if these acts qualifi ed as crimes under interna-
tional law, ie war crimes or crimes against humanity. 24 Nevertheless, the legislature 
still could not cope with the task of drafting a law conforming to these parameters. 
Although the Parliament amended the text of the Act and eliminated the unconsti-
tutional fi rst paragraph on ordinary crimes, the new law still linked Article 130 of 
Geneva Convention III and Article 147 of Geneva Convention IV proscribing grave 
breaches of the Conventions, which can be committed in international armed con-
fl ict, to Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions regulating the minimum 
rules applicable to non-international armed confl icts. 25 
 Inevitably, the Constitutional Court was compelled to examine the constitu-
tionality of the re-enacted law and predictably quashed it for establishing these 
connections contrary to the clear language of the Conventions. 26 Still, the Court 
declared that:
 [w] ith the nullifi cation of the law there is no obstacle preventing the state from pursuing 
the off ender of war crimes and crimes against humanity as defi ned by international law . . . It 
is international law itself which defi nes the crimes to be persecuted and to be punished as 
well as all the conditions of their punishability. 27 
 21  Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes 
against Humanity, opened for signature 26 November 1968, 754 UNTS 73 (entered into force 
11 November 1970). 
 22  Decision No 53/1993, section V(2). 
 23  Bragyova pointed out that even following the Court’s logic, the Constitution could only ‘trans-
form’ customary international law into Hungarian domestic law from the date of the adoption of 
this constitutional norm. Article 7(1) was only adopted in 1989, before that date no similar con-
stitutional provision existed regulating the relationship between international law and Hungarian 
law. Consequently, this constitutional provision cannot have retroactive eff ect.  András  Bragyova , 
 ‘Igazságtétel és Nemzetközi Jog’ [Historical Justice and International Law] ,  Állam- és Jogtudomány ,  34 
( 1993 ),  233–9 . Signifi cantly, Article 4 of the 1968 Convention requires States Parties to adopt legisla-
tive measures to prevent the application of statute of limitations ‘in accordance with their respective 
constitutional processes.’ As a result, ‘neither practice nor opinio juris prohibits states from apply-
ing constitutional or statutory implementations of principles of legality stronger than those applying 
in international law’:  Kenneth S.  Gallant ,  Th e Principle of Legality in International and Comparative 
Criminal Law ( Cambridge :  Cambridge University Press ,  2009 ),  398 . 
 24  Nobody seriously suggested that the events should be qualifi ed as genocide. 
 25  1993. évi XC. Törvény az 1956. Októberi Forradalom és Szabadságharc Során Elkövetett Egyes 
Bűncselekményekkel Kapcsolatos Eljárásról [Law No XC.  of 1993 on the Procedure Applicable for 
Certain Criminal Off ences Committed in the Course of the Revolution and War of Independence 
of 1956] (Hungary) Article 1, author’s translation. 
 26  A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánybírósága [Constitutional Court of the Republic of Hungary], 
No 36/1996, 4 September 1996. Section II. (1). (Decision No 36/1996)  Péter  Kovács translation, 
 ‘Correspondents’ Reports—Hungary’ ,  Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law ,  1 ( 1998 ),  453 . 
 27  Kovács ,  454 . 
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 Th is new interpretation precipitated a change of focus: instead of investigating the 
most signifi cant political crimes of the Communist era, the criminal proceedings con-
centrated on war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed during 
the 1956 Hungarian revolution and attempted to establish criminal responsibility 
based on international law. Th e prosecutors investigated forty potential cases and 
fi nally issued indictments in nine cases. However, only three persons were found 
guilty. 28 
 (II)  A Tragedy of Errors—Critical Analysis of 
the Hungarian Jurisprudence 
 In the following section, I will analyse the attempts of the Hungarian judiciary to 
apply international criminal law to the events of the 1956 revolution. Firstly, I present 
the applicable legal framework at the time of the commission of the acts, 29 that is, the 
regulation of war crimes and crimes against humanity. In this regard, I will focus on 
the most problematic questions addressed by the Hungarian courts. Subsequently, 
I will turn to the actual judgments and will try to explain why the Hungarian judiciary 
came to a fl awed conclusion. 
 (1)  War crimes 
 It is uncontroversial to say that by World War II international law had attached 
individual criminal responsibility to serious violations of the laws and customs of 
war in international armed confl ict. 30 After the war, most of these off ences were 
codifi ed in the grave breaches provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 31 Th e 
legal regulation of internal armed confl icts, however, was traditionally considered 
to belong to the domaine réservé of sovereign states. Accordingly, governments 
were given complete discretion to deal with rebels threatening their rule. Th e rules 
of the laws of armed confl ict only became applicable when the state accorded 
recognition of insurgency or belligerency to the rebels in a high-intensity civil 
 28  For more details see Hoff mann, above n 1, 735–53. 
 29  As it is demonstrated below, the Hungarian courts did not fully comply with the principle of 
intertemporality, which provides that ‘a juridical fact must be appreciated in the light of the law con-
temporary with it, and not of the law in force at time when a dispute in regard to it arises or fails to 
be settled’:  Island of Palmas (United States of America v Netherlands) (Decision) (Permanent Court of 
Arbitration) (1928) 2 RIAA 829, 845. 
 30  See  Antonio  Cassese ,  International Criminal Law ( Oxford :  Oxford University Press ,  2003 ),  47–62 ; 
 Gerhard  Werle ,  Principles of International Criminal Law ( TMC Asser ,  2009 , 2nd edn),  344–54 . 
 31  Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31 (entered into force 21 October 
1950) Article 50 ; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85 (entered into 
force 21 October 1950) Article 51; Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 
opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135 (entered into force 21 October 1950) Article 
130; Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for 
signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287 (entered into force 21 October 1950), Article 147. 
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war, accepting them as equal belligerents. 32 Outside of this situation, the con-
cept of international legal regulation pertaining to domestic armed confl icts was 
unintelligible. 
 Yet Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions enumerated a number 
of elementary norms applicable to ‘armed confl icts not of an international character’. 
Even though this rudimentary framework was certainly revolutionary in the sense 
of extending the protection of some elementary norms of international humanitar-
ian law to non-international armed confl icts, the very defi nition of the notion of 
non-international armed confl ict was conspicuously missing from the provision. 
Th is gave rise to much speculation about its scope of application. During the 1949 
Diplomatic Conference, most states intended to set a very high threshold of appli-
cation for Common Article 3, similar to the classic conditions of recognition of 
belligerency. 33 It can be concluded that the drafters conceived the term ‘armed 
confl ict not of an international character’ to refer to ‘situations of civil war, i.e. 
non-international armed confl ict reaching the threshold of intensity associated 
with contemporaneous conventional international warfare’. 34 
 In legal literature a number of criteria were adduced for the determination of the 
existence of non-international armed confl ict, the most frequently mentioned ones 
being a certain level of organization and intensity of violence. 35 Th us, Schindler 
suggests that hostilities have to be conducted by force of arms and exhibit such 
intensity that, as a rule, the government is compelled to employ its armed forces 
against the insurgents instead of mere police forces and that insurgents have to 
exhibit a minimum amount of organization, ie to be under responsible command 
and be capable of meeting minimal humanitarian requirements. 36 Draper likewise 
emphasized that the ability of insurgents to comply with their obligations under 
Common Article 3 not only implies a modicum of organization, but also a degree 
of territorial control. 37 
 In similar fashion, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) proposed 
during the consultations about the text of Additional Protocol II to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions a draft defi nition of non-international armed confl ict that 
 32  Hersch  Lauterpacht ,  Recognition in International Law ( Cambridge :  Cambridge University Press , 
 1947 ),  172–85 . 
 33  For a thorough perusal of the travaux préparatoires see  Anthony  Cullen ,  Th e Concept of 
Non-International Armed Confl ict in International Humanitarian Law ( Cambridge :  CUP ,  2010 ),  27–49 . 
 34  Cullen, above n 33, 37. 
 35  In fact, many experts argued that the threshold of applicability of Common Article 3 was actu-
ally high. In 1993, a UN Commission of Experts for instance stated that ‘Th e [Geneva] Conventions 
were designed to cover inter-State wars and large-scale civil wars’: See  Report of the Secretary-General 
pursuant to Article 5 of Security Council Resolution 837 (1993) , 3 May 1993, UN Doc. S/26351 [9] . 
 36  Dietrich  Schindler ,  ‘Th e Diff erent Types of Armed Confl icts According to the Geneva Conventions 
and Additional Protocols’ ,  Recueil des Courts ,  163 ( 1979 ),  147 . Draper suggests that an Article 3 con-
fl ict takes place whenever ‘sustained troop action is undertaken against rebels, even though the rebel 
organisation and control of any area is minimal, and the situation is such that the police are not able 
to enforce the criminal law in a particular area by reason of rebel action’.  Gerald I.A.D.  Draper ,  ‘Th e 
Geneva Conventions of 1949’ ,  Recueil des Cours ,  114 ( 1965 ),  89–90 . 
 37  Draper, above n 36, 90. 
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it considered suffi  ciently general and fl exible to apply to all situations based on 
the criteria of ‘the existence of a collective confrontation “between armed forces or 
armed groups”, under a responsible command, which is to say with a minimum 
level of organisation’. 38 
 Th e jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) also maintained that a certain level of organization and intensity 
of violence were indispensable for the determination of a non-international armed 
confl ict. In the  Tadić case the Appeals Chamber submitted that ‘[a] n armed con-
fl ict exists whenever there is . . . protracted armed violence between governmental 
authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State’. 39 
Th is defi nition has generally been accepted as a restatement of customary interna-
tional law, consistently reiterated by the ICTY, 40 International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda, 41 the International Criminal Court, 42 internationalized criminal 
courts, 43 military law manuals 44 and international expert reports. 45 Th e customary 
status of the  Tadić defi nition is also buttressed by its inclusion in Article 8(2) (f ) 
of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 46 Still, as pointed out 
above, contemporary consensus points to the conclusion that the threshold of 
non-international armed confl ict was signifi cantly higher in 1956 than it is today. 
 It must also be kept in mind that individual criminal responsibility does not 
automatically follow from the commission of a proscribed act. Before the 1990s, 
 38  Sylvie  Junod ,  ‘Additional Protocol II: History and Scope (1982–1983)’ ,  Th e American University 
Law Review ,  33 ( 1983 ),  32 . 
 39  Prosecutor v Tadić (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction) 
(International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, Case No IT-94-1-AR72, 
2 October 1995) [70] ( Tadić Interlocutory Appeals ). 
 40  See,  inter alia ,  Prosecutor v Delalić et  al (Judgment) (International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber II, Case No IT-96-21-T, 16 November 1998)  [183] ; Prosecutor 
v Kordić and Čerkez (Judgment) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial 
Chamber I, Case No IT-95-14/2-T, 26 February 2001) ( Kordić Judgment ) [24];  Prosecutor v Kunarac 
et al (Judgment) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, Case 
No IT-96-23&IT-96-23/1-A, 12 June 2002)  ( Kunarac Appeal ) [56];  Prosecutor v Milutinović et  al 
(Judgment) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber I, Case No 
IT-05-87-T, 26 February 2009) [125];  Prosecutor v Gotovina et al (Judgment) (International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber I, Case No IT-06-90-T, 15 April 2011) [1674]. 
 41  Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment) (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Trial Chamber I, 
Case No ICTR-96-4-T, 2 September 1998) [619];  Prosecutor v Rutaganda, (Judgment) (International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Trial Chamber I, Case No ICTR-96-3-T, 6 December 1999) [92]. 
 42  Prosecutor v Lubanga (Decision on the Confi rmation of Charges) (International Criminal Court, 
Pre-Trial Chamber I, Case No ICC-01/04-01/06, 29 January 2007) [233]. 
 43  Prosecutor v Eav (Judgment) (Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Trial Chamber, 
Case No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, 26 July 2010) ( Eav Trial ) [412]. 
 44  UK Ministry of Defence,  Manual of the Law of Armed Confl ict (Oxford: OUP, 2004), 29;  Yoram 
 Dinstein ,  Charles H.B.  Garraway and  Michael N.  Schmitt ,  Th e Manual on the Law of Non-International 
Armed Confl ict with Commentary ( San Remo ,  2006 ),  2 . 
 45  International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur,  Report to the United Nations Secretary-General 
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004 , UN Doc. S/2005/60 (25 January 
2005) [74]; Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon,  Report Pursuant to Human Rights Council Resolution 
S-2/1 , UN Doc. A/HRC/3/2 (23 November 2006) [51]; International Commission of Inquiry,  Report 
on Alleged Violations of International Human Rights Law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya , A/HRC/17/44 
(1 June 2011) [63]. 
 46  Article 8(2)(f ) provides that ‘[p] aragraph 2 (e) applies to armed confl icts not of an international 
character . . . that take place in the territory of a State when there is protracted armed confl ict between 
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almost unanimous opinion held that the concept of war crimes was confi ned to 
the fi eld of international armed confl icts. 47 Th e acceptance of individual criminal 
responsibility for crimes committed in non-international armed confl ict was 
largely due to the ICTY’s revolutionary 1995  Tadić Interlocutory Appeals  decision, 48 
which changed the perception of the international community on this question. 49 
Consequently, it can be concluded that international law did not criminalize vio-
lations of international humanitarian law committed during a non-international 
armed confl ict as war crimes in 1956. 
 (2)  Crimes against humanity 
 Th e category of crimes against humanity originally aimed to ensure that inhumane 
acts committed against the civilian population in connection with war were punished. 
Hence, it served as an ‘accompanying’ or ‘accessory’ crime to either crimes against 
peace or war crimes. 50 In eff ect, the International Military Tribunal treated the 
concept as an extension of war crimes. 51 
 Nevertheless, some crucial elements of this category—and especially its precise 
content in 1956—are subject to contradictory interpretations. Th e Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal required a nexus between crimes against humanity 
and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, that is, it linked crimes 
against humanity to an international armed confl ict. Even though it is generally 
accepted that contemporary customary international law no longer requires this 
connection, 52 there is disagreement as to when this bond was severed. While the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) contended in the  Korbély case that 
nexus with an armed confl ict ‘may no longer have been relevant by 1956’ for 
the determination of crimes against humanity, 53 other authorities suggest that this 
transformation took place at a later date. 54 
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups.’ Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17 July 1988, 2187 UNTS 90 (entered into force 
1 July 2002) Article 8(2)(f ) (ICC Statute). 
 47  For a review of contemporary jurisprudence see  Tamás  Hoff mann ,  ‘Th e Gentle Humaniser of 
Humanitarian Law—Antonio Cassese and the Creation of the Customary Law of Non-international 
Armed Confl ict’ , in  Carsten  Stahn and  Larissa  van den Herik (eds),  Future Perspectives on International 
Criminal Justice ( Th e Hague :  TMC Asser ,  2010 ),  58 ,  64 fn  59–60 . 
 48  Tadić Interlocutory Appeals, [128–36]. 
 49  Hoff mann, above n 47, 63–80. 
 50  Egon  Schwelb ,  ‘Crimes against Humanity’ ,  British Yearbook of International Law ,  23 ( 1946 ),  181 . 
 51  See especially  Cherif M.  Bassiouni ,  Crimes against Humanity—Historical Evolution and 
Contemporary Application ( Cambridge :  CUP ,  2011 ),  136–44 . 
 52  Steven R.  Ratner ,  Jason S.  Abrams and  James L.  Bischoff  ,  Accountability for Human Rights 
Atrocities in International Law—Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy ( Oxford :  OUP , 3rd edn,  2009 ),  59 . 
 53  Korbély v Hungary (European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Application No 
9174/02, 19 September 2008) ( Korbély Decision ) [82]. It must be pointed out, however, that even this 
uncertain statement was merely based on the unadopted Draft Code of Off ences against the Peace 
and Security of Mankind of the International Law Commission and the scholarship of two authors. 
Moreover, one of the cited authors, Egon Schwelb, did not actually make the claim attributed to him 
by the Court. See Schwelb, ‘Crimes against Humanity’, above n 50, 211. 
 54  Generally, most authors agree that the independence of crimes against humanity from interna-
tional armed confl ict was the outcome of a gradual evolution.  Antonio  Cassese ,  International Criminal 
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 Another contentious issue is the substance of the contextual elements of the 
crime. Th ere is general agreement that crimes against humanity require ‘widespread 
or systematic’ commission in which ‘the hallmark of “systematic” is the high degree 
of organisation, and that features such as patterns, continuous commission, use of 
resources, planning, and political objectives are important factors’. 55 Widespread 
commission, on the other hand, is the quantitative aspect of crimes against humanity, 
which typically denotes numerous inhumane acts, 56 but might also be satisfi ed by 
a singular massive act of extraordinary magnitude. 57 However, the jurisprudence of 
international criminal courts and legal doctrine are divided over whether the attack 
against the civilian population must be carried out in pursuance of a state plan or 
policy. Since the adoption of the  Kunarac judgment, the ad hoc tribunals have con-
sistently rejected the existence of such an underlying plan or policy under customary 
international law, 58 even though arguably the evidence adduced by the Tribunal to 
support this conclusion was far from satisfactory. 59 While certain authors accept 
this proposition, 60 the jurisprudence of the Nuremberg trials suggests that the 
post-war interpretation of crimes against humanity linked the commission of such 
acts to government organization or approval. In the  Alstötter  case, the US Military 
Tribunal thus pronounced that:
 crimes against humanity as defi ned in C.C. Law 10 must be strictly construed to exclude 
isolated cases of atrocities or persecutions whether committed by private individuals or 
by a governmental authority. As we construe it, that section provides for the punishment 
Law ( Oxford :   OUP ,  2003 ),  73 . Based on a thorough perusal of the relevant international legal 
instruments, Ford argues that the tipping point probably occurred between 1968 and 1984:  Stuart 
 Ford ,  ‘Crimes Against Humanity at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia:  Is a 
Connection with Armed Confl ict Required?’ ,  UCLA Pacifi c Basin Law Journal ,  24 ( 2007 ),  182–3 . 
Ratner, Abrams and Bischoff  suggest that this transformation was completed by 1975 but admit that 
‘the issue is certainly open to debate’: Ratner, Abrams and Bischoff , above n 52, 323. 
 55  Robert  Cryer et al,  An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure ( Cambridge :  CUP , 
2nd edn,  2010 ),  237 . 
 56  Cassese points out that ‘Crimes against humanity (CAH) have always been conceived, from the 
beginning, as crimes on an enormous scale. While early codifi cations of CAH did not explicitly con-
tain a requirement that the attack on the civilian population be on a large scale, it was understood 
that this law was intended to address massive attacks’:  Antonio  Cassese et al,  International Criminal 
Law—Cases and Commentary ( Oxford :  OUP ,  2011 ),  180 . 
 57  Prosecutor v Blaškić ( Judgment ) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial 
Chamber I, Case No IT-94-15-T, 3 March 2000)  [206];  Kordić Judgment (International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber I, Case No IT-95-14/2-T, 26 February 2001) [176]. 
 58  In the  Kunarac case the Appeals Chamber pronounced that ‘[t] here was nothing in . . . customary 
international law at the time of the alleged attacks which required proof of the existence of a plan 
or policy to commit these crimes’:  Kunarac Appeal (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, Case No IT-96-23&IT-96-23/1-A, 12 June 2002) [98]. Repeated  inter 
alia in  Prosecutor v Krstić (Judgment) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
Appeals Chamber, Case No IT-98-33-A, 19 April 2004)  [225];  Prosecutor v Semanza (Judgment) 
(International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Appeals Chamber, Case No ICTR-97-20-A, 20 May 
2005)  [269]. Th is fi nding was recently quoted with approval by the Extraordinary Chambers in 
the Courts of Cambodia. See  Eav Trial (Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Trial 
Chamber, Case No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, 26 July 2010) [412]. 
 59  William  Schabas ,  ‘State Policy as an Element of International Crimes’ ,  Journal of Criminal Law 
& Criminology ,  98 ( 2008 ),  981 . 
 60  Werle, above n 30, 299. 
11_9780199671144c11.indd   238 10/9/2013   1:32:43 PM
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in 
any way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
Trying Communism through International Criminal Law? 239
of crimes committed against German nationals only where there is proof of conscious 
participation in systematic governmentally organised or approved procedures, amount-
ing to atrocities and off ences of that kind specifi ed in the act and committed against 
populations. 61 
 Recently the ECtHR also deemed it important to analyse whether ‘the particular 
act committed by the applicant was to be regarded as forming part of this state 
policy, such as to bring it within the sphere of crimes against humanity, as this 
notion was to be understood in 1956’. 62 Similarly, the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court prescribes that ‘ “[a] ttack directed against any civilian population” 
means a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to 
in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a 
State or organisational policy to commit such attack’. 63 
 Th e codifi cation of the policy requirement by the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court might be seen as ‘a weighty piece of evidence’ contrary to the 
position of the ad hoc tribunals. 64 Nevertheless, even though the requirement of 
state plan or policy is disputed, there is widespread consensus that it is necessary 
that the act committed by the accused ‘objectively falls within the broader attack, 
and that the accused was aware of this broader context’. 65 Accordingly, in order to 
commit the crime the acts of the accused must form part of the broader course of 
conduct. 66 
 (3)  Hungarian jurisprudence 
 Th e interpretative frame of reference for the application of international criminal 
law to the events of 1956 was set out by the Hungarian Constitutional Court. Th e 
Court pronounced that grave breaches of Geneva Convention IV and ‘prohibited 
acts in the case of armed confl ict not of an international character occurring in 
the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties as determined by common 
Article 3’ are not subject to statutory limitations due to the 1968 UN Convention 
on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations. 67 Th e Constitutional Court 
opined that:
 Acts defi ned in Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions constitute crimes against 
humanity . . . Consequently the punishability of the acts prescribed in common Article 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions will not lapse, either. Provided these acts would not fall under the 
scope of war crimes defi ned in Article 1(a) of the New York Convention—either due to the 
 61  USA v Alstötter et al. (Judgment) 14 ILR 274, 320 (Military Tribunal III, 3–4 December 1947). 
 62  Korbély Decision (European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Application No 9174/02, 
19 September 2008) [84]. 
 63  ICC Statute, Article 7(2)(a). 
 64  Claus  Kress ,  ‘On the Outer Limits of Crimes against Humanity: Th e Concept of Organisation 
within the Policy Requirement: Some Refl ections on the March 2010 ICC Kenya Decision’ ,  Leiden 
Journal of International Law ,  23 ( 2010 ),  870 . 
 65  Prosecutor v Tadić (Judgment) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals 
Chamber, Case No IT-94-1-A, 15 July 1999) [271]. 
 66  Cryer et al, above n 55, 237.    67  Decision No 53/1993, section II. 
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victim group or the actual conduct—they would still qualify as crimes against humanity 
defi ned in Article 1(b). 68 
 Th e Court’s reasoning in this regard equates the category of crimes against humanity 
with violations committed in non-international armed confl ict (ie war crimes) 
without clearly justifying this novel and unusual interpretation. Th e decision relies 
solely on the statement of the International Court of Justice in the  Nicaragua case 
that the provisions of Common Article 3 embody ‘elementary considerations of 
humanity’ 69 and claims that ‘[i] n defi ning crimes against humanity, paragraph 47 
of the Report on the Statute of the ICTY also makes reference to Common 
Article 3’. 70 In reality, however, the International Court of Justice qualifi ed the 
transgressions in the case at hand not as crimes against humanity but as violations 
of humanitarian law, while the Secretary-General’s Report simply affi  rms that 
crimes against humanity are prohibited ‘regardless of whether they are committed 
in an armed confl ict, international or internal in character’ without alluding to a 
link between the violation of Common Article 3 and crimes against humanity. 71 
Th e Constitutional Court thus stretched the concept of crimes against humanity 
to the breaking point in an attempt to remedy the absence of Hungarian codifi -
cation of this core crime by reading it into the category of war crimes. 72 Only 
through this contorted approach could the Constitutional Court maintain that 
‘the great majority of . . . crimes against humanity were punishable also under the 
Hungarian criminal law valid in 1956’. 73 
 However contentious this decision might have been, it has become the template for 
Hungarian criminal courts. Th erefore the only crucial question in the ensuing criminal 
proceedings that remained was the determination of the existence of a non-international 
armed confl ict. Still, Hungarian courts were deeply divided. Although it became 
accepted that the events following the Soviet intervention on 4 November 1956 
constituted an international armed confl ict, there was disagreement between the 
courts on the question of whether the hostilities in the period between 23 October 
and 4 November reached the threshold of non-international armed confl ict. 
 Th is problem seemed to have been resolved when the Supreme Court decided 
in 1998 that in the examined period the hostilities did not reach the level of 
non-international armed confl ict. 74 Th e Court ruled that the material scope of 
application of Additional Protocol II to the 1949  Geneva Conventions 75 should be 
 68  Decision No 53/1993, section IV(4)(b). 
 69  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) 
(Judgment) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, 114 [218]. 
 70  Decision No 53/1993, section IV(4)(b). 
 71  See Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General,  Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to 
Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), UN Doc. S/25704 (3 May 1993) [47]. 
 72  Th e Hungarian Criminal Code does not explicitly criminalize violations of humanitarian law 
committed in a non-international armed confl ict but the provisions on war crimes have been inter-
preted since the 1990s to also include situations of internal confl icts. 
 73  Decision No 36/1996, section II(2). 
 74  Legfelsőbb Bíróság [Hungarian Supreme Court] No. 1344/1998/3, 5 November 1998. 
 75  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of Non-International Armed Confl icts, opened for signature 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 
609 (entered into force 7 December 1978). 
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used to ascertain the existence of non-international armed confl ict. Article 1 of 
Additional Protocol II prescribes a high threshold:  it requires territorial control 
and high level of organization by the non-state armed groups, namely responsible 
command and the ability to carry out and sustain concerted military operations. 
 Yet the Review Bench of the Supreme Court overturned this decision and adopted 
a much broader interpretation that became the basis of all further decisions of the 
Hungarian judiciary in the ‘volley cases’. Th e Court argued that:
 Th e community of nations sought to protect protected persons by Article 3 common to 
the Geneva Conventions in cases of civil war when the population of the state and the armed 
forces of the state are facing each other. No further criteria are specifi ed in the text of the norm. 
Requiring further criteria might endanger the humanitarian character of the conventions . . . Th e 
Commentary to the 1949 Geneva Conventions edited by the International Committee of 
the Red Cross provides a tool for the interpretation of the notion of an armed confl ict of 
non-international character (Commentaire IV. p. 23). Accordingly, de facto hostilities or the 
use of the armed forces of the state amount to a confl ict of non-international character . . . 
 Independently of the fi ndings of fact, it is common knowledge that, from 23 October 
1956 onwards, the central power of the dictatorship made use of its armed forces against the 
unarmed population engaged in peaceful demonstrations and against armed revolutionary 
groups whose organisation was in progress. During this time, the armed forces employed 
signifi cant military equipment, such as tanks and aircrafts, and their activities against the 
population opposed to the regime spread over the whole country. In practical terms, they 
waged war against the overwhelming majority of the population. 76 
 Th e reasoning is noteworthy for several reasons. First of all, the Supreme Court 
apparently did not consider it crucial to determine the customary law defi nition of 
non-international armed confl ict as it existed in 1956; it simply treated the ques-
tion as if it was the outcome of a purposive interpretation of Common Article 3. 
Such reasoning is reminiscent of the jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals, which 
attempted to ‘humanise humanitarian law’ by adopting innovative interpreta-
tions aiming at expanding the protective scope of humanitarian law. 77 However, it 
is suggested that a criminal court—in line with the principle of strict construction—
should adopt the interpretation of a norm that is the most favourable to the 
accused. In other words, the  in dubio pro reo principle should prevail over the  in 
dubio pro humanitate approach. 
 Even so, while the Court justifi es the fi nding that the 1956 revolution was a non- 
international armed confl ict (at least until 4 November 1956) by invoking the neces-
sity of extending the humanitarian protection to the broadest possible scope, it gave 
a defi nition that on a narrow reading accepts armed hostilities as a non-international 
armed confl ict only if they involve confrontation between the overwhelming majority 
of the population and the government—thus possibly excluding more isolated 
incidents. In eff ect, this defi nition simultaneously expands and limits the notion 
of non-international armed confl ict spelt out in  Tadić . Th e Hungarian Supreme 
 76  Legfelsőbb Bíróság [Hungarian Supreme Court] No X. 713/1999/3, 28 June 1999. 
 77  Th eodor  Meron ,  ‘Th e Humanisation of Humanitarian Law’ ,  American Journal of International 
Law ,  94 ( 2000 ),  239 . 
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Court did not establish any level of organization for the non-state armed groups but 
demanded an exceptionally high requirement of intensity in the form of the partici-
pation of the predominance of the population. Th e use of the ICRC Commentary 
as an interpretative aid is also unconvincing. Even though the views of the only 
international organization specifi cally entrusted with a role in developing interna-
tional humanitarian law holds a certain persuasive authority, it cannot contradict 
the will of the international community. Moreover, even the broad interpretation 
of the concept of non-international armed confl ict proposed by the International 
Community of the Red Cross is signifi cantly diff erent from the Hungarian Supreme 
Court’s opinion. Although the Commentary sought to lower the threshold of the 
applicability of Common Article 3, it still maintained the requirement of a certain 
level of organization. 78 
 Th e Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court together set the path for the 
criminal courts. Every criminal act before 4 November 1956 was to be regarded 
as a violation of Common Article 3 and hence a crime against humanity, while 
crimes committed after the critical date amounted to war crimes. Yet the confusion of 
war crimes and crimes against humanity was exacerbated when, in certain cases, 
the courts justifi ed their conclusions with reference to other rules of Geneva 
Convention IV—particularly the grave breach regime. In the  Kecskemét case, 
the Supreme Court held that the violation of Common Article 3 amounted to 
a grave breach specifi ed in Article 147 of Geneva Convention IV and conse-
quently a crime against humanity. 79 In the  Tiszakécske  volley case the judgment 
declared that the peaceful demonstrators who fell victim to volleys fi red from 
aeroplanes were protected persons under Article 3(1) of the Convention since 
they did not take direct part in hostilities, and that their intentional killing 
was thus a breach of Article 3(1)(a) and a crime against humanity. 80 Th e most 
confusing judgment, however, was passed by the Budapest Metropolitan Court, 
which found that the shooting at the Kossuth Square on 25 October 1956 
should be classifi ed with reference to Articles 2, 3, 4 and 6 of Geneva Convention IV, 
making the criminal acts grave breaches under Articles 146 and 147 and thus 
crimes against humanity. 81 
 Th e Hungarian judiciary was given a fi nal chance to remedy its fl awed applica-
tion of international law. Th e ECtHR determined that the Hungarian Supreme 
Court’s judgment violated the principle of non-retroactivity. 82 It rightly pointed 
out that
 the [Hungarian] criminal courts focused on the question whether common Article 3 was to 
be applied alone or in conjunction with Protocol II. Yet this issue concerns only the defi nition 
of the categories of persons who are protected by common Article 3 and/or Protocol II 
 78  Jean  Pictet (ed),  Commentary—IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Time of War ( Geneva :  International Committee of the Red Cross ,  1958 ),  35–6 . 
 79  Legfelsőbb Bíróság [Hungarian Supreme Court] Case No I.1.534/1999/5, 13 September 2000. 
 80  Legfelsőbb Bíróság [Hungarian Supreme Court] Case No I.1.535/1999/5, 20 September 2000. 
 81  Fővárosi Bíróság [Budapest Metropolitan Court] Case No 13.B.563/2001/18, 2 October 2002. 
 82  Korbély Decision (European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Application No 9174/02, 
19 September 2008), [95]. 
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and the question whether the victim of the applicant’s shooting belonged to one of them; 
it has no bearing on whether the prohibited actions set out in common Article 3 are to be 
considered to constitute, as such, crimes against humanity. 83 
 Consequently, the Supreme Court had to revisit the question. Yet, while the  Korbély 
Review Bench seemingly made an eff ort to heed the analysis of the ECtHR by 
analysing whether the alleged criminal act formed part of a widespread and system-
atic attack against the civilian population, it concluded that the concept of armed 
confl ict incorporates the widespread and systematic attack requirement and that 
the accused’s status as a captain in the Hungarian army established a direct 
connection to state policy. 84 Th e Bench did not even attempt to prove the existence 
of widespread and systematic attack in furtherance of state policy, holding instead 
that a professional soldier at the time of the revolution was necessarily engaged in 
the commission of crimes against humanity. 
 It appears that such an outcome was almost unavoidable. In continental 
European jurisdictions, there is a natural reticence about the application of inter-
national law, and Hungarian courts are no exceptions in this respect. Th e judges’ 
diffi  dence can often be traced back to psychological factors. Continental legal 
education focuses upon domestic and black-letter law, which explains the inse-
curity about the determination and application of international law. 85 Th e use 
of customary international law in domestic criminal proceedings is especially 
problematic. In the continental legal tradition, it is by no means obvious that 
customary norms can be used to establish criminal responsibility since the often 
vague content of a customary norm is diffi  cult to reconcile with the requirements 
of foreseeability and strict construction of criminal law norms. 86 Moreover, as a 
result of the  jura novit curia  principle, continental courts generally do not have 
recourse to international law experts to assist them in the determination of the 
applicable rules of international law. Th ey are presumed to be aware of the content 
of every norm in the entire legal system—including the rules of international law. 
Inevitably, in such circumstances domestic courts tend to opt for a continuity of 
interpretation within their jurisdiction, which can result in construing interna-
tional law in conformity with domestic legal norms. For instance, in the  Touvier 
case, ‘the defi nition of a crime against humanity depended on that adopted 
by French domestic law, as it has been consistently interpreted by the Cour de 
Cassation’. 87 
 83  Korbély Decision , above n 82, [80]. For an analysis of this question see  Károly  Bárd ,  ‘Th e Diffi  culties 
of Writing the Past Th rough Law—Historical Trials Revisited at the European Court of Human 
Rights’ ,  International Review of Penal Law ,  81 ( 2010 ),  42 . 
 84  Legfelsőbb Bíróság [Hungarian Supreme Court] Case No X. 1.055/2008/5, 9 February 2009. 
 85  Jan  Wouters ,  ‘Customary International Law Before National Courts: Some Refl ections From a 
Continental European Perspective’ ,  Non-State Actors and International Law ,  4 ( 2004 ),  31–2 . 
 86  Mark  Klamberg ,  ‘International Criminal Law in Swedish Courts: Th e Principle of Legality in the 
Arklöv Case’ ,  International Criminal Law Review ,  9 ( 2009 ),  405 . 
 87  Simonetta  Stirling-Zanda ,  ‘Th e Determination of Customary International Law in European Courts 
(France, Germany, Italy, Th e Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland)’ ,  Non-State Actors and International Law , 
 4 ( 2004 ),  9 . 
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 Even though re-characterization of national crimes as crimes under international 
law has been accepted in a number of jurisdictions, 88 the court in question must 
still prove that the conduct has fulfi lled all the criteria required by international 
law at the time of the commission of the act. However, in lieu of resorting to the 
challenging task of determining the exact scope of crimes against humanity under 
international law, it seems that the Hungarian courts simply deferred to Hungarian 
domestic law and interpreted the category of crimes against humanity as identical 
to the crimes defi ned in Chapter XI of the Hungarian Criminal Code, entitled 
‘Crimes against humanity’. 89 However, the Hungarian legal system has failed to 
codify crimes against humanity as defi ned under international law, and Chapter 
XI of the Criminal Code only proscribes war crimes and crimes against peace. Th is 
eventually resulted in substituting crimes against humanity with war crimes committed 
in non-international armed confl ict. 
 Metalegal infl uences could have also played a role in the fi nal outcome. Benvenisti 
argues that ‘the method of inquiry used by a national court in examining the exist-
ence of a custom is likely to refl ect its national affi  liation’. 90 In the present case, 
the casual treatment of international law might suggest that the courts treated the 
determination of guilt of the accused as a retrospective affi  rmation of the legitimacy 
of the 1956 revolution. Tellingly, the ECtHR was recently criticized by a Hungarian 
author for not taking judicial notice of the fact that the communist regime used 
widespread and systematic violence against the people revolting against its oppressors. 
In this interpretation, the  Korbély decision amounts to disputing the very existence 
of the revolution. 91 
 (III)  Conclusion—Back to Square One? 
 In Hungary, the peaceful, negotiated transition from communism to democracy 
resulted in legal and constitutional continuity with the totalitarian predecessor, 92 
preventing a real rupture with the past. 93 Th e Constitutional Court emphasized 
this continuity by pronouncing that:
 Th e politically revolutionary changes adopted by the Constitution and the fundamental 
laws were all enacted in a procedurally impeccable manner, in full compliance with the 
 88  Kenneth S.  Gallant ,  Th e Principle of Legality in International and Comparative Criminal Law 
( Cambridge :  CUP ,  2009 ),  276–7 . 
 89  In fact, the Hungarian term ‘emberiség elleni bűncselekmény’ can be translated either as crimes 
against humanity or crimes against mankind. 
 90  Eyal  Benvenisti ,  ‘Judicial Misgivings Regarding the Application of International Law: An Analysis 
of Attitudes of National Courts’ ,  European Journal of International Law ,  4 ( 1993 ),  165 . 
 91  Péter  Hack ,  ‘A Korbély-ügy—A Visszaható Hatály Tilalma és az Emberiség Elleni Bűncselekmények’ 
[Th e Korbély Case—Th e Prohibition of Retroactivity and Crimes against Humanity] ,  Jogesetek 
Magyarázata ,  1 ( 2010 ),  78–9 . 
 92  Uitz, above n 4, 289. Th e fi rst democratically elected prime minister, József Antall once memora-
bly replied to criticisms that the process of ‘decommunization’ was not suffi  ciently thorough that: ‘You 
should have made a revolution!’ 
 93  Rosenfeld pointed out that in case of a violent rupture with the past ‘the demands of political justice 
might be reconciled with those of constitutionalism by confi ning the operation of political justice to 
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old legal system’s regulations of the power to legislate, thereby gaining their binding force. 
Th e old law retained its validity. With respect to its validity, there is no distinction between 
‘pre-Constitution’ and ‘post-Constitution’ law. 94 
 Th e Constitutional Court’s decision was based on an interpretation of the concept 
of rule of law as security. However, Kis persuasively argues that the Constitutional 
Court’s jurisprudence was hitherto characterized by a moral reading of the principle 
of constitutionality and the sudden turn to a formal reading of the principle of 
legality was by no means inevitable. 95 Th is change of heart was due to the Court’s 
belief in the necessity of reaffi  rming that the legal order of the communist era was 
valid. 96 Kok suggests that this approach was ‘caused by the fact that in Hungary, 
the repression, apart from the period from 1956 to 1963, was considerably less 
severe than that in Czechoslovakia and former Eastern Germany’. 97 Yet such for-
mal reading of the rule of law principle inevitably led to repercussions. In certain 
segments of society it resulted in ‘widespread questioning of the whole existing 
establishment, including the rule of law and the judicial review of majoritarian 
decision-making’. 98 
 In these circumstances, international criminal law was used to bypass the statute 
of limitations. However, international criminal law proved a poor substitute for 
political justice. As with the other Central and Eastern European countries, pros-
ecutions under international law have produced very few tangible results. 99 Th e 
dearth of convictions spurred the right-wing government in 2010 to return to 
‘ordinary criminal law’ in dealing with the past. An amendment of the Criminal 
Code proscribed ‘denying, questioning or trivializing genocide and other crimes 
against humanity committed by national socialist or communist regimes’. 100 
 In similar vein, the preamble to the newly adopted Fundamental Law of Hungary 
(in eff ect from 1 January 2012)—the so-called ‘National Avowal’—raised the prospect 
of reopening the prosecution of communist crimes by denying legal continuity with 
the previous regime. Th e Fundamental Law pronounces that:
 We deny the any statute of limitations for the inhuman crimes committed against the Hungarian 
nation and its citizens under the national socialist and communist dictatorships. 
 We do not recognise the communist constitution of 1949, since it was the basis for 
tyrannical rule; therefore we proclaim it to be invalid . . . 
 We date the restoration of our country’s self-determination, lost on the nineteenth day 
of March 1944, from the second day of May 1990, when the fi rst freely elected body of 
the revolutionary period separating the ancient regime from the new constitutional order’:  Michael 
 Rosenfeld ,  ‘Dilemmas of Justice’ ,  East European Constitutional Law Review ,  1 ( 1992 ),  20 . 
 94  Decision 11/1992, section V. 
 95  János  Kis ,  ‘Alkotmánybíróság a mérlegen (III. rész)’ [Constitutional Court on the Scales (Part 
III)] ,  Fundamentum ,  4 ( 2000 ),  35 . 
 96  Ruti G.  Teitel ,  Transitional Justice ( Oxford :  OUP ,  2000 ),  15 . 
 97  Ruth  Kok ,  Statutory Limitations in International Criminal Law ( Boston, MA and Leiden :  Martinus 
Nijhoff  ,  2007 ),  210 . 
 98  Morvai, above n 9, 33. 
 99  Cherif M.  Bassiouni ,  International Criminal Law , Vol 3 ( Boston, MA and Leiden :  Brill Academic 
Publisher ,  2008 ),  5 . 
 100  Criminal Code, Article 296(c), author’s translation. 
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popular representation was formed. We shall consider this date to be the beginning of our 
country’s new democracy and constitutional order. 101  
 Coincidentally, at the time of the drafting of the Fundamental Law, the Offi  ce 
of the General Prosecutor declined to initiate proceedings against the last living 
communist leader, Béla Biszku, who had played a key role as a Minister of Interior 
between 1957 and 1961 in the reprisals against the participants of the 1956 
revolution. Th e Prosecution heeded the settled jurisprudence of the Supreme 
Court and restricted its analysis to the applicability of Geneva Convention IV, 
concluding that the acts alleged to have been committed by Biszku did not amount 
to grave breaches of the Convention and therefore were subject to the statute of 
limitations. 102 At the same time, however, Biszku was charged as the fi rst person to 
violate the new amendment of the Criminal Code for publicly asserting that the 
1956 revolution was a counterrevolution and that the sentences against revolutionaries, 
including about 235 death sentences, were justifi ed. 
 Yet the Hungarian Parliament attempted one fi nal time to reopen the prosecution 
of international crimes committed in connection to the 1956 revolution. With the 
avowed intention of recommencing the Biszku case, a new act translated the defi nition 
of crimes against humanity of the Nuremberg Statute into Hungarian and explicitly 
authorized the Hungarian courts to apply them. 103 However, far from solving the 
predicament of the Hungarian judiciary, the new law actually compounded it, 
since it did not defi ne the contextual elements of crimes against humanity and 
also criminalized the violation of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, 
in contravention to the  nullum crimen principle. 104 
 Worse still, the law introduced the category of ‘communist crimes’ and 
declared that the commission or aiding and abetting of serious crimes such 
as voluntary manslaughter, assault, torture, unlawful detention and coercive 
interrogation is not subject to prescription when committed on behalf, with 
the consent of, or in the interest of the party state. In the guise of enforcing 
international criminal law, this provision eff ectively replicates the regulation 
that was found unconstitutional by the Hungarian Constitutional Court in the 
fi rst half of the 1990s. 
 In conclusion, Hungary seems to have abandoned its experiment with international 
criminal justice in a domestic setting and turned once again to a political solution. 
 101  Magyarország Alaptörvénye [Th e Fundamental Law of Hungary],  http://www.kormany.
hu/download/4/c3/30000/THE%20FUNDAMENTAL%20LAW%20OF%20HUNGARY.pdf 
(accessed 15 April 2013). 
 102  Legfőbb Ügyészség [Offi  ce of the General Prosecutor] No. NF. 10718/2010/5-I., 17 December 2010. 
 103  2011. évi CCX. Törvény az Emberiesség Elleni Bûncselekmények Büntetendõségérõl és Elévülésének 
Kizárásáról, valamint a Kommunista Diktatúrában Elkövetett Egyes Bûncselekmények Üldözésérõl [Law 
No CCX of 2011 on the Punishability and the Exclusion of the Statute of Limitations of Crimes 
Against Humanity and on the Prosecution of Certain Crimes Committed During the Communist 
Dictatorship] (Hungary). 
 104  See more in detail Tamás Hoff mann (2011), ‘A Nemzetközi Szokásjog Szerepe a Magyar 
Büntetőbíróságok Joggyakorlatának Tükrében’ [Th e Role of International Customary Law in the 
Jurisprudence of the Hungarian Criminal Courts],  Jogelméleti Szemle < http://jesz.ajk.elte.hu/hoff mann48.
html > (accessed 28 February 2013). 
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Th is choice, however, has inevitably divided the people along party lines and eff ectively 
prevented any real prospects of fi nally facing the legacy of the communist past. 
If there is any moral in the story—apart from the necessity of reforming the legal 
education of judges—it is that international criminal law cannot in itself substitute 
for the ultimately political project of confronting past wrongs and trying to achieve 
national reconciliation. As long as the society is not ready to come to terms with 
its past, the application of international law will only serve as a fi g-leaf to conceal 
deep-rooted enmities. 
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 Competing Histories: Soviet War 
Crimes in the Baltic States 
 Rain  Liivoja * 
 Most contributions to this volume tell untold stories about war crimes trials. Th is 
chapter, however, focuses on a few trials that attempt to tell untold stories. In other 
words, it is not the trials themselves that have been hidden in the mist of history, 
but rather the off ences that they deal with. My aim here is to provide a brief comment 
on the eff orts that the three Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania—have 
made to prosecute off ences against international law committed in their territories 
by the Soviet authorities during and after World War II. Th is discussion highlights 
the storytelling or history-writing function that trials of international crimes often 
have. Th e situation of the Baltic states illustrates particularly vividly what happens 
if the historical record produced by such trials is in confl ict with existing historical 
paradigms. 
 (I)  Background 
 Th e Baltic states, as well as Finland, were part of the Russian Empire until the 
Russian Revolution of 1917. To cut a long story short, 1 in the wake of the collapse 
of the Tsarist Government, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania declared inde-
pendence; they waged successful wars of independence against Soviet Russia, which, 
in peace treaties concluded in 1920, recognized the new states and disclaimed any 
rights to their territory. 2 
 *  I am grateful to Lauri Mälksoo and Gerry Simpson for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Th e 
responsibility for the fi nal text, however, is mine alone. 
 1  For more detail, see  Andrejs  Plakans ,  A Concise History of the Baltic States ( Cambridge :  Cambridge 
University Press ,  2011 ) , particularly 293–307, and  Andres  Kasekamp ,  A History of the Baltic States 
( Basingstoke :  Palgrave Macmillan ,  2010 ),  95–105 . 
 2  See Treaty of Peace, Estonia–Russian SFSR, signed at Dorpat [Tartu], 2 February 1920, in force 30 
March 1920, 11 LNTS 30; Treaty of Peace, Lithuania–Russian SFSR, signed at Moscow, 12 July 1920, 
3 LNTS 106; Treaty of Peace, Latvia–Russian SFSR, signed at Riga, 11 August 1920, 63/2 LNTS 
195; Treaty of Peace, Finland–Russian SFSR, signed at Dorpat [Tartu], 14 October 1920, 3 LNTS 5. 
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 On 23 August 1939, the Reich Minister for Foreign Aff airs Joachim von Ribbentrop 
and the People’s Commissar for Foreign Aff airs Vyacheslav Molotov signed the Nazi–
Soviet Treaty of Non-Aggression. 3 Th is agreement, which has become widely known 
as the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, made it possible for Germany to attack Poland 
on 1 September 1939 without entanglement with the Soviets. On 17 September 
1939, the Red Army invaded Poland from the east and fi ve days later the advancing 
German and Soviet troops met under amicable circumstances, celebrating that 
fact by a joint ‘victory parade’ in Brest. By a secret protocol attached to the Pact, 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the German Reich divvied 
up Eastern Europe between them. Th e deal—as amended by a secret provision 
attached to a treaty concluded after the occupation of Poland 4 —left Finland, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, eastern Poland and what is now Moldova to the Soviet 
‘sphere of infl uence’. 
 In furtherance of this arrangement, the USSR cajoled the Baltic states into con-
cluding Mutual Assistance Pacts in September and October 1939, which permitted 
the establishment of Soviet military bases in their territories. 5 Finland, in contrast, 
rejected a similar treaty, and on 1 December 1939 the USSR attacked Finland, 
launching the 105-day-long Winter War, in which Finland managed to defend its 
independence but lost a sizable part of its territory. 6 
 In mid-June 1940, the USSR presented the Baltic governments with a demand for 
the total occupation of their territories, backed by a warning that military resistance 
would be repressed. Th e Baltic governments capitulated and Soviet forces invaded. 
Shortly thereafter, hasty ‘elections’ were held, in which only candidates approved by 
the Communist Party could run. Th e resulting ‘parliaments’ immediately petitioned 
Moscow to admit the Baltic states into the Soviet Union, a wish that was promptly 
granted, and the Baltic states were annexed to the USSR in early August 1940. 
Th us, ‘[w] ithin three months, the three states had been transformed from inde-
pendent sovereign republics into union republics, constituent parts of a latter-day 
empire’. 7 
 What happened next had something to do with a particular Soviet interpretation 
of history. Th e USSR took the view that the legitimate post-1917 governments in 
the Baltic states had not been the ones with which they had negotiated peace treaties 
in 1920, but rather Bolsheviks who had been toppled by ‘bourgeois democratic’ 
regimes. Accordingly, everyone involved in governing the Baltic states between 1918 
and 1940 was seen as having played a role in an illegal usurpation of Soviet power. 
 3  Treaty of Non-Aggression, Germany–USSR, signed at Moscow, 23 August 1939, reproduced at 
< http://www.lituanus.org/1989/89_1_03.htm > (accessed 3 March 2013). 
 4  Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Demarcation, Germany–USSR, signed at Moscow, 
28 September 1939,  reproduced  at  < http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/German-Soviet_Boundary_and_ 
Friendship_Treaty_28_September_1939 > (accessed 3 March 2013). 
 5  Pact of Mutual Assistance, Estonia–USSR, signed at Moscow, 28 September 1939, in force 
4 October 1939, 198 LNTS 223; Pact of Mutual Assistance, Latvia–USSR, signed at Moscow, 5 October 
1939, in force 11 October 1939, 198 LNTS 381; Pact of Mutual Assistance, Lithuania–USSR, signed 
at Moscow, 10 October 1939, 3  Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy , 380. 
 6  See Plakans, above n 1, 339, and Kasekamp, above n 1, 126.    7  Plakans, above n 1, 344. 
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Furthermore, having regained control over the Baltic territories in 1940, the Soviet 
authorities wished to reorganize the societies and economies along communist lines. 
Th e combination of these factors resulted in a highly systematic repression of the 
political, administrative, military and economic elites of the countries: undesirable 
persons were convicted by military tribunals for anti-Soviet or anti-communist 
off ences and either executed or sent to prison camps in the USSR. 8 Lesser ‘off end-
ers’, including family members of those convicted, were deported to remote parts 
of the Soviet Union. On 13–14 June 1941, during one night alone, more than 
40,000 people were ‘taken by truck to gathering points at peripheral railroad 
stations, packed into boxcars, and then taken to diff erent points in the interior of 
the USSR’. 9 
 In 1941, Germany attacked the USSR and occupied the Baltic states. Th e Nazis 
began carrying out their own repression campaign; murdering local Jews, Roma 
and those with Communist sympathies. Also, a signifi cant number of Jews from 
other countries were brought into the Baltics for execution. Altogether some 
300,000 people were murdered on Baltic soil during the German Occupation. 10 
 In 1944, the Red Army invaded again and re-established Soviet rule. Th e authorities 
were now confronted with a group of individuals—known as the ‘forest brethren’—
hiding from the Soviet authorities in the woods, and to some extent engaging in 
guerrilla warfare tactics. A two-fold strategy was adopted to deal with them. On the 
one hand, there began a campaign of extrajudicial executions of the forest brethren, 
who were regarded as ‘bandits’. On the other hand, to reduce support for them, 
another wave of deportations was undertaken. Deportation also served the purpose 
of accelerating the collectivization of agriculture through ‘dekulakization’—the 
physical removal of well-off  farmers. 
 As a result, from 1940 through 1953, some 200,000 people were expelled from 
the Baltic states. 11 Most notably, from 25–28 March 1949, in what was known 
as Operation  Priboi (‘Breaker’), the Soviet authorities deported some 90,000 
Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians to various parts of the USSR, in particular the 
Amur, Irkutsk, Novosibirsk, Omsk and Tomsk  oblasts and the Krasnoyarsk  krai . 12 
On top of the deportation eff ort, some 75,000 people from the Baltic region were 
sent to forced labour camps (the infamous Gulag). All in all, roughly ten percent of 
the adult population of the Baltic states was either killed, imprisoned or deported 
by the Soviets. 
 8  Consider, for example, the fate of the members of the Tallinn Rotary Club, who in the 1930s 
included numerous movers and shakers of Estonian society. According to a study recently commis-
sioned by the Club, of the ninety-one men who had been members in 1930–40, a third managed to 
escape to the West. Of the rest, sixty per cent were either executed or imprisoned, and the vast major-
ity of those imprisoned died in jail or in prison camps. See ‘Liikmed 1930–1940’,  Tallinn Rotary Club 
[website], < http://www.rotary.ee/tallinn/et/klubi-ajalugu/liikmed-.html > (accessed 3 March 2013, in 
Estonian). 
 9  Plakans, above n 1, 347.    10  Plakans, above n 1, 353.    11  Plakans, above n 1, 367–8. 
 12  Heinrihs  Strods and  Matthew  Kott ,  ‘Th e File on Operation “Priboi”: A Re-Assessment of the 
Mass Deportations of 1949’ ,  Journal of Baltic Studies ,  33 ( 2002 ),  1–36 ,  241 . 
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 (II)  Nazi Crimes in the Baltic States 
 Th e off ences committed during the German occupation of the territory of the Baltic 
states, like those perpetrated in other Soviet-claimed territories, were immediately 
subjected to scrutiny. 
 As early as 1942, several years before the end of the war, the Soviet Union 
established an Extraordinary State Commission to investigate the off ences of Nazis 
and their collaborators. Th is body was tasked with amassing evidence of crimes 
committed and damage caused by German forces occupying Soviet territory 13 and 
reports of the commission were used, inter alia, at the Nuremberg trial. 14 During 
the next few years, local commissions of a similar nature, numbering more than 
one hundred, 15 were set up in Soviet-controlled territories, including the Baltic states. 
 In 1943, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR passed a decree ‘on 
the penalties for German-fascist evildoers, guilty of murdering and torturing the 
Soviet civilian population and Red Army prisoners-of-war, and for Soviet citizens 
[guilty of ] spying and treason of the Motherland, and for their accomplices’. 16 
In accordance with this enactment, numerous trials were held all across the Soviet 
Union. Th e prosecutions relied on the evidence gathered by the Extraordinary 
State Commission and its local branches, and, most crucially, confessions of the 
accused. Two of the most widely known of these trials were held in 1943: the 
Krasnodar trial, which dealt with a group of eleven Russian and Ukrainian 
auxiliaries to  Sonderkommando 10a , and the Kharkov trial, which focused on three 
Germans and one Russian accused of killing civilians. 17 
 Th ese proceedings set the tone for subsequent trials, held in 1945–6 in Kiev, Minsk, 
Leningrad, Smolensk, Briansk, Nikolaev, Velikie Luki and elsewhere. 18 With 
respect to the Baltic territories, a trial took place in Riga in early 1946 and resulted 
in the conviction and execution of seven German ex-offi  cials of the Riga military 
district. 19 Th ese trials, characterized by the application of the 1943 edict, appear 
 13  See generally  Marina  Sorokina ,  ‘People and Procedures: Toward a History of the Investigation of 
Nazi Crimes in the USSR’ ,  Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History ,  6 ( 2005 ),  797–831 . 
 14  For the role of the Commission in preparing the Soviet case at Nuremberg, see  George  Ginsburgs , 
 Moscow’s Road to Nuremberg: Th e Soviet Background to the Trial ( Boston, MA and Leiden :  Martinus 
Nijhoff  ,  1996 ), especially  37–40 . 
 15  Sorokina, above n 13, 801. 
 16  An English translation of the edict appears in  F.J.M.  Feldbrugge ,  ‘War Crimes in Soviet Criminal 
Law: A Postscript’ ,  Review of Central and Eastern European Law ,  25 ( 1999 ),  459–61 . 
 17  For an illuminating account of the Krasnodar trial and the background to Soviet prosecutions, 
see  Ilya  Bourtman ,  ‘ “Blood for Blood, Death for Death”: Th e Soviet Military Tribunal in Krasnodar, 
1943’ ,  Holocaust and Genocide Studies ,  22 ( 2008 ),  246–65 . See also the judgment in  USSR v Langheld 
et  al. (Case of Atrocities Committed by German-Fascist Invaders in the City of Kharkov and Kharkov 
Region During Th eir Temporary Occupation) (Military Tribunal of the 4th Ukrainian Front, USSR, 
1943), the English text of which appears in  Nazi Crimes in Ukraine 1941–1944:  Documents and 
Materials (Kiev: Institute of State and Law of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, 1987), 
279–83. 
 18  Ginsburgs, above n 14, 40. 
 19  See ‘Riga Trial’,  Jewish Virtual Library [website], < http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/
Holocaust/WarCrime50.html > (accessed 3 March 2013). 
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to have come to a conclusion with respect to Soviet citizens in 1947 and as regards 
enemy nationals in 1949. 20 During the period in question, military tribunals 
across the USSR convicted roughly 2.5 million people of off ences relating to the 
German occupation. 21 
 Th e Soviet proceedings did not take place only during the war and the immediate 
post-war period. Th ere appears to have been something of a break in the 1950s, but 
another wave of prosecutions commenced in the 1960s and, again, also involved 
the territory of the Baltic states. Two particularly prominent trials, somewhat ham-
pered by the absence of some of the accused, were held in Estonia. In 1961, a 
prosecution was mounted against Ain-Ervin Mere (commander of the Estonian 
Security Police under the Self-Administration set up under German occupation), 
Ralf Gerrets (deputy commandant of a concentration camp at Jägala), and Jaan Viik 
(a guard at the camp, for the mass-murder of Jews). Th e three men were convicted 
and sentenced to death. Gerrets and Viik were duly executed. However, Mere had 
taken up residence in the UK and the British government declined to extradite him, 
citing a lack of evidence. He died in 1969 in Leicester, England. A fourth person, 
Aleksander Laak, commandant of the Jägala camp, had initially also been indicted, 
but he committed suicide in Winnipeg, Canada—allegedly after some prompting 
from a Zionist ‘avenger’—before the start of the trial. 22 
 In 1962, another trial was held where Juhan Jüriste, Karl Linnas and Ervin Viks 
were charged with murdering 12,000 civilians at a concentration camp at Tartu. All 
three defendants were convicted and sentenced to death, but only Jüriste was actu-
ally executed. For the want of an extradition treaty, Viks was not extradited from 
Australia and he died there in 1983. Th e US, however, deported Linnas to the USSR. 
(In view of the American non-recognition policy of the annexation of the Baltic states 
and the death sentence passed  in absentia , the deportation was quite extraordinary. 23 ) 
Linnas died in 1987 in a Soviet prison hospital while awaiting retrial. 
 Th e Soviet investigations and trials of Nazis and their collaborators, which con-
tinued into the 1980s, 24 should be approached with care. First of all, the historical 
record that they generated is tainted by conscious falsifi cation of evidence. It is quite 
telling that the person in charge of editing the reports of the Extraordinary State 
Commission was none other than Andrey Vyshinsky, 25 who, for example, personally 
‘corrected’ forensic medical reports provided to the Commission. 26 Th e most notori-
ous instance of direct falsifi cation was the fabrication of evidence to suggest that 
 20  F.J.M.  Feldbrugge ,  ‘War Crimes in Soviet Criminal Law: A Propos—Th e Lukianoff  Case’ ,  Review 
of Socialist Law ,  10 ( 1984 ),  293 . 
 21  Ginsburgs, above n 14, 41. 
 22  Jonathan Freedland, ‘Revenge’,  Th e Guardian , 26 July 2008, <http:// www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2008/jul/26/second.world.war > (accessed 3 March 2013). 
 23  See  Jerome S.  Legge , Jr,  ‘Th e Karl Linnas Deportation Case, the Offi  ce of Special Investigations, 
and American Ethnic Politics’ ,  Holocaust and Genocide Studies ,  24 ( 2010 ),  26–55 . 
 24  For a late case, see Feldbrugge, above n 20. 
 25  While Vyshinsky later gained some prominence as one of the prosecutors at Nuremberg, his 
main claim to fame was the orchestration of show trials during Joseph Stalin’s Great Purge in the 
late 1930s. 
 26  Sorokina, above n 13, 827–9. 
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the Germans were responsible for the massacre of some 22,000 Polish offi  cers at 
Katyn, 27 whereas in reality they had been killed by the Soviet NKVD—the People’s 
Commissariat for Internal Aff airs. 
 Second, the judicial proceedings were egregious examples of show trials. Th ey 
were characterized by infl ated charges, an extensive reliance on (coerced) confessions 
(often involving grotesquely self-deprecating admissions of guilt), impotent defence 
counsel, and carefully orchestrated media coverage. 
 Th ird, with respect to Soviet citizens, the main legal basis for the trials was Section 
58 of the 1926 Criminal Code of Soviet Russia, dealing with ‘counterrevolutionary 
crimes’, 28 a concept with notoriously broad scope. 29 Later trials, conducted under 
the 1961 Criminal Code of Soviet Russia or the relevant counterparts in the other 
Soviet republics, relied on the provision that criminalized the ‘betrayal of the father-
land’. 30 Th us, as Ferdinand Feldbrugge, an eminent Dutch scholar of Soviet law 
explained:
 [T] he edict of 1943 supplied the legal defi nition, the  Tatbestand , for the crimes of  foreign 
war criminals , but only the basis for special penalties (hanging and  katorga [i.e. forced 
labour under harsh conditions]) with regard to  Soviet citizens convicted of similar war 
crimes. Indeed the looseness of the Soviet defi nition of treason made it unnecessary to draft 
special provisions for punishing Soviet citizens who had acted against the Soviet Union in 
wartime. When we speak, therefore, of war crimes committed by Soviet citizens, we have in 
mind what is technically the crime of treason. 31 
 As a result, it may be diffi  cult to tell who during this period were actually convicted 
of war crimes and who were convicted of some perceived disloyalty to the Soviet 
regime. 
 Finally, only during the later trials was there any specifi c concern for the persecution 
and extermination of ethnic and racial groups. Th e earlier trials were fi xated on the 
anti-Soviet dimension of the defendants’ conduct rather than any specifi c violations 
of the law of armed confl ict or more general principles of humanity. Th us, Jewish 
victims were initially not designated as ‘Jews’ or ‘people’ or ‘civilians’, but as ‘Soviet 
citizens of Jewish descent’ or some such, in an attempt to cast the Soviet state as 
the greatest victim. 
 Having said all this, one cannot deny the atrocities committed by Nazi Germany in 
the territory that it occupied during World War II. Th ere is also no doubt that locals—
be they Estonians, Latvians or Lithuanians, or Russians, Byelorussians or Ukrainians—
for a variety of reasons, and sometimes quite enthusiastically, collaborated with the 
 27  Sorokina, above n 13, 804–806. 
 28  For an English translation of the provision, see ‘Criminal Code of RSFSR’, < http://www.
cyberussr.com/rus/uk58-e.html > (accessed 3 March 2013). Section 59 of the Code, addressing ‘crimes 
against the administrative order that are especially dangerous to the USSR’, also proved useful. 
 29  As Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn rhetorically asked in  Th e Gulag Archipelago , ‘[w] ho among us has not 
experienced its all-encompassing embrace? In all truth, there is no step, thought, action, or lack of 
action under the heavens which could not be punished by the heavy hand of Article 58’:  Aleksandr 
 Solzhenitsyn ,  Th e Gulag Archipelago ( New York, NY :  Harper & Row , 1st edn,  1973 ),  60 . 
 30  Section 64a.    31  Feldbrugge, above n 20, 293. 
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Germans and actively partook in the atrocities. 32 It is probable that many of these 
individuals were caught in the vast net cast by the Soviet authorities. Th us, grossly 
imperfect as the Soviet investigations and trials may have been, they generated at 
least a semblance of accountability for off ences committed in Eastern Europe in 
the interests of the Axis powers. 
 (III)  Soviet Crimes in the Baltic States 
 Th e conduct of the Soviet regime itself was, of course, never critically evaluated. 
Th us, when the Baltic states regained independence in 1991, the situation was 
such that while Nazi crimes in their territories had at least to some extent been 
investigated and judicially processed, no legal assessment had been given to the 
conduct of members of the Red Army or other authorities of the Soviet Union in 
the Baltic territories. Th e three Baltic states were determined to rectify the situation. 
 (1)  Preparatory steps 
 In 1992 all three states established national institutions to compile evidence of 
off ences committed by the occupying regimes—both German and Soviet, though 
admittedly focusing on the latter. Th us, in Estonia a State Commission for the 
Investigation of Policies of Repression operated until 2004, while the Latvian 
Centre for the Documentation of the Consequences of Totalitarianism 33 and the 
Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania 34 continue their work to 
this day. Furthermore, in 1998, the presidents of the Baltic states set up expert bod-
ies with international or mixed membership to specifi cally consider the occupation 
period in their respective countries in a historical perspective. Th us emerged the 
Estonian International Commission for Investigation of Crimes against Humanity 
(replaced in 2008 by the Institute of Historical Memory), 35 the Latvian History 
Commission, 36 and the International Commission for the Evaluation of the Crimes 
of the Nazi and Soviet Occupation Regimes in Lithuania. 37 
 Furthermore, all three states embarked on a distinctly legal process of evaluating 
Soviet-occupation-era atrocities. 38 Th e fi rst obstacle was the lack of adequate 
 32  For example, with respect to Estonia, see generally  Estonia 1940–1945: Reports of the Estonian 
International Commission for the Investigation of Crimes against Humanity (Tallinn, 2006). 
 33  See  Centre for the Documentation of the Consequences of Totalitarianism (CDCT) [website], < http://
www.sab.gov.lv/index.php?lang=en&page=15&sub=260 > (accessed 3 March 2013). 
 34  See  Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania [website], < http://www.genocid.lt > 
(accessed 3 March 2013). 
 35  See  Estonian Institute of Historical Memory [website], < http://www.mnemosyne.ee > (3 March 
2013). 
 36  See ‘Latvia’s History Commission’,  Ministry of Foreign Aff airs of Latvia [website], < http://www.
mfa.gov.lv/en/policy/4641/4661/4664/ > (accessed 3 March 2013). 
 37  See  Th e International Commission for the Evaluation of the Crimes of the Nazi and Soviet Occupation 
Regimes in Lithuania  [website], < http://www.komisija.lt > (accessed 3 March 2013). 
 38  All three became parties to the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to 
War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, GA Res. 2391 (XXIII) (26 November 1968), in force 11 
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legislation. Obviously the Soviet approach of classifying war crimes as a form of 
treason was out of the question. In any event, even though all three states initially 
continued to apply the existing Soviet-era criminal legislation, they purged these 
instruments of all distinctly Soviet off ences. Accordingly, all three states fi rst had to 
modify their legislation—a process that in hindsight looks rather peculiar. 
 In 1992, Lithuania passed a special Act providing for the responsibility for 
the genocide of the Lithuanian people. 39 Section 1 of the Act defi ned genocide, 
broadly following the defi nition of the Genocide Convention. 40 Section 2 added 
that ‘killing and torturing the people of Lithuania, deportation of its population 
carried out during the years of Nazi and Soviet occupation and annexation of 
Lithuania, corresponds to the defi nition of the crime of genocide as it is described 
by international law’. In an eff ort to codify Lithuanian criminal law, the crime of 
genocide was incorporated into the Criminal Code in 1998. Th e defi nition of the 
off ence referred to ‘actions committed with intent to physically destroy, in whole 
or in part, residents belonging to a national, ethnical, racial, religious, social or 
political group’ and then listing the various modalities. 41 
 In 1993, Latvia amended its Criminal Code with a new chapter, dealing with 
international crimes. Notably, section 68/1 provided that ‘crimes against human-
ity, including genocide’, are certain deliberate acts committed with intent to destroy, 
in whole or in part, a particular national, ethnical, racial or religious group. 42 Section 
68/3 proscribed war crimes, defi ned as ‘violations of the laws and customs of war’. 
 In 1994, Estonia inserted a provision dealing with genocide and crimes against 
humanity into the Criminal Code as section 61/3, which referred to:
 [c] rimes against humanity, including genocide, as these off ences are defi ned in international 
law, that is, the intentional commission of acts directed to the full or partial extermination of 
a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, a group resisting an occupation regime, or other 
social group, the murder of, or the causing of extremely serious or serious bodily or mental 
November 1970, 754 UNTS 73—Estonia acceded on 21 October 1991, Latvia on 14 April 1992 and 
Lithuania on 1 February 1996. 
 39  Įstatymas dėl atsakomybės už Lietuvos gyventojų genocidą [ Law on the Responsibility for the 
Genocide of the Population of Lithuania ], 9 April 1992, No. I-2477, Valstybės žinios (1992), No. 
13-342. See also  Justinas  Zilinskas ,  ‘Broadening the Concept of Genocide in Lithuania’s Criminal 
Law and the Principle of  nullum crimen sine lege ’ ,  Jurisprudencija ,  4 ( 118 ) ( 2009 ),  335 ;  Rytis 
 Satkauskas ,  ‘Soviet Genocide Trials in the Baltic States: Th e Relevance of International Law’ ,  Yearbook 
of International Humanitarian Law ,  7 ( 2004 ),  392 . 
 40  But for two points of diff erence, see Zilinskas, above n 39, 336. 
 41  Baudžiamasis kodeksas [ Criminal Code ], 1961/1990, Section 71(1), cited in  Compliance of 
the Republic of Lithuania Law ‘On Compensation for the Damage Infl icted by the USSR Occupation’ 
(Wording of 12 March 1998), the Republic of Lithuania Law ‘On Restoring the Rights of Persons Repressed 
for Resistance Against the Occupation Regimes’ (Wording of 12 March 1998) and the Republic of Lithuania 
Law ‘On Liability for Genocide of Residents of Lithuania’ (Wording of 9 April 1992 with Subsequent 
Amendments) with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania , Case No. 09/2008 (Constitutional 
Court, Lithuania, 2010). A separate section created an aggravated form of the off ence, involving the 
killing of the victims or organizing the commission of genocide by other persons. Criminal Code 
1961/1990 (Lithuania), section 71. 
 42  Cited in ‘Th ird Periodic Report of States Parties Due in 1997—Latvia’, Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Doc. CERD/C/309/Add.1 (25 March 1999), [21]. 
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harm to, a member of such group or the torture of him or her, the forcible taking of children, 
an armed attack, the deportation or expulsion of the native population in the case of occupation 
or annexation and the deprivation or restriction of economic, political or social human rights. 43 
 At the same time, three provisions regarding war crimes were introduced into the 
Criminal Code, dealing respectively with the abuse of the civilian population in 
a zone of hostilities, mistreatment of prisoners of war, and the use of prohibited 
means and methods of warfare. 44 
 Before looking at the proceedings undertaken within this legal framework, a 
few general observations are in order. First, all three states have since adopted com-
pletely new codifi cations of substantive criminal law—Latvia in 1998, 45 Lithuania 
in 2000, 46 and Estonia in 2001. 47 I  have mentioned the early legislation above 
because the lion’s share of criminal cases concerning Soviet off ences were dealt with 
under the earlier legislation. 
 Second, a striking feature of the Estonian and Lithuanian legislation is the broad-
ening of the defi nition of genocide. According to the 1948 Genocide Convention, 
the crime of genocide encompasses certain violent or coercive acts ‘committed with 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, 
as such’. 48 Lithuanian law adds ‘social or political group[s] ’ to the list, whereas 
Estonian law mentions ‘a group resisting an occupation regime, or other social group’ 
(the former being a thinly veiled reference to the forest brethren). Th e extension of 
the defi nition of genocide to social and political groups is not a uniquely Baltic 
phenomenon—numerous other states have done so 49 —but it doubtless has special 
signifi cance in the case of the Baltics (and also, for example, for Ethiopia in view 
of the Red Terror of the 1970s). 
 Th ird, early Estonian and Latvian defi nitions of crimes against humanity hardly 
qualifi ed as masterpieces of legal craftsmanship. For whatever reason, the legislators 
tried to address crimes against humanity and genocide jointly. Th ey did not succeed 
very well and in fact caused considerable confusion. Th e recent codifi cations have 
resolved the problem by treating the two off ences separately. 
 43  Criminal Code (Estonia), section 61/1(1), as introduced by Eestis inimsusevastaseid kuritegusid 
või sõjakuritegusid toimepannud isikute kriminaalvastutuse seadus [ Act on the Criminal Liability of 
Persons Who Have Committed Crimes against Humanity or War Crimes in Estonia ], 9 November 1994, 
Riigi Teataja I 1994, 83, 1447. 
 44  Criminal Code (Estonia), above n 43, sections 61/2, 61/3, and 61/4. 
 45  Krimināllikums [ Criminal Code ], 17 June 1998, Latvijas Vēstnesis No 199/200 (8 July 1998). See, 
in particular, section 71 (genocide), section 71/2 (crimes against humanity) and section 74 (war crimes). 
 46  Baudžiamasis kodeksas [ Criminal Code ], 26 September 2000, Valstybės žinios 2000 No. 89-2741. 
See, in particular, section 99 (genocide), section 100 (crimes against humanity), sections 101–113 
(war crimes). 
 47  Karistusseadustik [ Penal Code ], 6 June 2001, Riigi Teataja I 2001, 61, 364. See, in particular, sec-
tion 89 (crimes against humanity), section 90 (genocide) and sections 94–109 (war crimes). 
 48  Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, GA Res. 260 A (III) 
(9 December 1948), in force 12 January 1951, 78 UNTS 277, Article II. 
 49  See  John B.  Quigley ,  Th e Genocide Convention: An International Law Analysis ( Farnham :  Ashgate , 
 2006 ),  17–18 . 
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 But from these premises, imperfect as they may have been, the Baltic states 
proceeded to investigate, indict and try a number of persons suspected of having 
perpetrated international crimes against Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians. 
Th e defendants were mainly regional heads and operational commissioners of 
the Ministry of Internal Aff airs (MVD), the NKVD and the Ministry of State 
Security (MGB). 
 Th ere is, unfortunately, no defi nitive list or count of all the trials, let  alone of 
all the investigations that did not lead to trials. But by my last count, Estonian 
courts have convicted eleven persons, 50 Latvian courts nine, and Lithuanian courts 
another dozen or so. Yet the total number of investigations is in the order of several 
hundred as many cases were closed due to a shortage of evidence, or the death or 
ill-health of the accused, who were by this time in their 70s and 80s. Th us, I will 
mention here only a few representative cases, focusing especially on those which 
garnered international attention due to proceedings before the European Court of 
Human Rights. 
 (2)  Prosecution for crimes against humanity and genocide 
 Th e bulk of the cases addressed two aspects of Soviet repression: the deportation of 
civilians and the extrajudicial execution of forest brethren. Yet the way these acts 
have been qualifi ed as a matter of law has diff ered from state to state. 
 In Estonia, virtually all of the cases have proceeded under section 61/1 of the 
old Criminal Code, which, as already mentioned, contained the awkward amalga-
mation of genocide and crimes against humanity. An important case came before 
the Estonian courts in 1998, when Karl-Leonhard Paulov, a former ‘combat agent’ 
( agent-boyevik ) of MGB was prosecuted for having killed three forest brethren in 
1945 and 1946 by shooting them in the back. 
 Th e case is notable because this appears to have been the fi rst occasion where such 
an agent was actually prosecuted. Furthermore, the case allowed the Supreme Court 
to clear up the confusion created by the legislature in defi ning international off ences 
in Estonian law. Th e Court, by relying on the defi nitions contained in Article 6(2) 
of the Nuremberg Charter and Article 2 of the Genocide Convention, outlined 
the elements of genocide, distinguishing it from crimes against humanity. 51 Finally, 
the case allowed the Supreme Court to clarify the status of the forest brethren. 
Th e Supreme Court agreed with the position of the appellate court that they were 
civilians for the purposes of the law of armed confl ict. 52 Th erefore depriving them 
 50  See ‘Aegumatud rahvusvahelised kuriteod—Kriminaalasjad’,  Estonian Security Police [website], 
< http://www.kapo.ee/est/toovaldkonnad/aegumatud-rahvusvahelised-kuriteod/kriminaalasjad > 
(accessed 3 March 2013, in Estonian). 
 51  In re Paulov , Case No. 3-1-1-31-00, Riigi Teataja III 2000, 11, 118 (Supreme Court, Estonia, 2000). 
 52  Th e Courts, somewhat problematically, based themselves here on Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Confl icts, signed at Geneva, 8 June 1977, in force 12 July 1978, 1125 UNTS 3, Article 
50(1): ‘A civilian is any person who does not belong to one of the categories of persons referred to in 
Article 4 (A) (1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Th ird Convention and in Article 43 of this Protocol. In case of 
doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian.’ 
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of the right to life and the right to a fair trial could be qualifi ed as other ‘other 
inhumane act[s] ’ falling within the defi nition of crimes against humanity in Article 
6(2)(c) of the Nuremberg Charter. In a later case, concerning a MGB agent named 
Vladimir Penart, who in 1953 had shot another of the forest brethren, the Supreme 
Court had the occasion to further explain the point. 53 Th e Court noted that whether 
or not the forest brethren qualifi ed as combatants had to be evaluated in light of the 
1907 Hague Regulations which codifi ed customary international law at the time. 
Th e Court noted that since the forest brethren did not meet the criteria of Articles 
1 and 2 of the Regulations defi ning combatants, they were to regarded as civilians. 
 In only one instance has there been prosecution for genocide in Estonia. In 2007, 
one Arnold Meri was indicted under the provision in the new Penal Code dealing 
exclusively with genocide for his alleged involvement in the deportation of 251 
civilians from the island of Saaremaa during Operation  Priboi . However, the trial 
was suspended because of the aged defendant’s ill health, and subsequently closed 
when he died. Th us, Estonian courts have not had the occasion to pronounce on 
whether the deportation campaign amounted to genocide. 
 In Latvia, the intermingling of the defi nitions of crimes against humanity and 
genocide also caused some diffi  culty. However, there the authorities and courts 
opted for genocide. For example, in affi  rming the conviction of Alfons Noviks, the 
former People’s Commissar of the Interior of the Latvian SSR, for his involvement 
in the deportation, the Latvian Supreme Court explicitly qualifi ed this conduct 
as ‘[g] enocide against those inhabitants of Latvia whom Alfons Noviks marked as 
socially dangerous and detrimental to the Soviet regime’. 54 
 In Lithuania, there was little alternative in respect of the early cases to quali-
fying similar conduct as genocide, as the defi nition of crimes against humanity 
was introduced into Lithuanian law by the entry into force of the new Criminal 
Code in 2003. 55 
 In this context, the charge of crimes against humanity is clearly the less problematic 
one. Th e deportation campaign certainly satisfi es either of the two contextual 
elements of crimes against humanity. Th ere can be little doubt that, given the 
large number of persons aff ected by the measures, especially in relation to the size 
of the total population of the Baltic countries, the acts were widespread. In light 
of the deportation being carried out meticulously against specifi c segments of the 
population according to lists previously drawn up, they were also systematic. As 
regards modalities of crimes against humanity, that is to say the specifi c acts that 
amount to the off ence if the contextual element is satisfi ed, both murder and 
deportation are recognized as such by international law. 56 
 53  In re Penart , Case no. 3-1-1-140-30, Riigi Teataja III 2004, 2, 23 (Supreme Court, Estonia, 2003). 
 54  In re Noviks , Case No. #PAK-269 (Supreme Court, Latvia, 1996),  Baltic Yearbook of International 
Law, 1 (2001), 261, 298. 
 55  Zilinskas, above n 39, 338. 
 56  Charter of the International Military Tribunal, annexed to the Agreement for the Prosecution 
and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, UK–US–France–USSR, signed 
at London, 8 August 1945, in force upon signature, 82 UNTS 279, Article 6(1)(c); Rome Statute of 
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 Th e genocide charges, in contrast, are far more problematic. Th e main question 
is whether the activities of the Soviet authorities were undertaken with a view to 
eliminating a specifi c group, and if so, whether the group was covered by the defi -
nition of genocide. Here one stumbles on the innovation of the law of the Baltic 
states with respect to the range of protected groups. Whatever may be the status 
of customary law today, it is diffi  cult to make the argument that, in the 1940s and 
1950s, the destruction of social or political groups amounted to genocide under 
customary law. Hence, the genocide of a ‘group resisting occupation’ or of ‘those 
inhabitants . . . marked as socially dangerous and detrimental to the Soviet regime’ 
is a notion fraught with diffi  culty. 
 However, there is a diff erent way of approaching the matter. As the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has recognized, genocidal intent need 
not be manifested in ‘desiring the extermination of a very large number of the 
members of the group’, but ‘may also consist of the desired destruction of a more 
limited number of persons selected for the impact that their disappearance would 
have upon the survival of the group as such’. 57 An Estonian legal scholar, Lauri 
Mälksoo, has argued that the context of the Soviet repressions in the Baltic states 
indicates a genocidal intent in this sense. 58 Th e repressions were directed against 
the political, economic and intellectual elites, with the further hidden agenda of 
subjugating national groups. However, as Mälksoo notes, it may be diffi  cult to 
prove such intent on the level of the offi  cials who actually carried out the deportation 
orders. 59 
 As regards modalities, while the execution of individuals would certainly qualify as 
an act of genocide if the necessary  dolus specialis is present, 60 the status of deportation 
is far less certain. 61 
 In view of all this, Justinas Žilinskas, a Lithuanian legal scholar who has extensively 
studied the approach to the crime of genocide in Lithuania, 62 sensibly concludes 
that ‘[i] n many instances, it may be advisable to qualify crimes of the Soviet regime 
as crimes against humanity to avoid possible problems with the principle of  nullum 
crimen sine lege’ . 63 
the International Criminal Court, Rome, 17 July 1998, in force 1 July 2000, 2187 UNTS 90, Article 
7(1)(a) and (d). 
 57  Prosecutor v Jelisić , Case no. IT-95-10, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment (14 December 1999), [82]. 
 58  Lauri  Mälksoo ,  ‘Soviet Genocide? Communist Mass Deportations in the Baltic States and 
International Law’ ,  Leiden Journal of International Law ,  14 ( 2001 ),  784–5 . 
 59  Mälksoo, above n 58, 785. 
 60  Rome Statute, above n 56, Article 6(a). 
 61  UN Secretary-General, ‘Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide’, UN Doc. E/447 (26 June 
1947), 24:  ‘Mass displacement of populations from one region to another also does not constitute 
genocide. It would, however, become genocide if the operation were attended by such circumstances 
as to lead to the death of the whole or part of the displaced population (if, for example, people were 
driven from their homes and forced to travel long distances in a country where they were exposed to 
starvation, thirst, heat, cold and epidemics)’. 
 62  Justinas  Žilinskas ,  Nusikaltimai žmoniškumui ir genocidas tarptautinėje teisėje bei Lietuvos 
Respublikos teisėje ( Vilnius :  Lietuvos teisės universitetas ,  2003 ) . 
 63  Zilinskas, above n 39, 344. 
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 (3)  Prosecution for war crimes 
 Although there exists a fairly large body of cases where the off ence was characterized 
as a crime against humanity or as genocide, there have not been many war crimes 
trials. 
 Th is may seem curious in light of the fact that it has been an article of judicial 
faith in the Baltic states that their territories were militarily occupied by the USSR 
until 1991. Hence, the law of armed confl ict (in particular, the law of occupation) 
should have applied and its serious violations ought to be prosecutable as war 
crimes. Moreover, the law of armed confl ict (and hence war crimes law) was far better 
developed at the relevant time compared to the international law relating to crimes 
against humanity and genocide, which should have made laying war crimes charges 
technically much simpler. However, crimes against humanity and genocide appear 
as powerful and self-explanatory labels for the Soviet crimes, whereas war crimes 
might be viewed by the public as mere technicalities. In other words, describing 
the Soviet conduct as crimes against humanity (or, better yet, genocide) better 
refl ects the subjective suff ering felt by the victims. 
 Th at said, it is interesting that the most controversial of all the cases involving 
Soviet crimes in the Baltic states has been one of the very few war crimes trials—
the prosecution of Vasily Kononov in Latvia. 64 Th e facts of the case relate to the 
period after the Baltic states had been annexed by the Soviet Union and had then 
been occupied by Germany. Units of Soviet guerrillas, known as the Red Partisans , 
operated in the occupied territories, spreading political propaganda among the 
local population and engaging in acts of sabotage. To get a sense of the  modi oper-
andi of the Partisans, one can refer to the Soviet Supreme Command order of 17 
November 1941, which instructed that ‘[a] ll settlements in the rear of the German 
troops, 20–60 km deep behind the front line and 20–30 km to the right and to the 
left of the roads, must be destroyed and burned to ashes’. 65 
 In 1944, Kononov was a sergeant in command of a platoon of Red Partisans in 
Latvia. His unit suspected that a number of the inhabitants of a village called Mazie 
Bati had revealed to the Germans the location of another group of partisans, who 
had been subsequently ambushed and killed by German soldiers. At the same time, 
the villagers, apparently fearing an attack by the partisans, turned for assistance to 
the German military administration, which supplied several households with a rifl e 
and two grenades. 
 64  For more detailed examinations, see  Rain  Liivoja and  Ieva  Miluna ,  ‘Latvia’ in ‘Correspondent’s 
Reports:  A  Guide to State Practice in the Field of International Humanitarian Law’ ,  Yearbook of 
International Humanitarian Law ,  13 ( 2010 ),  571–4 ;  Lauri  Mälksoo ,  ‘Kononov v Latvia’ ,  American 
Journal of International Law ,  105 ( 2011 ),  101–8 ;  Giulia  Pinzauti ,  ‘Th e European Court of Human 
Rights’ Incidental Application of International Criminal Law and Humanitarian Law:  A  Critical 
Discussion of  Kononov v Latvia ’ ,  Journal of International Criminal Justice ,  6 ( 2008 ),  1043–60 ;  Mariya 
S.  Volzhskaya ,  ‘ Kononov v Latvia : A Partisan and a Criminal—Th e European Court of Human Rights 
Takes a Controversial Stance on War Crimes’ ,  Tulane Journal of International & Comparative Law ,  19 
( 2011 ),  651–68 . 
 65  Cited in  Pavel  Polian ,  Against Th eir Will: Th e History and Geography of Forced Migration in the 
USSR ( New York, NY :  Central European University Press ,  2005 ),  124 . 
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 On 27 May 1944, Sergeant Kononov led his unit, wearing German army uniforms 
to avoid detection, into the village where the inhabitants were preparing to celebrate 
Pentecost. Th ey split into groups and searched several farmhouses, fi nding the weapons 
supplied by the Germans. Th ey ordered the heads of families—altogether six men, 
who off ered no resistance—into the yard from their houses. Th ey bolted the doors 
after them and shot the men. Th e partisans then set fi re to two farmhouses, thereby 
burning to death the people inside—one man and three women, one in the fi nal 
stages of pregnancy. 
 In 1998, the Latvian authorities opened an investigation into Kononov’s wartime 
conduct. He was subsequently prosecuted for war crimes under the 1993 amendment 
to the Latvian Criminal Code. Th e proceedings were long and complex, making two 
cycles through the courts. In the end, the Latvian courts found that Mr Kononov 
had violated several rules of the law of armed confl ict, namely ill-treatment, 
wounding and killing of persons  hors de combat , 66 treacherous wounding and killing 
(by making improper use of enemy uniforms), 67 breach of the special protection 
accorded to women, 68 and destruction of property not imperatively demanded by 
the necessities of war. 69 He was sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment, time 
already served in pre-trial detention. 
 (IV)  Proceedings before the European Court of Human Rights 
 Several defendants in these cases have complained to the European Court of Human 
Rights of various violations of the European Convention on Human Rights. Some 
applicants have questioned the procedural fairness of the trials or the surrounding 
circumstances. Th e Court has not been particularly receptive to allegations that due 
process guarantees have been violated and has on a number of occasions declared 
complaints along those lines manifestly ill-founded. 70 Somewhat more problematic 
has been the fact that the defendants have been rather old and not in the best health. 
Th us, at least in one instance the Court found that the conditions of detention were 
incompatible with the age and ill-health of the particular defendant and therefore 
amounted to a violation of the prohibition of degrading treatment. 71 
 Th e brunt of the legal challenge has related, however, to the possibility that the 
defendants have been tried under retroactive law: as already noted, the proceedings 
 66  Regulation respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to the Hague Convention 
(IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Th e Hague (Hague Regulations), 18 October 
1907, in force 26 January 1910, 205 CTS 277, Article 23(c). 
 67  Hague Regulations, above n 66, Article 23(b). 
 68  General Orders No. 100—Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the 
Field, 24 April 1863 (US), Articles 19 and 37; Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War, signed at Geneva, 12 August 1949, in force 21 October 1950, 75 
UNTS 287, Article 16. 
 69  Hague Regulations, above n 66, Article 25. 
 70  See  Kononov v Latvia , Application no. 36376/04, ECtHR, Decision (20 September 2007);  Tess v 
Latvia (No. 2) , Application No. 19363/05, ECtHR, Decision (4 January 2008). 
 71  Farbtuhs v Latvia , Application no. 4672/02, ECtHR, Judgment (2 December 2004). 
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have been conducted with respect to events taking place in the 1940s and 1950s 
but under legislation enacted in the 1990s. 
 Th e relevant provision of the Convention is Article 7, which reads as follows: 
 (1)  No one shall be held guilty of any criminal off ence on account of any act 
or omission which did not constitute a criminal off ence under national or 
international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier 
penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the crimi-
nal off ence was committed. 
 (2)  Th is article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for 
any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal 
according to the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations. 
 In early 2006, the Court made two decisions regarding Estonia. Th e applicants had 
complained of a violation of Article 7 because they had been convicted of crimes 
against humanity committed before the Estonian Criminal Code was amended 
to incorporate such off ences. In dismissing the arguments, the Court held that 
deportation and extrajudicial execution committed post-Nuremberg had doubtless 
been criminal according to international law, which satisfi ed the requirement of 
Article 7(1). 72 While individual points in the court’s reasoning are open to criticism, 
the conclusion appears valid. 73 
 Regarding Mr Kononov’s allegation as to the retroactivity of Latvian law, the main 
question was ‘whether on 27 May 1944 the applicant’s acts constituted off ences 
that were defi ned with suffi  cient accessibility and foreseeability by domestic law or 
international law’. 74 In 2008, a Chamber of the Court, by a narrow majority of four 
votes to three, found that they were not. 75 In 2010, the Grand Chamber reversed 
that decision, by fourteen votes to three, fi nding that they were. 76 
 At fi rst sight, the disagreement between the Latvian courts and the Chamber 
seems to relate to the status of the villagers and any possible protection deriving from 
international law due to that status. Th e Latvian courts had regarded the villagers 
as civilians with the attendant protection against attack. Th e Chamber disagreed. 77 
It considered the villagers ‘collaborators of the German Army’ who could not be 
deemed civilians. 78 Th is suggests that collaboration turned them into combatants—a 
 72  Kolk and Kislyiy v Estonia , Application nos 23052/04 and 24018/04, ECtHR, Decision (17 January 
2006);  Penart v Estonia , Application no. 14685/04, ECtHR, Decision (24 January 2006). 
 73  Antonio  Cassese ,  ‘Balancing the Prosecution of Crimes against Humanity and Non-Retroactivity 
of Criminal Law:   Th e Kolk and Kislyiy v Estonia Case before the ECHR’ ,  Journal of International 
Criminal Justice ,  4 ( 2006 ),  410–18 . 
 74  Kononov v Latvia , Application no. 36376/04, ECtHR, Judgment (24 July 2008), [116]. Th ere was 
also the question whether, by intervening domestic statutory law, the crimes had become statute barred—
Russia thought so.  Kononov v Latvia (Chamber) , [105]. But I will leave that issue aside for the moment. 
 75  Kononov v Latvia (Chamber) , above n 74. Majority: President Zupančič (Slovenia), Judges Bîrsan 
(Romania), Gyulumyan (Armenia) and Myjer (Th e Netherlands). 
 76  Kononov v Latvia , Application no. 36376/04, ECtHR GC, Judgment (17 May 2010). 
 77  Kononov v Latvia (Chamber) , above n 74, [107]. See, however, Diss. Op. of Judge David Th ór 
Björgvinsson, [1] : ‘Th is Court is in no position to refute the fi nding or to override the conclusions of 
the national courts as regards the facts of the case and the applicable law’. 
 78  Kononov v Latvia (Chamber) , above n 74, [129] and [131]. 
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position that is rather odd. Moreover, the argument put forward by the applicant 
that Latvia had lawfully become part of the USSR 79 is diffi  cult to reconcile with the 
idea that the villagers were targetable as enemy combatants, that is ‘persons belonging 
to a hostile army’. If the annexation was lawful, and the villagers were Soviet nation-
als on Soviet territory, surely they could not have been regarded as part of a hostile 
army. 80 Th e Grand Chamber later simply hedged its bets, observing that even if the 
villagers were considered combatants or civilians having taken part in hostilities, they 
were still entitled to protection upon capture, and their extrajudicial execution con-
travened the law of armed confl ict. And as civilians they would have been entitled 
to even greater protection. 81 
 On one level, the whole case can be seen as a dispute about the identifi cation and 
interpretation of specifi c rules of the law of armed confl ict, and their application to 
the case at hand. Th e Chamber may have simply misapplied the law and the Grand 
Chamber rectifi ed this. It is not as if there has not been a struggle with the concepts 
of combatants and civilians elsewhere; plus, the Court’s expertise is not really in the 
law of armed confl ict. 
 But there appears to be a more fundamental disagreement buried beneath the 
legal niceties of ‘retroactivity’. One of the revealing points of controversy was whether 
the villagers, by arming themselves with weapons provided by the Germans, ostensibly 
for defensive purposes, lost their status as civilians. Russia, intervening in the pro-
ceedings in support of the applicant, certainly thought so. Russia suggested that any 
argument as to self-defence against the anti-Nazi partisans was ‘unacceptable, since 
it went against the tenor of the Nuremberg judgment. No legitimacy whatsoever 
could attach to the collaboration with the Nazi criminal regime.’ 82 Th e Chamber 
agreed. It dismissed the idea that the villagers engaged in collaboration in order to 
defend themselves against potential attacks of the Red Partisans: ‘National Socialism 
is in itself completely contrary to the most fundamental values underlying the 
[European] Convention [on Human Rights] so that, whatever the reason relied on, 
it cannot grant any legitimacy whatsoever to pro-Nazi attitudes or active collabora-
tion with the forces of Nazi Germany’. 83 In eff ect, the Chamber took the position that 
the alleged ‘pro-Nazi’ views of the villagers deprived them of protection accorded to 
civilians under international humanitarian law. 84 Indeed, the Chamber was somehow 
very insistent in suggesting that the villagers ‘had it coming’. As the Chamber said 
itself, ‘the villagers must have known that by siding with one of the belligerent 
parties they would be exposing themselves to a risk of reprisals by the other’. 85 
 79  Kononov v Latvia (Chamber) , above n 74, [94]. 
 80  Kononov v Latvia (Chamber) , above n 74, [97]. Th is question was explicitly brought up by Lithuania. 
 Kononov v Latvia (GC) , above n 76, [179]. See also [217] (‘persons belonging to the hostile army’). 
 81  Kononov v Latvia (GC) , above n 76, [194], [202]–[203], [227]. 
 82  Kononov v Latvia (Chamber) , above n 74, [106]. 
 83  Kononov v Latvia (Chamber) , above n 74, [130]. 
 84  Kononov v Latvia (Chamber) , above n 74, [130]; and Diss. Op. of Judges Fura-Sandström, Davíd 
Th ór Björgvinsson and Ziemele, [12]. 
 85  Kononov v Latvia (Chamber) , above n 74, [130]. Cf. Pinzauti, above n 64, 1058. Moreover, reprisals 
are used to compel an enemy to follow the law. Germany admittedly violated all sorts of rules, but 
what was this putative reprisal directed against? 
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 In short, Russia suggested, and the Chamber accepted, that the protection deriving 
from the law of armed confl ict depends on where one’s sympathies lie. To take the 
argument to its logical conclusion—the law of armed confl ict only protects the 
‘good guys’. Th is, however, goes against the very core principles of this body of 
law, which is supposed to apply quite independently of the justness of one’s cause. 
 Th e ‘good guys’ versus ‘bad guys’ theme appears in a rather striking fashion once 
more in Russia’s arguments:
 [T] he Latvian courts should not have applied by analogy the Charter of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal—whose purpose was to punish crimes committed by the Axis powers in the occupied 
territories—to the applicant, who had fought alongside the anti-Hitler coalition in his 
own country, the USSR. Such an extension was unacceptable and manifestly contrary to 
the judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal on which the entire post-war legal and political 
system was based. 86 
 At least some of the judges were persuaded by this reasoning. In his Concurring 
Opinion attached to the Chamber judgment, Judge Myjer recorded his understanding 
that ‘the Nuremberg trials and the subsequent trials of the Nazis and their henchmen 
at the international and national level were to be the fi nal ‘judicial settlement’ 
under criminal law of what had happened during the Second World War’. 87 He 
then referred to the applications made to the European Court previously by indi-
viduals who had many years after the war been tried for war crimes perpetrated 
in the interest of Axis powers. But they were ‘Nazi collaborators and had no right 
to complain about the fact that they were tried for war crimes or crimes against 
humanity many years after the end of the Second World War’. 88 Th e  Kononov case 
was diff erent, as this was ‘the fi rst case before this Court relating to events which 
took place during the Second World War in which the person on trial was not asso-
ciated with the Nazis or their allies and collaborators, but was on the side of the 
Allied powers fi ghting the Nazis’. 89 Apparently a distinction was to be made here. 
 Th is point was picked up by three dissenting judges of the Chamber who observed:
 Th is case is allegedly diff erent since the applicant belonged to the Allied powers fi ghting 
against the Nazis. Th e legal basis for such an approach is unclear. Why should criminal 
responsibility depend on which side those guilty of war crimes were fi ghting on? 90 
 (V)  By Way of Conclusion 
 Why indeed? Yet the line of reasoning adopted by Russia, and accepted by some of 
the European judges, is not novel. During the drafting of the Nuremberg Charter, 
 86  Kononov v Latvia (Chamber) , above n 74, [104]; see also  Kononov v Latvia (GC) , above n 76, 
[174]–[175]. 
 87  Kononov v Latvia (Chamber) , above n 74, Conc. Op. of Judge Myjer, [5] . 
 88  Kononov v Latvia (Chamber) , above n 74, [6] . 
 89  Kononov v Latvia (Chamber) , above n 74, [5] . 
 90  Kononov v Latvia (Chamber) , above n 74, Diss. Op. of Judges Fura-Sandström, Davíd Th ór 
Björgvinsson and Ziemele, [3] . 
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the Soviet Union took a similar stance. Justice Robert Jackson, the US representative 
during the Charter negotiations and chief prosecutor at the trial, has written that:
 [t] he Soviet Delegation proposed and until the last meeting pressed a defi nition which, in 
our view, had the eff ect of declaring certain acts crimes only when committed by the Nazis. 
Th e United States contended that the criminal character of such acts could not depend on 
who committed them and that international crimes could only be defi ned in broad terms 
applicable to statesmen of any nation guilty of the proscribed conduct. At the fi nal meeting 
the Soviet qualifi cations were dropped and agreement was reached on a generic defi nition 
acceptable to all. 91 
 Th e qualifi cations of course made their way into the Charter as jurisdictional 
limitations—the tribunal was only competent to deal with Axis war crimes. But 
the point is that already in the preparatory stages of the Nuremberg process, the 
Soviet Union was of the view that certain crimes are  by their very defi nition only 
capable of being committed by someone else—the enemy, in this instance, the 
‘Fascist-German invaders’. 92 
 Th e survival of this view points to a deeper problem, namely the persistence 
in the Soviet, and now Russian, ideology of what has been called the ‘myth of 
the war’. Marina Sorokina from the Russian Academy of Sciences has astutely 
observed that:
 [a] mong the many and varied Stalinist political myths that have been gradually destroyed in Russia 
in recent decades, the ‘myth of the war’ has proved to one of the most resilient. . . . According 
to its simple and bewitching logic, everything ‘ours’ consisted of heroes and victims, and 
everything ‘alien’ was associated with enemies and criminals. 93 
 Sorokina further argues that the Extraordinary State Commission, tasked with 
investigating the damage done by Nazi Germany to the Soviet Union, was ‘[o] ne 
of the immediate participants in the creation of the Stalinist war myth’. 94 Th e same 
can no doubt be said about the war crimes trials conducted in the Soviet Union. 
Perhaps one of the most successful individual components of this myth-creation 
was the shifting of the blame for the Katyn massacre to the Germans. When in 
2010 the lower house of the Russian parliament fi nally condemned Katyn as a 
 91  Report of Robert H. Jackson, United States Representative to the International Conference on Military 
Trials, London, 1945 , Publication 3080, International Organisation and Conference Series II, 
European and British Commonwealth 1 (Washington, DC: US Department of State, 1949), vii–viii. 
 92  Interestingly, French case law prior to 1994 interpreted crimes against humanity to mean ‘inhu-
mane acts and persecution committed in a systematic manner  in the name of a State practising a 
policy of ideological supremacy , not only against persons by reason of their membership of a racial 
or religious community, but also against the opponents of that policy, whatever the form of their 
opposition’ (emphasis added):  Barbie (1985) 78 ILR 136 (Court of Cassation), 137; (1998) 100 ILR 
330 (Court of Cassation), 336;  Touvier (1992) 100 ILR 337 (Court of Appeal of Paris), 350–351. 
Th is neatly excluded possible French (Vichy Government) crimes during World War II, the Algerian 
War, and French operations in Indochina. See  Luc  Reydams ,  ‘National Laws’ , in  Dinah L.  Shelton 
(ed),  Encyclopaedia of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity , Vol. 2 ( Detroit, MI :  Gale ,  2005 ),  730 . 
See also  Leila Nadya  Sadat ,  ‘Th e Legal Legacy of Maurice Papon’ , in  Richard J.  Golsan ,  Th e Papon 
Aff air: Memory and Justice on Trial ( New York, NY :  Routledge ,  2000 ),  131–160 . 
 93  Sorokina, above n 13, 800–1.    94  Sorokina, above n 13, 801. 
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crime of Joseph Stalin, the Communist Party voted against the motion, because it 
did not believe that the USSR had anything to do with the atrocity. 95 
 In view of the ‘myth of the war’, it is easier to understand why Russia got so 
worked up about the  Kononov case, while its reaction to the previous cases was more 
muted. Th e previous defendants had mostly been people doing the dirty work of 
the NKVD or the MGB. Little love has been lost between the ordinary Russian 
and various forms of Stalinist secret police. But Kononov was a partisan—a heroic 
fi ghter against Nazism—with the Order of Lenin, the highest Soviet decoration, 
pinned to his chest. While in many Western countries it is the prisoner-of-war 
who enjoys the status of the ultimate war hero, in the Soviet Union it was the Red 
Partisan. Th us, the prosecution attacked not just Kononov the man, but the Soviet 
partisan as a mythical fi gure. 
 Th e biggest complaint against the trials in the Baltic states has been that they are 
rewriting history. ‘It is true’, notes Yulia Latynina, a prominent Russian journalist, 
‘that the verdicts of the Latvian court and the [Grand Chamber of the] European 
Court of Human Rights are vivid examples of an attempt to rewrite history. But 
this is precisely the history that needs to be rewritten’. 96 Several contributors to this 
volume have elsewhere discussed the expressive value and the history-writing function of 
criminal law. 97 As Mark Drumbl explains, ‘[e] xpressivism . . . transcends retribution 
and deterrence in claiming as a central goal the crafting of historical narratives, 
their authentication as truths, and their pedagogical dissemination to the public’. 98 
Th is indeed appears to be the main function of the trials undertaken by the Baltic 
states. In the majority of cases, the defendants, when found guilty, have not been 
given any actual punishment. 99 In Estonia, for example, the seemingly standard 
practice is to mete out a sentence of eight years, suspended for three years. 
 But, interestingly, the public, who the Baltic states wish to educate, is not actu-
ally the society in which the trials take place. Every Estonian, Latvian or Lithuanian 
can tell a story about a relative or a family friend who was somehow aff ected by the 
Soviet oppression. Th ey do not need proof—though they probably appreciate the 
judicial authentication of their stories. Th e public who is being educated is the world 
community. And as long as there are judges in Strasbourg who believe the Soviet war 
myth, the history lesson may well be necessary. 
 95  ‘Russian Parliament Condemns Stalin for Katyn Massacre’,  BBC News , 26 November 2010, 
< http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11845315 > (accessed 3 March 2013). 
 96  Yulia Latynina, ‘Th e Red Partisans’,  Th e St. Petersburg Times , 11 June 2010, < http://www.sptimes.
ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=31668 > (accessed 3 March 2013). 
 97  See, in particular,  Mark A.  Drumbl ,  Atrocity, Punishment and International Law ( Cambridge : 
 Cambridge University Press ,  2007 ),  173–80 ;  Gerry  Simpson ,  Law, War and Crime ( Cambridge :  Polity , 
 2007 ), Chapter 4 . 
 98  Drumbl, above n 97, 173. 
 99  Even though a punishment may also serve an expressive purpose. See Drumbl, above n 97, 174. 
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 Universal Jurisdiction: Confl ict and 
Controversy in Norway 
 Julia  Selman-Ayetey * 
 (I)  Introduction 
 Th e media frenzy surrounding the trials of Slobodan Milosevic and Charles Taylor 
demonstrate the signifi cant public attention given to the prosecution of core inter-
national crimes. 1 Well-publicized trials such as these tend, however, to be prosecuted 
at the International Criminal Court (ICC), at ad hoc tribunals, or at hybrid courts. 
Unfortunately, many trials of core international crimes processed through domestic 
judicial systems have remained relatively obscure. Th e pending closure of the ad 
hoc tribunals and the attention given to war crimes trials that recently occurred in 
Bangladesh and Uganda may refl ect a slow but growing trend toward states con-
ducting domestic trials of core international crimes and the media’s willingness to 
cover such events. Th is chapter is part of larger eff orts to study domestic trials and 
understand their potential to develop international law. To this end, the chapter 
will briefl y outline the law of universal jurisdiction and examine its application 
in Norway in the case of  Public Prosecutor v Mirsad Repak . 2 Constitutional issues 
raised by the case will be critically explored and the question of whether any other 
legal forum would have been better suited to try the case will also be addressed. 
Finally, the chapter will conclude that the number of domestic prosecutions for 
 *  Julia Selman-Ayetey is a practising lawyer and former Lecturer in Criminal Law at University 
College, University of Oxford and former Lecturer in Criminology at Anglia Ruskin University. Th e 
author would like to thank Mr Petter Mandt, Senior Public Prosecutor at the Norwegian National 
Authority for Prosecution of Organised and Other Serious Crimes, for his helpful discussions on the 
 Repak  case and his insightful comments on an earlier draft of this chapter. Any errors, omissions, etc 
remain that of the author. 
 1  For brevity here the term ‘core international crimes’ is used to encompass war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and genocide unless otherwise specifi ed. Th e term is adopted from  Jo  Stigen ,  ‘Th e 
Right or Non-Right of States to Prosecute Core International Crimes under the Title of “Universal 
Jurisdiction” ’  Baltic Yearbook of International Law ,  10 ( 2010 ) . It should be noted that Stigen also 
includes the off ence of torture. Some academics would understandably also include crimes against 
peace, slavery and piracy in the defi nition of core international crimes. 
 2  Th e Public Prosecuting Authority vs Mirsad Repak , 08-018985MED-OTIR/08, 2 December 2008 
(Oslo District Court, Norway). 
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core international crimes, whether based on universal jurisdiction or not, must 
increase for impunity to decrease. 
 (II)  Universal Jurisdiction in Brief 
 Whilst international adjudication is now broadly accepted, the principle of universal 
jurisdiction remains one of the most controversial aspects of international criminal 
law. Th e law of universal jurisdiction, a type of extraterritorial jurisdiction, permits and 
sometimes requires countries to prosecute individuals for specifi c crimes regardless 
of where the crime occurred or the nationality of the suspect(s) or victim(s). Its 
foundation rests on the premise that some crimes (generally those that amount to 
breaches of international humanitarian law) are so grave, of such magnitude, and 
so shocking to the conscience that they are an off ence against the world, permitting 
any state to prosecute the alleged perpetrator:
 In other words, universal jurisdiction, in its purest form is one in which mankind acts on 
behalf of itself everywhere to ensure that the perpetrators of particularly heinous crimes 
will not escape justice on the basis of the limitations of national judicial systems or those 
of international courts. 3 
 In relation to universal jurisdiction, Anne-Marie Slaughter highlights that ‘govern-
ment offi  cials, scholars, and media offi  cials have already expressed concern over how 
to tame this new beast’. 4 Whilst concern has indeed been expressed, the law of uni-
versal jurisdiction is not quite so new. On the contrary, it has existed in some form or 
another, in both domestic and international law, since at least World War II. 5 More 
than 100 countries have laws that provide for the exercise of universal jurisdiction 
over core international crimes, 6 but as Kingsley Moghalu states, ‘having a law on 
the books is often quite diff erent from the political will to apply it in terms of a 
practical assertion of universal jurisdiction’. 7 
 Devised as a means of circumventing impunity, fears of allegations of lawfare 8 
and political manipulation are just two of the reasons states avoid employing uni-
versal jurisdiction. It is thus unsurprising that the ICC does not possess universal 
 3  Kingsley Chiedu  Moghalu ,  Global Justice: Th e Politics of War Crimes Trials ( Westport, CT :  Praeger , 
 2006 ),  77 . 
 4  Anne-Marie  Slaughter ,  ‘Defi ning the Limits:  Universal Jurisdiction and National Courts’ , in 
 Stephen  Macedo (ed),  Universal Jurisdiction: National Courts and the Prosecution of Serious Crimes 
under International Law ( Philadelphia, PA :  University of Pennsylvania Press ,  2004 ),  168 . 
 5  See  Joseph  Rikhof ,  ‘Fewer Places to Hide? Th e Impact of Domestic War Crimes Prosecutions 
on International Impunity’ ,  Criminal Law Forum ,  20/1 ( 2009 ),  1–51 ;  Supreme Court of Israel, 
 Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v Eichmann ( 1962 )  36  ILR  277 ;  J.E.S.  Fawcett ,  ‘Th e 
 Eichmann Case’ ,  British Yearbook of International Law ,  38 ( 1962 ),  181–215 . 
 6  Amnesty International,  Universal Jurisdiction: Th e Duty of States to Enact and Implement Legislation 
( International Secretariat ,  2001 ) . 
 7  Moghalu, above n 3, 82. See also Stigen, n 1. 
 8  See Joshua Rozenberg (2010), ‘Proposals to restrict the right to prosecute “universal jurisdiction” 
off ences’  Law Society Gazette [online], < http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/opinion/joshua-rozenberg/
proposals-restrict-right-prosecute-universal-jurisdiction-off ences > (accessed 6 March 2013). 
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jurisdiction, but instead operates on the principle of complementarity. Whilst the 
arguments for and against the law of universal jurisdiction are well documented 
and largely beyond the scope of this chapter, it is nevertheless argued that the assertion 
of jurisdiction based on universality should be viewed as legitimate when used as 
a last resort 9 or where the most appropriate forum consents to prosecution by the 
‘intervening’ state. 
 (III)  Norway’s Disdain for War Crimes 
 Following the lead of other pro-universal jurisdiction countries such as Belgium, 
Germany and Spain, Norway has demonstrated its commitment to cooperating 
with other states in matters of international criminal law. 10 In 2005 Norway created 
a special prosecutorial post and established a unit within the National Criminal 
Investigation Service (NCIS) to investigate and potentially extradite or prosecute 
individuals suspected of involvement in core international crimes. 11 However, 
Norway’s desire to prosecute war criminals was frustrated when its attempt to 
have the trial of Michel Bagaragaza transferred to its jurisdiction was refused by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) on the grounds that Norway 
lacked the appropriate legislation. 12 Although the prosecution of Bagaragaza could 
have occurred in Norway under ordinary domestic off ences such as murder and 
assault, the ICTR asserted that those charges would not adequately refl ect the 
repugnant nature of the off ences with which Bagaragaza was charged. It thus became 
apparent that Norway could encounter opposition in any future attempts to try 
war criminals under existing legislation. Consequently, in 2007, the Norwegian 
government announced its plan to enact legislation to prohibit core international 
crimes that were not specifi cally provided for in prior domestic law. Since then, 
the country has increasingly taken a stand against alleged war criminals. In 2006, 
Norway carried out its fi rst extradition of a war criminal when it transferred a 
Croatian national, Damir Sireta, to Serbia. 13 In April 2009, seven Israeli military 
 9  Th e last resort is generally held to be the situation where the most appropriate forum state is unwilling 
or unable to act. 
 10  For example, Norway has fi nancially contributed to the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia (ECCC). See ECCC (21 April 2011), ‘Norway Contributes NOK 6,000,000 to ECCC’, 
 ECCC [press release], < http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/fi les/media/5-ECCC%20PR%2021% 
20Apr%202011%20(Eng).pdf > (accessed 6 March 2012). Additionally Norway’s International 
Development Minister, Erik Solheim has suggested that the UN should investigate alleged war crimes 
in Sri Lanka, see Kristoff er Ronneberg (27 August 2009), ‘Solheim krever etterforskning etter Sri 
Lanka-video’,  Th e Aftenposten  (Norway) [online], < http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/uriks/article 
3237855.ece > (accessed 6 March 2013). 
 11  Human Rights Watch,  Universal Jurisdiction in Europe: Th e State of the Art , 18(5D) (2006). 
 12  Th e Prosecutor v Michel Bagaragaza , Case No. ICTR-2005-86-S, ‘ Decision on the Prosecution 
Motion for Referral to the Kingdom of Norway ’ (TC) 19 May 2006, [16]; see also  Th e Prosecutor v Michel 
Bagaragaza , ‘Decision on Rule 11 bis Appeal’ (AC), 30 August 2006. 
 13  Sireta was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment by the District Court of Belgrade, later 
reduced to fi fteen years. He was previously tried in absentia in Croatia and sentenced to twelve years’ 
imprisonment. 
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offi  cers, as well as Former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Defence Minister 
Ehud Barak and opposition leader Tzipi Livni, were accused of war crimes in a 
complaint lodged with Norway’s National Authority for Prosecution of Organised 
and Other Serious Crimes. No action was taken, however, because the individuals 
were not in Norway. In July 2010, following an international ‘wanted notice’, the 
Norwegian authorities extradited Vukmir Cvetovic, a Serbian, to Kosovo where 
he was subsequently convicted of war crimes and sentenced to seven years’ imprison-
ment. 14 Most recently, in September 2012, Norway’s prosecutors embarked upon 
their fi rst trial for the off ence of genocide. 15 As a result of these events, Norway’s 
investigative and judicial authorities have contributed to global justice and have 
established a reputation for impartiality and independence. Any concerns about 
abuse or misuse of universal jurisdiction laws on the part of the Norwegian police 
or judiciary would thus be diffi  cult to substantiate, given the tendency of Norway 
to engage with other states, extradite when possible, and dismiss complaints of a 
frivolous or politically motivated nature. 
 (IV)  Universal Jurisdiction and War Crimes 
Legislation in Norway 
 Norwegian legislation has enabled prosecution based on universal jurisdiction for 
over a century. Articles 12(3) and (4) of the Norwegian General Civil Penal Code 
1902 (the 1902 Penal Code) permitted the prosecution of nationals, residents 
and non-nationals for certain crimes committed abroad as long as the conduct 
was criminal under Norwegian criminal law and the individual was in Norway. 16 
Whilst the ability to exercise universal jurisdiction under the 1902 Penal Code 
was commendable, the problem with the legislation was that perpetrators who 
committed acts that, for example, would amount to genocide under international 
law could only be charged with murder in Norway. Prior to the implementation 
of the Norwegian General Civil Penal Code 2005 (the 2005 Penal Code), the only 
war-related off ences in Norway were those that pertained to acts against the state and 
the Norwegian Constitution (Constitution). 17 Th e pre-existing law, the 1902 Penal 
Code, contained off ences that could cover international core crimes in substance, but 
not in name. To rectify this discrepancy, the off ences of genocide, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity were adopted into Norwegian law on 7 March 2008 by 
virtue of an amendment to the 2005 Penal Code. 
 14  See EULEX Kosovo (13 July 2010),  European Union Rule of Law Mission  [website], < http://www.
eulex-kosovo.eu/en/pressreleases/0074.php > (accessed 6 March 2013). 
 15  Th e trial pertains to acts which occurred during the Rwandan civil war, see ‘Rwandan genocide 
trial opens in Norway’ (25 September 2012),  Huffi  ngton Post [website], < http://www.huffi  ngtonpost.
com/huff -wires/20120925/eu-norway-rwanda-trial/ > (accessed 6 March 2013). 
 16  General Penal Code , Act of 22 May 1902, No. 10 as subsequently amended by Act of 1 July 1994 
No. 50. 
 17  Repak, above n 2, [65]. 
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 Th e 2005 Penal Code enables the prosecution of core international crimes in 
Norway. Section 102 provides for the off ence of ‘crimes against humanity’ and sec-
tion 103 covers ‘war crimes’, with subsection 103(h) specifi cally referring to the 
unlawful confi nement of protected persons. Th ese new provisions accord in most 
part with the defi nitions under existing international criminal law. Th e 2005 Penal 
Code provides Norway with the authority to prosecute Norwegians, residents and 
foreigners suspected of having committed any of the stated off ences regardless of 
where in the world those off ences occurred. In contrast to many other countries, in 
Norway the decision to prosecute a case based on universal jurisdiction may be taken 
by the local prosecutor or police commissioner without any senior political input. 18 
Th is policy may assist in minimizing allegations of political infl uence often associated 
with the exercise of universal jurisdiction. As with the 1902 Penal Code, in order for 
this power to be exercised, the suspect must be present in Norway; however, the 2005 
Penal Code additionally requires that the prosecution must be in the public interest. 19 
 Despite Article 97 of the Constitution, which states that ‘no law must be 
given retroactive eff ect’, legislators drafted section 3 of the 2005 Penal Code in an 
attempt to permit such retrospectivity in clearly prescribed circumstances. 
 Section 3 of the 2005 Penal Code states:
 Th e provisions in Chapter 16 [that is, the war crime provisions] apply to acts committed 
before their entry into force if the act at the time of its commission was punishable under 
the criminal legislation in force at the time and considered to be genocide, a crime against 
humanity or a war crime according to international law. Th e punishment can however not 
exceed the punishment that would have been imposed pursuant to the penal provisions [in 
force] at the time the crime was committed. 
 Th is is in contrast to section 3 of the 1902 Penal Code which stated:
 If the criminal legislation has been amended in the period following the commission of an 
act, the penal provisions in force at the time of its commission shall be applicable to the act 
unless otherwise provided. 
 Th is provision has generally been interpreted as one that prohibits law being applied 
retrospectively. 
 (V)  Th e Investigation and Indictment of Mirsad Repak 
 Th e war in the former Yugoslavia was largely fought along ethnic lines. Mirsad 
Repak, an ethnic Bosniak, was a member of the Croatian Defence Forces (HOS), 
a paramilitary group which, amongst other things, operated the Dretelj detention 
camp in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1992 most of the detainees in the camp were 
Serbian civilians intended to be exchanged for imprisoned Bosniaks and Croats. 
 18  In the United Kingdom, for example, universal jurisdiction over serious international crimes can 
only be exercised with the express approval of the Attorney-General. Some countries require permission 
of the State Prosecutor or senior politicians. 
 19  International Review of the Red Cross ,  National Implementation of International Humanitarian 
Law: Biannual update on National Legislation and Case Law ,  91 ( 2009 ) . 
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The camp became notorious for its brutal guards, and the many atrocities 
committed there including torture and sexual abuse of both female and male 
detainees. 20 Repak fl ed the armed confl ict and arrived in Norway in 1993, where 
he sought asylum. He was granted Norwegian citizenship in 2001. 
 Repak was initially arrested on charges of unlawful deprivation of liberty, rape 
and severe injury because core international crimes did not exist in domestic law 
at the time the alleged off ences were committed. However, after the 2005 Penal 
Code was brought into force and after further investigation, a revised indictment 
was submitted to the Oslo District Court on 9 July 2008 resulting in Repak being 
charged with twenty-one off ences under the new provisions of the 2005 Penal 
Code—off ences that, importantly, were cross-referenced with the related off ences 
under the 1902 Penal Code:  (i)  eighteen counts of unlawful deprivation of lib-
erty under the 1902 Penal Code constituting both war crimes and crimes against 
humanity under the 2005 Penal Code; (ii) two counts of grievous bodily harm 
(GBH) under the 1902 Code equivalent to war crimes as per the 2005 Penal Code; 
and (iii) one count of rape under the 1902 Code equivalent to a war crime under 
the 2005 Penal Code. 21 
 Th e charges arose out of allegations that in 1992, during the war, Repak was 
complicit in the unlawful deprivation of liberty of eighteen non-combatant civil-
ians and personally raped one woman. 22 By arresting and transferring individuals 
to the camp, Repak was alleged to have participated in the gross mistreatment of 
detainees which included severe violence, psychological abuse, inhumane condi-
tions and insuffi  cient provision of food. It was also claimed that he was the leader 
of an interrogation in which a woman was beaten and tortured. 23 However, this 
particular act of violence was not covered by the charges in the indictment as they 
were time-barred from prosecution. 24 
 Often those responsible for initiating domestic investigations into international 
crimes are victims or relatives of victims, ordinary members of the public or cam-
paign groups. Repak’s case, however, was initiated following receipt of information 
from the Danish authorities, who were conducting their own investigations into 
war crimes involving refugees from the former Yugoslavia. 25 Beginning in 2005, 
and in conjunction with the State Investigation and Protection Agency in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, the Norwegian police had already initiated investigations of 
individuals who were suspected of war crimes and resident in Norway. 26 With the 
assistance of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
and prosecutorial authorities in various former Yugoslav countries, 27 Norwegian 
authorities intensifi ed their investigation on Repak, arrested him on 8 May 2007 
and detained him until February 2008, after which he was released pending trial. 28 
 20  Repak , above n 2, [15].    21  Repak , above n 2 [15].    22  Repak , above n 2, [204]. 
 23  Repak , above n 2, [16].    24  Repak , above n 2, [252]. 
 25  Interview with Petter Mandt, Senior Public Prosecutor, Norwegian National Authority for 
Prosecution of Organised and Other Serious Crimes (telephone interview, 27 July 2011). 
 26  Balkan Insight (25 August 2008), ‘Bosnia War Trial First for Norway since 1945’, < http://old.
balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/12606/?tpl=299&ST1=Text&ST_T1=Article&ST_AS1=1&ST_
max=1 > (accessed 6 March 2013). Th e investigation also focused on suspects from Rwanda. 
 27  Balkan Insight, above n 26.    28  Mandt, above n 25. 
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 (VI)  Th e Trial and Appeal Judgment 
 Despite defence counsel’s request for dismissal on grounds of unconstitutionality 
(among others), the trial of Mirsad Repak commenced on 27 August 2008 in the 
Oslo District Court. It was conducted according to substantive Norwegian laws, the 
most relevant being both the 1902 and 2005 Penal Codes as well as Norwegian laws 
of evidence and procedure under the Criminal Procedure Act 1981. Interestingly, as 
there is no jury in courts of fi rst instance in Norway, the case was solely determined 
by one judge and two lay members. Th e Court appointed a Victim’s Counsel and 
the prosecution and defence were composed of two attorneys each. Th ere were more 
than forty witnesses, approximately half of whom testifi ed in Court in Norway 
whilst the others testifi ed via telephone or video link from the Norwegian embassies 
in Australia, Bosnia, Serbia and the United States (US). 29 Additionally, the Court 
appointed four expert witnesses who gave evidence on the Balkan confl ict, the 
injuries suff ered by the alleged victims as well as witness psychology and the process 
of remembering. 30 Both the fi rst instance trial and appeal were conducted partly in 
Norwegian and, with the assistance of an interpreter, partly in Serbian/Croatian. 31 
 Despite admitting to having made some of the relevant arrests, Repak pleaded 
not guilty to all charges. 32 He further admitted to having been a coordinator and 
bodyguard in the HOS but asserted that he ‘never participated in the mistreat-
ment of detainees that took place in the Dretelj detention camp’. 33 Interestingly, 
Repak’s defence counsel raised the point that an amnesty was passed in 1999 by the 
Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina that would have prevented Repak from being 
prosecuted in that jurisdiction. Th e Court found that by fl eeing to Norway, Repak 
lost the protection of the law in Bosnia and Herzegovina and that the Norwegian 
authorities were thus entitled to prosecute despite the Bosnian amnesty. 34 
 Th e trial concluded on 22 October 2008, and on 2 December 2008 the Court 
found Repak ‘guilty of eleven counts of war crime in the form of deprivation of 
liberty of civilian non-combatant Serbs with subsequent internment in the Dretelj 
camp’, 35 contrary to section 103 of the 2005 Penal Code. He was, however, acquit-
ted of rape, both counts of GBH and all the crimes against humanity charges as 
detailed in section 102 of the 2005 Penal Code. On the evidence, the District 
Court noted that whilst it accepted that the female victim in question was indeed 
raped, the evidence was insuffi  cient to establish Repak as the perpetrator and 
suggested the possibility of mistaken identity. 36 Th e Court also found that Repak 
 29  Repak , above n 2, [51].    30  Repak , above n 2, [50].    31  Mandt, above n 25. 
 32  Repak , above n 2, [60]. 
 33  Denis Dzidic and Nidzara Ahmetasevic (26 September 2008), ‘Norwegian Courts Try War 
Crimes’,  Balkan Investigative Reporting Network [website], < http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/
norwegian-courts-try-war-crimes > (accessed 6 March 2013). 
 34  A v Th e Public Prosecution; Th e Public Prosecution v A , Supreme Court Judgment, 13 April 2011, [39] 
and [98], at < http://www.domstol.no/upload/HRET/English%20translation%20war%20crimes%20
case.doc > (accessed 6 March 2013). 
 35  Repak , above n 2, [258].    36  Repak , above n 2, [206]. 
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was not a prison guard nor had any major infl uence there, but did hold a middle 
leadership position, equivalent to that of a lieutenant, within the HOS with 
direct responsibilities for the HOS military police. 37 Th e Court made it clear that 
although Repak was not criminally liable for the off ences which took place in the 
Dretelj camp, ‘it must be presumed that more persons were detained and some 
arrived earlier at Dretelj than would have been the case without the defendant’s 
complicity’. 38 Th e arrests that were conducted, or ordered, by him contributed to 
the detainees’ deprivation of liberty and were considered an aggravating factor in 
sentencing, as were the acts of violent crime and torture which were time-barred 
from prosecution. 39 Th e Court sentenced Repak to fi ve years in prison and noted 
that the deviation from the prosecution’s recommendation of ten years’ impris-
onment was primarily the result of the off ences of which Repak was acquitted. 40 
Additionally, Repak was ordered to pay a total of Kr 400,000 41 in compensation for 
non-pecuniary damage to eight victims. He was not ordered to pay costs in the case 
as the Court stated it was more important that Repak ‘should pay the compensation 
for non-pecuniary damage . . . than paying costs of the case to the public treasury’. 42 
 Repak’s lawyers appealed to the Bogarting Court of Appeal on the basis of incor-
rect application of law and factual inaccuracies. Th e prosecution also requested the 
Court of Appeal to reconsider three counts of war crimes of which Repak had been 
acquitted by the District Court. A re-trial with a jury 43 followed, and in March 
2010 the Appeal Court upheld the fi rst instance verdict. Unexpectedly, the Appeal 
Court accepted most of the prosecution’s submissions and found Repak guilty of an 
additional two counts of war crimes based on unlawful detention, bringing Repak’s 
conviction to a total of thirteen off ences. 44 Despite the suggestion by the prosecutor 
for an eight-year term of imprisonment, in April 2010 the Appeal Court announced 
that it had reduced 45 his fi ve-year sentence to four-and-a-half years but increased the 
amount of damages he was to pay to his victims to Kr 1,400,000. 46 
 (VII)  Th e Supreme Court Judgments 
 Subsequently, both Repak’s lawyer and the prosecution appealed to Norway’s 
Supreme Court. Th e defence appealed on a number of grounds, the most relevant 
of which was the argument that the 2005 Penal Code did not provide a basis for 
the war crimes charges. Th e prosecution appeal was against the fi nding that the 
 37  Repak , above n 2, [18].    38  Repak , above n 2. 
 39  Repak , above n 2, [19], [252] and [263].    40  Repak , above n 2, [23]–[24]. 
 41  Approximately 43,000 British pounds.    42  Repak , above n 2, [282]. 
 43  In Norway a jury will participate in Appeal Court cases where there is a possible sentence of 
six years’ imprisonment or more. Th e jury consists of ten members split equally between men and 
women: Petter Mandt, above n 25. 
 44  A v Th e Public Prosecution; Th e Public Prosecution v A , above n 34, [8] . 
 45  Upon consultation with four members of the jury who are randomly chosen to assist the three 
appeal judges in deciding on the sentence: Mandt, above n 25. 
 46  Public Prosecutor v Mirsad Repak , LB-2009-24039 (April 12, 2010). Kr 1,400,000 is approxi-
mately 151,500 British pounds. 
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crimes against humanity off ences under the 2005 Penal Code could not apply 
to Repak’s acts. Upon receipt of the applications, the Supreme Court agreed to 
determine two issues, fi rstly the constitutional conundrum, which involved con-
sideration of potential limitation of time, abuse of process and retrospectivity, and 
secondly the severity of punishment. 
 On 3 December 2010, by a decision of eleven to six 47 rendered by all seventeen of 
Norway’s Supreme Court judges, 48 the Norwegian Supreme Court handed down 
its judgment. 49 It found that the case against Repak was not ‘time-barred’. Given 
that Repak’s alleged acts took place between May and September 1992 and the 
original indictment was fi led on 8 May 2007, the fi fteen-year limitation period 
provided for by the 1902 Penal Code, which for limitation purposes was held 
to be the applicable law, had not expired. With regard to abuse of process, the 
Court also found that the defence allegation that the charges against Repak required 
authorization by King in Council rather than the prosecution authority was unsub-
stantiated. 50 As for the issue of retrospectivity, a majority of eleven Supreme Court 
judges held that the District and Appeal Courts were correct in fi nding that the 
off ence of crimes against humanity could not apply to acts committed prior to 
the date of its legal eff ect. Surprisingly, however, they further found that the war 
crime off ence could not apply retrospectively either. 51 In eff ect, the Supreme Court 
decided that where off ences took place prior to the implementation of the 2005 
Penal Code, only the 1902 Penal Code could be used for prosecution. 
 Th is ruling, whilst important for the prosecution of future cases, did not absolve 
Repak of his criminal liability. It will be recalled that the indictment cited both 
the old and new laws, hence there was no need for a retrial and the thirteen counts 
against Repak stood, albeit for the off ences of deprivation of liberty rather than 
the more grave off ence of war crimes. As a result, the Court directed that the 1902 
Penal Code be used to determine his sentence thereby reducing the maximum 
term of imprisonment to twenty-one years, as opposed to the thirty years available 
under the 2005 Penal Code. 52 In a judgment rendered on 13 April 2011, 53 the 
Supreme Court indicated that it viewed Repak’s off ences as ‘extremely grievous’ 54 
 47  Mandt, above n 25. 
 48  Traditionally only fi ve judges sit in Norwegian Supreme Court cases. 
 49  See Supreme Court of Norway (22 December 2010), ‘Summary of Recent Supreme Court Decisions 
2010  (case  no.2010/934)’,  < http://www.domstol.no/en/Enkelt-domstol/-Norges-Hoyesterett/
Summary-of-Recent-Supreme-Court-Decisions/Summary-of-Supreme-Court-Decisions-2010/ > 
(accessed 6 March 2013). 
 50  A v Th e Public Prosecution; Th e Public Prosecution v A , above n 34, [32]–[33]. 
 51  ‘Norway Court Cancels Bosnian’s War Crimes Sentence’,  Th e Telegraph [online], 3 December 
2010,  < http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/bosnia/8179811/Norway-court-cance
ls-Bosnians-war-crimes-sentence.html > (accessed 6 March 2013). 
 52  Th is is consistent with Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which Norway 
has ratifi ed. 
 53  Prosecutor v Mirsad Repak , Supreme Court of the Kingdom of Norway, 13 April 2011. See Supreme 
Court of Norway, ‘Summary of Recent Supreme Court Decisions 2011 (Case No. 2010/934)’, 
< http://www.domstol.no/en/Enkelt-domstol/-Norges-Hoyesterett/Summary-of-Recent-Supreme-Co
urt-Decisions/Summary-2011/ > (accessed 6 March 2013). 
 54  International Review of the Red Cross,  What’s New in Law and Case Law Across the World: Biannual 
Update on National Legislation and Case Law, January–June 2011 , 93 (2011), 868. 
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acts ‘perpetrated against defenceless people and solely motivated by their ethnic 
background’ 55 over a period of more than four months. In accordance with that 
view, the Court increased Repak’s sentence to eight years in prison, two more than 
suggested by the Prosecution Counsel and the Attorney-General. 56 He was also 
ordered to pay approximately Kr 30,000 to ten victims and Kr 50,000 to another. 57 
 (VIII)  Discussion 
 Repak’s case was complicated by the fact that two Penal Codes were cited in the 
indictment. Section 223 of the 1902 Code, the relevant law in force at the time Repak’s 
acts were committed, detailed the off ence of ‘unlawful deprivation of personal liberty’ 
which clearly covered the acts of which Repak was accused. However the prosecution 
sought conviction under the 2005 Penal Code in an attempt to refl ect the gravity of 
Repak’s conduct. In accordance with the principle of fair labelling, the defence sub-
mitted that the off ences under the 2005 Penal Code ‘provide a far more defamatory 
description than that of deprivation of liberty’ 58 and thus provided an even stronger 
reason why the 2005 Penal Code should not be applied retrospectively. With regard 
to the war crimes charges, the District Court held that the acts detailed in the indict-
ment were completely covered by section 223 of the 1902 Penal Code, which it 
found had the same aim as section 103(h) of the 2005 Penal Code. 59 Th e District 
Court observed that, in order for the section 103 charges to be valid, the 2005 Penal 
Code required three questions to be answered in the affi  rmative:  (i) was there an 
armed confl ict? (ii) did the victims constitute protected persons? and (iii) were the 
off ences against international law? Th e fi rst question was quite easily satisfi ed as the 
war in the former Yugoslavia was clearly an armed confl ict and there was suffi  cient 
evidence to link Repak’s alleged off ences to the war. Secondly, it was accepted that 
the detainees were eff ectively hostages, given that the majority of them were intended 
to be used in a prisoner exchange with the Serbians. 60 Th e District Court thus 
concluded that Repak’s victims were non-combatants, qualifying them as protected 
persons. 61 Finally, the District Court used the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 
Additional Protocols (the Conventions) to assess whether Repak’s acts were contrary 
to the international law in force at the time they were committed. Th e District Court 
found that whether the war in the former Yugoslavia was deemed an international 
or non-international confl ict, Repak’s acts were in breach of the Conventions due 
to both the circumstances and conditions in which the civilians were arrested and 
detained. In its view, therefore, the war crimes charges were justiciable. Applying the 
same principle of interpretation, the District Court found that it would be applying 
 55  Prosecutor v Mirsad Repak , above n 53. 
 56  Prosecutor v Mirsad Repak , above n 53. See also, 14 April 2011, ‘Norwegian Court Sentences 
Mirsad Repak to Eight Years in Prison’,  Balkan Investigative Reporting Network ,  < http://www.bim.ba/
en/265/10/32188 >. 
 57  Approximately 3,300 and 5,500 British pounds respectively. 
 58  Repak , above n 2, [85].    59  Repak , above n 2, [8] .    60  Repak , above n 2, [42]. 
 61  See the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. 
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the law retrospectively in violation of the Constitution if it were to consider charges 
of crimes against humanity found in section 102 of the 2005 Penal Code, because it 
was not drafted in similar terms to any clause in the 1902 Penal Code. 62 Th e Appeal 
Court agreed with the District Court’s judgment. 
 Th e main issue for the Norwegian Supreme Court was to determine whether 
the 2005 Penal Code was in breach of Article 97 or could lawfully be applied 
retrospectively. As indicated above, the Supreme Court agreed with the District 
and Appeal Court’s treatment of the crimes against humanity charges in Repak’s 
case but overruled their assessment of the legality of the war crimes charges. Th e 
Supreme Court found that the application of the 2005 Penal Code provisions to 
acts that occurred in 1992 would be a breach of Article 97. 63 
 Did the Supreme Court get it right? In the circumstances, yes. Nevertheless, 
some might say that section 3 of the 2005 Penal Code is not unconstitutional, 
despite the names of the off ences it outlines being diff erent. It could be argued 
that Repak’s conduct (which gave rise to the charges of war crimes) was suffi  ciently 
similar in substance to the ‘unlawful deprivation of liberty’ off ence that existed 
under section 223 of the 1902 Penal Code 64 so that any issue of retrospectivity 
was merely theoretical. In fact, the six dissenting Supreme Court judges went even 
further by concluding that convictions based on both ‘sections 102 and 103 of the 
Penal Code 2005 would not be manifestly more onerous than conviction pursuant 
to section 223 of the Penal Code 1902 which applied at the time’ 65 and thus would 
not be in violation of Article 97. However, bearing in mind the failed Bagaragaza 
transfer and the principle of fair labelling, on balance it is argued that the Supreme 
Court made the right decision. Th ey took the widely accepted approach by fi nding 
that ‘developments in international law and Norway’s interest in assisting interna-
tional criminal courts could not undermine the fundamental requirement that a 
criminal conviction must have an authority in Norwegian law. 66 With Article 97 
prohibiting retrospective application of law there was, at least on a literal interpre-
tation, no basis for the charges in domestic legislation. Th us section 3 of the 2005 
Penal Code, on which the prosecution based the 2005 off ences in the indictment, 
was  ultra vires . It is suggested that had Article 97 not existed, section 3 would be 
 intra vires and the reasoning of the District and Appeal Court perfectly sound. 
Unfortunately, Norway had two sets of laws, neither of which were an appropriate 
basis for prosecution. Th e 1902 Penal Code was insuffi  cient because, arguably, it 
did not adequately refl ect Repak’s acts, and the 2005 Penal Code was insuffi  cient 
because it was not in eff ect at the time. It is suggested that the Norwegian authori-
ties consider amending Article 97 to accord with section 3 of the 2005 Penal 
Code. Th is would enable Norwegian courts to validly convict a defendant, whose 
acts occurred prior to 7 March 2008, of war crimes and crimes against humanity 
should a case with similar complexities arise in the future. 
 62  Repak , above n 2, [79].    63  Summary of Recent Supreme Court Decisions, above n 49. 
 64  Repak , above n 2, [76].    65  Summary of Recent Supreme Court Decisions, above n 49. 
 66  Summary of Recent Supreme Court Decisions, above n 49. 
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 It is generally held that the relevant laws for determining jurisdiction and charges 
are those in eff ect at the time the off ences were committed and not at the date of 
prosecution. To hold otherwise would legitimately raise concerns of unfairness:
 Legal certainty, which underlies the principle of legality, requires that, upon committing 
their acts, persons know what laws apply and what legal consequences attach to them. 
If they know that, at the time of commission, under then valid laws, their acts are not 
amenable to universal jurisdiction, they may decide to commit them (and fl ee abroad to a 
State which will possibly not extradite them). Conversely, if they know that their acts are 
amenable to universal jurisdiction, they may, facing denial of a safe haven abroad, refrain 
from committing them. 67 
 If a suspect is charged with an off ence that did not exist at the time of the relevant 
act, the ability to know the consequences of one’s actions is severely impaired, if 
not made impossible, because jurisdiction is only provided for  post factum . Whilst 
the Supreme Court eventually found that the war crime provisions under the 2005 
Penal Code could not apply to Repak’s acts, it is noted that in 1992 Repak could 
only have foreseen prosecution in Norway under the 1902 Penal Code. It may thus 
reasonably be argued that the prosecution should not have been permitted to cite 
the 2005 Penal Code in the indictment. Th is would have negated the need for an 
appeal based on unconstitutionality. 
 Nevertheless, despite the absence of contemporaneous domestic international 
criminal off ences, and despite the globally entrenched principle of non-retrospectivity, 
it may not be unreasonable for states that have since adopted off ences that may be 
prosecuted under universal jurisdiction legislation to assert that jurisdiction. First, 
the principle of legality, the essence of which is clarity and non-retrospectivity of 
law, is arguably not applicable to rules of procedure, of which jurisdiction is one. 68 
Second, many of the international off ences prosecuted under universal jurisdic-
tion have existed in treaty and customary international law for decades; hence the 
lack of domestic universal jurisdiction laws at the time of commission may be said 
to be irrelevant. Th e failure of Norwegian prosecutors to have the core interna-
tional off ences against Repak upheld has also been encountered in other European 
jurisdictions and often attributed to the general lack of domestic legislation cov-
ering such conduct prior to 2000. 69 However, it is a fallacy to assert that where 
such off ences are not refl ected in domestic legislation, the principle of legality 
prevents such charges from being laid. It is a norm of customary international law 
that states are permitted to assert universal jurisdiction over international crimes 
that were recognized at the relevant time. 70 Crimes against humanity have been 
recognized in international law for over fi fty years and therefore satisfy that test. 
 67  Cedric  Ryngaert ,  ‘Universal Jurisdiction Over Genocide and War-Time Torture in Dutch 
Courts: An appraisal of the Afghan and Rwandan Cases’ ,  Hague Justice Journal ,  2 ( 2007 ),  21 . 
 68  Th is appears to be supported by Ryngaert, see above n 67, 20. 
 69  Morten  Bergsmo (ed),  Complementarity and the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction for Core 
International Crimes ( Brussels :  Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher ,  2010 ),  74 ; Rikhoff , above n 5, 34. 
 70  See for example,  Jean-Marie  Henckaerts and  Louise  Doswald-Beck ,  Customary International 
Humanitarian Law: Volume 1:  Rules ( Cambridge :   Cambridge University Press ,  2005 ) ;  M.  Cherif 
Bassiouni ,  Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law ( Th e Hague:  Kluwer Law 
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It is recognized that many states require domestic implementing legislation in 
order to utilize international law; nevertheless, in states where discretion exists as 
to the direct application of international law, the prosecution of core international 
crimes is perhaps one scenario where that discretion should be exercised. 
 Most legal academics would agree that prosecutions of core international crimes 
have more of an impact and have the capacity to attain a higher degree of justice if 
they are carried out in the country where the atrocities occurred. Stigen aptly states 
that a case arising out of core international crimes:
 [M] ost naturally belongs in the territorial state or in the home state of the victim or the 
suspect. But sometimes extraditing to an aff ected state is no real option. Th e suspect might 
risk torture or the death penalty there; the legal system might be too weak; the authorities 
might be implicated in the crimes; or the state might be socially and politically inclined not 
to prosecute the crimes. If extraditing the suspect to a third state or an international(ised) 
criminal court is also not an option, prosecution in the custodial state is the only way to 
avoid impunity. 71 
 In Repak’s case, Norway was neither home to the crimes nor the country of his 
birth or that of his victims. Further, Bosnia was not in a period of transition and 
had already prosecuted a number of war criminals. Th us, despite the statutory 
authority to do so, some may question Norway’s motivation for prosecuting Repak. 
Th e answer is found in the fact that, according to the Norwegian Extradition Act, 
Repak’s Norwegian citizenship prevented him from being extradited. 72 Th e question 
then arises as to why Repak was not stripped of his Norwegian citizenship. It is not 
unprecedented for those who have obtained citizenship by fraud/deception or have 
concealed their involvement in core international crimes and other related off ences 
to have their citizenship revoked. For example, in some cases where naturalized 
citizens have been suspected of committing core international crimes prior to the 
acquisition of American nationality, the US authorities have withdrawn citizenship 
and deported those individuals back to their country of origin or to third countries 
that wanted them for prosecution. 73 It is believed that at the time of arrest Repak 
still benefi tted from Bosnian citizenship, hence he would not have been rendered 
stateless if Norway had revoked his citizenship. Whilst not impossible, historically 
it has been diffi  cult to revoke citizenship in Norway. 74 Given that extradition was 
not an option and revocation of citizenship not seriously considered, the only 
International , 2nd edn,  1999 ),  240 ;  Prosecutor v Tihomir Blaskic , Case IT-95-14-AR, 29 October 1997; 
 Prosecutor v Tadic , Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, IT-94-1AR72, 2 October 1995. Th ough not a 
case of universal jurisdiction see also  Kononov v Latvia  (2011) 52 EHRR 21; 29 BHRC 137. 
 71  Stigen, above n 1, 96 (citations omitted). 
 72  Norwegian Extradition Act , No. 39 of 13 June 1975. See also  European Convention on Extradition 1957 . 
 73  See for example,  T.M.  Beiner ,  ‘Due Process for All? Due Process, the Eighth Amendment and 
Nazi War Criminals’ ,  Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology ,  80 ( 1989 ),  293–337 ; AP (17 March 
2012), ‘John Demianjuk, convicted Nazi death camp guard, dies aged 91,  Th e Guardian [online], 
< http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/17/john-demjanjuk-nazi-camp-guard-dies > (accessed 
6 March 2013). 
 74  Mandt, above n 25. 
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options available to the Norwegian authorities were to prosecute or aff ord Repak a 
life without criminal responsibility for his off ences. 
 Still, given the issues that arose in Norway’s prosecution of Repak, one would 
be forgiven for questioning whether a diff erent legal forum would have been more 
appropriate. Th e ICC is only authorized to hear cases concerning acts that occurred 
after 1 July 2002, when the Rome Statute came into eff ect. Th e crimes Repak was 
alleged to have committed took place in 1992, so his case was not eligible to 
be heard before the ICC. Th us, apart from the unlikely possibility of a country 
asserting pure universal jurisdiction, any potential prosecution would be left to the 
ICTY, the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the BiH Court) or Norway, where 
Repak was residing and had gained citizenship. 
 Unlike the ICC, the ICTY is permitted to hear cases where the criminal conduct 
occurred as early as 1 January 1991. Its jurisdiction is to prosecute crimes against 
humanity, genocide, grave breaches of the Conventions, and violations of the laws 
or customs of war, 75 and thus would have covered the acts committed by Repak. 
However, given that the mandate of the ICTY is to ‘prosecute persons responsible 
for serious violations of international humanitarian law’, 76 it is conceivable that 
the acts allegedly committed by Repak would not be considered to be of suffi  -
cient seriousness, in comparison to previous defendants, to warrant a prosecution 
by the ICTY. Interestingly, the fact that the ICTY chose not to exercise its right 
under Article 9(1) of its Statute 77 implies that it had no interest in prosecuting Repak 
and had faith in the Norwegian judiciary. Th at said, technically, Repak could still be 
charged and tried before the ICTY, as Article 10(2) of the ICTY Statute provides that:
 A person who has been tried by a national court for acts constituting serious violations of inter-
national humanitarian law may be subsequently tried by the International Tribunal only if: 
 (a)  the act for which he or she was tried was characterized as an ordinary crime; or 
 (b)  the national court proceedings were not impartial or independent, were designed 
to shield the accused from international criminal responsibility, or the case was not 
diligently prosecuted. 
 As a result of the Supreme Court decision, Repak’s conviction was no longer for 
‘war crimes’ but for ‘unlawful deprivation of liberty’ and thus could be characterized 
as an ordinary crime as per Article 10(2)(a). However, given the lengths to which 
the Norwegian Court strived to be transparent 78 and the comparatively minor 
off ences 79 Repak was alleged to have committed, it is very unlikely that the ICTY 
would seek to do so. 
 75  ICTY Statute, Articles 2–5.    76  ICTY Statute, Article 1. 
 77  ICTY Statute, Article 9(1): ‘Th e International Tribunal shall have primacy over national courts. 
At any stage of the procedure, the International Tribunal may formally request national courts to defer 
to the competence of the International Tribunal’. 
 78  Despite the underreporting of the trial in the media, in its judgment the District Court stated: ‘Because 
of the special nature of the case at hand the Court fi nds reason to emphasise that Norwegian courts oper-
ate with complete independence from Norwegian and foreign authorities; nor have such authorities had 
any infl uence on the Court’s compositions or the present judgment. Th e Court has not been approached 
by any foreign authorities—or by Norwegian authorities.’ See  Repak , above n 2, 2[2] . 
 79  Repak , above n 2, [17]. 
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 Th e BiH Court was established in May 2002 to ‘ensure the protection of funda-
mental human rights and freedoms at the state level, as guaranteed by the Constitution 
of BiH’. 80 Its criminal division has a dedicated War Crimes Chamber that usually 
consists of a panel of three judges, one of whom is international. 81 Th e Court is 
not limited to acts committed within a specifi c time frame and is not restricted 
to prosecuting cases in which the defendant is deemed to be amongst those most 
responsible. Th us Repak’s case could have fallen within the remit of the BiH. 
 It has been said that ‘only when the directly aff ected states fail to investigate 
and prosecute do they forfeit their legal interest in primary prosecution and thus 
enable third states to fi ll the prosecutorial vacuum in order to protect international 
community values’. 82 Th ere is no indication that the BiH sought extradition or 
opposed the trial in Norway. In fact, they assisted the Norwegian authorities with 
the prosecution. 83 For example, BiH police, prosecutors and judicial authorities 
shared information and found and examined witnesses. 84 
 It is clear that BiH consciously yielded to Norway. But what if Bosnia had also 
wanted to assert its jurisdiction to try Repak? In such an instance, precedent generally 
aff ords jurisdiction to the state to which the suspect has a ‘genuine link’. 85 Th e 
Norwegian authorities would argue there was a genuine link to Norway because at 
the time of arrest Repak had citizenship, had worked and lived there for fourteen 
years, and domestic law prevented, or at least made diffi  cult, extradition. Similarly, 
Bosnia could assert that the fact that Repak was a citizen by birth and had com-
mitted the atrocities on its territory provided more of a bona fi de link with Bosnia. 
What at fi rst seems like a relatively straightforward test is thus not so easily applied. 
Perhaps a better litmus test to decide which state is entitled to jurisdiction is to ask 
which state has ‘closer links’. 
 Despite the numerous countries that have enacted universal jurisdiction laws:
 [t] oday there is signifi cant support in doctrine for the idea that no State may unilaterally estab-
lish order through criminal law, against everyone and the entire world, without there being 
some point of connection that legitimises the extraterritorial extension of its jurisdiction. 86 
 80  Th e Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina [website], < http://www.sudbih.gov.ba > (accessed 6 March 
2013). 
 81  Th e Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina website above n 80. 
 82  Julia  Geneuss ,  ‘Universal Jurisdiction Reloaded? Fostering a Better Understanding of Universal 
Jurisdiction’ ,  Journal of International Criminal Justice ,  7 ( 2009 ),  958 . 
 83  Mandt, above n 25. 
 84  Denis Dzidic and Marina Ferhatovic, ‘Refugee War Criminals Pose Dilemma to Scandinavia’, 
 Balkan Insight , 1 June 2009. Th e Serbian War Crimes Prosecutor’s Offi  ce also cooperated with 
Norwegian authorities, see Public Relations Service (17 April 2011), ‘Successful Cooperation of the 
War Crimes Prosecutor’s Offi  ce and Norwegian Investigators Results in Conviction of Mirsad Repak 
for War Crimes in Dretelj Camp’,  Republic of Serbia: Offi  ce of the War Crimes Prosecutor [website], 
< http://www.tuzilastvorz.org.rs/html_trz/VESTI_SAOPSTENJA_2011/VS_2011_04_19_ENG.
pdf > (6 March 2013). 
 85  See  Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v Guatemala) Second Phase, International Court of Justice 
(ICJ), 6 April 1955. See also section 153f German Code of Criminal Procedure, which asserts that 
German authorities will not commence proceedings where it is shown that a state with a stronger link 
to the crimes is investigating the matter. 
 86  Judgment on the Guatemala Genocide Case No. 327/2003, 25 February 2003, available at 
< http://www.derechos.org.nizkor/guatemala/doc/stsgtm.html >. 
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 States are therefore hesitant to assert authority solely on the grounds of ‘pure’ 
universal jurisdiction and usually justify their decision to prosecute on additional 
grounds of extraterritoriality such as passive personality or the protective principle. 87 
One may thus question whether Repak’s case is a genuine instance of ‘pure’ univer-
sal jurisdiction, as Norway justifi ed its decision to prosecute on the basis of Repak’s 
residency and acquired citizenship. For these reasons some may be inclined to view 
the case as one of active nationality rather than universality. However, according to 
the AU-EU Expert Report on the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction:
 Universal criminal jurisdiction is the assertion by one state of its jurisdiction over crimes 
allegedly committed in the territory of another state by nationals of another state against 
nationals of another state where the crime alleged poses no direct threat to the vital interests 
of the state asserting jurisdiction. In other words, universal jurisdiction amounts to the 
claim by a state to prosecute crimes in circumstances where none of the traditional links of 
territoriality, nationality, passive personality or the protective principle exists at the time of 
the commission of the alleged off ence. 88 
 As Repak did not possess Norwegian citizenship at the time the atrocities were com-
mitted, it is submitted that his case can rightly be categorized as one of universal 
jurisdiction. 89 
 Th e prosecution of Mirsad Repak was the fi rst war crimes trial in Norway in 
over fi fty years and was also the fi rst case to be tried under the new provisions of 
the 2005 Penal Code. Th e trial consequently raises a number of questions: should 
all domestic trials of core international crimes be obligated to have a jury at fi rst 
instance? Should they require the entire judging panel to be legally qualifi ed and 
specialize in international criminal or humanitarian law? Should they have a 
Victim’s Counsel? Additional questions are raised where universal jurisdiction is 
concerned. Should the implementation of an amnesty in the country where the 
off ence occurred bar prosecution by an intervening state? Should limitation periods 
prescribed by domestic legislation apply to international core crimes? 
 Th e diffi  culty in applying a new law for the fi rst time, particularly one of this nature, 
combined with the diffi  culty in investigating and prosecuting off ences committed in 
another country sixteen years prior, was acknowledged by the prosecutor. 90 It has been 
suggested that a trial at the ICTY or the BiH Court would have resulted in Repak’s 
defence being ‘far more eff ective’ 91 due to those judicial institutions having ‘far better 
 87  See  Gerry  Simpson ,  Law, War & Crime ( Cambridge :  Polity Press ,  2007 ) ;  Menno T.  Kamminga , 
 ‘Lessons Learned from the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction in Respect of Gross Human Rights 
Off ences’ ,  Human Rights Quarterly ,  23 ( 2001 ),  940–74 . 
 88  Technical Ad hoc Expert Group on the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction (16 April 2009), 
‘Report’  Council of the European Union: Council Secretariat , < http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/
node/847 > [8] (emphasis added) (accessed 6 March 2013). 
 89  Th is view is supported by the categorization of Repak’s case as one of universal jurisdiction by 
some NGOs such as International Federation for Human Rights and Redress: see FIDH and Redress 
(2 June 2009), ‘Universal Jurisdiction Developments:  January 2006–May 2009’,  FIDH [website], 
< http://www.fi dh.org/IMG//pdf/UJ_Informal_Update_Draft020609.pdf > (accessed 6 March 2013). 
 90  See Dzidic and Ahmetasevic, above n 33. 
 91  Denis Dzidic (16 February 2010), ‘Verdict Against Mirsad Repak Expected Soon’,  Balkan Investigative 
Reporting Network [website], < http://www.bim.ba/en/206/10/25878/?tpl=30 > (accessed 6 March 2013). 
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knowledge about international humanitarian law and relevant legal standards’. 92 Some 
might therefore question whether Repak had a fair trial. Two of the three individuals 
who presided over his fi rst instance trial were lay members, one of whom was a 
psychologist and the other a web designer. 93 Trials of core international crimes are 
diffi  cult on any account, even more so when constitutional law and universal jurisdic-
tion are factors to be considered. Th ese trials thus demand a high standard of expertise. 
It is doubtful whether lay jury members have suffi  cient knowledge and experience of 
the law in this area to satisfy the degree of competency required to adjudicate these 
international off ences as demanded by the world community. Whilst Repak was 
subject to the same procedures any other Norwegian would have at fi rst instance, it is 
questionable whether such procedures are suffi  cient for a war crimes trial. 
 Th ough it is clear that the Norwegian courts went to great length to ensure 
Repak’s trial was transparent and just, as the old adage goes, justice must not only 
be done but must be seen to be done. It is likely that had Repak been prosecuted 
in a more experienced war crimes court, such as the ICTY or the BiH Court, fewer 
questions would have been raised as to whether justice was indeed seen to be done. 
It is acknowledged that national courts will, and should, have a degree of auton-
omy with regard to judicial procedures implemented in domestic prosecutions of 
core international crimes. Nevertheless, given that these off ences may be said to be 
brought on behalf of the world community, there needs to be further international 
discussion with the aim of creating a level of consistency across domestic courts that 
choose to prosecute international off ences. Such requirements may reduce appeals, 
minimize allegations of unfairness and support the legitimacy of domestic prosecu-
tions. Whilst there is always the option of creating new rules, the most practical 
course of action would be for the international community to come to a consensus 
concerning which pre-existing international rules of procedure should be adopted 
for the domestic prosecution of core international crimes (not just those based on 
universal jurisdiction). 94 
 Some academics hold the view that states will continue to view universal 
jurisdiction with trepidation, preventing it from becoming a common feature 
of international criminal justice. However, the poor state of the global economy, 
which will make it diffi  cult to establish more special tribunals in the near future, 
combined with the relative ineffi  ciency and expense of the international judicial 
system, reasonably leads one to conclude that if atrocities are to be dealt with at 
all, it is likely they will need to be prosecuted through domestic systems, many 
using extraterritorial jurisdiction. Th us it is suggested that the application of 
universal jurisdiction—though not necessarily ‘pure’ universal jurisdiction—will 
indeed become more common. 
 92  Dzidic, above n 91.    93  See  Repak , above n 2. 
 94  See also  E.  Jessberger ,  ‘Universal Jurisdiction’ in  A.  Cassesse et al. (eds)  Th e Oxford Companion 
to International Criminal Justice ( Oxford :  Oxford University Press ,  2009 ),  557 ;  C.  Kress ,  ‘Universal 
Jurisdiction over International Crimes and the Institut de Droit International’ ,  JICJ ,  4 ( 2006 ),  581 ; 
 Luc  Walleyn ,  ‘Universal Jurisdiction: Lessons from the Belgian Experience’ ,  Yearbook of International 
Humanitarian Law ,  5 ( 2002 ),  394–406 . 
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 (IX)  Conclusion 
 Th e decision of a state to prosecute core international crimes when the conduct 
took place in another country, the victims were not nationals, and the off ender 
was not a national when the crimes were committed, is of great signifi cance, 
particularly given that universal jurisdiction is capable of being used as a conduit 
for politics. However, where the power is used genuinely in an attempt to maximize 
global justice, it should be used with pride and without fear of political controversy. 
Norway’s increasing tendency to investigate, arrest, extradite and now prosecute 
foreign war criminals not only discourages disreputable individuals from seeking 
refuge there, but also demonstrates to the rest of the world that Norway is a coun-
try that respects international humanitarian law and will utilize its extraterritorial 
powers when necessary. Th e paucity of media reports on the prosecution of Mirsad 
Repak should not be taken as an indication of it being legally irrelevant. Th e trial 
was an important one because it achieved the appropriate balance between ideal-
ism and pragmatism, law and politics, and justice and impunity. Th ough legiti-
mate concerns arose, the prosecution and conviction of Mirsad Repak illustrates 
that such prosecutions can be achieved in an eff ective and just manner and should 
provide impetus to other states to take similar action should the need arise. Whilst 
questions may persist as to whether the BiH Court would have been better placed 
to try the case, any argument that Norway was wrong to assert its jurisdiction is 
relatively weak. 
 Th e debate surrounding the merits of domestic versus international prosecution of 
core international crimes is understandable. What cannot be denied is the fact there 
are far more perpetrators of these heinous crimes than can be tried by international 
institutions. Hence domestic war crimes trials—whether based on territoriality, 
nationality, passive personality, the protective principle or universality—will become 
a vital mechanism for upholding human dignity and ensuring that those deemed to 
be a  hostis humani generis 95 do not escape prosecution for the devastation they cause 
to victims, their families and the world community. 
 Although it is acknowledged that there have been, and for the foreseeable future 
will continue to be, important practical, political and legal obstacles that hinder or 
taint the prosecution of core international crimes in national courts, the increas-
ing calls for the establishment of war crimes tribunals in countries such as Brazil, 
Liberia and Sri Lanka demonstrate a desire for justice at a local level. Further 
academic debate is therefore needed regarding the intricacies of such prosecutions, 
particularly concerning whether domestic courts should be free to prosecute core 
international crimes entirely according to the substantive and procedural laws 
of their state, or whether certain standards should be internationally agreed and 
implemented in an eff ort to ensure consistency. Additionally, states that currently 
 95  Latin for ‘enemy of mankind’. See  Filartiga v Pena-Irala , 630 F. 2d 876 (2d Cir.1980);  Prosecutor 
v Furundžija , IT-95-17/1-T, 10 December 1998. 
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restrict the extradition of their nationals should consider enacting laws to permit 
the extradition of citizens accused of core international crimes to a country that has 
closer links with the alleged off ences and are willing to prosecute. 
 Norway is not the fi rst third-party state to try individuals accused of committing 
war crimes in the Former Yugoslavia. Austria, Denmark, Germany and Switzerland 
have also prosecuted off enders for these atrocities. 96 Th e further legitimization of 
domestic prosecutions of core international crimes will be dependent on the encour-
agement and support given to states that take such action. 97 Just as the establishment 
of the ICC and international tribunals brought challenges, so too do domestic trials 
of core international crimes. 98 But these challenges must be confronted and overcome 
and countries that attempt to do so must be applauded for blazing the trail of global 
justice via domestic means. 
 96  C.L.  Sriram ,  ‘Exercising Universal Jurisdiction: Contemporary Disparate Practice’ ,  Th e Journal of 
Human Rights ,  6 ( 2002 ),  49–76 . 
 97  See for example David A.  Kaye, Council of Foreign Relations, ‘Justice Beyond Th e Hague: 
Supporting the Prosecution of International Crimes in National Court’,  Special Report No. 61 (June 
2011);  Mark S.  Ellis ,  ‘International Justice and the Rule of Law: Strengthening the ICC through 
Domestic Prosecutions’ ,  Hague Journal on the Rule of Law ,  1 ( 2009 ),  79–86 . 
 98  For problems in Croatia see Amnesty International (2010), ‘Behind a Wall of Silence: Prosecution 
of War Crimes in Croatia’,  Amnesty International [website] < http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/
EUR64/003/2010/en/81544213-9880-4a5e-acea-d5269d0bc8ad/eur640032010en.pdf > (accessed 6 
March 2013). 
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 Reading the Shadows of History: Th e 
Turkish and Ethiopian ‘Internationalized’ 
Domestic Crime Trials 
 Jackson Nyamuya  Maogoto * 
 (I)  Introduction 
 Th e domestic trial of individuals is not novel. Numerous countries have laws that 
allow for prosecution of international crimes through their domestic systems. 
Domestic trials of individuals for international crimes are on the rise. By the turn 
of the twenty-fi rst century more than thirty countries were involved in the pros-
ecution of perpetrators of international crimes. 1 Domestic trials now cover various 
corners of the globe, from Cambodia and Sierra Leone to East Timor and Iraq. 
Th ese four countries are specifi cally mentioned as they off er insights into the key 
diff erences that distinguish them from other domestic criminal trials. 
 In Cambodia, Sierra Leone and East Timor, the United Nations was an 
active player. In the case of Cambodia, Th e Law on the Establishment of Th e 
Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia was the result of an agree-
ment between the United Nations and the government of Cambodia. 2 Th e Special 
Court for Sierra Leone was set up jointly by the government of Sierra Leone 
and the United Nations 3 while the East Timor Special Panels were a result of the 
promulgation of a constituent instrument of the United Nations Transitional 
 *  Senior Lecturer, Th e University of Manchester. 
 1  See generally  Joseph  Rikhof ,  ‘Fewer Places to Hide? Th e Impact of Domestic War Crimes 
Prosecutions on International Impunity’ ( 2009 )  20  Criminal Law Forum   1 . 
 2  Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia concerning 
the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic 
Kampuchea (6 June 2003); Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea 
(as amended 27 October 2004), Chapter XIX. 
 3  Th is was established by an Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of 
Sierra Leone pursuant to Security Council resolution 1315 (2000) of 14 August 2000. Th e statute 
of the Special Court for Sierra Leone  available at < http://www.sc-sl.org/DOCUMENTS/tabid/176/
Default.aspx > accessed 10 January 2013. 
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Administration. 4 All three feature signifi cant involvement of international person-
nel within the judicial mechanisms. Th e Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST), meanwhile, 
was established by the Coalition Provisional Authority deriving its powers from 
Security Council Resolution 1483. 5 Th e IST was a variant of the aforementioned 
regimes in the sense that it was instituted by the international community and led 
to the involvement of a core of international advisors. However, as will be seen, 
in contrast to the Turkish and Ethiopian trials, these courts are hybrid involving a 
good measure of international involvement in inception and operation. Essentially 
these are ‘nationalized’ international trials while the Turkish and Ethiopian courts, 
though also targeting principal perpetrators and accessories, were ‘international-
ized’ national trials. Th ough separated by almost eight decades, these early nation-
alized trials foreshadowed the large-scale domestic prosecution of violations of 
international law. 
 Th is chapter delves into the nuances of the unheralded Turkish and Ethiopian 
trials. Th e Turkish and Ethiopian domestic trials were extraordinary in that they 
used the framework of extant penal codes to prosecute international crimes in 
accordance with domestic penal codes. Turkish authorities invoked norms encom-
passing the laws of humanity and crimes against humanity in the prosecution of 
its political and military elite. 6 Similarly the Ethiopian prosecutions (Red Terror 
Trials) focused on the former ruling military junta (the Derg), 7 whose senior mili-
tary and political offi  cials were suspected of committing mass human rights viola-
tions—genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Yet, these trials though 
more ‘successful’ (in the number of defendants tried and convictions) than, say, the 
much more famous and relatively well known post-World War I German national 
 4  Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment 
of a Special Court for Sierra Leone (16 January 2002); United Nations Transitional Administration in 
East Timor, Regulation No. 2000/15 on the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over 
Serious Criminal Off ences (6 June 2000). 
 5  UN Security Resolution 1483 issued post Operation Iraqi Freedom which toppled the Saddam 
Hussein regime among other things had called for the United Nations to play a vital role in recon-
struction eff orts and the development of institutions in Iraq as well the need for accountability for 
the crimes committed by the previous Iraqi regime. Th e Court was set up by a specifi c Statute issued 
under the Coalition Provisional Authority. Th e Statute is  available at < http://www.cpa-raq.org/
human_rights/Statute.htm > accessed 12 January 2013. 
 6  On 2 November 1918, a Parliamentarian submitted a motion to institute hearings in the 
Ottoman Chamber of Deputies to establish the responsibility of the members of the two wartime 
Cabinets framing the off ences under the violations of ‘the rules of law and humanity’. Similar senti-
ments were echoed in early 1919 by Sultan Mehmed VI as head of state who in authorising a new 
law for court-martialling alleged perpetrators denounced the off ences in question as ‘crimes against 
humanity’. See eg  Vahakn N  Dadrian ,  ‘Genocide as a Problem of National and International Law: Th e 
World War I Armenian Case and Its Contemporary Legal Ramifi cations’ ( 1989 )  14  Yale Journal of 
International Law  221 , 293–94 . 
 7  ‘Derg’ means ‘council’ or ‘committee’ in ancient Ethiopian language. Th is was the name 
given to the Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces comprised of 120 commissioned and 
non-commissioned low-rank offi  cers of the air force, police force and the territorial army which was 
later to seize power in the disarray spawned in the aftermath of the collapse of the reign of Emperor 
Haile Selassie I  in the face of a people’s uprising that culminated in a revolution. Th e Derg would 
become synonymous with the communist military Junta that ruled Ethiopia into the early 1990s. 
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war crimes trials in Leipzig, remain under-researched. Yet, it is in the hidden his-
tory of these trials that we see the early signs of hybridity. 
 (II)  Turkey’s Involvement in World War I: Militarism 
and the ‘Resolution’ of the ‘Armenian Question’ 
 (1)  Crescents and crosses? Th e Armenian genocide 
 During World War I, as the rest of the world looked on, the Ottoman Empire 
carried out one of the largest genocides in world history massacring large numbers 
of its minority Armenian population. Th e exact number killed is contested but 
falls somewhere between 250,000 and 1,000,000 people. 8 Th e massive, deliber-
ate and systematic massacres by Turkey of its ‘troublesome’ Armenian Christian 
subjects under the cover of war did not go unnoticed. 9 As early as 24 May 1915, 
the Entente Powers (which together with their junior partners made up the 
Allied Powers) 10 solemnly condemned ‘the connivance and often assistance of 
Ottoman authorities’ in the massacres, adding further that ‘[i] n view of these 
new crimes of Turkey against humanity and civilisation . . . the Allied governments 
announce publicly . . . that they will hold personally responsible . . . all members of 
the Ottoman government and those of their agents who are implicated in such 
massacres’. 11 
 Evidence suggests that Turkey’s entry into World War I was substantially infl u-
enced by a desire to create an opportunity to resolve once and for all certain 
lingering domestic confl icts. 12 Th e Armenian Genocide was the culmination of 
many decades of Armenian persecution at the hands of the Turks and heralded 
 8  See eg  David M  Lang ,  Armenia: Cradle of Civilization ( Allen & Unwin , 2nd ed,  1978 )  289 ; 
Vincent H P Caillard, ‘Turkey’,  Th e Encyclopædia Britannica, ( Encyclopædia Britannica,  11th 
ed, 1911)  Vol 27, 426; Glenn E Curtis (ed.),  Armenia, Azerbaijan, And Georgia:  Country Studies 
(1995) 14–15, 35;  Patrick  Balfour ,  Baron  Kinross  Ottoman Centuries: Th e Rise and Fall of the Turkish 
Empire ( William Morrow ,  1977 )  554 , 606 ;  Bernard  Lewis ,  Th e Emergence of Modern Turkey ( Oxford 
University Press , 2nd ed,  1968 )  356 . 
 9  Vice-Field Marshal Pomiankowski, the Austrian Military Plenipotentiary attached to the 
Ottoman General Headquarters during the War, alluded in his memoirs to the unabating antagonism 
between the Muslim and the non-Muslim nationalities. Referring to ‘the spontaneous utterances of 
many intelligent Turks’, Pomiankowski conveyed their view that these conquered people ought to 
have been forcibly converted into Muslims, or ‘ought to have been exterminated ( ausrotten ) long 
ago’:   Joseph  Pomiankowski ,  Der Zusammenbruch Des Ottamanischen Reiches; Erinnerungen an die 
Turkei aus der Zeit des Weitkrieges ( Zurich :  Amalthea-Verlag ,  1928 ),  162 . 
 10  Th ese were the countries led by the United Kingdom, France and Russia that had waged war against 
the Central Powers that revolved around the aggression of German and the then Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Bulgaria. Th e junior partners of the Entente powers 
were Belgium, Serbia, Italy, Japan, Greece and Romania. 
 11  ‘France, Great Britain and Russia Joint Declaration of 24 May 1915’,  Armenian National 
Institute [website], < http://www.armenian-genocide.org/Affi  rmation.160/current_category.7/affi  rma-
tion_detail.html > (accessed 1 March 2013). 
 12  Mehmed Talat the then Turkish Interior Minister is reported to have expressed this intent to an 
attache at the German Embassy in Istanbul in charge of the Armenian desk. Talat later Grand Vizier 
asserted that Turkey was ‘intent on taking advantage of the war in order to thoroughly liquidate its 
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a fi nal move on the part of the Ottoman regime to rid itself, once and for all of 
its Armenian Christian minority. Alleging treasonable acts, separatism, and other 
assorted acts by the Armenians as a national minority, the Ottoman authorities 
ordered, ostensibly for national security reasons, the wholesale ‘relocation’ of virtu-
ally the Empire’s entire Armenian population. Despite the promises of Ottoman 
authorities that promulgated these emergency laws, the Armenians did not return 
from these deportations. 13 
 Th e deportations proved to be a cover for the ensuing destruction. Ittihadist lead-
ers 14 secretly formed a unit called the Special Organization ( Teşkilat-i-Mahsusa ), 
one of whose principal purposes was to resolve the ‘Armenian Question’. Th e 
Organization Unit’s mission included deployment in remote areas of Turkey’s inte-
rior in order to ambush and destroy convoys of Armenian deportees. Th e elimina-
tion agenda extended to the sinking of transport ships at sea. 15 
 (2)  Th e Paris Peace Conference—victory in war and defeat in 
securing justice 
 When Turkey signed the Armistice on 30 October 1918, she lay at the mercy of 
the European Allies. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill described Turkey as 
being ‘under the spell of defeat, and of deserved defeat’. 16 Echoing this, his Foreign 
Minister, George Curzon, in denouncing Turkey, noted it was ‘a culprit awaiting 
sentence’. 17 Turkey’s culpability, in Allied eyes, involved mainly war crimes and 
crimes against its own citizens. Th e Allies, pursuant to their 1915 Declaration, 18 
internal foes, i.e, the indigenous Christians, without being thereby disturbed by foreign intervention.’ 
German Ambassador Wangenheim’s 17 June 1915 report to his Chancellor in Berlin.  German Foreign 
Ministry Archives, A A Turkei 183/37, A19744. 
 13  In a Memorandum dated 26 May 1915, the Interior Minister requested from the Grand Vizier 
the enactment through the Cabinet of a special law authorising deportations. For the English text of 
the law, see  R  Hovannisian ,  Armenia on the Road to Independence 1918 ( University of California Press , 
 1967 )  51 . 
 14  Th e virulently expansionist movement that had ascended to power in the run up to World War 
I. Among the objectives and ambitions of the wartime Ittihadist Government was restoring the wan-
ing grandeur of the Ottoman Empire by eliminating threats undermining it as well ensuring that it 
fi rmly incorporated all Turkic peoples. 
 15  As Winston Churchill wrote:
 In 1915 the Turkish government began and ruthlessly carried out the infamous general 
massacre and deportation of Armenians in Asia Minor . . . the clearance of the race from 
Asia Minor was about as complete as such an act, on a scale so great, could well be. Th ere 
is no reasonable doubt that this crime was planned and executed for political reasons. 
Th e opportunity presented itself for clearing Turkish soil of a Christian race opposed to 
all Turkish ambitions, cherishing national ambitions that could be satisfi ed only at the 
expense of Turkey, and planted geographically between Turkish and Caucasian Moslems. 
 Winston  Churchill ,  Th e World Crisis: Th e Aftermath ( Th ornton Butterworth ,  1929 )  405 . 
 16  Ibid 367. 
 17  E L Woodward and R Butler (eds),  Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939 (HMSO, First 
Series, 1952) Vol 4 (Statement of the then British Foreign Minister George Curzon, 4 July 1919), 661. 
 18  Declaration of France, Great Britain and Russia , 24 May 1915, quoted in  Egon  Schwelb ,  ‘Crimes 
Against Humanity’ ( 1946 )  23  British Year Book of International Law ,  178 , 181 . 
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were determined to initiate criminal proceedings against Turkish offi  cials sus-
pected of complicity in the war of aggression  and the Armenian Genocide. Th e 
task of considering the various possibilities was delegated to the Commission on 
Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties (the 
‘Allied Commission’). 19 Th e Commission commenced its work by taking specifi c 
cognisance of Turkish massacres of hundreds of thousands of Armenians as part of 
a state policy of  resolving the ‘Armenian Question’. 
 Th e scale of the massacres was such that a majority of the members of the Allied 
Commission were of the opinion that the Hague Convention (IV) principle, 
which allowed for reliance upon ‘the laws of humanity’ and ‘dictates of public con-
science’, 20 whenever clearly defi ned standards and regulations to deal with grave 
off ences were lacking, suffi  ced to cover the perpetration of the massacres within 
the rubric of ‘crimes against humanity’. 21 On 5 March 1919, the Commission 
tabled a report defi ning this off ence. 22 Th e report specifi ed the following violations 
against civilian populations: systematic terror; murders and massacres; dishonour-
ing of women; confi scation of private property; pillage; seizing of goods belonging 
to communities, educational establishments and charities; arbitrary destruction 
of public and private goods; deportation and forced labour; execution of civilians 
under false allegations of war crimes; and violations against civilians as well as mili-
tary personnel. Th e Commission’s fi nal report, dated 29 March 1919, spoke of ‘the 
clear dictates of humanity’ which were abused ‘by the Central Powers by barbarous 
or illegitimate methods’ including ‘the violation of . . . the laws of humanity’. Th e 
report concluded that ‘all persons belonging to enemy countries . . . who have been 
guilty of off ences against the laws and customs of war or the laws of humanity, are 
liable to criminal prosecution’. 23 
 Beginning in January 1919, Turkish authorities, directed and often pressured 
by Allied authorities in Istanbul, arrested and detained scores of wartime political 
and military leaders. Th ose arrested comprised four groups: (1) the members of 
Ittihad’s Central Committee; (2) war-time cabinet ministers; (3) a host of provin-
cial governors; and (4) high-ranking military offi  cers. Th e suspects were transferred 
to a detention facility in a military prison maintained by the Turkish Defence 
Ministry. 24 Subsequently, forty-one of the suspects were released by Turkish author-
ities on the basis that they were innocent. Admiral Somerset Gough-Calthorpe, 
 19  Th e Commission was comprised of two members from each of the fi ve Great Powers: the United 
States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan. In additional the Commission 
co-opted fi ve representatives—one each from Belgium, Greece, Poland, Romania, and Serbia—the 
Associated Powers that together with the Entente Powers made up the Allied Power alliance. Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace,  Th e Treaties of Peace 1919-1923 (Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 1924) 3. 
 20  Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land , 18 October, 1907, Preamble, 36 Stat 
2277, 2779–80, 1 Bevans 631, 632. 
 21  Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties, 
‘Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference, 29 March 1919’ (1920) 14  American Journal 
of International Law  95. 
 22  Ibid.    23  Ibid. 
 24  Of these, twenty-six were ordered released by the Court Martial itself with the assertion, ‘Th ere is 
no case against them.’  Spectateur D’orient , (Istanbul) 21 May 1919. 
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the senior British military offi  cer involved in negotiating the terms of Turkey’s 
surrender (as well serving as the British High Commissioner to Turkey), informed 
London with regard to the released suspects that ‘there was every reason to believe, 
[they] were guilty of the most heinous crimes . . . mainly in connection with mas-
sacres’. 25 On 28 May 1919, sixty-seven detainees were seized from the Istanbul 
military prison in a surprise swoop by the British. Twelve of the prisoners, mostly 
ex-ministers, were taken to the island of Mudros, the rest to Malta. 26 Th e twelve 
ministers were eventually transferred to Malta, where the number of prisoners 
rose to 118 by August 1920. 27 However the British raid and repeated diplomatic 
pressure served to harden the resolve of the ascendant Turkish ultra-nationalist 
Kemalist government 28 in the face of requests to hand over the rest of the off enders 
in their custody for trial before an inter-Allied tribunal. 29 
 (3)  Peace Treaty of Sèvres: translucent accountability and 
opaque enforceability 
 A peace treaty was presented to Turkey on 11 May 1920, and signed four months 
later at Sèvres, France. 30 Th e treaty contained several articles providing for the trial 
and punishment of those responsible for the Armenian Genocide. Th e provisions 
obligated Turkey to recognize the prosecution of alleged perpetrators by the Allied 
powers and extended the obligation to include the surrender of those identifi ed. 
 25  British Foreign Offi  ce Papers, FO 371/4174/88761 (folio 9) (30 May 1919) (Foreign Offi  ce (FO) 
Archives. Public Record Offi  ce, London). 
 26  Th e British Foreign Offi  ce Near East specialist declared, ‘Th ere is probably not one of these 
prisoners who does not deserve a long term of imprisonment if not capital punishment.’ British 
Foreign Offi  ce Papers, FO 371/6509/E8745 (folios 23–24); See also  Vahakn N  Dadrian ,  ‘Genocide as 
a Problem of National and International Law: Th e World War I Armenian Case and Its Contemporary 
Legal Ramifi cations’ ( 1989 )  14  Yale Journal of International Law  221 , 286 . 
 27  Referring to the Malta exiles, a British Foreign Offi  ce Near East specialist declared:  ‘Th ere is 
probably not one of these prisoners who does not deserve a long term of imprisonment if not capital 
punishment.’ British Foreign Offi  ce Papers, FO 371/6509/E8745 (folios 23-24). 
 28  Th e Kemalists were trying to mitigate the consequences of the total collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire subsequent to the World War I military defeat by establishing a secular Turkish republic bereft 
of the expansionist, ambitions of the wartime Ittihadist Government which sought to not only prevent 
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire but to ensure that it fi rmly incorporated all Turkic peoples. 
 29  Turkey asserted that such a surrender of Turkish subjects contradicted the sovereign rights of the 
Ottoman Empire as recognised by England in the Armistice Agreement. In the words of the Turkish 
Foreign Minister:
 compliance with the demand for surrender by the Turkish Government would be in direct 
contradiction with its sovereign rights in view of the fact that by international law each 
State has [the] right to try its subjects for crimes or misdemeanours committed in its own 
territory by its own tribunals. Moreover, His Britannic Majesty having by conclusion of 
an armistice with the Ottoman Empire recognised [the] latter as a  de facto and  de jure 
sovereign State, it is incontestably evident that the Imperial Government possesses all the 
prerogatives for freely exercising [the] principles inherent in its sovereignty. 
 British Foreign Offi  ce Papers, FO 608/244/3749 (folio 315)  (Rear Admiral Richard 
Webb’s 19 February 1919 telegram to London). Webb was then also serving as the British 
Assistant High Commissioner to Turkey. 
 30  Peace Treaty of Sevres , 10 August 1920, reprinted in ‘ Treaty of Peace Between the Allied Powers and 
Turkey’ (1921) 15  American Journal of International Law 179 (Supp). 
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Under Article 226, the Turkish government recognized ‘the right of trial and pun-
ishment by the Allied Powers, notwithstanding any proceedings or prosecution 
before a tribunal in Turkey’. 31 Turkey was required to surrender ‘all persons accused 
of having committed an act in violation of the laws and customs of war, who are 
specifi ed either by name or by rank, offi  ce or employment which they held under 
Turkish authorities’. 32 Under Article 230, Turkey was further obliged to hand over 
to the Allied Powers the persons responsible for the massacres committed dur-
ing the state of war on territory which formed part of the Turkish Empire as of 1 
August 1914. 33 
 Disagreements, feuds, and rivalries among the Allies, on the one hand, and gen-
eral war-weariness on the other, was to undermine unity and weakened resolve in 
pursuing and holding Turkey accountable for its wartime atrocities. Consequently, 
a withdrawal of all occupation forces commenced as negotiations got underway for 
a prisoner exchange. Yielding further to the pressures of the now fi rmly established 
Kemalist government, the Allied Powers undercut (and all but discarded) the Peace 
Treaty of Sèvres when they presented the Treaty of Lausanne for signing. 34 Th is 
treaty replaced the Peace Treaty of Sèvres and avoided the subject of war crimes 
and massacres—marking an ignominious triumph of impunity over international 
justice. Th e Treaty of Lausanne eff ectively marked the end of the pursuit of justice 
through supranational penal process. 35 However, though the international initia-
tive had eff ectively collapsed by 1921, domestic pressure and political expedience 
was already playing a key role in delivering a measure of justice through a series of 
domestic trials commencing in Turkey as early as 1919 (prior to the peace treaties). 
 (4)  Seeking redemption? Domestic Turkish justice 
 On the night of 1–2 November 1918, seven top leaders of the wartime Ittihadist 
Party surreptitiously fl ed from Istanbul. Days later a Turkish parliamentar-
ian introduced a motion for the trial before the High Court of wartime cabinet 
ministers. 36 Th e motion enumerated ten charges that covered alleged misdeeds 
related to Turkish participation in World War I encompassing aggression, military 
 31  Peace Treaty of Sevres , 10 August 1920, reprinted in ‘ Treaty of Peace Between the Allied Powers 
and Turkey’ (1921) 15  American Journal of International Law 179 (Supp); see also  James F  Willis , 
 Prologue To Nuremberg: Th e Politics and Diplomacy of Punishing War Criminals of the First World War 
( Greenwood Press ,  1982 )  180 . 
 32  Peace Treaty of Sevres , 10 August 1920, reprinted in  ‘Treaty of Peace Between the Allied Powers 
and Turkey ’, 15  American Journal of International Law 179 (Supp 1921). 
 33  It was further stipulated that ‘[t] he Allied powers reserve to themselves the right to designate the 
tribunal, which shall try the persons so accused, and the Turkish Government undertakes to recognise 
such tribunal.’ Ibid 181. 
 34  Treaty of Lausanne , 28 LNTS 12 reprinted in (1924) 18  American Journal of International L aw 1 
(Supp). 
 35  Vahakn N  Dadrian ,  ‘Genocide as a Problem of National and International Law: Th e World War 
I Armenian Case and Its Contemporary Legal Ramifi cations’ ( 1989 )  14  Yale Journal of International 
Law  221 , 309–10 . 
 36  Johannes Lepsius,  Deutschland und Armenien, 1914-1918: Sammlung Diplomatischer Aktenstucke 
[ Germany and Armenia, 1914–1918: A Collection of Diplomatic Documents ] (Tempelverlag, 1919) 111. 
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incompetence, political abuses, and economic crimes. In particular, two of the 
charges focused on the Armenian Genocide and challenged the enactment of the 
Temporary Laws. 37 It asserted that the deportations were contrary to the spirit 
and letter of the Constitution meaning that associated ‘orders and instructions’ 
were contrary to ‘the rules of law and humanity’. Ensuing debate resulted in the 
establishment of a Select Parliamentary Investigation Committee. In the next 
fi ve weeks, ‘the Committee conducted fourteen hearings in which it interrogated 
fi fteen ministers, including two Seyhulislams. In addition to the revelations and 
confessions exacted from the ministers during these hearings, the Committee also 
secured a number of documents, some of which were top-secret orders and instruc-
tions regarding the massacres.’ 38 
 Parallel to the work of the Select Committee, an Administration Inquiry 
Commission was established on 23 November 1918 and mandated to investigate 
misdeeds by administrative and military offi  cers. It was vested with broad powers 
pursuant to the Ottoman Code of Criminal Procedures. 39 However, in large part 
owing to residual power of the Ittihadists, the work of the Select Parliamentary 
Committee was proving ineff ectual. Its slow progress in investigation gave rise to 
angst. Th e Sultan’s government was faced with opposition from Ittihadists and 
ascendant Kemalists and was keen to placate Western powers who had deployed 
troops and seemed inclined to maintain a military presence in Turkey, something 
that galled the citizenry and stood to compromise Turkey’s sovereignty and his 
authority. 40 Bowing to political pressure and a restive public, the Committee was 
dissolved by Sultan Mehmed VI (Head of State). Th e main focus of the prosecu-
torial case now shifted singularly to the Administration Inquiry Commission. It 
proved to be the main vehicle that would collect the relevant evidence to facilitate 
prosecutions. Th e Commission compiled dossiers on the suspects and concluded 
with a recommendation that evidence was suffi  cient to warrant the commencement 
of criminal proceedings against them. In early 1919, the Sultan authorized a law 
to establish an Extraordinary Court Martial to try the alleged perpetrators noting 
 37  In a Memorandum dated 26 May 1915, the Interior Minister had requested from the Grand Vezir 
the enactment through the Cabinet of a special law authorizing deportations. Th e Cabinet acted on 
30 May through promulgation of the Temporary Law of Deportation. Pursuant to this law, alleging 
treasonable acts, separatism, and other assorted acts by the Armenians as a national minority, the 
Ottoman authorities ordered, for national security reasons, the wholesale deportation of Armenians, 
a measure that was later extended to virtually all of the Empire’s Armenian population. It is to be 
noted that though Armenians were the main victims (in size and numbers), the Greek and Assyrian 
Christian groups also suff ered. See, eg,  R.  Hovannisian ,  Armenia on Th e Road to Independence ,  1918 
( Berkeley, CA :  University of California Press ,  1967 ),  51 . 
 38  Vahakn N  Dadrian ,  ‘Genocide as a Problem of National and International Law: Th e World War 
I Armenian Case and Its Contemporary Legal Ramifi cations’ ( 1989 )  14  Yale Journal of International 
Law ,  221 , 294 . 
 39  Its mandate was premised on paragraphs 47, 75 and 87.  J.A.  Bucknill and  H.A.S.  Utidjian (trans-
lation),  Th e Imperial Ottoman Penal Code: A Translation ( Oxford :  Oxford University Press ,  1913 ) . 
 40  Ittihadism should not be confused with Kemalism. Th e former was bent on re-establishing itself 
in post-war Turkey without relinquishing its pan-Islamic ambitions. Th e latter was trying to mitigate 
the disastrous consequences of a military defeat by confronting the victorious allies as a provincial 
insurgency, unless the allies were willing to recognize the sovereign rights of a new Turkish republic, 
bereft of expansionist ambitions. 
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that the off ences in question amounted to ‘crimes against humanity’. Defendants 
were classifi ed as either principal co-perpetrators or accessories. 41 Th e main trial 
was based at the Military Court in Istanbul; however, there were six other regional 
courts operating in parallel. Th e chapter now turns to consider the conduct of the 
trials themselves. 
 (5)  Seeking a measure of justice: militarism and genocide on trial 
 (a)  Th e key trials 
 Th e key indictment focused on leaders of the wartime ruling Ittihad Party. Th ere 
were three principal charges:  conspiracy, premeditation and intent, and murder 
and personal responsibility. Th e Prosecutor-General averred that the Party’s objec-
tives and methods were criminal citing secret memoranda emanating from its 
Central Committee on the question of the entry into war as part of the solution 
of the ‘Armenian Question’. Included in the charge were offi  cials of the Defence 
Ministry’s War Offi  ce and the Interior Ministry. 42 Th e defendants were accused of 
having deliberately engineered Turkey’s entry into the war ‘by recourse to a num-
ber of vile tricks and deceitful means’ and of using ‘this vantage ground to carry 
out their secret intentions—massacre of the Armenians’. 43 
 On the question of premeditation and intent, the Indictment alleged that ‘[t] he 
massacre and destruction of the Armenians were the result of decisions by the 
Central Committee of Ittihad’. 44 Th e Indictment noted that the ‘release [of ] gangs 
of convicts from the prisons’, ostensibly for combat duty, was a cover as they were 
really destined for ‘massacre’ duties in the Special Organization. Th is Organization 
was essentially a death squad. Pre-empting the act of state defence, the Indictment 
elaborated that its basis was  personal responsibility of the defendants as members of 
 41  Th e criminal categories included: 
 1.  the central instigators of crimes against Armenians; 
 2.  those who worked under the auspices of those mainly responsible, such as infl uential members 
of the Central Committee of the Committee of Union and Progress (Th e Iitihadist Party);  
 3.  members of clandestine organizations, such as the Special Organization, along with 
high-ranking military offi  cials and criminals set free from prison; 
 4.  those who had enriched themselves or otherwise profi ted from these crimes. 
 Raymond Kevorkian, Th e Extermination of Ottoman Armenians by the Young Turk Regime 
(1915–16), Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence, [online] 3 June 2008, available at < http://www.
massviolence.org/Th e-Extermination-of-Ottoman-Armenians-by-the-Young-Turk-Regime >, accessed 
12 February 2011. 
 42  It was the War Offi  ce that had managed the Special Organization, whose key task was deal-
ing with the ‘Armenian question’. It was noted that:  ‘Th e evidence gathered yields the picture of a 
party whose moral personality is mired in an unending chain of bloodthirstiness, plunder and abuses’ 
( Vahakn N.  Dadrian ,  ‘Genocide as a Problem of National and International Law: Th e World War 
I Armenian Case and Its Contemporary Legal Ramifi cations’ ( 1989 )  14  Yale Journal of International 
Law ,  221 , 309–10 ). 
 43  Takvimi Vekayi , No. 3540 at 4.  (Takvimi Vekayi was the Offi  cial Newspaper of the Ottoman 
Empire. Commencing publication in 1831, it would go on to occupy a special place and the main 
source of government news). 
 44  Takvimi Vekayi , No. 3540 at 8. 
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the Party’s Central Committee. 45 In the conviction and sentencing, the Court relied 
on Articles 45, 55, and 170 of the Ottoman Penal Code. Th e Court found the defend-
ants guilty of orchestrating the entry of Turkey into World War I and of committing 
the genocide of the Armenians. Th e defendants were condemned to death  in absentia . 
 (b)  Th e Yozgat trials 
 Th e Yozgat trial series, commencing in early 1919, featured senior administrative 
offi  cials and regional army commanders. 46 Th e principal charge was the deportation 
and subsequent massacre of the region’s Armenians. Th e offi  cials were complicit 
in the deportation of an astonishing ninety-fi ve per cent of the region’s Armenian 
population, almost all of whom could not subsequently be accounted for or traced. 
Th e Yozgat verdict declared, ‘there can be no doubt and no hesitation’ about the 
real purpose behind the deportations. 47 Th e Court rejected the Attorney General’s 
proposal to rely on Article 56 of the Ottoman Penal Code. 48 Th is would have rel-
egated the atrocities to domestic law violations in the course of civil upheaval thus 
providing a measure of legitimacy to the  relocation programme. Th e Court instead 
relied on Articles 45 and 170 of the Ottoman Penal Code and Article 171 of the 
Military Code. Th e defendants were sentenced to death. 
 (c)  Th e Trabzon trials 
 On trial were seven defendants, fi ve present and two absent. Th e defendants ranged 
from administrators to police and military offi  cers. Th e Armenian deportees, the 
Court found, were handed over to the Special Organization by the War Offi  ce as 
part of its central action plan to  solve the ‘Armenian Question’. Many Armenian 
deportees in this particular case met their fate through the sinking of transport 
ships in the Black Sea. It also found that the administrative offi  cials colluded in 
plundering and profi teering from the property confi scated from deportees. Th e 
judgment averred that the events in question were contrary to provisions of the 
Ottoman Civil Code and additionally also breached Islamic tenets. It noted that 
from a legal and moral perspective all Ottoman citizens had the right ‘to the pro-
tection of their honour, lives and properties, without discrimination, by the offi  -
cials of the state, that protection being a matter of duty’. 49 Th e Court found fi ve of 
the defendants guilty (two  in absentia ) and acquitted another two. 
 45  J A  Bucknill and  H A S  Utidjian (trans),  Th e Imperial Ottoman Penal Code; A Translation ( Oxford 
University Press ,  1913 ) . 
 46  Vahakhn N  Dadrian ,  ‘Th e Turkish Military Tribunal’s Prosecution of the Author’s of the Armenian 
Genocide: Four Major Court-Martial Series’ ( 1997 )  11  Holocaust & Genocide Studies  28 , 33 . 
 47  Vahakhn N  Dadrian ,  ‘Th e Turkish Military Tribunal’s Prosecution of the Author’s of the Armenian 
Genocide: Four Major Court-Martial Series’ ( 1997 )  11  Holocaust & Genocide Studies  28 , 339 . 
 48  J A  Bucknill and  H A S  Utidjian (trans),  Th e Imperial Ottoman Penal Code; A Translation ( Oxford 
University Press ,  1913 ) . 
 49  See e.g.  Vahakn N  Dadrian ,  ‘Genocide as a Problem of National and International Law: Th e 
World War I Armenian Case and Its Contemporary Legal Ramifi cations’ ( 1989 )  14  Yale Journal of 
International Law   221 , 
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 (d)  Th e Ittihadist and wartime cabinet ministers’ trials 
 Th ese two trial series specifi cally targeted the offi  cials at the apex of both the 
Ittihadist Party and government. One focused on the senior offi  ce bearers of the 
Ittihadist Party and the second targeted a host of senior wartime ministers and sen-
ior military commanders. Th ese two series of trials together tried over thirty-fi ve 
defendants. Th e bulk of these defendants (particularly in the wartime cabinet min-
isters’ trials) were tried  in absentia . Charges included responsibility for Turkey’s 
entry into the war and the alleged role of the accused as principal architects respon-
sible for sanctioning and implementing a national drive to atrocity. Th e series of 
trials dealing with the senior party offi  cials deemed them to have been accessories 
and therefore imposed lighter sentences. Th e series dealing with the ministers and 
military offi  cers by virtue of their authority and positions of power prosecuted 
them as principals. Several death sentences and lengthy prison sentences were 
handed down. 
 Th ese were clearly important trials of some consequence. Why, then, have these 
important trials languished in archival records? Several general reasons account for 
this unfortunate reality. 
 First, with the end of World War I, the Ottoman Empire had collapsed and the 
focus externally (among the Allies) and internally (in Turkey)—crowding out wider 
national and international knowledge of the trials underway—was on the escalat-
ing domestic Turkish insurgency. Th e Allies were fi nding it diffi  cult to read the 
geo-political landscape and were politically uncertain as to their role in reconstitut-
ing a former empire that occupied a pivotal physical and socio-political position. 
At the same time, internally, leading and ascendant national fi gures were engaged 
in settling political scores and/or consolidating their power and infl uence. Second, 
when the Republic of Turkey emerged from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire 
after the triumph of the Kemalists over the ancien régime, the government’s focus 
was fi rmly on consolidating its power and crafting a new national identity. Th is 
meant that the Armenian Genocide was now wrapped up in geo-politics, dip-
lomatic posturing and war revisionism. Th e aim was to push the dark gloom of 
the atrocities from both the national debate and international focus. Th ird, and 
paradoxically, the subsequent focus on the genocide (the second most studied after 
the Holocaust), in the face of an unrepentant Turkish Republic that sought to air-
brush the massacres, stifl ed widespread studies and dissemination of the very trials 
that had delivered a measure of justice. Th e trials have in essence been pushed to 
the periphery by the success in unearthing the political and practical facts of the 
massacres and hence have been seen more through the lens of internecine politics 
and not nearly enough as an important event that delivered a measure of historical 
record and justice. In sum the continued sensitivity by Turkey to the Armenian 
genocide has a threefold eff ect—Turkey focuses on rebuffi  ng accounts of the geno-
cide, other states focus on proving it did happen and disseminating records, with 
the Turkish national war crimes trails remaining caught in between. 
 In the decades after the conclusion of the Turkish national trials, no state under-
took large scale domestic trials of its nationals for international crimes. It was to be 
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seven decades before Ethiopia undertook trials on such a scale. In the meantime 
the prosecution was largely left to the limited eff orts by international tribunals 
(Nuremberg and Tokyo at the end of World War II and attendant national trials 
under an international law mandate) and in the early 1990s the work of the ad 
hoc international criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Finally, in 1994 
after close to three decades of brutal Communist rule in Ethiopia, the dark years 
of the Red Terror (a systematic, bureaucratic system of murder and extermination) 
were subjected to a judicial intervention aimed at dealing with thousands of cases 
of murder, torture and imprisonment of ‘counter-revolutionaries’. Th e trials—in 
which some 2000 people were arraigned—lasted several years. It constituted the 
most extensive judgment of human rights violations since the trials at the end 
of the World War II. Th is chapter now turns to review the large-scale Ethiopian 
domestic trials that sought to deliver justice and a measure of catharsis to a nation 
broken by brutality and rivers of blood. 
 (III)  Ethiopia’s Red Terror Campaign and 
the Search for Justice 
 (1)  ‘Draining the sea to catch the fi sh’: a regime’s quest to 
‘eradicate’ all opposition 
 In the early 1970s severe famine beset parts of Ethiopia. Th is was to be the trig-
ger for years of grievances related to socio-economic and political exclusion. On 
one hand, the peasantry was embittered over the feudal system of land ownership. 
Th e military was demanding higher wages. And a hungry citizenry saw already 
poor living conditions plummet further as the economy nosedived and infl ation 
soared. By 1974 the imperial government seemed unresponsive to the economic 
and political needs of its people. It was on the back of acute economic poverty 
and political suppression that mass uprisings erupted against the rule of Emperor 
Haile Selassie I. Th e Provisional Military Administration Council of Ethiopia (the 
Derg) 50 was formed by offi  cers of the Ethiopian Army. Th e Derg, while initially an 
apolitical body, seized the opportunity presented by an enfeebled aristocratic order 
and adopted a virulent form of socialism. Th e Derg seized power, suspended the 
Constitution and established a military government. 
 Th e fi rst victims of the Derg were fi gures who represented the face of the old rul-
ing class. It therefore summarily executed sixty offi  cials of the former imperial gov-
ernment. 51 Th is event marked the beginning of seventeen years of state-sponsored 
terror and violence. 52 After eliminating the ‘aristocrats’ and ‘the land owners’, the 
Derg turned its attentions to ‘anti-revolutionaries’ and ‘anti-unity’ elements. Even 
 50  Please refer to footnote 7 above which elaborates on this. 
 51  T S  Engelschin  ‘Prosecutions Of War Crimes And Violations Of Human Rights In Ethiopia’ , 
( 1994 )  8  Yearbook of African Law   43 . 
 52  Girmachew A  Aneme ,  ‘Apology And Trials:  Th e Case Of Th e Red Terror Trials In Ethiopia’ 
( 2006 )  6  African Human Rights Law Journal  64 , 65 . 
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as the Derg was consolidating itself, an internecine power struggle was in the mak-
ing within its ranks. In the fi rst three years of its rule it had two leaders: Generals 
Amman Andom and Teferi Banti. It was however a lower ranking military offi  cer—
Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam—who possessed the greatest infl uence and power 
within the Derg. In 1977, Colonel Mengistu fi nally assumed formal power after 
outmanoeuvring his opponents. 
 Mengistu quickly moved to cement his grip on power by focusing on civilian 
opposition elements as well as any other entities perceived as enemies of the revo-
lution. To assist in the government’s ‘anti-revolutionary’ campaign, the Mengistu 
regime issued arms to members of the Urban Dweller’s Associations (‘kebeles’) 
whose mandate was to kill any individuals opposed to the regime or lacking 
zeal in professing the government’s Marxist–Leninist ideology. 53 Hundreds of 
suspected political opponents were murdered and their bodies dumped in the 
streets as a warning to others. Th e purges intensifi ed as the unbridled brutal-
ity caused segments of the population to crystallize into diehard opposition. 
An Amnesty International report estimated that the total number of persons 
killed by the end of the initial round of the Red Terror campaign (1977–81) 
ranged from 150,000 to 200,000. 54 Th is was to be symptomatic of the rest of 
Mengistu’s rule. 
 In the early 1980s, the Derg ratcheted up its bloody campaign by ‘manufac-
turing’ hunger as part of its counter-insurgency strategy in regions that opposed 
its rule. 55 Commencing in 1983 the Ethiopian government took advantage of 
a pre-existing severe drought to direct starvation against insurgent populations 
in its northern provinces. In addition to this, the military pursued a murderous 
campaign targeting rebel strongholds: bombing markets, placing restrictions on 
movement and trade, forcibly relocating populations and actively interfering with 
international humanitarian relief eff orts. It is estimated that the artifi cial fam-
ine and forced relocations ultimately killed 400,000 people, adding to the Red 
Terror campaign toll of the late 1970s. 56 Overall during the rule of Mengistu some 
1.5 million Ethiopians are estimated to have been killed (by famine or force), dis-
appeared, or injured (many maimed). 
 By l989, the main nodes of the Ethiopian insurgency against the Mengistu 
regime had coalesced as the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic 
Front (EPRDF). 57 Progressively, the EPRDF secured military victories in the 
 53  See generally  Julie V  Mayfi eld ,  ‘Th e Prosecution of War Crimes and Respect for Human 
Rights: Ethiopia’s Balancing Act’ , ( 1995 )  9  Emory International Law Review  553 , 559 ;  Edmund J 
 Keller ,  Revolutionary Ethiopia ( Indiana University Press ,  1988 ) . 
 54  See generally  Julie V  Mayfi eld ,  ‘Th e Prosecution of War Crimes and Respect for Human 
Rights: Ethiopia’s Balancing Act’ , ( 1995 )  9  Emory International Law Review  553 , 566 . 
 55  See eg Africa Watch,  Evil Days: Th irty Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia (1991) 139  available at 
< http://www.hrw.org/node/78194 > accessed 6 May 2013. 
 56  See eg Africa Watch,  Evil Days: Th irty Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia (1991) 139  available at 
< http://www.hrw.org/node/78194 > accessed 6 May 2013. 
 57  Th e EPRDF was made up of the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front, the Amhara National 
Democratic, Movement, the Oromo Peoples Democratic Organization, and the Ethiopian Democratic 
Offi  cers. 
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countryside and gradually prevailed over government troops. By early 1991 it 
had encircled Addis Abba. In a scene similar to that which occurred in Turkey, 
Mengistu fl ed the country along with leading members of the Derg. On 8 May 
1991, the Mengistu regime offi  cially fell. Th e triumphant EPRDF began arresting 
and detaining individuals suspected of violating human rights during the Derg 
era. In what was to be a landmark move to accountability, the following year, the 
transitional government established the Special Prosecutor’s Offi  ce (SPO) with a 
mandate to investigate and prosecute the massive human rights violations of the 
Derg era. 58 
 (2)  Seeking catharsis: the Ethiopian ‘Red Terror’ domestic trials 
 Th e SPO faced the dilemma of whether domestic or international law should 
apply in any prosecutions of Derg perpetrators. Under the Penal Code of the 
Empire of Ethiopia of 1957, 59 most of the detainees could be charged with com-
mon crimes such as homicide, wilful injury, assault, coercion, illegal restraints, 
abuse of power, use of improper methods, and conspiracy if the actions were 
viewed as the result of internal disturbances. However, the scale of the atrocities 
was such that they amounted to widespread and systematic human rights viola-
tions which amounted to crimes under international law which were incidentally 
also covered by the Ethiopian Penal Code. Th e Penal Code, in Articles 281–286, 
enshrined off ences against the state or against national or international inter-
ests that embedded international norms pertaining to genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes. 60 Th e defendants were classifi ed into three main cat-
egories by the SPO: policy makers, fi eld commanders, and material off enders. 61 
Th e charges brought against the defendants included genocide and crimes against 
humanity, torture, murder, unlawful detention, rape, forced disappearances, 
abuse of power, and war crimes. Th e main charge against the top offi  cials of the 
Derg regime was the crime of genocide in violation of Article 281 of the 1957 
Ethiopian Penal Code. 62 
 In 1994, the SPO fi led the fi rst charges against seventy-three Derg mem-
bers. Mengistu and seventy-two of the Derg’s leading offi  cials were among the 
indictees. Th e lengthy charge sheet detailed more than 200 acts of genocide and 
crimes against humanity involving tens of thousands of victims. Th e trial got off  
to a wobbly start owing to scarcity of resources—legal, technical and infrastruc-
tural. Despite these early setbacks, the SPO pushed ahead with an ambitious 
 58  Proclamation 40/92 , the Proclamation for the Establishment of the Special Prosecutor’s 
Offi  ce, 1992. 
 59  Penal Code of Th e Empire of Ethiopia of 1957, Proclamation No. 158 of 1957,  Negarit Gazeta , 
Extraordinary Issue No. 1 of 1957, 23 July 1957. 
 60  Penal Code of Th e Empire of Ethiopia of 1957, Proclamation No. 158 of 1957,  Negarit Gazeta , 
Extraordinary Issue No. 1 of 1957, 23 July 1957. 
 61  See generally ‘Apology and Trials: Th e Case of the Red Terror Trials in Ethiopia’, (2006) 6  African 
Human Rights Law Journal 64, 76. 
 62  Penal Code of Th e Empire of Ethiopia of 1957, Proclamation No. 158 of 1957,  Negarit Gazeta , 
Extraordinary Issue No. 1 of 1957, 23 July 1957, Article 281. 
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investigation mandate. Th ree years later, after intensive investigation, the SPO 
fi led further charges against a total of 5,198 high and middle ranking public and 
military offi  cials of the former government. Th e Special Prosecutor requested 
that trial courts take into account various aggravating circumstances. 63 It was 
with this in mind and in accordance with the terms of Articles 84 and 85 of the 
Ethiopian Criminal Code that the Court would eventually hand down very stiff  
sentences. 
 Th e trials of leading government and military personnel occurred at the 
Ethiopian Federal High Court. Th ere were numerous other parallel trials through-
out the country both at the Federal High Court divisions and the supreme courts 
of the regional states. Th e decision to disperse the trials was made both for the 
sake of convenience and in order to try some of the accused at locations where 
the crimes had been committed. 64 Th is dynamic was much like the Turkish trials 
which (as mentioned above) were held in a series of trials in regional courts dis-
persed across several provinces. 
 Th e main trial was naturally that of Mengistu and his top lieutenants. 65 Th e 
charge sheet and evidence list comprised more than 5,000 pages. Th e evidence 
against Mengistu included signed execution orders, videos of torture sessions and 
personal testimonies. Of the seventy-three accused, fourteen had died and only 
thirty-three were present in court. Mengistu was among twenty-fi ve defendants 
tried  in absentia for their role in the killing of thousands of people during the 
brutal rule of the Derg. On 12 December 2006, the trial against Mengistu and 
his co-accused fi nally concluded after more than a decade. In January 2007, the 
Ethiopian Federal High Court convicted him and his co-accused of genocide, 
crimes against humanity and wilful bodily injury. He was sentenced to life in 
prison with many of his co-accused receiving the same sentence for, among other 
things, direct responsibility for the deaths of 2,000 people and the torture of at 
least 2,400. Following an appeal by the prosecution on 26 May 2008, Mengistu’s 
previous sentence of life imprisonment was substituted with a death sentence 
by Ethiopia’s High Court. Eighteen of his co-defendants also saw their life sen-
tences substituted for the death penalty. In the same year that Mengistu’s life 
imprisonment was revised upwards, nineteen other persons were convicted on 
5 April 2008. 
 63  Th ese aggravating circumstances, amongst others, were: 
 1.  the accused intended, planned, instigated and assisted in the execution of the plan using the 
country’s resources, institutions and government power; 
 2.  Th e victims were in the custody of the institutions run by the accused; 
 3.  Th e commission of the crimes under such circumstances shows that the accused were willing 
and had the resolve to commit the crimes; 
 Penal Code of the Empire of Ethiopia of 1957 , Article 281 ( Negarit Gazeta , Extraordinary Issue No 1 
of 1957), Articles 84 and 85. 
 64  Articles 78(2) and 80(2) of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. 
 65  Special Prosecutor v.  Colonel Mengistu Hailamariam et  al ., File No. 1/87, Ethiopian Federal 
High Court. 
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 Ultimately, a total of 5,119 persons were tried for involvement in the terror 
campaign by the Derg government with crimes ranging from genocide and war 
crimes to crimes against humanity and other serious human rights violations with 
3,583 convicted and sentenced to death, life in prison, and a range of lengthy 
prison sentences. 66 Th e scale and the nature of the trials was unprecedented not 
only in Africa but around the globe. 
 As with the Turkish national trials, the puzzle is why the largest trials of inter-
national crimes since World War II remain at the periphery of history. Several 
reasons can be ventured. Surprisingly, despite several decades and evident diff er-
ences (predominantly time and geographical location), in general terms, these 
mirror those of the Turkish national trials with geo-political considerations, 
rebirth of nationalism, the residual power of ousted elites and a reassertion of 
territorial sovereignty as a fulcrum. To begin with, the trials were held in the 
shadow of Ethiopia/Eritrea war tensions. Despite Eritrea formally becoming 
independent in 1993, the extremely volatile relations between the two neigh-
bours (before, then and thereafter) remained a headache for the continent and 
the world at large. Second in the early 1990s a number of dictators faced the 
challenge of multi-party politics. Mengistu Haile Mariam had belonged to the 
‘African dictators club’ and many of his cronies still in power felt aggrieved by 
the fall from power of one of their own and, no doubt, the prospect of the legal 
consequences. Th e incoming government was well aware that the deposed leader 
still had very powerful friends and they did not wish to antagonize them. Hence 
in an act of crude diplomacy, the new government was keen to downplay the 
scale and remarkable achievements of the trials. As ensuing years would show, 
this stance was to suit Meles Zenawi, a liberator who was to tinge his rule with 
some of the authoritarian excess of his predecessor, Mengistu. Th us the trials 
were wrapped in the opaque prism of politics and national healing (transitional 
justice) for years and only in the twenty-fi rst century are they gaining the public-
ity they deserve. 
 (IV)  Conclusion 
 Th e prosecution of the Turkish leaders implicated in the commission of inter-
national crimes before the Turkish Courts-Martial, which resulted in a series of 
indictments, verdicts and sentences, was of extraordinary signifi cance. It was to 
be another eight decades before another nation—Ethiopia—undertook domestic 
trials targeting international crimes on the same scale. While both domestic tri-
als were driven by political expedience, the most important thing was that they 
 66  Firew  Tiba ,  ‘Th e Trial of Mengistu and Other Derg Members for Genocide, Torture and Summary 
Executions in Ethiopia’ in  Chacha  Murungu and  Japhet  Biegon (eds),  Prosecuting International Crimes 
in Africa ( Pretoria University Law Press ,  2011 )  163 , 168 ; Luelseged Degu, Report from Special 
Prosecutor’s Offi  ce of Ethiopia: Half-way Transitional Justice (11 February 2010)  available at < http://
es.ictj.org/en/news/coverage/article/3447.html > accessed 5 February 2013. 
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delivered a measure of justice and importantly co-opted international law in the 
implementation of domestic penal codes. Th ough imperfect, they signifi ed recog-
nition by national governments that justice through trial was essential to address 
widespread and systematic breaches of international norms. Importantly, it was 
a historic ‘vanguard’ in the blending of the norms and doctrines of international 
criminal law with domestic penal codes. 
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 Mass Trials and Modes of Criminal 
Responsibility for International Crimes: 
Th e Case of Ethiopia 
 Firew Kebede  Tiba * 
 (I)  Introduction 
 Ethiopia responded to the legacy of mass atrocities committed during the early 
years (1974–1980) of the communist rule of Colonel Mengistu Hailemariam and 
his associates by instituting a project of mass prosecution. Th e process reached a 
climax on 26 May 2008 with the Federal Supreme Court decision in the case of 
 Special Prosecutor v Colonel Mengistu Hailemariam & Others , which upheld the 
Special Prosecutor’s argument that the life sentence imposed by the Federal High 
Court was inadequate. Th e convictions included the crimes of genocide, aggra-
vated homicide, torture, illegal imprisonment and abuse of power. Th e Court did 
not elucidate or advance an appropriate theory concerning the mode of crimi-
nal responsibility required, even though the main charges generally relied on the 
assumption that the accused participated in the alleged crimes as co-perpetrators. 
Instead, the Court merely asserted that their culpability arose from being members 
of the Provisional Military Administration Council (Derg) and from the fact that 
they owned or adopted its decisions as their own without protesting for seventeen 
years. 1 
 Although the judicial process has been overtaken by a political decision to com-
mute the death sentences to life in prison with parole, the  Mengistu trial remains 
signifi cant on many levels. 2 Fundamentally, the trial represents the fi rst ever 
nationally conceived and implemented accountability program in Sub-Saharan 
 *  Lecturer in Law at Deakin University, Melbourne. 
 1  Special Prosecutor v Colonel Mengitsu Hailemariam & Others , Judgment, Criminal File No. 30181, 
Federal Supreme Court, 26 May 2008. 
 2  At the prompting of religious leaders, the Head of State President Girma Woldegiorgis exercised his 
constitutional prerogative on 1 June 2011 and commuted the death sentence imposed on twenty-three 
former Derg offi  cials convicted of genocide and other crimes. Most of them are now released on parole 
having served the maximum prison term possible for life sentence under Ethiopian law. 
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Africa in the wake of a large-scale atrocity. Th e magnitude of the trial alone, with 
all its imperfections, entitles the process to a special place in the history of national 
accountability projects. Unfortunately, for various reasons, the story of the trial 
has not been told adequately. Some of the reasons for this will be highlighted in 
this chapter. 3 
 Needless to say, organizing a large-scale criminal trial is a challenging task any-
where in the world. Th e diffi  culty is exponentially multiplied in a developing coun-
try like Ethiopia where the legal system is chronically under-resourced. Such trials 
also risk the possibility of collective condemnation or the accused being found 
guilty by association. In this case alone, 106 accused were joined together in a 
single criminal trial. By contrast, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 
(IMT) tried twenty-four of the most wanted Nazi leaders, while the maximum 
number of accused joined in a single trial at the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has been seven. Th is demonstrates how unwieldy 
the Ethiopian counterpart has been when compared to similar large-scale trials. 
 Th is chapter seeks to challenge the approach taken in the decisions of the 
Ethiopian federal courts in light of modes of criminal responsibility under inter-
national criminal law. 4 Specifi cally, it will examine the objections raised by the 
accused about their convictions solely on account of them being members of the 
Derg. Th e chapter argues that courts failed to draw on international criminal 
law jurisprudence (such as the concept of joint criminal enterprise or alternative 
doctrines) in fi nding the defendants guilty. Th e muddled conceptual approach to 
modes of criminal responsibility in these trials has arguably undermined the qual-
ity of the decision and its signifi cance for international criminal law. Furthermore, 
the Court’s refusal to order separate trials has also made it diffi  cult for the accused 
to mount a proper defence against the charges. 
 (II)  Th e Ethiopian Red Terror 
 Th e full scale of atrocities committed in Ethiopia following the overthrow of 
the imperial regime in 1974 has yet to be fully told. Th e 1974 revolution was 
 3  Th roughout this chapter, reference is made to the Mengistu trial unless the context suggests 
that reference is being made to the entire prosecution programme, which encompassed a number of 
separate trials that were conducted in other parts of the country by regional courts. Unless specifi ed 
otherwise, all court decisions quoted in this chapter are those of the Federal High and Supreme Courts 
in the Mengistu trial. Unfortunately, the non-existence of accessible documentation on the regional 
trials has made impossible the task of analysing these other low-profi le cases. 
 4  For literature on other aspects of the trial see:  Firew Kebede  Tiba ,  ‘Th e Mengistu Hailemariam 
Genocide Trial in Ethiopia’ ,  Journal of International Criminal Justice ,  5 ( 2007 ),  513–28 ;  Firew Kebede 
 Tiba ,  ‘Prosecuting International Crimes in Domestic Courts: Th e Trial of Mengistu and Other Derg 
Members for Genocide, Torture and Summary Executions’ in  Chacha  Bhoke Murungu and  Japhet 
 Biegon (eds),  Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa ( Pretoria :  Pretoria University Law Press  2011 ), 
 163–83 ;  Yacob  Haile-Mariam ,  ‘Th e Quest for Justice and Reconciliation: Th e International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda and the Ethiopian High Court’ ,  Hastings International and Comparative Law 
Review ,  22 ( 1989–99 ) ;  J.V.  Mayfi eld ,  ‘Th e Prosecution of War Crimes and Respect for Human 
Rights: Ethiopia’s Balancing Act’ ,  Emory International Law Review ,  9 ( 1995 ),  553–93 . 
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a momentous event in the modern history of Ethiopia. Th e revolution brought 
down the three-millennia Solomonic dynasty. Haileselassie I, the last Ethiopian 
monarch, had been in power for nearly half a century presiding over a semi-feudal 
economy that relegated the masses to serfdom. His regime’s failure to respond to 
reform demands over the course of his reign led to a spontaneous mass rebellion 
and eventually a military coup mounted by the Derg. 
 Th e rebellion was initiated by university students, peasants, labour unions, 
urban dwellers and intellectuals. Th e army also had administrative issues it sought 
to be addressed. Th is subsequently led to the formation of a mobilization commit-
tee from various sectors of the army composed of junior offi  cers who took charge 
of the negotiation with the emperor. Th e negotiations failed to break the deadlock. 
Following this deadlock, junior offi  cers from various army divisions sent to Addis 
Ababa to air their grievances took matters into their own hands and removed the 
aging monarch from power and established the Derg on 28 June 1974. 
 Th e Derg declared the abolition of the imperial regime. 5 In a decree that fol-
lowed two days later, Proclamation No. 2/1967, the members of the Derg, num-
bering a little over 100, assumed the position of collective heads of states instead of 
giving power to one single individual. Th is arrangement changed sometime later 
when members resolved to empower the Chairman to execute decisions of the 
general assembly, standing committee and sub-committees. 
 Th e assumption and monopolization of power by the military was not accept-
able to other organized parties that sought the establishment of a popular govern-
ment. Th e ensuing political confrontation ushered in an era of terror that led to 
the death and injury of tens of thousands of people. 6 At the height of this bra-
zen abuse of power, the Derg empowered its security apparatus, urban and rural 
dweller associations, militias, and revolutionary guards to kill, torture and maim 
with impunity anybody suspected of being a ‘subversive’, ‘anti-revolutionary’, 
‘counter-revolutionary’, or ‘anti people’. 7 
 Th e charges fi led by the Special Prosecutor in all Red Terror cases identify 12,315 
individuals as being killed. Th e courts so far have found that 9,546 of these were 
indeed victims of the crimes perpetrated during that period. Of these, 228 victims 
were women and girls. 8 Furthermore, 1,500 victims were confi rmed by the courts 
 5  Provisional Military Government of Ethiopia, Proclamation No. 1/1967. 
 6  Human Rights Watch,  Ethiopia: Reckoning Under the Law , 6:11 (November 1994). 
 7  Th e Red Terror was authorized by Proclamation 121 of 1977: see United States Institute of Peace 
(1994)  Ethiopia:  Report of the Offi  ce of the Special Prosecutor , < http://www.usip.org/fi les/resources/
Ethiopia-SPODossier-2.pdf > (accessed 25 February 2013) (SPO Report). 
 8  Report of the SPO on February 2010 to the House of Peoples Representatives. See the video doc-
umentary produced by the state run Ethiopian Television in Amharic which includes the SPO Report 
as well as Member of Parliament comments. See the video on this video-sharing website: < http://
www.ethiotube.net/video/8192/Documentary--findings-of-human-rights-abuses-during- 
Red-Terror-era--Part-1 > (Part I) (accessed 25 February 2013)  and < http://www.ethiotube.net/
video/8194/Documentary--fi ndings-of-human-rights-abuses-during-Red-Terror-era--Part-2 > (Part 
II) (accessed 25 February 2013). For an immediate reaction to the report in transitional justice context 
see: Luelseged Degu (11 February 2010), ‘Report from Special Prosecutor Offi  ce of Ethiopia: Half-Way 
Transitional Justice’,  Abugida Ethipian American Information Centre [website], < http://www.abugid-
ainfo.com/index.php/13562/ > (accessed 25 February 2013). 
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as having suff ered bodily injury. 9 Th e charges also included 2,681 individuals as 
victims of torture, of which the courts have confi rmed 1,687. Of these, 172 were 
female. 10 Th ese numbers do not necessarily represent the actual number of vic-
tims. Th e number of individuals whose lives were cut short due to the misguided 
policies of the Derg could run into millions. For example, the forced resettlement 
programme (1984–6), which consisted of moving hundreds of thousands of peas-
ants from the north of the country to the south, likely for political reasons, caused 
numerous deaths. 11 Th e plan, which was offi  cially characterized as a famine relief 
programme, resettled 600,000 people, of which fi fteen to twenty per cent (up 
to 100,000) lost their lives either in transport or upon arrival. 12 Th e deaths were 
largely caused by malnutrition and diseases. Th ere were also war crimes commit-
ted against civilians. In one such incident, in June 1988, government forces using 
MIG-21 jet fi ghters and attack helicopters systematically attacked the market town 
of Hawzen in Tigray from dawn to dusk, killing approximately 2,500 civilians. 13 
 Th e Red Terror is only one of the many faces of human rights abuses committed 
during seventeen years (1974–91) of the Derg’s rule. Th e Red Terror was a cam-
paign of urban counter-insurgency waged in the main cities of Ethiopia between 
1976 and 1978 and has been characterized as ‘one of the most systematic uses of 
mass murder by the state ever witnessed in Africa’ at the time. 14 Th e offi  cial phase 
of the Red Terror (a reaction to what was described as the opposition forces’ White 
Terror) began on 17 April 1977 with Mengistu’s speech and the symbolic smash-
ing of three bottles in a public square. Th e three bottles represented the blood of 
imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism. 15 Th is symbolic act of spilling 
blood was literally applied, with fervent zeal, in the coming years. Th e brutality of 
the campaign is best encapsulated by the following paragraph in a Human Rights 
Watch report:
 Bodies were left on the roadside to advertise the killings of the previous night—those who 
inspected the piles of bodies to see if their friends or relatives were among the corpses were 
targeted for execution or imprisonment themselves. Relatives were forbidden to mourn. In 
other cases, relatives had to pay one Ethiopian dollar for each ‘wasted bullet’ in order to 
have the body returned. 16 
 Even children of tender age were not spared the violence. As a Human Rights 
Watch report confi rms (quoting Rene LeFort): ‘Simply knowing how to read and 
write and being aged about 20 or less were enough to defi ne the potential or actual 
“counter-revolutionary”. Th e authorities were even able to institute a law author-
izing the arrest of children between eight and twelve years.’ 17 
 9  SPO Report 1994, above n 7.    10  SPO Report 1994, above n 7. 
 11  SPO Report 1994, above n 7.    12  SPO Report 1994, above n 7. 
 13  SPO Report 1994, above n 7. 
 14  Africa Watch (September 1991), ‘Evil Days:  30 Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia’, 101, 
 Human Rights Watch [website], < http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/fi les/reports/Ethiopia919.pdf > 
(accessed 25 February 2013). 
 15  Africa Watch, above n 14, 102.    16  Africa Watch, above n 14, 103. 
 17  Africa Watch, above n 14, 103. 
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 While the state sponsored violence targeted victims far and wide, the use of 
violence to achieve political objectives was not monopolized by the Derg. Th ere 
were indeed several assassinations of those allied to the Derg by radical political 
groups. In fact, the Derg usually blamed radical opposition elements for fi ring 
the fi rst shot, forcing it to respond in kind. Numerous defence witnesses at the 
Mengistu trial testifi ed about the urban warfare and targeted assassinations that 
were routinely conducted by hit squads of these radical opposition political forces. 
Unfortunately, the Special Prosecutor’s mandate did not extend to the investiga-
tion of the conduct of forces other than the Derg during the Red Terror. Th is has 
had the eff ect of undermining the objectivity of the trial. In a sense, the trial tells 
one side of the story and fails to fairly apportion blame, which is critical to the 
healing process. 
 (III)  Background to the Trial Program 
 Th e Transitional Government of Ethiopia, controlled by Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Democratic Front, an armed group that overthrew the military 
regime, decided to establish the Offi  ce of Special Prosecutor (SPO) in 1992. 18 Mr 
Girma Wakjira was appointed as Special Prosecutor in September 1992 and given 
the rank of a minister. Th e law establishing the SPO claimed that ‘heinous and hor-
rendous criminal acts which occupy a special chapter in the history of the peoples 
of Ethiopia have been perpetrated against the people of Ethiopia by offi  cials, mem-
bers and auxiliaries of the security and armed forces of the Dergue-WPE regime’. 19 
It thus instructed the SPO to investigate and prosecute ‘any person having com-
mitted or responsible for the commission of an off ence by abusing his position in 
the party, the government or mass organizations under the Dergue-WPE regime’. 20 
 Th e sheer magnitude of the crimes and the multidimensional nature of the con-
fl ict throughout the period of the Derg’s reign made it impossible for the govern-
ment to comprehensively document what took place, let  alone bring all of the 
suspects to justice. Ethiopia’s choice of prosecution as a transitional justice model 
means that stories of the sad episode are mainly told through the offi  cial channels 
of court documents and witness testimonies in an adversarial setting. Yet adver-
sarial court proceedings are not necessarily the best mechanisms for getting the 
true picture of events surrounding the crimes committed. 
 Th e trial venues themselves were scattered throughout the country. Th e princi-
pal court with subject matter jurisdiction was the Federal High Court. While the 
 18  See note 3 above for the coverage of decision leading to the prosecution of those responsible for 
the commission of crimes as well as the establishment of the Offi  ce of Special Prosecutor. 
 19  Proclamation establishing the Offi  ce of the Special Prosecutor (8 August 1992), Proclamation No 
22/1992, preamble, < http://www.usip.org/fi les/resources/Ethiopia-Charter.pdf > (accessed 25 February 
2013). 
 20  Proclamation establishing the Offi  ce of the Special Prosecutor (8 August 1992), Proclamation No 
22/1992, Article 6, < http://www.usip.org/fi les/resources/Ethiopia-Charter.pdf > (accessed 25 February 
2013). 
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Federal High Court trials conducted in the capital in Addis Ababa were occasion-
ally reported, the trials in regional supreme courts barely received attention. Th is 
refl ects the pattern of publicity experienced by Red Terror victims in regional cit-
ies, as opposed to the capital. 
 All these factors indicate that the story of the Ethiopian trials has not been told 
adequately to domestic audiences, much less to the global community. Unlike 
other large-scale trials of a similar nature, the Ethiopian trials were a national 
aff air controlled by Ethiopians with minimal input, especially from international 
and intergovernmental organizations and international civil-society groups. Th e 
establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone were international initiatives and serve as interest-
ing counterpoints. Th e early engagement of some foreign governments and inter-
national non-government organizations (NGOs) did not continue in Ethiopia due 
to disagreements with the SPO as to the conduct of the trials. 21 In 1994, the 
SPO decried the lack of support for Ethiopian transitional justice eff orts, especially 
from NGOs, compared to the support given to the El Salvadorean, Chilean, and 
Argentinian truth and reconciliation commissions. He described his job as being a 
lonely exercise and expressed frustration at shouldering such a great burden alone. 22 
 Th e trials in the federal courts were conducted in Amharic, the working lan-
guage at the federal government, and in working languages of regional state gov-
ernments in regions with delegated local jurisdiction. To the author’s knowledge, 
court and prosecutorial documents are not translated into English or any other 
foreign language. As a result, key documents remain inaccessible to an audience 
outside Ethiopia. Even in Ethiopia, scholarly research into the trial is minimal. 
Th ere were some early eff orts to monitor the trials and share the fi ndings with civil 
societies and international institutions, but that eff ort did not have a signifi cant 
impact given the lengthy nature of the trials. 23 
 In the legislation establishing the SPO, it was envisioned that the process would 
establish a historical record of the brutal off ences and would educate the people 
about the need to avoid backsliding into military rule. 24 Unfortunately, this ambi-
tion has not been realized because the archives of the trials have not been made 
publicly available. Th ere is, however, an ongoing initiative by the Ethiopian Red 
Terror Documentation and Research Centre (ERTDRC) to digitize the documen-
tary evidence used in the trials and make it available to the public and researchers. 
Th is is a crucial step, considering the wealth of documentary evidence left behind 
by the Derg. 
 Th e process of collecting incriminating documentary and electronic evidence 
against the accused for the trials was not as daunting as one would expect for such 
 21  Todd  Howland ,  ‘Learning to Make Proactive Human Rights Interventions Eff ective: Th e Carter 
Centre and Ethiopia’s Offi  ce of the Special Prosecutor’ ,  Wisconsin International Law Journal ,  18 
( 2000 ),  407–35 . 
 22  SPO Report 1994, above n 7. 
 23  Th e author took part in the Trial Observation and Monitoring Project involving law students in 
the observation of the trials held in Addis Ababa. 
 24  Proclamation establishing the Offi  ce of the Special Prosecutor, above n 19, preamble. 
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high-profi le criminal acts. Bureaucrats meticulously documented the actions taken 
against most of the victims. When the investigation began, the SPO was able to 
collect over 25,000 pages of government documents 25 and conduct approximately 
5,000 witness interviews. 26 Th e documents range from death warrants to calcu-
lations of the cost of executions to fi lms of torture sessions and bombings. 27 In 
1994, a SPO report indicated that it has ten times more evidence than needed to 
successfully prosecute several of the detainees and many of the exiles for serious 
criminal off ences. 28 Many hope that those documents will be made available for 
public viewing while the trials are still fresh in the minds of many, but this has yet 
to come to fruition. 
 (IV)  Th e Accused 
 At the beginning of the investigative process, approximately 2,000 former offi  cials 
were arrested. Th e overall fi gure of how many suspects have been arrested through-
out the country is still not available. 29 In the case of  Special Prosecutor v Col. 
Mengistu Hailemariam & others , seventy-three Derg and 106 non-Derg members 
were charged. Key accused included Col. Mengistu Hailemariam, Chairman of the 
Provisional Military Administration Council (PMAC), Chairman of the General 
Assembly of the PMAC, and Chairman of the PMAC Standing Committee; 
Major Fikreselassie Wogderes, Secretary for the PMAC General Assembly and its 
Standing Committee (later Prime Minister); and Captain Fisseha Desta, Secretary 
for the PMAC and its Standing Committee (later Vice-President). Capitain Fisseha 
was also a one-time head of the Derg’s Administration and Legal Aff airs Standing 
Committee. 30 
 (V)  Th e Charges 
 In 1994, after two years of investigation, the SPO fi led its fi rst charges with the 
Central High Court against seventy-three suspects. 31 Of these, twenty-one were 
tried  in absentia , including Mengistu, who had gone into exile in Zimbabwe. Th e 
SPO believes that up to 300 government and military offi  cials fl ed Ethiopia when 
the Mengistu regime collapsed. 32 
 25  Human Rights Watch, above n 6, 23. 
 26  Human Rights Watch, above n 6, 23. See also Donatella Lorch, ‘Africa First: Ethiopia War-Crime 
Trial’,  Th e International Herald Tribune , 12 November 1994. 
 27  Lorch, above n 26. 
 28  SPO Report 1994, above n 7.    29  Human Rights Watch, above n 6. 
 30  See the charges, judgments and other materials related to the trials published by the Federal 
Supreme Court (Addis Ababa: Meskerem 2000). 
 31  Mayfi eld, above n 4, 567.    32  Mayfi eld, above n 4, 567. 
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 Th e accused were charged with 211 counts of genocide, and alternatively 211 
counts of homicide in the fi rst degree and other off ences against bodily integrity, 
including 1,823 killings, 999 acts of bodily harm, and 194 enforced disappear-
ances. 33 Th e accused were classifi ed into three major groups: (1) 146 policy- and 
decision-makers; (2)  2,433 fi eld commanders who transmitted orders from the 
fi rst group or initiated their own orders; and (3) 2,619 simple perpetrators. 34 
 As noted above, there was suffi  cient evidence to implicate members of the Derg 
in the commission of grave international crimes. 35 Th e fi rst key piece of evidence 
in this regard concerned the Derg General Assembly’s unanimous decision in 
November 1974 to execute sixty ex-offi  cials of the imperial regime after discuss-
ing each ex-offi  cial’s case and the punishment to be meted out. 36 Th e minutes of 
the meeting contain a list of Derg members who were in attendance. Th e second 
key piece of evidence is the instruction given by the Derg Campaign Department 
(under the direct command of a Derg Standing Committee chaired by Mengistu) 
to Derg special forces to eliminate those preparing to participate in a May Day 
demonstration in 1976 organized by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party 
(EPRP). 37 On 30 April 1976, hundreds of youth were executed throughout 
the country. Th ese and similar executions were given de jure authorization by 
Proclamation 121 of 1977, which permitted security forces to take action against 
the so-called counter-revolutionaries. 
 According to the fi rst charge, the accused, while collectively running the govern-
ment, 38 publicly encouraged low-level offi  cials, cadres and security personnel to 
commit crimes in violation of Article 281 and 286 of the 1957 Ethiopian Penal 
Code. Th e encouragement allegedly took the form of word of mouth, images, and 
writings conveyed in public meetings and media announcements. Article 281 deals 
with the crime of genocide, while Article 286 concerns preparation and provoca-
tion to commit crimes of international character, including genocide. 
 It seems that the Special Prosecutor elected to include the charge of prepara-
tion and provocation as a priority because the bulk of the crimes were directly 
perpetrated by low-level offi  cials who were provoked into committing atrocities 
by the leaders of the revolution. Th e low-ranking offi  cials at the various levels 
of the administrative structure were under the eff ective control of the Derg, as 
 33  Wondwossen L.  Kidane ,  ‘Th e Ethiopian “Red Terror” Trials’ , in  M.  Cherif Bassiouni (ed), 
 Post-Confl ict Justice ( Ardsley, NY :  Transnational Publishers Inc,  2002 ),  682 . 
 34  Howland, above n 21, 407–35, 426, footnote 51. On indictments in general, see  Yacob 
 Haile-Mariam ,  ‘Th e Quest for Justice and Reconciliation: Th e International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda and the Ethiopian High Court’ ,  Hastings International and Comparative Law Review ,  22 
( 1989–1999 ),  708–12. 
 35  SPO Report 1994, above n 7.    36  SPO Report 1994, above n 7. 
 37  SPO Report 1994, above n 7. 
 38  Th e Derg members formed a collective head of state and made all key decisions in the General 
Assembly, the Standing Committee, and other sub-committees. Th e SPO charges alleged that the 
Derg and its sub-committees had been in eff ective control of government during the relevant peri-
ods. According to the SPO charges, offi  cial use of force against victims during this period could be 
attributed to any Derg member unless evidence to the contrary was provided (for example, by proving 
that a particular Derg member was opposed to the collective decision taken against victims of the 
regime): SPO Report 1994, above n 7. 
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the latter body was in charge of recruiting and arming them. 39 Th e Derg offi  cials 
also incited low-level offi  cials and security personnel to violence by calling for 
the elimination of political opponents in public meetings and by transmitting the 
same message using mass media. Slogans calling for the elimination of anti-people, 
anti-revolution anarchists, counter-revolutionary reactionaries, the aristocracy, and 
the bourgeoisie were the most common forms of incitement. 40 It was, in fact, not 
unusual to come across some of these slogans attached to the corpses of those 
executed during the Red Terror. 41 
 Th e second charge alleges that the accused as  co-off enders committed crimes 
of genocide directly or indirectly in violation of Article 281(a) and (c), as well as 
Article 32(a) of the 1957 Penal Code. Th e relevant sections of Article 281(a) and 
(c) and Article 32(a) 42  are:
 Art. 281.—Genocide; Crimes against Humanity. 
 Whosoever, with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, religious 
or political group, organises, orders or engaged in, be it in time of war or in time of peace: 
 (a)  Killings, bodily harm or serious injury to the physical or mental health of members 
of the group, in any way whatsoever; or 
 . . . 
 (c)  the compulsory movement or dispersion of peoples or children, or their placing 
under living conditions calculated to result in their death or disappearance, is pun-
ishable with rigorous imprisonment from fi ve years to life, or, in cases of exceptional 
gravity, with death. 
 Likewise, Article 32 of the Penal Code provides:
 Art.32.—Principal Act: Off ender and Co-off enders. 
 (1)  A person shall be regarded as having committed an off ence and punished as such if: 
 (a)  he actually commits the off ence either directly or indirectly, for example by 
means of an animal or a natural force; or 
 (b)  he without performing the criminal act itself fully associates himself with the 
commission of the off ence and the intended result; or 
 (c)  he employees a mentally defi cient person for the commission of an off ence or 
knowingly compels another person to commit an off ence. 
 (2)  Where the off ence committed goes beyond the intention of the off ender he shall he 
tried in accordance with Article 58 (3). 
 (3)  Where several co-off enders are involved they shall be liable to the same punishment 
as provided by law. 
 Th e Court shall take into account the provisions governing the eff ect of personal circum-
stances (Art. 40) and those governing the award of punishment according to the degree of 
individual guilt. (Art. 86). 
 Th e prosecution divided charges in relation to Article 281 into three 
sub-headings: (1) killing of members of a political group; (2) causing bodily harm 
 39  See the charges, above n 30.    40  See the charges, above n 30. 
 41  One of these slogans was in Amharic  Qey Shibir Yiff afam , roughly, ‘let Red Terror be intensifi ed’. 
 42  Penal Code of Ethiopia 1957, Proclamation No. 158 of 1957, 23 July 1957, available at < http://
www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49216a0a2.html > (accessed 25 February 2013). 
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or serious injury to the physical or mental health of members of a political group; 
and (3) placing members of a political group or victims under living conditions 
calculated to result in their death or disappearance. In total, 219 counts of geno-
cide were alleged. Th e prosecution sought to show that these acts occurred between 
1974 and 1983. As a matter of prosecutorial strategy, the prosecution also brought 
an alternative charge of aggravated homicide in violation of Article 522 of the 
1957 Penal Code. 
 Th e victims identifi ed in the charges could be classifi ed broadly into four 
groups. 43 Th e fi rst group included the monarch, members of the royal family, and 
the aristocracy. In the second group were members of the Derg who died following 
purges designed to rid the regime of traitors and sympathizers of anti-revolutionary 
elements. Th e third group included individuals perceived to be members or sym-
pathizers of the various political parties that stood in opposition to the military 
regime. In the fourth group were those targeted for elimination for various reasons, 
such as businessmen who were accused of sabotaging the economy by hoarding 
and victims of personal vendettas by low-level offi  cials and revolutionary guards. 
 Th e political parties in the third group, the Derg’s primary targets during the 
Red Terror, were numerous and diff ered in their political outlooks. Th e most 
prominent parties promoted socialism as their guiding ideology. Members of the 
EPRP were the most common targets of Derg’s brutal crackdown. Th e EPRP 
was established in April 1972, two years before the Revolution, as a radical and 
progressive organization composed of students, intellectuals, workers, and peas-
ants rallying against the feudal system. 44 Th e EPRP considered the assumption of 
power by the Derg as the ‘usurpation of power and called for the immediate for-
mation of a representative and all inclusive provisional popular government which 
would pave the way for the formation of an elected popular government’. 45 Th e 
outlawing of the EPRP by the Derg did not stop the Party’s clandestine political 
activities and quickly led to armed confrontations both in the cities and rural areas. 
Th ere is disagreement as to who usually fi red the fi rst shot, but EPRP members 
and those perceived to be its sympathizers overwhelmingly faced the brunt of the 
violence. 46 MEISON (All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement) originally aligned itself 
with the government and played a role in the ideological and armed confrontation 
with EPRP, but later faced the same fate as the EPRP when its leaders fell out with 
the Derg. MEISON was composed mainly of intellectual returnees from Europe. 
 Some other parties were organized along ethnic lines and engaged in insurgency 
in rural areas. Th e most prominent ones were the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), 
the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF), the Tigrean Peoples Liberation 
Front (TPLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (TPLF). Th e Derg was fi nally top-
pled in 1991 by the collective military might of these liberation parties. Strikingly, 
 43  See the charges, above n 30. 
 44  ‘Overview of the History of EPRP’,  Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party [website], < http://www.
eprp.com/party/history.html > (accessed 25 February 2013). 
 45  ‘Overview of the History of EPRP’, above n 44. 
 46  Babile  Tola ,  To Kill a Generation: Th e Red Terror in Ethiopia ( Washington DC : 2nd edn,  Free 
Ethiopia Press,   1997 ) . 
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in keeping with the political craze of the time, most if not all of the parties were 
proponents of Marxist–Leninist ideology. 
 (VI)  Mode of Criminal Responsibility 
Issues in the Mengistu Trial 
 Th e accused advanced wide-ranging objections to the charges fi led against them. 47 
Th e objections related to a range of substantive, procedural and institutional 
aspects of the charges and the trial. 48 Th e Federal High Court dispensed with these 
objections in its decision on 10 October 1995. In this section, I  will examine 
objections relating to the mode of criminal responsibility. 
 Th e key mode of criminal responsibility provisions in the 1957 Ethiopian Penal 
Code invoked by the Special Prosecutor against the principal accused were Articles 
32(1)(a) and (b), which apply to principal off ences committed by off enders and 
co-off enders. According to Article 32(1)(a), a person shall be regarded as having 
committed an off ence and punished as such if: ‘[H] e actually commits the off ence 
either  directly or indirectly , for example by means of an animal or a natural force; 
or (b) he without performing the criminal act itself  fully associates himself with the 
commission of the off ence and the intended result’ (emphasis added). Th is makes 
the direct and indirect participation in the commission of crimes the most impor-
tant mode of criminal responsibility. 
 47  Special Prosecutor v Col. Mengistu Hailemariam & Others , Ruling on Preliminary Objections, 10 
October 1996, File No. 1/87, Ethiopian Federal High Court. 
 48  Th e objections were: (1) Th e courts established by the transitional charter have no jurisdiction to 
try accused charged for commission of the crime of genocide; (2) Bringing the accused before courts is 
not the transitional government’s regular duty or responsibility; (3) Th e actions of the provisional mili-
tary administration as government could not be retrospectively judged as illegal; (4) Th e 1955 Revised 
Constitution which was the basis for the adoption of the 1957 Penal Code in its Article 4 as well as 
Article 2137 of the Civil Code provide immunity from prosecution or civil liability for the Head of 
State; (5) Th e cases should not be tried in domestic courts; (6) It is inappropriate for Article 281 of 
the 1957 Penal Code to include ‘political groups’ in groups protected against genocide; (7) Th e case of 
the defendants has not been referred for preliminary inquiry according to Article 80 of the Ethiopian 
Criminal Procedure Code which requires preliminary inquiry for grave charges such as aggravated 
homicide; (8) Th e charge was not brought within fi fteen days after the completion of the investigation 
fi le as required by Article 109 of the Ethiopian Criminal Procedure Code; (9) Th is case is not suit-
able for judicial settlement. Th e best solution is to seek national reconciliation; (10) Th e charges are 
barred by statute of limitation as per Articles 286, 414 and 416 of the 1957 Ethiopian Penal Code; 
(11) Th e charge of committing fraud in a name of courts lacks specifi city; (12) Th e inclusion of names 
of individuals who are no longer alive as co-off enders is prejudicial to their case; (13) Accused other 
than the top twelve request a separate trial as they are only accused with the top twelve on eighteen 
counts out of over 200 counts; (14) Th e charges against the accused are not specifi c enough or the time 
and place of commission are unknown, weapons used and the level of participation of each accused 
in the alleged crimes are not suffi  ciently specifi ed. Th is creates suspicion as to whether the alleged 
crimes were committed; (15) Th e charges are confusing; (16) Th e crime of provocation to commit 
genocide under Article 286 and the crime of commission of genocide cannot be charged cumulatively; 
(17) It is improper to cite Articles 32(1)(a) and (c) against one accused in respect of one charge; (18) 
Objection regarding the mention of Article 37(1) of the Penal Code on criminal conspiracy as the 
provisional military administration council was not created to commit crimes but to lead the country. 
Furthermore, it is improper to charge them both as co-off enders and co-conspirators at the same time. 
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 As pointed out, the core group of the accused was comprised of members of 
the Derg. When the Derg collapsed in 1991, seventy-three original members 
faced prosecution. 49 Th e prosecutor alleged that these members committed crimes 
in their capacity as members of the Derg General Assembly and as members of 
committees and sub-committees that were responsible for executive decisions. 50 
According to the prosecutor, these leaders exercised eff ective control over the 
police, security and paramilitary forces who directly committed crimes. 51 
 One of the many objections of the accused related to their individual criminal 
responsibility in light of their subordinate position to Chairman of the Derg, with 
whom ultimate power resided. Th e accused claimed that they could not be held 
responsible unless they acted  ultra vires , because Proclamation No. 110/69, Article 
8, gave the Chairman of the Derg sole responsibility of protecting peace and secu-
rity, maintaining unity of the country and taking action against anti-people and 
anti-revolution forces. 52 Th e Federal High Court dismissed their objections, stat-
ing that this provision did not mean that the Chairman carried out these respon-
sibilities on his own. 53 Obviously, even if the Chairman exercised ultimate de 
jure power, there appears to be no question about the division of labour between 
members of the Derg’s standing and sub-committees. De jure command may be 
ascertained on the basis of pre-established offi  cial hierarchies, whether in a civilian 
or a military power structure. 54 ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence identifi es three 
general criteria to determine evidence of de facto command for civil and military 
authorities when de jure power is lacking. 55 Th ese are: (i) the power to infl uence; 
(ii) capacity to issue orders; and (iii) evidence stemming from the distribution of 
tasks. 56 Th us, the prosecution could have established both the de jure and the de 
facto power exercised by Derg members. However, neither the prosecution nor 
the Court took the opportunity and invoked established jurisprudence of interna-
tional criminal tribunals to demonstrate the de jure and de facto power exercised 
by Derg members. As a result, they missed the opportunity to solidify the concep-
tual legal basis on which the defendants were convicted. 
 Th e accused also objected to the mode of responsibility by attempting to refute 
the existence of an overall plan to eliminate political opponents. In its merits deci-
sion of 12 December 2006, the Federal High Court held that the accused had 
taken part in the implementation of the common plan conceived by the Derg. 57 It 
noted that the Derg passed a standing military order between  Sene 30/1966 and 
 Tikimit 06/1967 to eliminate individuals and groups opposed to the revolution. 
According to the Court, the Derg’s announcement following the assassination of 
prominent fi gures and members of the former imperial regime (indicating that 
killing of such people did not amount to a killing of innocents) demonstrated 
 49  See charges, above n 30.    50  See charges, above n 30.    51  See charges, above n 30. 
 52  Special Prosecutor v Col. Mengistu Hailemariam & Others, Ruling on Preliminary Objections, 
10 October 1996, File No. 1/87, Ethiopian Federal High Court, 22. 
 53  Special Prosecutor v Mengistu , above n 52. 
 54  Ilias  Bantekas ,  ‘De Facto Command’ in  Antonio  Cassese (ed),  Th e Oxford Companion to 
International Criminal Justice ( Oxford :  Oxford University Press  2009 ),  291 . 
 55  Bantekas, above n 54, 292.    56  Bantekas, above n 54.    57  Bantekas, above n 54, 4–5. 
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that there was a plan to destroy people politically associated with the overthrown 
regime. 58 
 Th e Court further noted that the decision made by the Derg in a meeting held 
on  Hidar 10/1969, which permitted every power structure in the Derg to take 
action against anti-revolution elements, supported the idea that there had been a 
decision to eliminate political opponents. According to the Court, various actions 
taken after this decision, such as summary executions, torture and imprisonment, 
confi rmed the Derg’s plan to eliminate individuals associated with the imperial 
regime and those opposed to the revolution. 
 Th e Court additionally held that the willingness of the accused to continue as 
Derg members after the commission of the crimes demonstrated their continued 
determination to stand by the Derg’s decision to eliminate political opponents. 59 
According to the Court, because the Derg could not carry out its functions with-
out its members, its decisions were its members’ decisions, as well. 60 Its members 
owned the Derg’s actions by directly supporting—or by at least not opposing—
them, so by continuing as members they thereby helped the group continue to 
exist. 61 
 It is important to examine analogous international criminal law rules and juris-
prudence to make sense of the allegations and defences mounted by the accused 
in relation to modes of criminal responsibility. In its  Lubanga confi rmation of 
charges decision, the Pre-Trial Chamber highlighted the importance of control in 
the notion of co-perpetration. According to this notion:
 Th e principals of a crime are not limited to those who physically carry out the objective ele-
ments of the off ence, but also include those who, in spite of being removed from the scene 
of the crime, control or mastermind its commission because they decide whether and how 
the off ence will be committed. 62 
 Th us, according to the Pre-Trial Chamber, the concept of co-perpetration embod-
ied in Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute coincides with joint control over the 
crime by reason of the essential nature of the various contributions to the com-
mission of the crime. 63 According to the Chamber, the concept of co-perpetration 
based on joint control over the crime is rooted:
 [I]n the principle of the division of essential tasks for the purpose of committing a crime 
between two or more persons acting in a concerted manner. Hence, although none of the 
participants has overall control over the off ence because they all depend on one another for 
its commission, they all share control because each of them could frustrate the commission 
of the crime by not carrying out his or her task. 64 
 Th e Ethiopian courts had the opportunity to elaborate the concept of 
co-perpetration in the  Mengistu case. Unfortunately, both the Federal High Court 
 58  Bantekas, above n 54.    59  Bantekas, above n 54.    60  Bantekas, above n 54. 
 61  Bantekas, above n 54. 
 62  International Criminal Court,  Prosecutor v Th omas Lubanga Dylo , Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision 
on the Confi rmation of Charges, 29 January 2007, [330]. 
 63  Lubanga , above n 62, [341].    64  Lubanga , above n 62, [342]. 
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and Supreme Court failed to create a well-defi ned theory of individual criminal 
responsibility of co-off enders. 
 One of the key objective elements of the concept of co-perpetration is the exist-
ence of an agreement or common plan between two or more persons. 65 Although 
the common plan must include an element of criminality, it does not need to 
specifi cally be directed at the commission of a crime. 66 It suffi  ces: 
 i.  Th at the co-perpetrators have agreed (a) to start the implementation of 
the common plan to achieve a non-criminal goals, and (b) to only com-
mit the crime if certain conditions are met; or 
 ii.  Th at the co-perpetrators (a) are aware of the risk that implementing the com-
mon plan (which is specifi cally directed at the achievement of a non-criminal 
goals) will result in the commission of the crime, and (b)  accept such an 
outcome. 
 While one can question whether this objective element of the concept of 
co-perpetration refl ects a rule of customary international law, one can hardly ignore 
the relevance of the concept for the defence’s argument and the Court’s decision on 
issues of individual criminal responsibility for genocide in the  Mengistu case. For 
instance, one of the defence’s arguments was that the Derg had no plan to commit 
genocide, a contention that goes to the heart of one of the objective requirements 
of the co-perpetration. Th e Court responded:
 [A] s it is clearly known, when a government is in power, it does not have only one objective 
or tasks. It has many objectives and tasks. Th e evidence submitted by the parties demon-
strates this. However, even if many of its objectives were good, the existence of good deeds 
do not wipe out responsibility for the criminal acts. One cannot say that there was no 
criminal intention. Th e main question is whether the accused had the intention to elimi-
nate politically affi  liated groups. 67 
 Th is seems to be in line with the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision in the  Lubanga 
case, which held that co-perpetrators may well initially set out to implement 
non-criminal goals and only later agree to commit crimes. Th e Derg members did 
not form the Provisional Military Administration Council to commit crimes, but 
they agreed to eliminate their political opponents after the latter demanded the 
establishment of a popularly-elected government. 
 Th e accused presented a large number of defence witnesses who testifi ed that 
the Derg had no plan for eliminating their political adversaries. Th e bulk of 
their testimony was misdirected, however, toward disproving the existence of a 
pre-conceived plan to eliminate political opponents. As the Pre-Trial Chamber 
observed in  Lubanga , ‘the agreement need not be explicit and that its existence can 
be inferred from subsequent concerted action of the co-perpetrators’. 68 
 Th e second most important objective requirement of co-perpetration based on 
joint control over the crime is ‘the co-ordinated essential contribution made by 
 65  Lubanga , above n 62, [343].    66  Lubanga , above n 62, [344]. 
 67  Lubanga , above n 62.    68  Lubanga , above n 62, [345]. 
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each co-perpetrator resulting in the realization of the objective elements of the 
crime’. 69 Th e essential contribution is conditioned on the member’s power to frus-
trate the commission of the crime by not performing his or her tasks. 70 Key Derg 
members assumed various leadership roles. In addition to being members of the 
Derg’s General Assembly, which was its highest organ and collectively served as 
head of state, they also served as members and chairs of diff erent key standing 
committees and sub-committees that enjoyed tremendous power in implement-
ing General Assembly decisions. It is was thus imperative that the actions of each 
accused be explained in light of the control requirement and their ability to frus-
trate the commission of the Derg’s crimes. Unfortunately, the prosecution’s charges 
as well as the trial and appeal courts’ decisions fall far short of providing a clear 
picture about each individual’s contribution to the common plan. 
 Th e Ethiopian Penal Code does not include planning as a mode of respon-
sibility. But the notion of planning feeds into the notion of common plan by 
co-off enders. In ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence, the  actus reus of planning requires 
that one or more persons design criminal conduct that results in the perpetration 
of one or more statutory crimes. 71 It is ‘suffi  cient to demonstrate that the plan-
ning was a factor substantially contributing to such criminal conduct’; but-for 
causation is not required 72 Th e  mens rea  of planning requires that ‘the accused, 
directly or indirectly, intended the crime in question to be committed’. 73 In  Kordić 
and Čerkez, it was held that the required intent exists when ‘a person (who) plans 
an act or omission with the awareness of the substantial likelihood that a crime 
will be committed in the execution of that plan . . . Planning with such awareness 
has to be regarded as accepting that crime’. 74 Th e crimes allegedly committed by 
Derg members could easily qualify as planning under this framework. Indeed, that 
framework would have been particularly useful in the case of Derg members who 
did not sign execution orders or oversaw the liquidation of political opponents. 
Unfortunately, both the prosecution and the courts again missed the opportunity 
to use the ICTY and ICTR’s jurisprudence to fi nd the defendants guilty in a man-
ner that would withstand the test of international scrutiny. 
 Issues of modes of criminal responsibility are also apparent when one looks 
closely at the defences mounted by individual accused. For instance, two of the 
accused, Fikreselassie Wogderes (former Prime Minister) and Fissheha Desta (for-
mer Vice-President) were able to prove that they were outside the country when 
some of the specifi ed criminal acts were committed, including the execution of 
the Emperor as well as the purge and murder of other Derg members. Th e Court 
nevertheless held that:
 69  Lubanga , above n 62, [346].    70  Lubanga , above n 62, [347]. 
 71  Lubanga , above n 62. See also, International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,  Prosecutor 
v Blaškić, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 3 March 2000, [279]; International Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia,  Prosecutor v Kristić , Trial Chamber, Judgment, 2 August 2001, [601]. 
 72  International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,  Prosecutor v Kordić and Čerkez, Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment, 17 December 2004, [26]. 
 73  Blaškić, above n 71, [278]; International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,  Prosecutor v Kordić 
and Čerkez, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 26 February 2001, [386]. 
 74  See Stefano Manacorda, ‘Planning’ in Cassese, above n 54, 456. 
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 [S] uch defences are only relevant for a person who is accused of directly and personally 
committing crimes. Th e accused in this fi le were not charged for committing all the crimes. 
Th ey were accused of causing the crimes to be committed and it is clear that others com-
mitted the said crimes. Th erefore, it is not necessary for the accused to be physically present 
and supervise or assist in the commission. . . . Th e Prosecution’s evidence demonstrated that 
the crimes were committed by the Derg with the intention and plan of its members and by 
its institutions. Th erefore, the accused could commit the crimes from anywhere. 75 
 Th e Secretary of the Derg argued that he did not make the decisions to take action 
against the victims, but merely conveyed, in his capacity as Secretary, the decisions 
made orally by the Chairman. Th e Court, however, held that the signatures on the 
execution and arrest orders showed that he permitted the actions to be taken and 
there was no indication that he gave the orders in pursuance of the oral decision 
made by someone else. 76 Besides, even if it could be concluded that the Secretary 
was merely conveying the Chairman’s decision, his signature indicated that he had 
agreed with the decisions. 77 Th e Court further held that since decisions or guide-
lines were made by the General Assembly, of which the accused was a member, he 
was liable in his role as a participant in the Assembly. Th e accused carried out his 
responsibility based on the division of labour between the members of the Derg. 
 In another instance, an accused was able to prove that he had objected to arbi-
trary killings at the height of the Red Terror. However, the Court held that this 
isolated act of objecting to mistreatment of political opponents could not absolve 
him of liability, because the accused was not opposed to the overall plan of elimi-
nating political adversaries. 78 
 Continued membership in the Derg was also considered critical for the convic-
tion of a Derg member who was initially involved in the day-to-day operation of 
diff erent ministries but was later imprisoned by the Derg for fi fteen years. He was 
nevertheless held responsible for the regime’s decisions. 79 In contrast, the forty-fi rst 
defendant—Corporal Begashaw Gurmesa—was acquitted because he was able to 
show his opposition to the Derg’s criminal intentions even before he fell out of 
favour. 80 Th roughout, the Federal High Court reiterated that the specifi c respon-
sibilities of a Derg member did not matter; instead, it was suffi  cient if he/she was 
a member of the Derg, did not oppose its decisions, and associated himself with 
its actions. 81 
 Th e Special Prosecutor appealed the sentencing decision of twenty-one con-
victees, while another twenty-three cross-appealed. In their appeals, the accused 
submitted,  inter alia , that: 
 1.  Th ey did not commit the crimes and that none of the prosecution’s wit-
nesses directly and individually implicated them; 
 75  Federal High Court, Judgment on Merits: See the judgment and other materials related to the 
trials published by the Federal Supreme Court, above n 30, 135. 
 76  Judgment on Merits, above n 75, 136.    77  Judgment on Merits, above n 75. 
 78  Judgment on Merits, above n 75, 319.    79  Judgment on Merits, above n 75, 385. 
 80  Judgment on Merits, above n 75, 412.    81  Judgment on Merits, above n 75, 419. 
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 2.  their names were not found on the documentary evidence introduced by the 
SPO and most of the documentary evidence consisted of photocopies, to 
which the law did not attach great evidentiary value; 
 3.  [t] he Federal High Court found them guilty not because there was specifi c 
evidence against them, but merely because they were members of the Derg. 
 Again, these points of appeal mostly raise issues concerning modes of criminal 
responsibility. 
 With regard to its appeal, the prosecution submitted:
 Th e accused are members of the Derg. Th e Derg is represented by its members and it can-
not exist without its members and the decision of the Derg means the decision of its mem-
bers. Th e accused remained members of the Derg until the very end and are responsible 
for crimes committed by the Derg. Th e accused, as members of the Derg, had planned to 
eliminate groups organised on political basis. Following their decision to execute members 
of the former imperial regime, they came up with a general policy of eliminating those 
opposed to the Revolution and the Derg. Th ey accepted as their own the consequences of 
the acts committed as per the plan hatched by the Derg. Th ere is no reason why they should 
not be responsible for the consequences of their policies. 82 
 Th e Federal Supreme Court affi  rmed the Federal High Court’s fi ndings in regards 
to the conviction of those charged in the  Mengistu case. 83 It held that a decision of 
the Derg was not the decision of one member or of the few; instead it was a deci-
sion of the members as a whole. 84 Moreover, it concluded that the members must 
have accepted the consequences of the Derg’s decisions. 85 Continued membership 
in the Derg led to their liability regardless of their being dispatched to provinces 
away from where major decisions were made. 86 
 What is most striking here is the Court’s attribution of later criminal acts to 
the entire membership of the Derg by virtue of the Derg’s earlier collective deci-
sion to target persons whose political outlook was similar to the sixty members 
of the imperial regime who received the fi rst blow and those who were generally 
categorized as counter-revolutionaries. 87 Another decision taken during the Derg’s 
early rule, which permitted all members to take action against anti-revolutionary 
elements, was also used by the Court to hold that the actions of the whole could 
be attributed to the few. 
 As shown above, both the Federal High and Supreme Courts concluded that the 
accused’s criminal responsibility could be based on their membership of the Derg. 
Th is is a tenuous basis for determining individual criminal responsibility, given 
that the Derg was not pronounced a criminal organization. While its machinery 
was no doubt responsible for the many atrocities committed, it is incumbent upon 
courts to establish a carefully constructed theory of individual criminal responsi-
bility so as not to condemn all Derg members merely by association. 
 82  Mengitsu , above n 1.    83  Mengitsu , above n 1, 23–25.    84  Mengitsu , above n 1, 21. 
 85  Mengitsu , above n 1.    86  Mengitsu , above n 1. 
 87  At a meeting held on 10  Hidar  1969 it was decided that every member of the Derg was empow-
ered to take action against anti-revolution elements. 
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 (VII)  Concluding Remarks 
 Th is chapter examined the mode of criminal responsibility adopted in the 
Ethiopian courts’ decisions in the case of former Derg members accused of com-
mitting genocide against their political opponents. Th e Ethiopian Penal Code 
contains a concept of co-perpetration as a mode of criminal responsibility that 
is particularly well-suited to the prosecution of suspects who plan and direct the 
commission of mass crimes without direct physical perpetration. Although analo-
gous modes of criminal responsibility have been adopted by the ICTY and ICTR, 
the Ethiopian concept of co-perpetration is most similar to Article 25(3)(a) of the 
Rome Statute, where reference is made to notions such as ‘co-perpetration’. Th at 
similarity is perhaps due to the continental law pedigrees of the Rome Statute and 
the 1957 Ethiopian Penal Code. 
 Ethiopia’s mass prosecution of mass crimes committed during the military 
regime nevertheless raises serious questions about individual criminal responsi-
bility. Although it is possible for a large group of individuals to commit heinous 
crimes in concert, it is rarely easy to prosecute all of them at once unless all of the 
suspects contributed equally to the criminal scheme. Th at is why it is important for 
the prosecution and courts to have a clear theory of individual criminal responsi-
bility in apportioning guilt. Th e joint trial of well over one hundred individuals is 
unprecedented in recent history. Although the idea of a joint trial is not a problem 
in and of itself, assuming that the parties shared criminal intention and carried out 
certain prohibited acts in furtherance of those intentions, the idea of individual 
guilt remains fundamental. For justice to be properly served, individual criminal 
responsibility must clearly be shown to exist. Loose notions such as membership 
in an organization or non-opposition to criminal actions should not be taken as 
absolute indicators of culpability. Membership in organization does not necessarily 
mean that all members enjoy the same power or can frustrate the criminal plan. 
Nor does non-opposition to a criminal plan mean the non-opposing member took 
part in the criminal act. Overall, as shown in this chapter, the Ethiopian courts 
missed an opportunity to benefi t from the decisions of international tribunals con-
cerning modes of criminal responsibility. Not only did this aff ect the quality of the 
judgements in the Mengistu trial, it also failed to decisively dispel the view that 
some members of the Derg were found guilty by association. A well-conceived 
and executed theory of mode of criminal responsibility could have assisted in this 
regard. Regardless, the Ethiopian trial has at least managed to document the story 
of victims of the Red Terror, a story which unfortunately remains inaccessible to 
the wider public and international community. Th e vast trove of documentary 
and electronic evidence in the prosecutor’s custody is yet to be digitized and publi-
cally distributed twenty years after the commencement of the trials. Th e language 
barrier also means that only those with working knowledge of Amharic language 
are able to do meaningful research into the trial documents. As a result, there has 
been little research on the trials. Th e Ethiopian trial is also notable for its inability 
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to attract and continuously engage foreign donors who could have fi nancially and 
technically supported the endeavour. 
 Th e trial also failed to give a balanced picture of the confl ict as the prosecution 
was empowered only to investigate and prosecute crimes committed by those in 
government. Hence the pedagogical value of the trials is somewhat diminished as 
a result of this selectivity. 
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 War Crimes Trials, ‘Victor’s Justice’ and 
Australian Military Justice in the Aftermath 
of the Second World War 
 Georgina  Fitzpatrick * 
 [Th e convicted] are called war criminals, but they are not criminals at all. 
Th ey are all innocent. Th ey committed no crime. You need not feel ashamed. 
People in other parts of the world, too, are beginning to understand that war 
crimes trials were mistaken. 
 Judge Radhabinod Pal to families of convicted ‘B’ and ‘C’ class war crimi-
nals, Fukuoka, 1952 1 
 Between 1945 and 1951, the Australian military services conducted 300 war crimes 
trials at Darwin and several island locations in the Asia-Pacifi c region. 2 Th ere were 
952 Japanese tried, several appearing in more than one trial. Th e military courts, 
set up under the War Crimes Act 1945, were presided over by three to fi ve mili-
tary men, none of them required to have any legal training. 3 A Judge-Advocate 
could be appointed to assist with legal advice but this was not mandatory. 4 Th e 
prosecuting offi  cer tended to have been a solicitor or a barrister in civilian life sub-
sequently recruited into the Australian Army Legal Corps (AALC). Th e defending 
offi  cer, although sometimes from the AALC, could be Japanese, accustomed to a 
 *  Research Fellow, Melbourne Law School. 
 1  Quoted in  Yuma  Totani ,  Th e Tokyo War Crimes Trials: Th e Pursuit of Justice in the Wake of World 
War II ( Cambridge, MA and London :  Harvard University Press ,  2008 ),  226 . ‘B’ class war criminals 
were those accused of conventional war crimes, ‘C’ class were accused of crimes against humanity. In 
practice, ‘B’ and ‘C’ category crimes overlapped so that these ‘minor’ trials are referred to collectively. 
‘A’ class were those tried at the International Military Tribunal of the Far East (IMTFE) for crimes 
against peace. 
 2  Trials were held at Morotai, Labuan, Wewak, Rabaul, Darwin, Singapore, Hong Kong and 
Manus. One trial began at Ambon but it was completed at Morotai. 
 3  Th e British military courts required at least one of their court members to have legal qualifi ca-
tions:  Philip R  Piccigallo ,  Th e Japanese on Trial: Allied War Crimes Operations in the East, 1945–1951 
( Austin, TX :  University of Texas Press ,  1979 ),  98 . 
 4  In this respect, the Australian practice also diff ered from the British,  Michael  Carrel ,  Australia’s 
Prosecution of Japanese War Criminals:  Stimuli and Constraints , PhD Th esis, ( Th e University of 
Melbourne ,  2005 ),  83 . 
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completely diff erent legal system and operating through interpreters. Th e accused, 
even if they knew some English, faced trial, perhaps for their life, reliant on such 
interpreters as the Australian military courts could provide. Sometimes the trials 
rattled through at a great pace, with the only evidence sworn statements by wit-
nesses who were not present to be tested by cross examination. On the face of it, 
there could be grounds for unease. 
 (I)  Th e Impact of Judge Pal 
 Ever since the 1952 publication of Judge Pal’s dissenting position at the 
International Military Tribunal of the Far East (IMTFE), there has been an under-
current of criticism about the charges and the procedures at the trials of the major 
Japanese war criminals in Tokyo. On the sixtieth anniversary of the judgment at 
Tokyo, a gathering of historians and international lawyers revisited the question of 
‘victor’s justice’ and demonstrated its continuing interest. 5 In Japan, Pal’s critique 
has shaped the discussion for several generations, as Dr Totani has set out so clearly 
in her beautifully argued book on the IMTFE. 6 Pal’s critique also had its eff ect on 
historians of other nationalities. Richard Minear nailed his colours to the mast 
with his title,  Victor’s Justice , published in 1971, which became very infl uential 
in Anglophone circles. 7 Th irty years later, a Taiwanese historian, Leo T.S. Ching, 
could still refer to the IMTFE as ‘a theatrical demonstration of the losers’ crimi-
nality and a farcical assertion of the victors’ moral righteousness’. 8 Th is has been 
a viewpoint of some longevity which Dr Totani’s challenging book, with its close 
attention to the actual trial transcript and appended evidence, may fi nd diffi  cult to 
dislodge. Th e debate about the IMTFE lies outside the scope of this chapter but it 
provides one context in which any discussion of fairness in relation to the trials of 
the so-called minor criminals must be placed. Too many historians have leapt to 
the conclusion that ‘victor’s justice’ is an appropriate term to apply to the minor 
trials and yet the research has barely begun. 
 Judge Pal also played a part in framing the discourse about the minor trials. 
During his fi rst post-Tribunal trip to Japan in 1952, as quoted at the beginning 
of this chapter, he assured the families of convicted ‘B’ and ‘C’ class war criminals 
that their relatives had ‘committed no crime’. 9 He reiterated this view when he 
saw those serving their time in Sugamo prison alongside the ‘A’ class war crimi-
nals, declaring: ‘None of you bore any guilt’. On the one hand, Pal argued that 
 5  Th e papers from the November 2008 conference at Melbourne Law School have been published. 
See  Yuki  Tanaka ,  Tim  McCormack and  Gerry  Simpson (eds),  Beyond Victor’s Justice? Th e Tokyo War 
Crimes Trials Revisited ( Boston, MA and Leiden :  Brill Academic Publishers ,  2011 ) . 
 6  Totani, above n 1, 224–45. 
 7  Richard  Minear ,  Victors’ Justice: Th e Tokyo War Crimes Trials ( Princeton, NJ :  Princeton University 
Press ,  1971 ) . Th is was reprinted in 2001. 
 8  Leo T.S.  Ching ,  Becoming ‘Japanese’:  Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation 
( Berkeley, CA :  University of California Press ,  2001 ),  46 . 
 9  Totani, above n 1, 226. 
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the major war criminals could not be held responsible for what had happened in 
far-fl ung islands because those crimes should be laid at the feet of the perpetra-
tors in the fi eld (his IMTFE position), and on the other hand, he argued, without 
perceiving any inconsistency or lack of logic, that the latter should be exonerated as 
well. 10 
 Pal’s assertion that those convicted at the minor trials were ‘all innocent’ suggests 
some hubris. It is most unlikely that he had access to, much less worked through, 
the transcripts of the 2,240 or so minor trials conducted by several Allied coun-
tries between 1945 and 1951. 11 Even sixty years after the last one fi nished—an 
Australian-run trial held on Manus Island in April 1951—insuffi  cient research has 
been undertaken to make such blanket declarations with confi dence. Until a com-
plete series of trials conducted by one country is explored, such assumptions cannot 
be tested. 12 As the historian currently engaged in an extensive study of Australia’s 300 
war crimes trials, 13 it is my intention here to challenge the imputation of wholesale 
injustice visited upon the ‘B’ and ‘C’ class minor war criminals and to make some 
preliminary observations. 
 (II)  Th e Australian Trials 
 Little has been written, much less published, about the Australian-run trials. Th ere 
are chapters in books, 14 a few articles, 15 and two doctoral theses. 16 David Sissons, 
the acknowledged expert and participant—as an interpreter at three Morotai trials 
in February 1946—worked intensively through the Australian and Japanese sources 
 10  Totani, above n 1, 227. 
 11  Trials of Japanese ‘B’ and ‘C’ class suspects were held by America, Britain, Australia, Netherlands, 
France, Philippines and China. See the comparative statistics in Piccigallo, above n 3, 264. Th ese 
should be treated with caution as ongoing research updates or clarifi es some fi gures. 
 12  For the British trials, see  Hirofumi  Hayashi ,  ‘British War Crimes Trials of Japanese,’ 
 Nature-People-Society: Science and the Humanities ,  31 ( 2001 ) ;  R. John  Pritchard ,  ‘Th e Gift of Clemency 
following British War Crimes Trials in the Far East, 1946–1948’,  Criminal Law Forum ,  7 ( 1996 ),  15 . 
 13  Under the leadership of Professor Tim McCormack, Asia Pacifi c Centre for Military Law, 
Melbourne Law School, the study is entitled  Australia’s Post-World War Crimes Trials: A Systematic and 
Comprehensive Law Reports Series consisting of 300 Law Reports (prepared by Dr Narrelle Morris) and 
eight historical essays by this author providing context for each location of the Australian trials. It is 
anticipated that publication will begin 2015. 
 14  Michael  Carrel ,  ‘Australia’s Prosecution of Japanese War Criminals:  Stimuli and Constraints’ 
in  David A  Blumenthal and  Timothy L.H.  McCormack (eds),  Th e Legacy of Nuremberg: Civilising 
Infl uence or Institutionalised Vengeance? ( Boston, MA and Leiden :  Martinus Nijhoff  Publishers ,  2008 ), 
 239 ;  Gavan  McCormack ,  ‘Apportioning the Blame: Australian Trials for Railway Crimes’ in  Gavan 
 McCormack and  Hank  Nelson (eds),  Burma/Th ailand Railway: Memory and History ( Crows Nest, 
NSW :  Allen & Unwin ,  1993 ),  85 . 
 15  David  Creed ,  Moira  Rayner and  Sue  Rickard ,  ‘It Will Not be Bound by the Ordinary Rules 
of Evidence,’  Journal of the Australian War Memorial ,  27 ( 1995 ),  47 ;  Rob  Gill ,  ‘Th e Aftermath of 
War (Japanese soldiers on trial in Darwin),’  Northern Perspective ,  18 ( 1995 ),  98 ;  Emmi  Okada ,  ‘Th e 
Australian Trials of Class B and C Japanese War Crimes Suspects, 1945–51’,  Australian International 
Law Journal , ( 2009 ),  47 . 
 16  Caroline  Pappas ,  Law and Politics: Australia’s War Crimes Trials in the Pacifi c, 1943–1961 , PhD 
thesis ( University of New South Wales ,  1998 ); Carrel, above n 4 . 
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from the mid-70s to the mid-90s. However, he only published a brief entry in various 
editions of the  Australian Encyclopaedia , 17 an article giving a guide to sources 18 and a 
long essay published posthumously online in 2006. 19 Before his death in 2006, he 
deposited his papers with the National Library of Australia. Th ese have been of great 
benefi t for my research, because he interviewed or corresponded with many of his 
fellow participants, now deceased. He also hunted down and translated many of the 
Japanese accounts. 20 To his assiduity, I owe a great debt. 
 An article of some infl uence in this poorly served fi eld of scholarship has referred 
to the Australian trials as ‘an unfortunate episode’ and, on the basis of two cases 
tried at Rabaul, has portrayed the general spirit of Australia at the time of the 
trials as a ‘time of revenge and retribution for perceived Japanese mistreatment 
of allied prisoners of war and of civilians occupied by Japan’. Leaving aside the 
tendentious use of the word ‘perceived’ and the weighted choice of quotation in 
the title—‘It Will Not be Bound by the Ordinary Rules of Evidence’—to suggest 
summary justice, Creed and his fellow authors 21 discussed two trials in which four 
Japanese soldiers were accused of sexual crimes against Chinese women, for which 
they received the death sentence. 22 Written during the preparations for the 1995 
Australia Remembers commemorations, the authors called for retrospective com-
passion for the four men hanged ‘for off ences for which Australian soldiers could 
not or would not, have been executed’. 23 While the harshness of the sentences is 
indeed remarkable for crimes when the victims did not die, the argument of Creed 
et al needs some unpacking. 
 Th e authors set out the steps of the two trials fairly accurately. My concerns 
stem from the manner in which the argument is built up in order to arrive at their 
verdict that these cases appear ‘to have been a substantial miscarriage of justice’. 24 
In the fi rst trial, a case of rape, we are told that not only are the names of the pros-
ecuting and defending offi  cers not known—they were not recorded in the trial 
transcripts—but that we do not know ‘whether the defending offi  cer was assisted 
by a Japanese counsel’. 25 To the reader, it would seem that the accused, Sergeant 
 17  David  Sissons ,  ‘War Crimes Trials’ , in  Australian Encyclopaedia ( Sydney, NSW :   Australian 
Geographic , 5th edn,  1988 ),  2980 . Th is edition is to be preferred to later editions which removed his 
criticisms of the trials. 
 18  David Sissons (1997), ‘Sources on Australian Investigations into Japanese War Crimes in the 
Pacifi c,’  Journal of the Australian War Memorial [online], < http://www.awm.gov.au/journal/j30/sis-
sons.asp > (accessed 24 February 2013). 
 19  David Sissons (2006),  Th e Australian War Crimes Trials and Investigations (1942–51) , < http://
socrates.berkeley.edu/~warcrimes/documents/PT.htm > (accessed 24 February 2013). 
 20  See the fi nding aid to his papers, held at the National Library of Australia (NLA) < http://nla.gov.
au/nla.ms-ms3092 > (accessed 24 February 2013). 
 21  Creed, above n 15, 47. Th e quotation came from a speech by the Minister for Defence, John 
Beasley, when explaining the provisions of the War Crimes Act, Commonwealth,  Parliamentary 
Debates , House of Representatives, 4 October 1945, 6511. 
 22  Th e cases were held on 12–13 December 1945 and 6 April 1946. All the Australian-run trials 
are digitized and may be found through the online catalogue of the National Archives of Australia. 
For the trial transcripts see Trial of Sergeant Yaki Yoshio, National Archives of Australia (NAA) 
Canberra, A471, 80747 and Trial of Warrant Offi  cer Matsumoto Tsugiji and two others, A471, 80782 
respectively. 
 23  Creed, above n 15, 47, 53.    24  Creed, above n 15, 53.    25  Creed, above n 15, 47. 
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Yaki Yoshio, was very likely at a disadvantage. Th ese defi ciencies in information, 
however, could have been remedied by reading the press reports which not only 
name the Australian legal personnel but also name Captain Sekiyama as a Japanese 
lawyer from Tokyo assisting the defence. 26 So Sergeant Yaki was not disadvantaged 
in this sense. He had an Australian and a Japanese lawyer defending him. 
 In discussing this case the authors found it an ‘unusual feature’ and ‘astound-
ing’ that the accused did not petition against either the fi nding or the sentence. 27 
First of all, the decision not to petition was not unique. 28 Secondly, although the 
trial record does not indicate why the accused did not petition, there is some 
evidence elsewhere as to the reason. Th e accused had admitted having sexual inter-
course with the Chinese woman. Th e dispute in court between victim and accused 
rested on the question of consent. It seems that General Imamura, General Offi  cer 
Commanding of the 8th Japanese Army in the Islands, agreed with the verdict of 
the court that there had been no consent. Imamura regarded rape as such a heinous 
crime that he forbade Sergeant Yaki the right to petition. 29 A very junior Japanese 
soldier would not disobey such an order. Th us, Yaki’s decision not to petition, even 
if ‘astounding’, is a consequence of a Japanese cultural mindset in which obedience 
to superiors overrides self-interest. It cannot be ascribed to some impediment in 
the Australian procedure. 
 Another possibly misleading statement about this case concerns Lieutenant 
General Vernon Sturdee, the Confi rming Authority, who, it is alleged, established 
‘an almost universal practice for Australian war crimes trials simply confi rming the 
fi ndings and sentence without giving reasons’. 30 While it is true that Sturdee did 
not provide explanations for his confi rmations—although at earlier stages of the 
reviewing process, reasons were quite often given by reviewing offi  cers for their 
recommendations—the impression is given to the reader that confi rmations were 
automatic and that Sturdee acted without volition. In fact, Sturdee commuted so 
many death sentences in the fi rst few months of the trials that there was a public 
outcry. 31 
 In the second case discussed by the authors, the main concern expressed is that 
the three men convicted received a death sentence for the crime of torture ‘an even 
more unusual departure from contemporary Australian legal procedure’. It is out-
side the scope of this chapter and my expertise as a historian to consider whether 
the argument that military courts did not follow domestic precedents is a useful 
one to pursue. 32 However, their account of the torture enacted upon the Chinese 
victim and confi rmed by local witnesses omits the information that the assaults 
 26  ‘War Trials at Rabaul’,  Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 13 December 1945, 3. 
 27  Creed, above n 15, 47, 49–50. 
 28  For example, after a trial held at Wewak two weeks earlier, a Japanese lieutenant sentenced to 
death for cannibalism had also chosen not to petition. See below n 95. 
 29  One of the Japanese defence counsel at Rabaul noted this in a privately published Japanese book 
on  Rabauru (Rabaul) cited in Sissons, above n 19. 
 30  Creed, above n 15, 47, 49.    31  See discussion below n 107. 
 32  Torture was defi ned as a war crime and the death sentence was among the punishments permitted 
under the War Crimes Act 1945 (Cth). 
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on two successive days involved a banana. What happened was more than torture 
even if rape was not specifi ed as one of the charges. In conducting this trial, the 
court members and legal personnel showed great, and perhaps unexpected, sensitivity 
to the victim, closing the court to the public to save her from embarrassment before 
her neighbours. As a contemporary press account reported, the crimes were ‘so revolt-
ing that no newspaper could print them’. 33 
 One aspect that the authors of this article highlight is the speed with which 
the accused were sentenced—that the court members took only fi ve minutes to 
consider their verdict and a further fi ve 34 to announce the verdict and hear any 
submissions on sentencing. Once more summary justice is implied. However, one 
could look at it another way. Th e President of the Court, Lieutenant Colonel John 
Moyes (Headquarters 8th Military District (8MD)), and one of the three court 
members, Major J. W. Ogle, had amassed considerable experience from other tri-
als. 35 It seems likely that they understood the circumstances existing during the 
occupation of New Britain, the situation of the Japanese garrison and the position 
of the local Chinese and had developed an informal scale of atrocities. 
 Th e fi nal point to be discussed here in relation to this case is the assertion that 
the ‘confi rmation procedures in the torture case were also brief ’. 36 Th e implication 
is that the three Japanese on trial were particularly badly treated in the reviewing 
process. Th ey were sentenced on 6 April and submitted petitions the same day. 
Th e reviewing offi  cer, Major W. Chambers (AALC) who was Acting Chief Legal 
Offi  cer for 8MD, headquartered at Rabaul, went through the proceedings and 
concluded on 17 April that the fi ndings and sentence could be confi rmed. 37 Th e 
Judge Advocate General (JAG), William B. Simpson, based in Canberra, consid-
ered the petitions and went through the proceedings, producing a seven-point 
summary and concluding that the fi ndings and sentence should stand. 38 Th is was 
dated 22 May. Th en the Deputy Adjutant-General of the Directorate of Prisoners 
of War and Internees (DPW&I), Brigadier Walter J. Urqhuart, reviewed trial pro-
ceedings, petitions and the JAG’s advice on 7 June and did not disagree. Following 
all this advice, General Sturdee on 11 June confi rmed the fi ndings and sentences, 
which were then promulgated to the convicted men on 25 June. Th ey were hanged 
at Rabaul the next morning. Can an eleven-week process of review be judged 
summary justice, as implied by the authors? 39 
 Th is article has been discussed at length because it shows the need for those 
working on the Australian trials to avoid general assertions about the quality of 
military justice based on merely two cases and two trial transcripts. Th ese two 
 33  ‘More Verdicts Follow Jap Hangings’,  Sun (Sydney), 7 April 1946. 
 34  It was actually ten minutes, NAA Canberra, A471, 80782, 34. 
 35  Moyes had presided over nine earlier trials in Rabaul and Ogle had been a court member for six 
earlier trials. Admittedly, the other two members of the court were having their fi rst experience. 
 36  Creed, above n 15, 47, 50. 
 37  See his one page review in the trial transcript, NAA Canberra, A471, 80782, 13. 
 38  NAA Canberra, A471, 80782, 5–6. 
 39  It is possible Creed et  al meant the one day interval between promulgation and hanging was 
brief. Th e author is preparing an essay on death sentences which discusses the disciplinary reasons for 
executing a war criminal the morning after promulgation. 
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cases were exceptional in attracting death sentences for crimes where the victims 
had not died 40 and should be treated as exceptions. Also, trial transcripts need to be 
supplemented by the extensive contemporary accounts available to the researcher. 
Th ose who have conducted much wider research across the whole series of the 
Australian-run trials—Sissons, Carrel and Pappas 41 —are less hasty to condemn 
Australian military justice. 
 Sissons, who worked through all 300 cases, laid the main criticisms of the 
Australian-run trials at the feet of the War Crimes Act  which federal parliament 
had passed in October 1945 with little or no debate. 42 Th e War Crimes Act, Sissons 
argued, was discriminatory in several aspects, denying the Japanese suspect safe-
guards available to Australians. He and those who have built on his work perceive 
a number of fl aws in the way the trials were set up and, to some extent, conducted. 
Th ese relate to admissible evidence, joint trials, language diffi  culties and inconsist-
ent sentencing. 
 (III)  Admissible Evidence 
 Although the admissibility of affi  davits and hearsay was a common feature of war 
crimes trials of the immediate post-war period, 43 section 9 of the War Crimes Act 
has been a principal source of disquiet for those critiquing the Australian trials. 44 
Section 9(1) stated:
 At any hearing before a military court the court may take into consideration any oral state-
ment or any document appearing on the face of it to be authentic, provided the statement 
or document appears to the court to be of assistance in proving or disproving the charge, 
notwithstanding that the statement or document would not be admissible in evidence 
before a fi eld general court martial. 45 
 Th is ‘dispensation from the traditional rules of evidence’ 46 has been seen as a 
major disadvantage for the accused, whose defence offi  cer was thereby deprived 
of the ‘very valuable right to confront the witness and test the evidence by 
cross-examination’. 47 Not surprisingly, the prosecution made considerable use of 
 40  Sissons, above n 17, 2980, 2981. 
 41  See the work by Carrel, above n 4; Pappas, above n 16; Sissons, above n 19. 
 42  Commonwealth,  Parliamentary Debates , Senate, 4 October 1945, 6463; Commonwealth, 
 Parliamentary Debates , House of Representatives, 4 October 1945, 6510. 
 43  See, for example, the practice relating to evidence in the Nuremberg military tribunals and in the 
British war crimes trials in Hong Kong, discussed in  Kevin J . Heller ,  Th e Nuremberg Military Tribunals 
and the Origins of International Criminal Law ( Oxford :  Oxford University Press ,  2012 ) , Chapter 6 and 
 Suzannah  Linton ,  ‘Rediscovering the War Crimes Trials in Hong Kong, 1946–48,’  Melbourne Journal 
of International Law ,  13 ( 2012 ),  1 ,  25 , respectively. 
 44  Th ere are substantial sections in the two theses. See Pappas, above n 16, 95–99 and Carrel, above 
n 4, 94–5, 172–80. See also a summary by Okada, above n 15, 47, 56–9. Th is article appears to be a 
précis of the arguments and evidence produced by Sissons, Pappas and, in particular, by Carrel. 
 45  War Crimes Act 1945 (Cth), section 9.1.    46  Carrel, above n 4, 94. 
 47  Sissons, above n 17, 2980, 2980. However, the two Chinese female victims in the cases discussed 
by Creed et al were present and were cross-examined. Th is makes the title of their article quite mislead-
ing: Creed, above n 15, 47. 
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this liberal provision concerning admissible evidence and built their cases to a 
large extent upon statements and documents. Most cases in the Australian series 
of trials included as staples, the statements and affi  davits collected from prisoners 
of war soon after they were recovered from liberated camps following the Japanese 
surrender. 48 Rarely were former prisoners of the Japanese fl own to the island loca-
tions of the trials to present their evidence in person. Among the few times vic-
tims appeared as witnesses were during those cases involving the Sandakan-Ranau 
death marches across Borneo. One of the six survivors—Warrant Offi  cer William 
Sticpewich—appeared at three trials at Labuan. 49 He and two other survivors—
Private Keith Botterill and Corporal William Moxham—testifi ed in person at the 
Rabaul trial of Captain Yamamoto Shoichi and ten others in May 1946. 50 Other 
examples include the appearance of a Dutch prisoner of war, Staff  Sergeant Fredrik 
Waaldyk, at the only trial held in Ambon, fortuitously available because he had 
remained on Ambon after his liberation from the notorious Tan Toey prisoner of 
war camp. He was married to a local inhabitant. 51 Another instance occurred at the 
Rabaul trials when Jemadar Chint Singh, an Indian Army prisoner of the Japanese 
from the time of his capture at the fall of Singapore, returned to give evidence at 
the ‘Command Responsibility’ trials of 1947. 52 Th ese were the exceptions. In the 
context of post-war shortages of air transport and the debility of most prisoners of 
war in the fi rst years after repatriation, insistence upon former prisoners attending 
the court in person would not have been feasible. 
 Even at the time there was some concern about this ‘dispensation’. An AALC 
offi  cer, Captain Maxwell R. Ham, was asked to write a legal opinion on Australia’s 
right to try war criminals in general and on section 9 of the War Crimes Act in 
particular. Although Ham acknowledged using affi  davits and statements in the 
absence of actual witnesses to be cross-examined was not consistent with the hear-
say ruling of Australian domestic law, he pointed out that the defence could also 
use such materials. 53 His opinion was sought in September 1946 when the trials 
had been underway for ten months with several Rabaul cases highlighting conten-
tious issues. One in particular used hearsay. Both the defending offi  cer, Captain 
 48  Even so, Major D.E. Cleverly, writing his report on the war crimes work of the DPW&I, recom-
mended special training for those selected for questioning war crimes victims and witnesses ‘as in 
many cases affi  davits received by the Directorate were not suitable for use by the prosecution and had 
to be returned for correction’: NAA Canberra, A7711, Vol 1, 419. 
 49  Trial of Staff  Sergeant Sugino Tsuruo, A471, 80716; Trial of Captain Hoshijima Susumu, A471, 
80777; Trial of Civilian Hayashi Yoshinori and two others, A471, 80779. 
 50  Trial transcript, NAA Canberra, A471, 81029. 
 51  Memo: Sergeant Waaldyk NEI Army—Retention in Ambon, 20 October 1945, NAA Melbourne, 
MP742/1, 336/1/395. According to a Progress Report, 19 October 1945, in the same fi le, sorting out 
those to be accused was delayed by Waaldyk’s weakness but they waited for he was the ‘most impor-
tant informant’. See his evidence, Trial of Captain Shirozu Wadami and 90 others, NAA Canberra, 
A471, 81709. 
 52  For example, he testifi ed at the trial of Lieutenant General Adachi Hatazo in April 1947, NAA 
Canberra, A 471, 81652. He had stayed behind for some months after liberation to identify suspects 
and had thereby survived a plane crash which killed the ten Indian prisoners who had been recovered 
with him. He had returned to India before coming back to Rabaul in 1947. 
 53  Minute paper, Dept of Army, written by Captain Ham for the Director of Legal Services, 9 
September 1946, NAA Melbourne, MP742/1, 336/1/980. 
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Lyston A.  Chisholm, and the Judge-Advocate, Captain J.H. Watson, expressed 
concern about accepting this as evidence in relation to one of the accused but, 
on review in May 1946, the JAG had concluded the evidence suffi  cient to justify 
the fi nding of guilty. In an unusual turn, this case was reviewed once more by 
the JAG in October 1947 following a petition for retrial. However, he did not 
change his position. 54 Th at this case should be revisited in several ways over an 
eighteen-month period seems indicative of an intention to ensure justice had been 
done and to negate suggestions of wholesale vengeance. 
 Another Australian legal offi  cer, Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin J. Dunn, also 
pondered the question of admissible evidence. Within three months of his work 
at Morotai as reviewing offi  cer and deputy Director of Legal Services there, Dunn 
published an article comparing the Australian legal basis for its trials with that of 
Britain and the US. In considering section 9, he conceded that ‘[t] hese provisions 
are so foreign to the rules of evidence applicable to a criminal trial by British courts 
that some lawyers may be critical of them’ and he assumed that ‘expediency was 
largely responsible for this modifi cation’ but he pointed out that the onus was 
still upon the prosecution to prove the off ence beyond reasonable doubt. 55 Th at 
contemporary legal offi  cers were considering this question at all suggests to me a 
determination to be seen as fair in the conduct of the trials. 
 (IV)  Holding Group Trials 
 Another concern about the Australian trials expressed by contemporaries and later 
critics related to the practice of holding group trials as permitted by Regulation 12 
accompanying the Act, which stated that:
 Where there is evidence that a war crime has been the result of concerted action upon the 
part of a unit or group of men, then evidence given upon any charge relating to that crime 
against any member of such unit or group may be received as prima facie evidence of the 
responsibility of each member of that unit or group for that crime. 56 
 Anyone charged as part of such a group was not permitted to apply for a 
separate trial. 
 Questions have been raised about the fairness of trying large numbers of sus-
pects together. Th e examples cited always refer to the same two trials, one with 
ninety-one accused 57 and another with forty-fi ve accused. 58 However, the average 
number of defendants tried in any one trial was three. Th ere were only fourteen 
 54  See transcript, Trial of 2nd Lieutenant Tasaka Mitsuo and two others, NAA Canberra, 
A471, 80978. 
 55  Benjamin J  Dunn ,  ‘Trial of War Criminals,’  Australian Law Journal ,  19 ( 1946 ),  359 ,  361 . He had 
been Reviewing Offi  cer for eight of the early trials held at Morotai in December 1945. 
 56  Appendix D: Regulations for the Trial of War Criminals. Statutory Rules 1945, Carrel, above 
n 4, 271–3. For discussions of the legal issues, see Pappas, above n 16, 98, Carrel, above n 4, 167–70. 
 57  Trial of Captain Shirozu Wadami and 90 others, NAA Canberra, A471, 81709. 
 58  Trial of Staff  Sergeant Matsutaka and 44 others, NAA Canberra, A471, 80754. 
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Australian cases (or 4.7% of all cases) where ten or more suspects were prosecuted, 
twelve of them involving between ten and seventeen men. 59 Th ey were aberrations 
and selecting them as typical examples should be avoided. 
 When these cases reached the JAG of the time, both men complained of the 
scale of evidence they had to work through. J. Bowie Wilson, the JAG reviewing the 
Labuan trial of forty-fi ve guards for ill-treatment of prisoners held at Kuching camp in 
British North Borneo, found the trial ‘unsatisfactory’. He complained that the ‘great 
number of the accused tried jointly made it extremely diffi  cult to follow and to allo-
cate the evidence to the individual’. 60 His replacement as JAG, William B. Simpson, 
made ‘a most emphatic protest’ the following month when he got the documents 
for the Ambon-Morotai mass trial of ninety-one Japanese who were accused of 
ill-treatment of prisoners of war at Tan Toey camp in Ambon, where the death rate 
reached seventy-seven per cent. 61 Simpson spent ‘six full days on this fi le’ and worried 
that he might have overlooked ‘through sheer inability to remember some cogent 
detail . . . something in favour of one or other accused’. 62 Mass trials on this scale were 
never held again—an indication that the possibility of unfairness in this approach was 
recognized. Th ese two had been early trials in the whole sequence and it seems the 
courts learnt their lesson about the diffi  culties involved in adopting such a procedure. 
 (V)  Language Diffi  culties 
 In February 1946, the Japanese defence counsel in the mass trial of the Tan Toey 
guards, Somiya Shinji, raised the problem of language diffi  culties, arguing that 
the accused were ‘unable to defend themselves suffi  ciently’ because they could 
not express ‘in an exact and accurate manner what they wanted to state’. He also 
pointed out that their ‘way of thinking was diff erent from that of other nations 
owing to the diff erence in thought and feeling between them’. 63 Th is is a criticism 
of some substance. 
 Japanese lawyers for the defence appeared for the fi rst time at Labuan, a week 
ahead of their use at Rabaul and nearly two months before their use in the Morotai 
trials. 64 Colonel Yamada who, with Major Hayasaki, began appearing for the 
 59  Carrel, above n 4, 167. 
 60  J. Bowie Wilson to DPW&I (for Convening Authority), 4 March 1946, Minute Paper, Trial 
of Japanese War Criminals, NAA Canberra, A471, 80754 PART 1, 6. Th is was one of Wilson’s last 
cases and one can speculate that it played a part in his replacement by Simpson. Wilson retired on 31 
March 1946. 
 61  Th e death rate was nearly twice that on the Burma-Th ailand railway ‘at its worst’. See  Joan 
 Beaumont ,  ‘Gull Force Comes Home:  Th e Aftermath of Captivity,’  Journal of the Australian War 
Memorial ,  14 ( 1989 ),  43 . For an extensive study of Tan Toey, see  Joan  Beaumont ,  Gull Force: Survival 
and Leadership in Captivity, 1941–1945 ( Crows Nest, NSW :  Allen & Unwin ,  1988 ) . 
 62  W.B. Simpson to AMF HQ (for DPW&I), 24 April 1946, NAA Canberra, A471, 81709 
PART 1, 9. 
 63  Th is was part of his closing address, NAA A471, 81709 PART 1, 464. 
 64  Colonel Yamada and Major Hayasaki were the fi rst defending offi  cers in early trials at Labuan 
before being augmented by other Japanese counsel in later trials. Th e Rabaul trials had Japanese 
defence counsel from the fi rst trial there on 12–13 December, eight days after their fi rst use at Labuan. 
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defence at Labuan in December 1945 spoke excellent English and had completed 
his education in England. With Hayasaki, he had formerly been a member of the 
Japanese civil administration in Borneo. 65 Even if Yamada had formal legal train-
ing and had some advantage in his linguistic abilities, he was not accustomed to 
Australian military courts. In the fi rst trial at Labuan, ‘Captain Brereton took the 
unusual course for a prosecutor of going out of his way to assist Yamada by explain-
ing law and court procedure and by allowing him latitude in his handling of wit-
nesses’. Yamada returned the favour by often assisting the interpreters ‘explaining 
some fi ne shade of meaning of a Japanese phrase’. 66 
 Th e language problems and cultural misunderstandings created by the 
co-existence of Anglophone president, court members, prosecution and sometime 
defence counsel, with defendants who might be not only Japanese but Korean 
or Taiwanese, calls for a study in itself. Added to this mixture were Japanese 
defence counsel operating in an unfamiliar legal system and witnesses, belong-
ing not only to language groups previously mentioned, but sometimes including 
Malays, Indonesians, New Guinea indigenous and other islanders. Th e possibili-
ties of mutual incomprehension were boundless. Th e longueurs  of the translation 
and checking process, particularly in the humid conditions of some of the island 
locations, could send not only defendants to sleep but endangered the alertness of 
the court members. However, when General Imamura Hitoshi and the military 
policeman guarding him dozed off  during his trial at Rabaul it was the president 
of the court, Major General J.S. Whitelaw who woke them up. 67 During the trial 
of Lieutenant Asaoka and two others for executing captured Royal Australian Air 
Force crew, held at Morotai in December 1945, several nurses who had come to 
watch were at fi rst ‘all keenly interested’ but they became distracted by the long 
delays while the interpreters made sure the witnesses and accused understood com-
pletely the counsels’ questions. 68 
 Th e number of interpreters on off er from the Allied Translator and Interpreter 
Service (ATIS) even when supplemented by nisei serving in the US Forces was 
extremely limited and the standard of some of the rapidly trained Australian 
interpreters was variable. 69 At the Rabaul trials, the principal interpretation was 
Japanese defence counsel did not appear at Wewak and were not used at Ambon and Morotai until 
late January 1946. Th ey were fi rst used there in the mass trial of ninety-one accused. 
 65  Eric Th ornton, ‘Massacre of 44 POW’s [sic]:  Jap Sergeant Faces Trial’,  Argus (Melbourne), 
4 December 1945, 16. 
 66  Eric Th ornton, ‘Jap Lawyer Invites Prosecutor to be his Guest in Japan’,  Argus (Melbourne), 
7 December 1945, 20. Th e invitation to visit was extended by Yamada to Brereton. 
 67  Ishimura  Kei ,  Beyond the ‘Judgement of Civilisation’:  Th e Intellectual Legacy of the Japanese 
War Crimes Trials, 1946–1949 ( Tokyo :   International House of Japan ,  2003 ) , translated by Steven 
J. Ericson, 311. A  strategy to keep alert, adopted by Major Kenneth J. Prowse, president at three 
of the Labuan trials, was to take notes in a ledger. Th e ledger is now in the National Library of 
Australia: NLA MS 5722, Prowse Papers, Folder 1. 
 68  ‘Th eir interest begins to wain [sic]’, Australian telegram from ABC reporter, Talbot Sydney 
Duckmanton, 5 December 1945, Australian War Memorial (AWM), PR00238, Duckmanton Papers. 
For the trial, see Trial of Lieutenant Asaoka Toshi and two others, NAA Canberra, A471, 80717. 
 69  Colin  Funch ,  Linguists in Uniform: Th e Japanese Experience ( Melbourne :  Japanese Studies Centre, 
Monash University ,  2003 ) provides a full account of ATIS. 
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done by Japanese interpreters ‘who all spoke excellent English’. Th e Australian 
linguists adopted the practice of monitoring their translations and interceding 
when they ‘felt that the Court or the accused or Counsel may have misunder-
stood an interpretation’. 70 Even so, Lieutenant Joseph da Costa, one of the most 
fl uent of the ATIS interpreters at Labuan, was concerned that suspects did not 
grasp what was going on. He had been educated in Japan, before his evacua-
tion to Australia in 1941 on one of the last ships to leave. His spoken Japanese, 
acquired from his nanny, was ‘excellent’. 71 He was, however, not familiar with 
specialized military terms or medical terms in Japanese; words that had to be 
used during the trials. Worried and conscientious, he adopted the practice of 
visiting the specifi c prisoner in the evening to go over the day’s proceedings to 
ensure that the suspect knew what had been said during the day. He did not 
want them to be unaware of the implications of the prosecuting counsel’s ques-
tions. 72 In adopting such strategies, the ATIS interpreters attempted to remedy 
the translating defi ciencies. 
 Occasionally, the courts could take advantage of the presence of a chance lin-
guist, such as the offi  cial Dutch observer at the Darwin trials, Major J.M.L. 
Hosselet, Judge-Advocate in Australia for all Dutch troops. Th e crimes being 
tried at Darwin had taken place in Dutch Timor and among the witnesses were 
local villagers. A prisoner of war in Java for over three years, Hosselet was skilled 
in several languages, assisting the court at times during the trial. 73 At Rabaul, 
in four cases involving the torture of German-speaking priests, nuns, Chinese 
and local civilians based at the Ramale Mission, a Chinese civilian, Frederick 
Chan, and two of the priests acted as interpreters when the victims gave their 
evidence. 74 
 Despite these makeshift solutions, however, there were never enough compe-
tent interpreters to ensure all defendants and witnesses understood the implication 
of questions. Undoubtedly, the standard of linguistic profi ciency in many cases 
did not match the requirements expected at war crimes trials today. However, it 
is anachronistic to judge the provisions made by current standards. In consider-
ing the question of fairness, the good intentions and the compensatory strategies 
adopted should be taken into account and wholesale condemnation of the trials, 
citing this factor, should be rejected. 
 70  Letter from Mr John Ferris to the author, 26 January 2010. Th is was confi rmed in my interview 
with Mr John Hook (Melbourne, 11 March 2010). Mr Ferris and Mr Hook had been interpreters 
with ATIS at Rabaul. 
 71  Arthur  Page ,  Between Victor and Vanquished: An Australian Interrogator in the War Against Japan 
( Loftus, NSW :   Australian Military History Publications ,  2008 ),  475 . Page (born Papppadopoulos) 
knew da Costa in Japan when they were schoolboys. 
 72  Interview with Colonel da Costa (Melbourne, 12 March 2010). 
 73  He was offi  cially credited as interpreter in the second Darwin trial, NAA Canberra, A471, 81630. 
 74  Father Hohne interpreted at two Rabaul trials, NAA Canberra A471, 80745 and NAA Canberra, 
A471, 80744; Father Zwinge and Mr Chan interpreted at two more, NAA Canberra, A471, 80743 
and NAA Canberra, A471, 80741. 
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 (VI)  Inconsistency in sentencing 
 Th ose criticizing the Australian-run trials point to the inconsistency in sentencing 
as a major issue. Th ere were no general guidelines to sentencing policy or tariff s. 75 
Earlier trials eventuated in harsher sentences than later trials. Death sentences were 
more frequently awarded. In the fi rst month of the trials, sixty-two per cent of the 
accused were sentenced to death whereas the fi gure is only twenty per cent for the 
Manus trials in 1950–1, despite the Manus cases being selected on the basis they 
were likely to attract the death sentence. 76 
 In one case, Lieutenant Katayama Hideo, tried in Morotai in March 1946 and 
sentenced to death for his role in executing one of four downed airmen, lived long 
enough to see that accused in later trials were awarded lesser sentences, including a 
case at Rabaul in which Captain Noto Kiyohisa had been found guilty of a similar 
crime—the murder of three prisoners of war—but had received only a twenty-year 
sentence. 77 Katayama had been kept alive for over a year after one of his co-accused 
had been shot by fi ring squad as he was needed as a witness at a later case. He 
appeared at the Rabaul trial of Captain Kawasaki who was alleged to have con-
veyed the order to Katayama to execute the captured prisoners. 78 In the meantime, 
as a fl uent English speaker, he was found to be extremely useful translating docu-
ments for the Australians. Th ree weeks before the execution of Katayama, Major 
Herbert F. Dick, prosecuting offi  cer in the Kawasaki case, submitted a detailed 
minute paper, arguing for mitigation of Katayama’s death sentence. One of his 
arguments was on the grounds of consistency of sentencing. Dick pointed out the 
discrepancy of awarding a twenty-year sentence to Noto, a more senior offi  cer, for 
a similar crime. 79 Despite this argument as well as petitions from all in the Rabaul 
compound and delaying tactics by the Australian Commandant in promulgating 
the warrant of execution—Brigadier Neylan hoped that new instructions would 
arrive from Melbourne—Katayama faced a fi ring squad on 23 October 1947. 80 
 One reason for inconsistency in sentencing lies in the fact that trials were 
being held concurrently in the fi rst few months at several diff erent locations, 
 75  General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, had issued directions 
for trials held in his area of responsibility: Pappas, above n 16, 283. 
 76  Th e fi gures are given by Pappas, above n 16, 153. For the policy on selecting the fi nal cases for 
trial at Manus, see NAA Melbourne, MP742/1, 336/1/2076. For the division of cases ready for trial 
into categories to see which ones should go forward to trial, see NAA Canberra, A4940, C2. 
 77  Trial of Naval Captain Noto Kiyohisa, NAA Canberra, A471, 81210, held on 9–10 July 1947. 
 78  Trial of Captain Kawasaki Matsuhei, NAA Canberra, A471, 81067. One of the last cases tried at 
Rabaul, it was heard in late June and early July 1947. Kawasaki was found not guilty in a case of some 
complexity. Th e chain of command was diffi  cult to establish but it became clear that a far more senior 
offi  cer, Baron Takasaki, had some questions to answer. 
 79  Minute paper by Major H F. Dick for DPW&I, 1 October 1947, NAA Melbourne, MP742/1, 
336/1/1737. 
 80  Th is is a very well documented case with several Japanese and Australian contemporary sources 
providing much detail about his last days. Th e Katayama case also featured in  Blood Oath , a fi lm 
which should be treated with great caution, Hank  Nelson ,  ‘ “Blood Oath”: A Reel History’,  Australian 
Historical Studies ,  24 ( 1991 ),  429 . 
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not allowing court members therefore to learn from each other. Th e fi rst trials 
at Wewak, Morotai and Rabaul all begin in early December 1945 within days of 
each other. Each court had, of course, completely diff erent personnel as president, 
court members and legal offi  cers. In the temporary courts of Wewak, Morotai and 
Labuan, held in those particular locations to take advantage of the availability of 
Australian forces, there were lots of offi  cers for the Convening Authority to press 
into service. In those temporary courts, there was a great turnover in personnel, 
militating against the build up of even personal consistency, much less a consist-
ency for the court as a whole. 81 
 In the later and longer-running courts at Rabaul, Singapore and Manus Island, 
individual presidents, court members and counsel built up much experience with 
which to measure the heinousness of one crime as against another. Lieutenant 
Colonel C.H. Smith was president or member of more than eighty Rabaul tri-
als, including the ‘Command Responsibility’ cases. Lieutenant Colonel C.R.E. 
Jennings was president of fourteen of the twenty-three trials held in Singapore. 
Particular courts in the one location might develop some consistency, not only 
because they were run by overlapping personnel but also because they focused on a 
particular atrocity or set of related atrocities. Th is was the case in the Singapore tri-
als, eighteen of which related to crimes committed against prisoners of war build-
ing the Burma-Th ailand Railway. Although Captain A.D. Mackay sat as president 
in only one of the Singapore cases—a Burma-Th ailand railway case heard on 10 
and 12 March 1947 82 —he had built up some expertise as the prosecuting offi  cer 
in eight earlier cases, fi ve of them concerning crimes committed on the railway. He 
then continued to prosecute cases in Hong Kong. 
 Other personnel were moved from one location to another such as Major Dick, 
Lieutenant Colonel John T.  Brock and Major Henry J.  Foster. Th e breadth of 
experience gained in diff erent postings gave these individuals the opportunity to 
develop some perspective and may be a partial explanation as to why later sen-
tences were more lenient than earlier ones for very similar crimes. 
 Inconsistency was also apparent in the tariff s awarded to senior offi  cers as 
compared with the junior offi  cers who had carried out their orders. At a trial in 
Rabaul in April 1946, two non-commissioned offi  cers and seven Formosan civil-
ians were sentenced to death for the execution of sick Chinese prisoners of war. 83 
Four were hanged on 17 July 1946 after the various stages of petition and review 
but the remaining fi ve—all Formosans—were kept alive to give evidence at the 
trial of Major General Hirota Akira who had given the original order. 84 Tried in 
March and April 1947, Hirota only got seven years’ imprisonment. 85 Following 
 81  See Pappas, above n 16, 280–1 for a discussion of the lack of information given to courts about 
JAG’s opinions where the fi ndings had been overturned. 
 82  Th e trial of Korean Guard Hayashi Eishun, A471, 81695 is critiqued by McCormack, above 
n 14, 85, 90–1. 
 83  Trial of Sergeant Matsushima and eight others, NAA Canberra, A471, 80915. 
 84  David Sissons, ‘Th e Australian War Crimes Trials’, typescript draft, 16 August 1985, for  Sydney 
Morning Herald (Sydney), 10 (in the possession of the author). 
 85  Trial of Major General Hirota, NAA Canberra, A471, 81653. Th is is one of the ‘Command 
Responsibility’ trials. 
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the intervention of the president of the court, Major General J.S. Whitelaw, and a 
recommendation from the JAG that such a long detention awaiting death should 
justify commutation, the fi ve Formosans were reprieved—too late for the four men 
already hanged. 
 Of all fi ve ‘command responsibility’ trials, only Lieutenant General Baba Masao 
received a death sentence. 86 Th e burden of guilt for the war crimes committed 
tended to be placed on the shoulders of the privates and junior offi  cers, not at the 
feet of those who passed the orders down the chain or were responsible for the 
policy that led to the atrocities. 
 (VII)  Th e Review Process as a Safety Net 
 Although there are some well-known cases where either the fi nding or the sen-
tencing tariff  seems questionable, as in the Katayama case discussed earlier, many 
apparent injustices were caught by the review process. When Private Fukushima 
was found not guilty of murdering an Australian prisoner at Ranau in Borneo, 
a new court, with diff erent personnel, 87 was assembled the next day and he was 
re-tried on the same charge but as a civilian. Th e second court found him guilty. 
A  blatant miscarriage of justice, however, was averted when the JAG pointed 
out that the principle of double jeopardy still applied to war crimes suspects. He 
advised Sturdee not to confi rm the sentence. 88 
 Th ere are other examples where the review process provided a safety net. In the 
fi rst cannibalism trial at Wewak, Lieutenant Tazaki admitted that he had mutilated 
and cannibalized the body of a dead Australian soldier when severely malnour-
ished and suff ering from malaria. Although his defending offi  cer (Captain Jack 
Watson) argued that he was temporarily insane at the time, he was sentenced to 
death by hanging, the fi rst death sentence to be awarded in the whole series of 
Australian-run trials. 89 Th e convicted man did not petition so his case was not sent 
to the JAG but was sent to the Convening Offi  cer who was advised by the Chief 
Legal Offi  cer. Luckily for Tazaki, the reviewing offi  cer, Brigadier Alan S. Lloyd, 
recommended commutation on several grounds, including the conditions fac-
ing Tazaki at that late stage of the war, and that recommendation was followed. 90 
Tazaki’s death sentence was commuted to fi ve years with hard labour. 91 
 86  Trial of General Baba, NAA Canberra, A471, 81631. 
 87  With the exception of the Japanese defence counsel. 
 88  Trial of Private Fukushima Masao, NAA Canberra, A471, 81060, held 28–29 May 1946, and 
Trial of Civilian Fukushima Masao, NAA Canberra, A471, 81218, held 30–31 May 1946. 
 89  Th ere is silent fi lm footage of his being questioned and of his trial in the collection of the 
Australian War Memorial, See ‘Interrogation of Suspected War Criminals’, F07377 and ‘War Crimes 
Trial of Lieutenant Tazaki’, F07379. Both fi lms reveal his emaciated state even after several months 
following the cannibalism committed in July 1945. 
 90  Trial of Lieutenant Tazaki Takehiro, NAA Canberra, A471, 80713. 
 91  Th e commutation was dated 19 December 1945. To what extent the commutation had been 
infl uenced by a campaign (alleging bias) by war correspondent, Noel Ottaway, and his editor, John 
Goodge of the Sydney  Sun , whose letters found their way into many ministers’ fi les, is hard to ascertain. 
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 In cases where there were petitions, then the petitions and trial transcripts 
were forwarded by the Convening Offi  cer to Army headquarters in Melbourne 
for review. Th e Director of Legal Services would examine court proceedings and 
advise whether the court was legally convened and properly constituted, the 
charges properly drawn and whether the sentence was valid and should be con-
fi rmed. Proceedings then went to the JAG. He would advise on whether petitions 
should be upheld or dismissed and whether there was any reason for not confi rm-
ing the fi nding and the sentence. All this legal advice would be considered by 
the Confi rming Authority, Acting Commander-in-Chief General Sturdee, before 
confi rming or changing the fi nding or sentence. 92 
 Indeed, the multiple steps of reviewing a case frequently overturned or miti-
gated a sentence. Th ere were 214 death sentences passed by Australian courts, yet 
only 148 of these were confi rmed. 93 In February 1946, Sturdee commuted twenty 
death sentences handed out at two early Labuan trials in December 1945. 94 For 
those trials that concluded between November 1945 and 31 January 1946, 
Sturdee commuted a total of twenty-eight of the death sentences to terms of 
imprisonment. 95 In these cases he followed the advice of the then Judge Advocate 
General, J. Bowie Wilson. Wilson, for example, recommended that the twenty 
subordinates, tried for the Riam Road massacre, be given ten-year sentences on 
the grounds that ‘it is impossible to believe that these men were competent to 
judge between a legal and an illegal order’. 96 Sergeant Sugino, however, who 
had given the order to bayonet and kill the prisoners, had his death sentence 
confi rmed. 97 
 Th ese particular commutations caused a huge outcry. Returned servicemen 
and other organizations complained to Members of Parliament. 98 When they, in 
turn, sought explanations from the Minister for the Army, Forde responded that 
this power had been delegated to Sturdee who was ‘not interfered with by the 
Government or any other authority in the impartial exercise of his discretion’. 
Forde argued that it was just the same as the government not interfering with deci-
sions of the domestic courts. 99 
 92  Carrel above n 4, 95–8.    93  Table C, Carrel above n 4, 101. 
 94  Trial of Sergeant Miura and fourteen others, NAA Canberra, A471, 81214 and Trial of Guard 
Hirota and eight others, NAA Canberra, A471, 81204. Th ese concerned the Riam Road massacre of 
prisoners of war in Borneo. 
 95  Th ey comprised commutations of death sentences given at Labuan (twenty-two), Rabaul (three), 
Morotai (two), Wewak (one). See Carrel, above n 4, 126. 
 96  See Carrel, above n 4, 162. 
 97  Trial of Sergeant Major Sugino, NAA Canberra, A471, 80716. 
 98  Th ose organizations sending protest resolutions passed at meetings and found in Department 
of the Army fi les included the Australian Labour Party Paddington Branch (15 March 1946), NAA 
Melbourne, MP742/1, 336/1/981, Ipswich branch, Returned Sailor’s Soldier’s Airmen’s Imperial 
League RSSAILA (27 February 1946), Australian Prisoners of War Relatives’ Association (4 March 
1946)  and Australian Legion of Ex-Servicemen and Women (1 April 1946), NAA Melbourne, 
MP742/1, 336/1/555. 
 99  Francis Forde’s reply to P.J. Roche, Secretary, Ipswich branch, RSSAILA, 29 March 1946, NAA 
Melbourne, MP742/1, 336/1/555. 
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 Of the 643 guilty sentences awarded, 130, or twenty per cent, were mitigated, 
commuted or not confi rmed. 100 Of these, twenty-six fell into the latter category. 101 
Th e second Judge Advocate General, William B. Simpson, who replaced J. Bowie 
Wilson on 31 March 1946, had a considerably higher success rate in getting 
Sturdee to act on his recommendations for changes to fi ndings or sentences than 
did his predecessor. Wilson had sixty-nine per cent of his recommendations for 
change ignored, compared to Simpson’s eighteen per cent. Th is diff erence has an 
obvious bearing on the perception that the sentencing in the earlier trials was 
harsher. 102 Wilson opposed death sentences on junior men, whereas Simpson had 
less concern about that, arguing that massacres were so obviously wrong, the rank 
of the perpetrator was irrelevant. 103 
 Th e Australian acquittal rate was also high compared to the other Allied war 
crimes trials. Th e Australian courts acquitted 29.31 per cent, surpassed only by 
China’s rate of 39.64 per cent. Th e overall Allied rate of acquittal was 18.9 per 
cent. 104 Th is cannot be explained as a consequence of prosecuting ‘even minor 
off ences’ as claimed by Okada. 105 Crimes prosecuted included torture, rape, 
ill-treatment resulting in large-scale deaths, massacres, executions of captured pris-
oners, none of which could be described as minor. 
 (VIII)  ‘Victor’s Justice’—Evidence from the Participants 
 While historians and lawyers continue to debate the question of ‘victor’s justice’, 
it is interesting to read what contemporaries thought. In December 1945, F.R. 
Sinclair, Secretary of the Department of the Army, asked his Minister how poster-
ity might judge the Australian-run trials. He pointed out that ‘the motives which 
underlie our activities in bringing our former enemies to trial cannot be said to 
be altogether dis-interested or unbiased’. 106 He was uneasy about the death sen-
tences which gave the victors power to hang or shoot the vanquished in a system 
where all the stages of reviewing under the War Crimes Act were to be done by the 
military themselves. 107 Th at he won the concession of having the JAG, a civilian 
adjudicator, brought into the process, was, Sissons pointed out, down to his ‘hard 
 100  Pappas, above n 16, 132. 
 101  Th ey comprised cases at Morotai (one), Rabaul (twenty-two), Singapore (one), Hong Kong 
(one) and Manus (one), See Sissons, above n 18, Table A, n 9. 
 102  Pappas, above n 16, 150. 
 103  Pappas, above n 16, 146–7. 
 104  See Table E, Carrel, above n 4, 102. 
 105  Okada, above n 15, 47, 50. She also claimed that the acquittal rate at Manus stemmed from 
the choice of crimes being prosecuted, but see n 75. Manus cases were chosen because they involved 
murders and other serious crimes and so were likely to attract the death sentence. 
 106  Sinclair to the Minister, Dept of Army, 6 December 1945, NAA Melbourne, MP742/1, 
336/1/980. 
 107  Sturdee, the Commander in Chief of the Army, was given sole authority to confi rm the death 
sentence. Th is diff ered from the Field Courts Martial practice of confi rmation resting with the 
Governor-General in Council. For the procedure for confi rmation of death sentences, see Minute 
Paper, Trials of War Criminals, December 1945, NAA Melbourne, MP742/1, 336/1/382. 
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fought battle’. 108 Sir William Webb, whose advice was sought and was soon to be 
presiding over the IMTFE, was quite scathing about Sinclair’s doubts, writing to 
Sinclair’s Minister, Frank Forde:
 Apparently Mr Sinclair thinks we owe the same duty to the Japanese guilty of war crimes as 
we do to our own soldiers guilty of breaches of military discipline. I respectfully suggest that 
this is a wholly erroneous view. It is certainly contrary to international law, which merely 
requires a fair trial for enemies charged with breaches of the rules of warfare. 109 
 Webb argued that war criminals were like pirates or brigands and that diff erent 
rules should be applied to them. 
 A surprising number of people involved in the trials—both Australian and 
Japanese—have left accounts. One of the most detailed was a diary kept by 
Captain Athol Moffi  tt, the prosecuting offi  cer in some of the trials held at Labuan 
in January 1946. Written on the same evening or the day after the events described, 
the diary provides the uncensored views of a young offi  cer, trying to prove that 
Captain Hoshijima, the commandant of Sandakan camp, was directly responsible 
for the deaths of over 1,000 prisoners who died of starvation during his time of 
command. 110 It was, Moffi  tt wrote, ‘easy to prove cruelty’ as he had fi fty statements 
detailing many incidents during the years that Hoshijima ran the prisoner of war 
camp. However, he expected the Japanese defence to argue that the Allied bomb-
ing campaign had reduced rations. He was sure that this was not the true reason 
‘but the evidence we have that H[oshijima] was a party to this starvation is not yet 
watertight’. He was investing much hope in Sticpewich, one of the six survivors 
from the Sandakan death marches , who was daily expected at Labuan as a witness. 
In the meantime, he thought the Japanese might give a lead. He wrote, ‘I will fer-
ret them out and see what I can get’. 111 Th e next day, he questioned the Japanese 
quartermaster, who, to Moffi  tt’s delight, connected the cutting of the rice ration 
to an order from Hoshijima. It was the next sentence in the diary which attracted 
my attention: ‘His evidence is so important that I had it read over to him 3 times 
and had him say it was quite correct.’ 112 Th is was the central piece of evidence that 
convicted Hoshijima and brought him to the scaff old two months later, but the 
sentence might also indicate an eff ort to be fair. Was Moffi  tt, by asking for repeti-
tion, warning—‘[d] o you realise what you have just admitted? Do you really mean 
what you have just said?’ Obviously, much more work is needed on this text, but 
the point is that the diary provides another type of source—apart from trial tran-
scripts and government fi les—for investigating the fairness of the trials. 
 Several of the Japanese convicted published accounts after repatriation to Japan 
in the 1950s, including memoirs by General Imamura Hitoshi, Commander of 
 108  Sissons, above n 86, 6. Th e decision to appoint a civilian as JAG arose after World War I out of a 
desire to give the position some independence from the Army, Report, ‘Draft Historical Notes JAG’s 
Department and Australian Army Legal Division’, cited in Pappas, above n 16, 145. 
 109  Webb to Forde, 8 Jan 1946, NAA Melbourne, MP742/1, 336/1/980. 
 110  Trial of Captain Hoshijima, NAA Canberra, A471, 80777 PART 1 and 80777 PART 2. 
 111  Diary entry for 2 January 1946, Diary of Athol Moffi  tt, AWM PR01378, Moffi  tt Papers, 137–8. 
 112  Diary entry for 3 January 1946, Diary of Athol Moffi  tt, AWM PR01378, Moffi  tt Papers, 138. 
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the Japanese forces in New Guinea, New Britain and other islands, 113 tried at one 
of the ‘Command Responsibility’ trials in 1947. He objected to the acceptance 
of hearsay contrary to the usual rules of evidence in British and Australian law. 
Lieutenant Katayama Hideo, executed in October 1947, smuggled out volumes 
of a diary which were subsequently published in Japan after his death. 114 Another 
Japanese diary was kept by Captain Kokaze Ichitano, who was posted as a defence 
offi  cer to the war crimes court at Rabaul in January 1946. 115 Th ese and other 
Japanese sources deserve a separate study. 
 One contemporary account from Somiya Shinji, the Japanese defence lawyer 
at the mass trial of ninety-one Japanese suspects, was published in 1946 before 
Judge Pal’s judgment on the fairness of the IMTFE was made known and gained 
such infl uence. Somiya’s account was subsequently translated. 116 Somiya headed 
the defence of Captain Shirozu Wadami, commander of the 20th Garrison Unit, 
Japanese Navy, and the ninety others responsible for administering the Tan Toey 
prisoner of war camp. Th is trial, discussed above, began at Ambon and was com-
pleted at Morotai. 117 
 Somiya, who was later Defence Counsel at one of the IMTFE trials, wrote an 
account of the trial which reveals, directly and indirectly, how diff erent were the 
legal systems of the two countries. Among the diff erences that Somiya noted with 
approval was the way the President and court members acted as ‘umpires of the 
games’, that the defence had equal rights with prosecution, that the prosecution was 
required to assume the burden of proof and that the trials were open to the pub-
lic. 118 He also commented upon the way witnesses were called to court ‘to be ques-
tioned whenever necessary’ and that the president and court members could make 
‘inquiries to the witness’ but, unlike the Japanese system, that questioning was ‘only 
subsidiary’ to the examinations by prosecuting and defence counsels. 119 Somiya also 
noted that ‘defending offi  cers were allowed to communicate with defendants freely’ 
which was a right not granted in Japan. 120 He was able to visit his clients every night. 
 Somiya’s account also reveals the eff orts made to grant the nintety-one suspects 
a fair trial. He was very impressed during the Ambon section of the trial when 
the local witnesses were tested in their identifi cation evidence. Th e suspects wore 
diff erent clothing and stood in a diff erent order at repeated identifi cation parades 
 113  Imamura was tried at Rabaul, and sentenced to ten years. Imamura’s memoirs, published in the 
early 1960s, and composed while imprisoned in Java where the Dutch also tried him, are discussed in 
Ushimura above n 67. 
 114  See sections of Katayama Hideo,  Ai to Shi to Eien to (Tokyo:  Gendai Bungei Shuppan, 
1958) translated by David Sissons in NLA MS 3092, Sissons Papers, Boxes 22, 23, 32, 33. 
 115  See sections of Kokaze Ichitano, ‘Shusen Zengo to Sempai Bengono Kaiso’, 160–82, translated 
by David Sissons in NLA MS 3092, Sissons Papers, Box 32. 
 116  See Somiya Shinji, ‘Th e Account of Legal Proceedings of Court for War Criminal Suspects’ 
(1946). Th is typescript translation by Kazuo Yoshioka was commissioned by John Williams, the 
prosecuting counsel in the trial which Somiya describes, Mitchell Library, Sydney, MLMSS 2207, 
Williams Papers. 
 117  See above n 57. 
 118  Somiya, above n 116. Th ese novelties were also noted with approval in relation to the Tokyo 
Trials in 1948 by Prof. Uchida Rikizo from University of Tokyo, Totani, above n 1, 207. 
 119  Somiya, above n 116, 6.    120  Somiya, above n 116, 10. 
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‘for fear but any misidentifi cation on the part of the witnesses should happen’. 121 
Somiya was also impressed with what happened when the Japanese Medical Offi  cer 
of the Tan Toey Camp seemed likely to be trapped into self-incrimination. Th e 
Judge-Advocate, Major J.D. Bell, asked the prosecutor to stop, citing the right to 
silence. Th e Court adjourned and then resumed. Several times over the next ten 
days, the Judge-Advocate repeated this advice to witnesses ‘whenever the prosecu-
tion’s inquiries became fi erce and severe and might reduce the witnesses to testify 
against themselves’. 122 Th e Judge-Advocate also came to Somiya’s assistance with 
advice on how to conduct the defence. Rather than the long and detailed defence 
address Somiya had prepared, he recommended calling witnesses as required and 
cross-examining the prosecution witnesses. 123 In such manner and to some extent 
was the unequal contest between those familiar with the Australian system and 
those who were not remedied. 124 
 When Somiya heard the verdicts and sentences, he wrote that he felt ‘the trial very 
fair’. 125 He had expected more convictions—forty-four were found not guilty—
because the case, connected with the death of over 400 Allied prisoners, had attracted 
such publicity. Only four of those found guilty received the death sentence. 
 Although Somiya had acquired some experience of procedure in an Australian 
military court, he still felt uncomfortable coping with an unfamiliar and culturally 
diff erent system. In his next case at Morotai, he asked for and received the assis-
tance of an Australian defence counsel, one of the practical ways being developed 
to compensate for the Japanese disadvantage. 126 Somiya described Captain D.M. 
Campbell in action in a way that not only reveals his admiration but also is a very 
good example of what happened in other courts and locations where Australian 
defence counsel fought as hard for their client as they would have in pre-war civil-
ian law courts. 127 Somiya wrote:
 From the opening of the trial, Capt Campbell did all in his power to defend the accused; he 
raised objections whenever the prosecution’s charges or claims were considered to infringe 
the principle of court proceedings or extend too far; he took objections against the pros-
ecution’s arguments, documentary evidence or witness’ evidences and even against the 
President’s interrogations. 128 
 121  Somiya, above n 116, 7.    122  Somiya, above n 116, 7.    123  Somiya, above n 116, 16. 
 124  See also the opinion of the Judge-Advocate at that trial—Captain J. Douglas Bell—in his letter 
to John Williams, 7 April 1971. He felt proud that, without help from headquarters, they were able 
to conduct a trial that was ‘not a hollow farce . . . convicting everybody out of hand’ and that even the 
Japanese thought it conducted ‘with restraint, dignity, fairness and justice’. Copy in possession of the 
author. 
 125  Somiya, above n 116, 34. 
 126  Eventually the practice settled down to a pattern where the Japanese legal offi  cer prepared the 
brief while the AALC offi  cer put the actual case in court as instructed by the Japanese, Pappas, above 
n 16, 139. 
 127  Other notable examples are Captain William Cole at Darwin and Captain Lyston Chisholm at 
Rabaul. Interpreter John Hook was very impressed by the diligence of the latter, Interview with John 
Hook (Melbourne, 11 March 2010). 
 128  Somiya, above n 116, 36. Th is type of help was not an aberration. See above n 66 outlining 
how Colonel Yamada, the defence lawyer, was assisted through some of the unfamiliar procedures by 
Captain Brereton, the prosecutor. 
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 Th ere are many more passages which could be quoted but this has given some 
of the fl avour. It is but one of many contemporary documents from participants, 
both Australian and Japanese. Th ese should be analysed alongside the trial tran-
scripts and offi  cial fi les when exploring the question of ‘victor’s justice’ in relation 
to the Australian-run trials in order to get a balanced overview. 
 (VIII)  Conclusion 
 Contemporaries were aware of how the trials could be criticized. As we have seen, 
one senior public servant, F.R. Sinclair, expressed his concerns as early as December 
1945. In September 1946, when at least half of the Australian-run trials had been 
completed, a legal opinion was sought about the right of Australia to conduct trials 
in general and the acceptance of hearsay. 129 Th at questions were being raised even 
at that late stage in the sequence of trials, demonstrates the eff orts being made to 
achieve just outcomes. 
 Although it is possible to expose the weaknesses of specifi c war crimes trials run 
by the Australians in the aftermath of the Second World War and to fi nd examples 
of problems relating to admissible evidence, joint trials, language diffi  culties and 
sentencing inconsistency, researchers need to take care before leaping to conclu-
sions. Th e tendency to focus on a small number of cases as if they were typical (as 
happened in the Creed article) can be misleading. It is unfair to the personnel run-
ning the courts. Th e more work that is done on the whole sequence of the three 
hundred trials, the more evidence emerges of conscientious eff orts to make up for 
defi ciencies in the provisions of the War Crimes Act. Vengeance, an emotion asso-
ciated with ‘victor’s justice’, was much less evident in participants’ papers and in 
offi  cial investigation and correspondence fi les associated with the trials than might 
have been anticipated. 
 To tread a fi ne line between vengeance and justice was diffi  cult. Ron Mendelsohn, 
a public servant, in a comment on a cabinet submission in 1955, admitted the 
problem. ‘But what were we to do?’ he wrote. ‘To allow these men to go unpun-
ished would have done violence to our own feelings . . . we wanted to ram home the 
idea that to use war as an instrument of policy is evil, but that if war is to be used 
there are conventions of humanity to be observed.’ 130 
 
 129  See above n 53. 
 130  Ron Mendelsohn, Comments on Cabinet Submission No 316:  Japanese War Criminals, 12 
April 1955, NAA Canberra, A4940, C1233, quoted in Pappas above n 16, 284. 
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 Justice for ‘Asian’ Victims: 
Th e Australian War Crimes Trials 
of the Japanese, 1945–51 
 Narrelle  Morris * 
 One of the common critiques of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
(the Tokyo Tribunal), held after World War II, was that it failed to systematically and 
comprehensively examine and address crimes committed by the Japanese against 
the peoples in the Asia-Pacifi c region, particularly those arising out of Japanese 
colonialism and wartime occupations, and including sexual crimes against Asian 
women. Representative of this criticism, for example, is Korean activist Won Soon 
Park’s conclusion in 1997 that the Tokyo Tribunal was ‘little more than a feast 
whose guest list included the Western Allies but blatantly omitted the Asian 
victims themselves’. 1 
 In short, the Tokyo Tribunal has been indicted for being, amongst other things, 
an example of partial and selective justice along racial, colonial and gendered lines. 
In fact, the range and complexity of reasons behind the apparent absence of and 
silence regarding Asia in the Tokyo Tribunal have been articulated by many critics 
since the end of World War II, and contested again by others. 2 Interestingly, recent 
legal scholarship by historian Yuma Totani has suggested that the Asian presence—
for want of a better word—in the Tokyo Tribunal was undoubtedly more vivid and 
infl uential than has often been concluded. She draws attention in particular to the 
eff orts of several prosecution teams, including the British Commonwealth team 
that introduced to the Tribunal evidence of Japanese war crimes committed in a 
broad geographical area across South East Asia and the Pacifi c, many of which were 
committed against Asian and Pacifi c nationals. 3 In her view, such evidence has not 
 *  Research Fellow, Melbourne Law School. 
 1  Won Soon  Park ,  ‘Japanese Reparations Policies and the “Comfort Women” Question’ ,  Positions: 
East Asia Cultures Critique ,  5 ( 1997 ),  119 . 
 2  See, for example,  Richard  Minear ,  Victors’ Justice:  the Tokyo War Crimes Trial ( Princeton, 
NJ :  Princeton University Press ,  1971 ) and  Yuki  Tanaka et al. (eds),  Beyond Victor’s Justice? Th e Tokyo 
War Crimes Trial Revisited ( Boston, MA and Leiden :  Martinus Nijhoff  ,  2011 ) . 
 3  Yuma  Totani ,  Th e Tokyo War Crimes Trial:  Th e Pursuit of Justice in the Wake of World War II 
( Cambridge, Mass. and London :  Harvard University Asia Centre ,  2008 ),  162–3 . 
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taken its proper place in studies of the Tribunal due to the manner in which it was 
tendered and because of the dispersal of related documents. It is apparent from the 
scholarship of Totani and others that, even after more than sixty years of analysis, 
the Tokyo Tribunal is still revealing ‘hidden histories’ and the process of understanding 
the Tribunal remains ongoing. 
 While the proceedings, judgments and other documents of the Tokyo Tribunal 
have been interpreted and re-interpreted since it concluded, the Australia’s sub-
sidiary B and C class war crimes trials—300 of which were held pursuant to the 
War Crimes Act 1945 (Commonwealth) in Morotai, Wewak, Labuan, Rabaul, 
Darwin, Singapore, Hong Kong and Manus Island in the period 1945–51—
have since that time been unreported and virtually unassessed. In part, this was a 
deliberate creation of ‘hidden history’ by the Australian Government as, for many 
years after the trials were completed, requests to access the trial proceedings were 
refused. Th e Japanese Government, for example, made unsuccessful requests in 
1955 and 1959 to be granted copies of the trial proceedings. A third Japanese 
request came in 1965 and was considered at some length over the next few years, 
primarily in respect of the concern that releasing the trial proceedings might 
precipitate criticism of Australia. As a 1967 report into the issue of whether to 
grant access observed, while the trials were ‘generally satisfactory’ and did not 
cause ‘any substantial miscarriage of justice’:
 Since war crimes trials are a controversial issue in general, they provide material for a trouble-
maker to use against the country which conducted them . . . Almost all of the trials of ‘B’ 
and ‘C’ class criminals have elements appearing on the face of the records which would 
provide a hostile reader with anti-Australian ammunition. 4 
 One of the report’s conclusions, however, was that a refusal to grant access to the 
trials ‘might imply that we have something to hide’. 5 After considerable consultation, 
Australian approval was fi nally granted in 1968 for partial copies of trial proceedings 6 
to be made available to the Japanese Government and for ‘bona fi de Australian 
Scholars’ to be able to review the trial proceedings. 7 Th ere was no suggestion made 
as to how applicant scholars might be determined to be bona fi de, perhaps because, 
as of 1967, the Australian Government had ‘no record of any interest ever being 
expressed by scholars’ in the trials. 8 It was not until 1975 that the Australian public 
was granted open access to the trial proceedings, which had, by then, been shifted 
from the Attorney-General’s Department to the Australian Archives. In announcing 
his decision to grant public access, the Attorney-General, Mr K. Enderby QC, 
 4  See Lyndel V. Prott, report entitled ‘Release of Records of Japanese War Crimes Trials’ 5 April 
1967 (National Archives of Australia (hereafter NAA): A432, 1967/2152), 1, 2, 5. 
 5  Prott, ‘Release of Records of Japanese War Crimes Trials’ (NAA: A432, 1967/2152), 11. 
 6  Th e copies were not to include the Judge-Advocate General’s reports, pursuant to the practice 
not to provide such confi dential and privileged reports when transcripts of Australian court-martial 
proceedings were ordinarily made available. 
 7  See the correspondence on this issue in NAA: A432, 1967/2152. 
 8  See Department of External Aff airs cablegram 11 April 1967 (NAA: A432, 1967/2152). 
17_9780199671144c17.indd   349 10/3/2013   4:18:56 PM
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in 
any way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
Southern Histories350
remarked: ‘For too long Australian scholars have been hampered in their attempts 
to interpret Australia’s history. Restrictions like this one [on access to the trial 
proceedings] no longer serve a useful purpose . . . Th e past should be everyone’s 
property.’ 9   
 While the trials were now open, few scholars and probably even fewer members 
of the public took up this call to serve as interpreters of history. It is likely that they 
were daunted by the prospect of having to examine and analyse tens of thousands 
of pages of transcript, evidence and reports with little overarching or explanatory 
material for guidance. Th ere may also have been some doubt that such an eff ort 
would be worth it. Th e 1967 report on access had critically (and wrongly) observed 
that the fact that the trial proceedings lacked written judgments meant they were 
of ‘little value for research’. 10 
 While more than thirty-fi ve years has now passed since public access was 
granted, the process of revealing the ‘hidden histories’ of the Australian war crimes 
trials is no less daunting. In fact, the passage of time and the passing of nearly all 
those Australian personnel who participated in the trials have now imposed more 
constraints upon our understanding of them. While the process of understanding 
the trials has barely begun, one of the ‘hidden histories’ that is becoming clear was 
that there was a considerable emphasis on Asian victims of Japanese war crimes, 
far beyond what might be expected of notionally ‘Australian’ trials. To be sure, 
a few of the Australian trial series, such as those held at Labuan, Morotai and 
Darwin, almost exclusively heard trials regarding identifi ably Australian, British or 
American victims. However, in the Rabaul trial series—which encompassed more 
than two-thirds of all trials held, 190 trials—the overwhelming majority of the 
victims were non-Caucasian, being Indian or Chinese prisoners-of-war or Asian 
or Pacifi c civilians who were resident in or transported to territories occupied by 
Japan. However, as the trials reveal, many of these victims themselves are and will 
remain ‘hidden’, as their identities and numbers were often unknown. 
 Th is chapter examines the odd Australian statutory jurisdiction based on 
classes of victims that enabled some Asian victims of Japanese war crimes to 
be dealt with in the Australian war crimes trials, assesses their presence in the 
Rabaul trial series, and focuses on representations of Asians as witnesses in several 
notable trials held at Rabaul. Unlike the criticisms that have been made about 
the Tokyo Tribunal, the Rabaul trials cannot be criticized for seeking justice only 
for Caucasian victims of Japanese war crimes and for deliberately avoiding or 
otherwise neglecting the ‘hidden history’ of Asian victims. Th e question as to 
whether Asian victims received justice at the Australian trials, as perhaps implied 
by the title of this paper, however, is very complex and remains to be considered 
in depth. 
 9  See Attorney-General’s Department, ‘Access to Historical Records’ Press release (NAA: A1838 
3103/10/13/12 Part 16A, 2 June 1975). 
 10  Prott, ‘Release of Records of Japanese War Crimes Trials’ (NAA: A432, 1967/2152), 11. 
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 (I)  Jurisdiction over War Criminals 
 By the close of World War II, it was well established in international law that a 
belligerent was entitled to prosecute for war crimes those members of the armed 
forces of the enemy who fell into its hands, irrespective of the place where the 
crime was committed or of the victim’s nationality, unless the belligerent was 
somehow prohibited from doing so by international law. Th ere was not always 
broad agreement as to what wartime conduct was criminal under international 
law but, as Dr Willard B. Cowles, then a member of the United States’ Judge 
Advocate General’s Department, concluded in June 1945: ‘[I] t is clear that, under 
international law, every independent State has jurisdiction to punish war criminals 
in its custody regardless of the nationality of the victim, the time it entered the war, 
or the place where the off ence was committed.’ 11   
 Th e Charter of the International Military Tribunal (for the Nuremberg Tribunal) 
and the Charter for the International Military Tribunal for the Far East not 
surprisingly thus defi ned their jurisdictions by reference to ‘major war criminals of 
the European Axis’ 12 and to ‘Far Eastern war criminals’ 13 respectively. Th e phraseology 
deliberately formalized some selectivity; since the war criminals had to be ‘of the 
European Axis’ and ‘Far Eastern’, 14 this eff ectively excluded the two Charters from 
being applied to war criminals within the Allied Forces themselves. Neither of the 
two Charters limited their jurisdiction by reference to the victims of war crimes, 
although victims impliedly had to have been within the European and the ‘Far 
Eastern’ war theatres. 
 Although the principle of universal jurisdiction of belligerents over war criminals 
was seemingly then recognized in Australia, 15 the legislation for Australia’s own war 
crimes trials, the War Crimes Act 1945, deliberately circumscribed this jurisdiction by 
explicitly referencing the victims of war crimes. Th e bill for the Act was drafted with 
lightning speed by the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department without 
 11  Willard B.  Cowles ,  ‘Universality of Jurisdiction over War Crimes’ ,  California Law Review ,  33 
( 1945 ),  218 . Professor Hersch Lauterpacht described this as a rule which was ‘well established as a 
matter of practice and which has behind it sound legal principle’:  Hersch  Lauterpacht ,  ‘Th e Law of 
Nations and Punishment of War Crimes’ ,  British Yearbook of International Law ,  21 ( 1944 ),  68 . See 
also  Kenneth C.  Randall ,  ‘Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law’ ,  Texas Law Review ,  66 
( 1988 ),  785–841 . 
 12  See Article 1 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, annexed to Agreement for the 
Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, signed in London on 
8 August 1945, 82 UNTS 279. 
 13  See Article 1 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, signed in 
Tokyo on 19 January 1946, amended 26 April 1946, TIAS 1589, 4 Bevans 21. 
 14  As Rashid Khalidi points out, the ‘Far East’ is ‘one of many relics of an earlier, Eurocentric era, 
when things were “near” or “far” or in the “middle” in relation to the privileged vantage point of 
Europe’:  Rashid I.  Khalidi ,  ‘Th e Middle East as an Area in an Era of Globalisation’ , in  Ali  Mirsepassi , 
 Amrita  Basu ,  Frederick  Weaver (eds),  Localising Knowledge in a Globalising World: Recasting the Area 
Studies Debate ( Syracuse, NY :  Syracuse University Press ,  2003 ),  171 . 
 15  See, for example, Fry’s assertion that ‘a belligerent’s international competence to try and punish 
aliens charged with war crimes is unquestioned’, in  Th omas  Penberthy Fry ,  ‘Th e International and 
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much consultation 16 in late September 1945, was introduced into Parliament on 
4 October 1945, passed both Houses without amendment within a few hours 17 
and received royal assent on 11 October 1945. 18 Th e Act’s jurisdictional provisions, 
sections 7 and 12, when read together, established three classes of victims of war 
crimes into which a victim of an alleged war crime must have fallen in order for an 
Australian Military Court to be convened:
 Section 7—A military court shall have power to try persons charged with war crimes 
committed, at any place whatsoever, whether within or beyond Australia,  against any person 
who was at any time resident in Australia , and for that purpose, subject to any direction by 
the Governor-General, to sit at any place whatsoever, whether within or beyond Australia. 
 . . . 
 Section 12—Th e provisions of this Act shall apply in relation to war crimes committed, 
in any place whatsoever, whether within or beyond Australia  against British subjects or citizens 
of any powers allied or associated with His Majesty in any war , in like manner as they apply 
in relation to war crimes committed against persons who were at any time resident in 
Australia. 19 
 In short, to be dealt with by an Australian Military Court, while it was irrelevant 
where the alleged war crime had been committed, the war crime must have been 
committed against: (1) any person who was at any time resident in Australia; or 
(2) a British subject; or (3) a citizen of any power allied or associated with His 
Majesty in any war. Th ese classes appear to demonstrate a claim to jurisdiction 
over certain war crimes based on an extension to the passive personality principle, 
as the jurisdiction accrued from the victims essentially being nationals (although 
that word was not expressly used in either quoted sections of the Act) of the 
co-belligerent Allied states, including Australia. 20 
 Th e underlying criteria for the classes of victims noticeably, and rather awkwardly, 
changed across sections 7 and 12 of the Act from a victim’s residency to allegiance 
to citizenship. Th e inelegance of this drafting was quickly acknowledged in prac-
tice; Maj K.R. Townley, acting as the Judge-Advocate in the Morotai M8 trial in 
December 1945, advised the Court that he thought that the categorization of classes 
National Competence of Australian Parliaments to Legislate in Respect of Extra-Territorial Crime 
(Including War Crimes)’ ,  University of Queensland, Faculty of Law Papers ,  1 ( 1947 ),  33 . 
 16  Gen Th omas A. Blamey, the Commander-in-Chief of the Australian Army, for example, was quite 
unaware of the drafting of the War Crimes Bill and its passage, as he had drafted his own regulations 
to permit the trial of war criminals and presented it to his Minister on 3 October 1945: see the cor-
respondence from Gen Blamey to Mr Frank M. Forde, Minister for the Army dated 3 October 1945; 
and between the Minister for the Army and Mr John A. Beasley, the Acting Attorney-General, dated 5 
October 1945, in NAA: A472, W28681. Perhaps in return for the non-consultation, the Department 
of the Army drafted and presented regulations for the War Crimes Act 1945 to the Executive Council 
for approval without fi rst submitting them to the Attorney-General’s Department: see Department of 
the Army, ‘Memorandum for the Secretary’ October 1945 (NAA: A472, W28681). 
 17  Th e sitting session of Parliament was forecast to end on 5 October 1945:  see Department of 
External Aff airs, ‘Cablegram to Dr H.V. Evatt’ 26 September 1945 (NAA: A472, W28681). 
 18  Act No. 48 of 1945.    19  Italics added for emphasis. 
 20  Another feature that highlighted co-belligerent jurisdiction was section 5(4) of the War Crimes 
Act 1945 that empowered the Governor-General to appoint as a member (not as the president) of an 
Australian Military Court one or more offi  cers of the armed forces of any allied or associated power. 
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of victims had been ‘conceived in haste and born in confusion’. 21 Th e Court in that 
trial agreed, commenting that the draftsmanship on the issue seemed ‘most inept’. 22 
In fact, the overall drafting of the Act was viewed with some bemusement during 
the fi rst trials convened at Morotai in late 1945. Lt Col L.J. Byrne, the prosecut-
ing offi  cer in the fi rst ever trial, which began at Morotai on 29 November 1945, 
described the Act as an example of ‘very curious and quaint methods of drafting’. 
In a rare moment of concurrence, the defending offi  cer, Capt J.C. Brown, politely 
agreed, observing that the drafting was ‘to say the least . . . most unusual’. 23   
 Th e decision to predicate the jurisdiction of the War Crimes Act 1945 upon 
classes of victims was certainly deliberate, as the British Royal Warrant of 18 June 
1945, upon which the Act was closely modelled, did not defi ne its jurisdiction in 
relation to victims. 24 Regulation 4 of the Regulations for the Trial of War Criminals 
(UK) attached to the Royal Warrant simply provided that a person had to be located 
within the limits of command by an offi  cer authorized to convene a Military Court 
and that it had to appear to the convening offi  cer that the person had committed 
a war crime at any place within or without the limits of the offi  cer’s command. 25 
Given the modelling of the War Crimes Bill, as it then was, on the Royal Warrant, 
it is not unsurprising, therefore, that one of the earliest drafts of section 7 of the 
Bill similarly said nothing at all about classes of victims but was worded simply 
as: ‘A military court shall have power, whether within or outside Australia, to try 
persons charged with war crimes.’ 26   
 Th e insertion of classes of victims into the War Crimes Act 1945 was, however, 
not without precedent in the Australian war crimes context. Clear parallels exist 
between the jurisdictional provisions of the Act and the developing phraseology 
of the Instruments of Appointment of the various inquiries into war crimes 
commissioned in Australia in 1943, 1944 and 1945. Sir William Webb, upon his 
appointment as War Crimes Commissioner, was instructed on 23 June 1943, for 
Such appointments occurred on several occasions during the Rabaul trial series but the appointments 
of Chinese National Army offi  cers in cases involving Chinese prisoners-of-war were controversial, as 
sometimes those offi  cers had been prisoners-of-war together with the prosecution witnesses, leading to 
defence claims that the Courts were not impartial. See, for example, the Rabaul R55 trial (NAA: A471, 
80915). 
 21  See the Morotai M8 trial (NAA: A471, 80769). Townley later became the President of the Australian 
Military Courts at Manus Island, 1950–1. 
 22  Morotai M8 trial, above n 21. 
 23  Morotai M9 trial (NAA: A471, 80718). 
 24  Royal Warrant, Army Order No. 81, 18 June 1945. Th e War Crimes Regulations (Canada) (PC 
5831/45), made by Order in Council on 30 August 1945, were also based on the Royal Warrant. 
 25  For an analysis of the British Royal Warrant, see United Nations War Crimes Commission,  Law 
Reports of Trials of War Criminals , 1 (1947), 105–10. For an analysis of regulation 4, see Dr Egon 
Schwelb, legal offi  cer to the United Nations War Crimes Commission, ‘British Regulations for the 
Trial of War Criminals By Military Courts’ 27 June 1945 (NAA: A472, W28681). For analysis of 
the war crimes trials held under the Royal Warrant, see  A.P.V.  Rogers ,  ‘War Crimes Trials Under 
the Royal Warrant: British Practice 1945–1949’ ,  International and Comparative Law Quarterly ,  39 
( 1990 ),  780–800 . 
 26  See the Attorney-General’s Department fi les developing the War Crimes Bill, with unidentifi -
able handwritten annotations (NAA: A2863, 1945/48). A similar draft of section 7 can be seen in an 
entirely handwritten draft of the War Crimes Bill (NAA: A472, W28681). 
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example, to enquire into ‘[w] hether there have been any atrocities or breaches of 
the rules of warfare on the part of members of the Japanese Armed Forces in or in 
the neighbourhood of the Territory of New Guinea or of the Territory of Papua’. 27 
 Th ese instructions were clearly targeted at those (expressly limited) persons who 
might have committed war crimes, not the victims of such crimes. Th e instructions 
for the second and third war crimes inquiries, however, demonstrated an increasing 
focus upon the victims of war crimes. Webb’s remit was broadened for his second 
inquiry, when he was instructed on 8 June 1944 to enquire into ‘whether there 
have been any war crimes on the part of individual members of the Armed Forces 
of the enemy against any persons who were resident in Australia prior to the present 
war, whether members of the Forces or not’. 28 
 Th e instructions given to the Board of Inquiry into war crimes, also headed 
by Webb, on 3 September 1945, about a month prior to the passage of the War 
Crimes Bill, expanded the remit even further to embrace both British subjects and 
citizens of allied nations. Th e Board of Inquiry was instructed to enquire into:
 [w] hether any war crimes have been committed by any subjects of any State with which His 
Majesty has been engaged in war since the second day of September, [o]ne thousand nine 
hundred and thirty-nine, against any persons who were resident in Australia prior to the 
commencement of any such war whether members of the Defence Force or not, or against 
any British subject or against any citizen of an allied nation. 29 
 Th e jurisdictional provisions of the War Crimes Act 1945 greatly resemble this 
fi nal instruction, although the reference to ‘whether members of the Defence Force 
or not’ was dropped in section 7, while the third class of victims in section 12 was 
broadened to include any citizens of associated, not just allied, powers. 
 Given the lack of extant explanation for the wording of the jurisdictional provisions 
of the War Crimes Act 1945—which can probably be attributed to its swift draft-
ing and the lack of signifi cant consultation on the draft with other government 
departments or the Australian Army—it is diffi  cult to determine precisely why the 
drafters deliberately chose to impose limits on the universal jurisdiction over war 
criminals and, having done so, then selected ‘resident in Australia’ as the criteria for 
section 7 of the Act, rather than the more normative birth, nationality or, perhaps, 
membership of the armed forces, as the wording of the second and third Webb 
appointments might have suggested. Caroline Pappas, one of the few researchers 
to have examined the processes and practices of the Australian war crimes trials, 
has suggested that the reason that classes of victims were explicitly referred to in 
the Act was to ensure that the expansive list of war crimes encompassed by the 
Act—which went beyond conventional war crimes—was not construed to cover 
victims who were enemy nationals, for example the Japanese themselves. 30 Th ere is 
certainly some support for the conclusion that the Act’s jurisdiction was designed 
 27  NAA: AWM226, 5.    28  NAA: AWM226, 7.    29  NAA: AWM226, 8. 
 30  Caroline Pappas, ‘Law and Politics:  Australia’s War Crimes Trials in the Pacifi c, 1943–1961’ 
(unpublished PhD thesis, University of New South Wales, 1998), 94. 
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to preclude Australians from being charged under it with war crimes against the 
Japanese or anyone else. A domestic analysis of the British Royal Warrant under-
taken to consider the legislative ‘action necessary’ to institute war crimes trials by 
Australia had pointed out with some concern, for example, that the terms of the 
Royal Warrant and its regulations were ‘completely general in their operation’ and 
that nothing in them prevented proceedings against British subjects accused of war 
crimes. 31 
 At the same time, however, the drafters of the War Crimes Act 1945 appeared 
to be faced with the problem of ensuring that however jurisdiction based on classes 
of victims was established, it was not too limited. If section 7 of the Act had been 
based on Australian birth, nationality or membership of the armed forces, many 
victims of war crimes committed in New Guinea or on Nauru Island, for example, 
might have had their cases slip through the prosecutorial gap. It appears as though 
residency in Australia was thus chosen as the criteria for section 7 of the Act spe-
cifi cally to ensure that trials could be convened in relation to certain Asian vic-
tims of war crimes, as they would be encompassed by being ‘resident in Australia’, 
although perhaps not by the other possible criteria. A number of Asian victims 
at the Rabaul trials in fact fell into the class of ‘resident in Australia’, as section 3 
of the War Crimes Act 1945 defi ned ‘Australia’ as including the ‘Territories of 
the Commonwealth’ and  section  4 extended the operation of the Act to ‘every 
Territory of the Commonwealth’. When read together with the defi nition of terri-
tory in the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Commonwealth), this meant that inhab-
itants of New Guinea and Nauru, for example (the former a mandated territory of 
Australia and the latter a mandated territory of the British Empire but, under agree-
ment between the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, administered 
by Australia), were deemed to be resident in Australia for the purposes of the Act. 
 Th e use of the unusual phrase ‘resident in Australia’ in the Act proved somewhat 
confusing to Australian Army offi  cers in the fi eld faced with investigating war crimes 
and convening trials. Th e Australian First Army Headquarters, for example, posed 
several questions to Australian Headquarters (AHQ) in Melbourne throughout 
November and December 1945 in relation to whether certain persons—namely 
natives of mandated territories and, more specifi cally, Chinese civilians born in 
Rabaul before and after the mandate over New Guinea was granted in 1919—were 
to be considered as ‘Australian nationals’ for the purposes of the trials. Th e First 
Army was advised in each case that, for the purposes of the trials, natives of the 
mandated territories of New Guinea and Nauru were to be considered as ‘Australian 
nationals’, although the Chinese civilians in Rabaul must have ‘resided there perma-
nently’ to be so considered. 32 Th e continued use by all correspondents of the phrase 
‘Australian nationals’ when considering the Act appears to demonstrate how diffi  cult 
 31  See the undated, unattributed report entitled ‘Royal Warrant and Regulations for the Trial of War 
Criminals: Action Necessary to Constitute Australian War Crimes Courts’ (NAA: A472, W28681). 
 32  See various messages from First Army to Landforces, 28 November 1945, 1 December 1945 and 
20 December 1945; and responses from Landforces to Landops, First Army, 29 November 1945, 4 
December 1945 and 21 December: (NAA: MP742/1, 336/1/382). 
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it was to come to grips with the concept of ‘resident in Australia’. Th e AHQ’s advice 
to the First Army was, however, partially incorrect:  there was no requirement of 
duration of residency in Australia in the War Crimes Act 1945 nor in the Act’s sub-
sidiary Regulations for the Trial of War Criminals (Commonwealth) 33 and, indeed, 
it could be construed from the wording of sections 7 and 12 of the Act, both of 
which included the phrase ‘at any time resident in Australia’, that such residency did 
not have to be uninterrupted or even ongoing at the time when the war crime was 
committed. 
 In addition to being diffi  cult to interpret, the criteria of ‘resident in Australia’ soon 
proved to be impracticable, especially during the Morotai trials in late 1945 to early 
1946, during which the victims were predominantly Australian prisoners-of-war. 
Defending offi  cer Capt Brown argued throughout the fi rst Morotai trial, for example, 
that the prosecution had failed to establish that the unidentifi ed prisoner-of-war 
described as the victim in the charge had been ‘resident in Australia’. While a 
Japanese witness had given evidence that he had been told that one, possibly two, 
of the several airmen taken prisoner-of-war and executed together had been born 
in Melbourne and that all three had been stationed in Townsville, Capt Brown 
submitted to the Court that evidence of birth in Australia was not suffi  cient proof. 
Residency, in his mind, did not need to go so far as ‘domicile’; that is, a permanent 
intention to take up accommodation at a certain place but it must be ‘volun-
tary’. He argued that the airmen’s stationing in Townsville, if that was indeed the 
case, did not prove their intention to ‘reside’ there. Maj Townley, acting as the 
Judge-Advocate, dealt with these submissions in his summing up by suggesting a 
fairly simple test for ‘residence’. He considered that ‘residence’ did not imply ‘any 
great degree of permanence’ but it did imply ‘something more than a mere transitory 
passage’. He advised that:
 [I] f a person were born in any particular country, you [the Court] may draw the inference 
from that fact alone, if there is no other evidence, that he comes within the class of person 
described in Section 7, i.e. a person at any time resident in that country. 
 He suggested, however, that if residency in Australia pursuant to section 7 could 
not be proven, then the Court then should proceed to consider whether the victim 
fell within the ambit of section 12; that is, whether the victim was a British subject 
or a citizen of any allied or associated power. 
 Eventually, the process of proving residency in Australia was made more effi  cient for 
prosecuting offi  cers in mid-1946 by the addition of regulation 11A to the Regulations 
for the Trial of War Criminals. 34 Th e new regulation, the subject of which was described 
as ‘urgent’ by the Secretary of the Army when urging its approval, 35 read:
 In any proceedings of a military court, a document purporting to be a certifi cate under the 
hand of the prosecutor or prosecuting offi  cer that a person referred to in the charge was 
 33  Statutory Rule 164/1945, made under the War Crimes Act 1945 on 25 October 1945 and notifi ed 
in the  Commonwealth of Australia Gazette on 26 October 1945. 
 34  Statutory Rule 56/1946. 
 35  See Attorney-General’s Department, ‘Memorandum for the Secretary’ undated but despatched 
12 February 1946 (NAA: A472, W28681). 
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at some time resident in Australia shall be prima facie evidence of the matter so certifi ed 
without proof of the handwriting of the prosecutor or prosecuting offi  cer. 36 
 As only one such certifi cate in the hand of the prosecuting offi  cer was ever tendered, 37 
it appears that the existence of the regulation in of itself eff ectively thwarted the 
defence in subsequent trials from pressing the issue of whether it had been proven 
beyond reasonable doubt that an (obviously Australian) victim was at any time 
‘resident in Australia’. Th e failure to tender such documents in other trials is very 
curious, especially as there were ongoing but unsuccessful defence submissions 
throughout the trials that, due to the more complicated international mandate 
over Nauru, residents of Nauru were not residents of a territory of Australia. 38 
 If the broad intention behind the drafting of the jurisdiction provisions of the 
War Crimes Act 1945 based on classes of victims was to ensure that no trials could 
be convened in relation to war crimes committed against enemy nationals, however, 
it was ineff ectual. A victim’s residency in Australia by reason of being an inhabitant 
of a mandated territory seemed to override in a few cases other identifi cation which 
would appear far more pertinent. Several trials regarding war crimes committed by 
Japanese against German and Austrian missionaries resident in New Guinea, for 
example, were held at Rabaul in early 1946. Th e defence in those cases submitted 
that the alleged victims were actually subjects or citizens of an Axis power allied with 
Japan and therefore did not fall within any class of victim established by the Act; 
however, these submissions were not accepted by the Australian Military Courts. 
 Th e victim in the Rabaul R6 trial, for example, was Father Henry Berger, a German 
Roman Catholic missionary who was assigned to Ramale Mission in New Britain. 39 
Berger complained that he had been struck several times and threatened with death 
by Lt Abe Akihisa, an offi  cer of the 17th Transport Regiment. At trial the prosecuting 
offi  cer, Maj F.D. Green, submitted that these acts amounted to unlawful assault. At 
the end of the prosecution case, the defending offi  cer, Maj I.A.H. Spain, submitted 
that Abe had no case to answer on the ground that the evidence did not support the 
charge of unlawful assault since the laws and usages of war only operated as between 
opposing belligerents or belligerents and neutrals. He pointed out that the complain-
ant in this case was a German subject and Japan and Germany were allies at war. 
Opposing the application to dismiss the charge, Maj Green referred the Court to 
section 7 of the Act and advised that, by virtue of this section, the Act would apply 
 36  Statutory Rule 56/1946 (20 March 1946). 
 37  Th e certifi cate was tendered as an exhibit in relation to an unnamed Australian prisoner-of-war 
who was murdered in that, after being injured during an air raid, he was shot and his body thrown 
into the sea by the accused, who claimed that it was a mercy killing, see Hong Kong HK9 trial 
(NAA: A471, 81656). It is unclear why the certifi cate was tendered in this case, as there are many trials 
in which the name of the victim was unknown. 
 38  Such submissions only arose, of course, when the particulars of the charge were worded somehow 
so as to imply that the Nauruans were residents of Australia. In the Rabaul R180 trial, the Nauruan 
victims were described as ‘natives of Nauru displaced to Truk’ and the prosecuting offi  cer submitted 
that by virtue of section 12 of the War Crimes Act 1945, the Act applied to war crimes committed 
against British subjects in any place whatsoever and that the Court might take judicial notice of the 
fact that natives of Nauru were British subjects: see the Rabaul R180 trial (NAA: A471, 81208). 
 39  Rabaul R6 trial (NAA: A471, 80744). 
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even to Japanese who had been resident in Australia. Th e Judge-Advocate, Capt 
F. Ackland, advised the Court that section 7 of the Act referred to ‘any person 
who was at any time resident in Australia’ and that the term ‘Australia’ included 
the territories. Capt Ackland pointed out that there was evidence, which had not 
been challenged, that the German missionary was resident in Australia. He further 
advised that a person resident in the King’s dominions was entitled to protection 
of the King’s peace, notwithstanding their nationality and, moreover, that tempo-
rary occupation by a hostile power did not alter this entitlement. On the rights of 
inhabitants, he referred the Court to para 383 of the Chapter XIV of the Australian 
edition of the  Manual of Military Law 1941 , which set out that:
 It is the duty of the occupant to see that the lives of inhabitants are respected, that their 
domestic peace and honour are not disturbed, that their religious convictions are not inter-
fered with, and generally that duress, unlawful and criminal attacks on their persons, and 
felonious actions as regards their property, are just as punishable as in times of peace. 
  Unfortunately, the Judge-Advocate’s description of New Britain as part of the 
King’s dominions was, in this case, probably wrong. In the case of  Frost v Stevenson 
in 1937, the High Court of Australia found that New Guinea, of which New 
Britain was a part, was not part of the dominions of the Crown. As Chief Justice 
Latham observed, ‘[t] he conclusion which I have thus reached is that New Guinea 
is a place out of His Majesty’s dominions in which His Majesty has jurisdiction’. 40   
 By late 1947, however, there seemed to have been a rethink as to whether it was 
proper to try Japanese for war crimes committed against subjects or citizens of 
its own allies. In the Hong Kong HK1 trial, for example, the prosecuting offi  cer, 
Maj A.D. Mackay, advised the Court that while it would become apparent from 
the evidence that ‘a number of other internees’ had been massacred alongside 
twenty-three Australian civilian internees on New Ireland in 1944, the killing of 
those other internees formed ‘no part of the case against the accused’ and the Court 
was to entirely disregard that evidence. He found it ‘ironical to note that such other 
persons were all of German nationality and supposedly the Allies of the Japanese’. 41   
 Th at the Australian trials should encompass victims of war crimes who were not, 
by birth or nationality or even residency, ‘Australian’, however, was not natural 
and inevitable to some critics. Th e Minister for Post-War Reconstruction, John 
Dedman, questioned (somewhat outside the remit of his portfolio) in August 
1946, for example, as to why Australia had been ‘placed in the position’ of having 
to try Japanese for war crimes committed against Indian and Chinese nationals, 42 
though he did not explain why he apparently considered it an unnecessary burden. 
Brig A.W. Wardell, then acting Adjutant-General of the Army, which was running 
the trials, drafted the response that:
 A war crime is an off ence against the law of nations and it behoves any nation to punish 
proved breaches against such law, whether committed against its own nationals or those of 
 40  [1937] HCA 41; (1937) 58 CLR 528.    41  Hong Kong HK1 trial (NAA: A471, 81645). 
 42  Dedman presumably did not know that some Japanese had also been tried for off ences against 
Axis nationals. 
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another country. Th is is particularly so where the nationals of another country are resident 
in the territory of the Commonwealth, or if they are in that territory when the crime was 
committed. 43 
 In short, Wardell was expressing his conviction that the identity of a victim of a 
war crime was, in fact, largely irrelevant, as it was the duty of every nation to punish 
war criminals in order to uphold the law of nations. In addition to apparently 
asserting the universality principle, however, Wardell’s response also suggested a 
reliance—not on the passive personality principle as might have been expected 
from the Act’s use of classes of victims—but on the territorial principle; that is, 
jurisdiction necessarily arose because the victims of the war crimes were resident 
in the territory of the Commonwealth of Australia (not just in Australia itself ) 
or were within that territory when the war crime was committed. Th at a signifi -
cant proportion of those victims whose cases were dealt with at Rabaul happened 
to be Asian was perhaps inevitable; it was a simple consequence of the Japanese 
armed forces’ transportation of enormous numbers of Indian and Chinese civilians 
and prisoners-of-war to New Guinea and other places in South East Asia and the 
commission of acts amounting to war crimes against them and the inhabitants of 
those places. As these places were either a part of Australian territory or fell within 
Australia’s zone of control in the immediate post-war period, many suspected war 
criminals fell into Australian custody at the end of the war which ‘behoved’, as 
Wardell had put it, Australia to convene war crimes trials against them given 
suffi  cient evidence to do so. 
 (II)  Numbers and Nature of Asian Victims at the Rabaul Trials 
 It is a sad measure of the nature and extent of Japanese war crimes committed in 
the Pacifi c theatre of World War II that the total number of Asian victims whose 
cases were eventually dealt with at the Rabaul trials cannot be quantifi ed. Due to a 
lack of evidence, many of the charges at the trials could only describe the victims as 
‘unknown’ and their quantity as ‘a number’. In this manner, for example, the mas-
sacres of the population of Ocean Island were described in the charges in the Rabaul 
R51, R52, R53, R68 and R70 trials as the murder of ‘persons unknown’, a linguistic 
shorthand that completely understates their extent and signifi cance. Regrettably, 
the identifi cation and quantifi cation of Asian victims is further hindered by the fact 
that there was little attempt (even at the Rabaul trials where the greatest number of 
trials were held) to regularize the particulars of charges, as can be seen by the various 
examples below: 
 •  Murder, in that they on Ocean Island on or about 20 August 1945 murdered 
persons unknown (Rabaul R53 trial); 
 43  Brig A.W. Wardell, Acting Adjutant-General, ‘Minute Paper on War Crimes Trials for Secretary, 
Department of the Army’ 20 October 1946 (NAA: MP742/1, 336/1/980). 
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 •  Torturing civilians, in that he at Ramale on or about 10 February 1945 tortured 
Sister Mektil, Sister Cecilia (both civilians) and other civilians (Rabaul R7 trial); 
 •  Murder, in that they at Teninbaubau, Bougainville on or about 23 January 
1945 murdered twelve Indians (Rabaul R90 trial); 
 •  Murder, in that he at New Guinea in or about January 1945 murdered Hav 
Mehr Din (Rabaul R96 trial); 
 •  Ill-treatment of a prisoner-of-war in that he at Mango about 3 March May 
1945 ill-treated WO Hor Chin Chun, a prisoner-of-war (Rabaul R118 trial); 
 •  Murder in that they at New Ireland in or about 1944–5 murdered a number 
of Chinese civilians, half-caste civilians and natives (Rabaul R127 trial). 
 Moreover, the issue of jurisdiction was only rarely directly addressed in the charges; 
that is, the particulars of charges never included a reference into which class a victim 
fell in the sense of ‘resident in Australia’, ‘British subject’ or ‘citizen of an allied or 
associated power’. Rather, those who drafted the charges usually concerned them-
selves only with whether the victim was a prisoner-of-war or a civilian, although if 
the nationality of the victim was known, it was often appended, as shown in the 
examples above. A defence objection to the drafting of a charge in the basis that it 
lacked particularity by not alleging that an unidentifi ed victim fell into one of the 
classes of victims established by sections 7 and 12 of the War Crimes Act 1945 was 
overruled in the very fi rst trial at Morotai, mentioned above, and was never, as far 
as this author knows, raised again. 
 In addition to distinguishing between prisoners-of-war and civilians, the trials 
also explicitly distinguished between ‘civilians’ and ‘natives’, a false distinction but 
one characteristic of this period. Th e trials consistently used the term ‘native’ both 
as a noun and an adjective and, of course, this has long since been unpacked as 
imperialistic, colonialist and racist. 44 Most of those involved with the trials only per-
ceived ‘natives’ as a kind of amorphous group, an inevitable (to them) demarcation 
based on physical appearance, living standards, language and education. As the 
Australian Military Courts were far less inquisitive about factual details than modern 
courts today, unless a witness, affi  ant or declarant in evidence happened, as an 
aside, to state where a ‘native’ victim was from, contemporary readers of the trials 
have no idea of the actual ethnic background, family or tribal affi  liation or claim 
to nationality of many victims. Th e location of the war crime cannot be used as 
an accurate guide to the origins of victims, as the Japanese armed forces routinely 
shipped civilian inhabitants of occupied territories all over the Asia Pacifi c, either 
as labourers or simply to transfer population groups. Th e sole survivor to give 
evidence at the trials relating to the Ocean Island massacres, for example, was one 
Kabunare, a ‘native’ from Nikunau Island, one of the Gilbert Islands, then a British 
colony. 
 44  For a discussion of the implications of the term ‘native’, see, for example,  Bill  Ashcroft ,  Gareth 
 Griffi  ths and  Helen  Tiffi  n (eds),  Post-Colonial Studies: Th e Key Concepts ( London :  Routledge ,  2000 ), 
 158 . See also  Arjun  Appadurai ,  ‘Putting Hierarchy in Its Place’ ,  Cultural Anthropology ,  3 ( 1988 ),  36–49 . 
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 While in many cases the specifi c nationality or ethnicity of native victims were 
not particularized in the charges, the general identity of most other victims can 
usually be surmised from a reading of the evidence, which begs the question as 
to why those who drafted the charges were not more specifi c and consistent in 
their approach. From the extent to which victim identifi cation is possible from the 
records of the 190 trials held at Rabaul,  Figure 17.1 shows a rough statistical over-
view of the types of victims. As charges often encompassed multiple victims or trials 
were convened upon multiple charges, the same trial could include several types of 
victims. In the Rabaul R173 trial of Lt Gen Adachi Hatazō, for example, the single 
charge against him, based on the principle of command responsibility, alleged 
the commission of ‘brutal atrocities and other high crimes against the people of 
the Commonwealth of Australia and its allies’ in New Guinea. 45 Th e prosecution 
evidence, however, described war crimes committed by Adachi’s subordinates 
 45  NAA: A471, 81652. 
 











Number of trials in which category of victim represented
 Figure 17.1  Categories of victims represented in the Australian Military Court war crimes 
trials at Rabaul. 
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against Chinese civilians, ‘natives’, Indian and Australian prisoners-of-war 
and Australian and American soldiers. Th e Rabaul R173 trial, therefore, is 
represented in each of the Chinese, ‘native’, Indian, Australian, and American 
categories. 
 Th is statistical breakdown overwhelmingly demonstrates that the majority of 
victims whose cases were dealt with during the Rabaul trials were of Asian or Pacifi c 
origin. For example, Indian, Chinese and ‘natives’ were represented amongst the 
victims in 176 of the 190 trials overall at Rabaul. By contrast, Australian victims 
were represented in only seventeen of the trials and British and American victims 
in only fi ve and two trials respectively. Whatever criticisms might be made about 
the Tokyo Tribunal or the Australian war crimes trials held in other locations, 
the Rabaul trial series was not, by far, a story about justice for only Australian or 
Caucasian victims of war crimes. 
 (III)  Attitudes towards Asian Witnesses at the Rabaul trials 
 Th at there was an Asian presence, indeed a certain Asian precedence, in the Rabaul 
trials does not mean that Asian witnesses, affi  ants or declarants who gave evidence 
of war crimes against their comrades, neighbours, family or themselves were viewed 
in an exemplary light, though to what extent attacks on their competency, credibility 
and veracity arose from prevalent colonial or racist attitudes of the time or were 
simply a defence tactic to weaken and destabilize prosecution cases is diffi  cult to 
gauge. It was certainly a standard defence practice at many trials to submit that the 
prosecution evidence had been exaggerated or fabricated by victims and prosecution 
witnesses for a variety of reasons, including to take revenge upon the Japanese or 
to ingratiate themselves with Australian authorities in hope of personal benefi t or 
to avoid being tried for a crime themselves. Lt Gen Adachi defended himself, and 
by implication his subordinates, in his trial by asserting, for example, that it was 
‘not infrequent that the Indians after their recovery tried to conceal their treason 
against England and to falsify their position by reporting against the Japanese, 
maliciously fabricating or exaggerating incidents’. 46 
 According to Phipson’s  Th e Law of Evidence , the eighth edition of 1942, which 
was the principal text on evidence that was cited in the Australian Military Courts, 
all witnesses were, in general, to be considered as competent, including ‘believers 
of all creeds’. 47 Witnesses were, of course, permitted to be questioned as to their 
 46  NAA: A471, 81652, Part 1. In trials at Rabaul concerning Indian prisoners-of-war, the principle 
defence was that the Indians were not prisoners-of-war subject to the protection of international 
law but that, in seeking the independence of India from Britain, they had been released on parole 
from the status of prisoners-of-war to become of their own free will either members of the Indian 
National Army, which was collaborating with the Japanese Forces, or volunteer labourers for the 
Japanese Forces. Th e Japanese claimed that it was only after the cessation of hostilities that the Indians 
asserted that they were prisoners-of-war and had been forcibly made to join the Indian National Army 
or to serve as labourers. 
 47  Sidney Lovell  Phipson ,  Th e Law of Evidence , ( London :  Sweet & Maxwell , 8th edn,  1942 ),  443 . 
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credibility and their general reputation for veracity. 48 It is noticeable, however, that 
Phipson did not extend the warnings about, for example, the danger of convicting 
on uncorroborated testimony of accomplices 49 or the requirement that the testimony 
of ‘infants, lunatics and drunkards’ be ‘received with caution’ 50 to witnesses of a 
certain nationality or ethnic type, such as Chinese, Indian or ‘native’ witnesses. In 
fact, the only occasions on which Phipson concerned itself regarding the evidence of 
such witnesses was in regard to various oaths, affi  rmations and declarations which 
could be used in relation to them. 51 Nevertheless, there appeared to be a minor 
undercurrent of feeling in the trials that the evidence of Asian witnesses, including 
Japanese witnesses, although admissible, ought to be considered and weighed dif-
ferently to the evidence of non-Asian witnesses. Some defence submissions, which 
appear from their literacy to have been made by Australian defending offi  cers 
and not Japanese defending offi  cers or civilian defence counsel, openly attributed 
negative tendencies to Asian witnesses along racial and ethnic lines. Moreover, 
these defence attacks were usually made in closing addresses to which no response 
by the witness was possible, even if he or she was present. 52   
 As an example of the defence attacks on Asian witnesses, Chinese witnesses were 
said to have the ‘habit’ of revenge and the ‘disposition’ to exaggerate even ‘matter[s] 
of no account’, 53 which they did out of malice or because simply exaggeration was 
‘common’ to those ‘unlearned coolies’. 54 Indian witnesses were similarly alleged to 
have exaggerated out of their desire for revenge against the Japanese. Capt J.H. 
Watson, who appeared as the defending offi  cer in many trials at Rabaul, suggested 
in no less than six separate trials that the prosecution evidence had been produced 
out of the ‘notorious’ ‘characteristic imagination’ or ‘characteristic exaggeration’ of 
Indian witnesses. 55 In the Rabaul R71 trial Capt Watson submitted, for instance, 
that it was ‘possible for the Indians, who certainly would not lack motive, to distort 
simple facts having regard to their notorious capacity for exaggeration’. 56 
 Similar critical comments were made regarding the veracity and credibility of the 
evidence of ‘native’ witnesses, particularly that the ‘shortness of memory’ of ‘natives’ was 
‘well known’ 57 or that they were ‘prone to exaggeration’. 58 Th at the Japanese accused 
occasionally held similar beliefs about the ‘native’ witnesses is clear. Th e two Japanese 
convicted in the Rabaul R21 trial submitted in their petition, for example, that 
 48  Lovell Phipson, above n 46, 180, 469–74.    49  Lovell Phipson, above n 46, 477–9. 
 50  Lovell Phipson, above n 46, 445.    51  Lovell Phipson, above n 46, 452–4. 
 52  Most witnesses were not present, since the permissive rule of evidence set down in section 9(1) 
of the War Crimes Act 1945 meant that the Court might consider ‘any document appearing on 
the face of it to be authentic, provided the . . . document appears to the court to be of assistance in 
proving or disproving the charge, notwithstanding that the . . . document would not be admissible in 
evidence before a fi eld general court martial’. Th at this section had the eff ect in practice of depriving 
the accused of the right to cross-examine the witnesses against him was a common defence complaint. 
 53  See the petition in Rabaul R81 trial (NAA: A471, 80987). 
 54  See the defending offi  cer’s closing address in the Rabaul R114 trial (NAA: A471, 81020). 
 55  See the defending offi  cer’s closing addresses in the Rabaul R20, R23, R29, R71, R117 and R130 
trials (NAA: A471, 80729, 80725, 80736, 80984, 81023 and 81057). 
 56  See the defending offi  cer’s closing address in the Rabaul R71 trial (NAA: A471, 80984). 
 57  See the defending offi  cer’s closing address in the Rabaul R13 trial (NAA: A471, 80737). 
 58  See the defending offi  cer’s closing address in the Rabaul R21 trial (NAA: A471, 80730). 
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it was a ‘well-known fact’ that natives would ‘unashamedly’ tell lies, disregarding 
‘morality and humanity’, as they were ‘slaves of going by nature’. 59 In defending his 
witnesses in this case, Capt J.D. Steed, the prosecuting offi  cer, admitted that ‘natives’ 
tended to ‘confuse fact with hearsay’. He suggested, however, that if the ‘frills’ of 
their testimony were removed, a ‘solid core’ of reliable evidence still remained. 
 Unlike such critical views of the evidence of Chinese and Indian witnesses, the 
views regarding the evidence of ‘native’ witnesses seemed to receive a bit of an offi  cial 
imprimatur in a few trials at Rabaul. Capt F.D. Green, acting as the Judge-Advocate 
in the Rabaul R9 trial, instructed the Court, for example, that:
 You have formed your opinion of the native Witnesses, and I think you can take notice of 
the fact that it is very diffi  cult indeed for the Prosecution to get a consecutive story from 
native Witnesses. Th ere have been many discrepancies. Such discrepancies in fact that if they 
appeared in the case for the Prosecution with white Witnesses would undoubtedly rule the 
Prosecution completely out of having made a [p] rima facie case. I suggest to you that the 
fact that there are discrepancies in the evidence of the native Witnesses does not lead the Court 
to an inescapable conclusion that these Witnesses or any of them are lying. In this respect 
natives are very like children. Th ey have vivid imaginations, and their evidence must be very 
carefully scrutinised. 60  
 Similarly, Maj I.A.H. Spain, acting as Judge-Advocate in the Rabaul R10 trial, 
observed to the Court that the prosecution evidence had been wholly heard from 
‘natives’. As such, he warned the Court that it was dangerous to convict upon the 
evidence of ‘natives’ who ‘like young children are an unreliable class of witness 
without some corroboration’. 61 
 It is diffi  cult to ascertain, at this late stage, whether the views expressed, in particular 
about the evidence of native witnesses, stemmed from the speaker or writer’s own 
beliefs or were simply representative of a more widespread viewpoint. Certainly, 
these sorts of observations about ‘native’ evidence were not too dissimilar from 
how Aboriginal witnesses were then viewed in mainstream Australian courts. As 
one anthropologist, A.P. Elkin, observed in 1947 when considering the ‘unsatis-
factory features of native evidence’, Aboriginal witnesses were ‘apt to be labelled 
“liars” ’ due to contradictions in their statements made at diff erent times or when 
they were questioned in cross-examination. 62 In fact, he thought that Aboriginal 
witnesses appeared to say ‘whatever will get them out of the strange magic-ridden 
room as quickly as possible’. 63 Elkin concluded that the evidence of Aborigines 
in court was, for a complexity of reasons, ‘unreliable’, and ‘almost inevitably so’, 
and that the ‘actual court scene’ was ‘apt to be ludicrous and futile’. 64 He stressed, 
however, that it was ‘not lack of intelligence on the part of the Aborigines’ which 
made them unreliable witnesses, it was the application of:
 selected (that is, legal) mechanisms of one culture to persons ‘schooled’ in another culture 
which provides very diff erent mechanisms for dealing with similar situations . . . [and that 
 59  See the defending offi  cer’s closing address in the Rabaul R21 trial (NAA: A471, 80730). 
 60  See the Judge-Advocate’s summing up in the Rabaul R9 trial (NAA: A471, 80742). 
 61  See the Judge-Advocate’s summing up in the Rabaul R10 trial (NAA: A471, 80740). 
 62  A.P.  Elkin ,  ‘Aboriginal Evidence and Justice in North Australia’ ,  Oceania ,  17 ( 1947 ),  182 . 
 63  Elkin, above n 61, 183.    64  Elkin, above n 61,184. 
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this was done] without the medium of a thoroughly understood common language, and 
without expert assistance in understanding the native cultural background. 65  
 Th e same observations could be drawn about the Australian Military Courts. Many 
of the Asian witnesses who appeared before the Courts were unlikely to have been 
familiar with an adversarial legal system, let alone with the adapted structure and 
procedures of the fi eld general court-martial system generally used in the trials. 
Moreover, there was no common language—while English was the principal 
language of the Courts, Japanese, Mandarin, Cantonese and pidgin (Tok Pisin) 
were also used. 66 Th ere is no evidence whatsoever that the members of the Courts, 
most of whom were not legally trained, received any guidance on understanding the 
cultural background of the witnesses whose demeanour they were asked to assess. 
As Nancy Armoury Coombs points out in her 2010 study of the evidentiary foun-
dations of international criminal convictions, factors such as these can function as 
impediments to the accurate provision of evidence by witnesses and, consequently, 
due fact-fi nding by courts. 67 
 Th e attacks on Asian witnesses during the Rabaul trials were very signifi cant 
because, in most cases involving Asian victims, the oral or written record of oral 
evidence of Asian eye-witnesses to the war crimes formed the bulk, if not all, of the 
prosecution cases. In contrast to the position at the International Military Tribunal 
at Nuremberg, there were few, if any Japanese documentary records of war crimes 
committed in occupied areas that could be tendered in evidence. 68 Such documents, 
if they existed at all (which was increasingly unlikely by 1944–5, given the wide 
dispersal of units from various command headquarters in South East Asia and the 
tendency to give oral orders which were carried out immediately), were usually 
destroyed in response to offi  cial orders to dispose of records regarding military 
matters at the time of the surrender. 69 For example, the Japanese armies in locations 
including Borneo, Malaya and Java were instructed on 20 August 1945 that not 
only were personnel who had mistreated prisoners-of-war or civilian internees 
permitted to immediately fl ee the area but that ‘documents which would be unfa-
vourable for us in the hands of the enemy are to be treated in the same way as secret 
documents and destroyed when fi nished with’. 70 If the members of the Australian 
 65  Elkin, above n 61, 187. 
 66  Th e few Indian witnesses who appeared in person tended to use English on the stand. Th e written 
statements of Indian witnesses that were tendered in evidence were, however, translated from 
languages such as Urdu. 
 67  Nancy Armoury  Coombs ,  Fact-Finding Without Facts: Th e Uncertain Evidentiary Foundations of 
International Criminal Convictions ( New York :  Cambridge University Press ,  2010 ) . 
 68  As Nancy Armoury Coombs observes, the ‘high-level Nazi offi  cials who were prosecuted at the 
Nuremberg Tribunal were convicted on the strength of their own documentation’: Coombs, 11. 
 69  Th is instruction was itself, however, tendered at the Tokyo Tribunal: Totani, above n 3, 105–7. See 
also Edward Drea, ‘Introduction’ in Edward Drea et al,  Researching Japanese War Crimes: Introductory 
Essays , National Archives and Records Administration for the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese 
Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, 2006, < http://www.archives.gov/iwg/
japanese-war-crimes/introductory-essays.pdf > (accessed 3 March 2013), 9–10. 
 70  Quoted in Totani, above n 3, 106. 
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Military Courts were thus convinced by the defence to place a lesser weight on or 
to disregard evidence from those Asian eye-witnesses, then the accused was more 
likely to be found not guilty. 
 Given the lack of written judgments by the Australian Military Courts and thus 
remarks on the evidence or demeanour of specifi c witnesses or facts found to be 
proven, it is impossible to determine to what extent negative submissions about 
Asian witnesses had an impact on the Courts and aff ected their consideration of 
the weight to be given to their evidence. Th e rate of conviction at Rabaul, however, 
perhaps suggests that the Courts found such arguments generally unconvincing. 
Of 390 accused tried at Rabaul (some of these being the same persons appearing 
in multiple trials), 266 were convicted and 124 were acquitted, amounting to a 
conviction rate of 68.2 per cent. 71 Th is fi gure was, in fact, slightly higher than the 
overall conviction rate from the Australian war crimes trials, which was 67.64 per 
cent. 72 
 Although there was an overwhelming Asian presence at the Rabaul series of the 
Australian war crimes trials, it is certainly probable that the number of trials merely 
scratched the surface of the war crimes that were committed. Th at justice was selective 
in that sense is regrettable; however, as the distinguished British jurist Lord Wright 
of Durley, the Chairman of the United Nations War Crimes Commission, observed 
in 1948: ‘Th e majority of war criminals will fi nd safety in their numbers. It is physi-
cally impossible to punish more than a fraction. All that can be done is to make 
examples’. 73 
 Th at some trial personnel felt it necessary to attempt to discredit Asian witnesses 
on the basis of their race or ethnicity, well beyond what was usually permitted in 
attacking veracity, is disappointing, though perhaps not surprising for the period. 
No doubt, though, if there was a wider knowledge of the Australian war crimes 
trials, some of the most prevalent criticisms of the various international and 
domestic war crimes trials of the Japanese—that they did not adequately deal 
with war crimes committed against Asian victims—would be far less sustainable. 
 71  See the chart of statistics in David C.S. Sissons, ‘Th e Australian War Crimes Trials and Investigations 
(1942–51)’, < http://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~changmin/documents/Sissons%20Final%20War%20
Crimes%20Text%2018-3-06.pdf >. According to a similar chart compiled by Michael Carrel, the 
number of accused tried at Rabaul was 392: Michael Carrel, ‘Australia’s Prosecution of Japanese War 
Criminals: Stimuli and Constraints’, unpublished PhD thesis (Th e University of Melbourne, 2005), 
100. My own count is that 392 accused were tried at Rabaul but, if the multiple trials of the same 
persons are discounted, the total number of individual persons tried was 330. 
 72  Carrel, above n 70, 102. 
 73  United Nations War Crimes Commission,  History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission 
and the Development of the Laws of War ( London :  H.M. Stationery Offi  ce ,  1948 ),  22 . 
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 Dirty War Crimes: Jurisdictions of Memory 
and International Criminal Law 
 Peter D.   Rush * 
 It would be a mistake to expect that trials for past human rights crimes will 
settle disputes about the historical interpretation of recent events. History 
cannot be ‘settled’ in this sense . . .  1 
 What matters is not the fact that we remember history, but the way in which 
we remember it. 2 
 Although it must be justice that has the fi nal word, we cannot remain silent in 
the face of all that we have heard, read and recorded. 3 
 (I)  Leave-taking 
 Decisions are constitutive of transitions and their dealing with the past. Whether 
the move is to move on from war or social confl ict, from crime or atrocity, the 
conduct and norms of law give shape to their formation and transformation. Th is 
chapter engages the two didactic orientations of international criminal justice that, 
for better or worse, have come to coordinate the juristic presentation of that con-
duct, those norms—namely, the prosecutorial and the testimonial. Staying with 
law and its forms, it addresses the intimacies of a legal case history. 
 *  Director, International Criminal Justice programme, Institute for International Law and the 
Humanities, Melbourne Law School, University of Melbourne. Early iterations of the work of 
this chapter were presented at the Melbourne Law School (the ‘Untold Stories’ conference), Ulster 
University Law School, and the Centre for Transnational Legal Studies in London (Georgetown 
University Law School). Th anks to the participants at each of these fora and especially to Gerry 
Simpson, Eugene McNamee and Naomi Mezey. Th anks also to Mark Rosenthal, Katrina Zablocki 
and Shaun McVeigh. Alison Young is the inspiration and guide through the cinematic moment of law. 
 1  Juan E.  Mendez ,  ‘Latin American Experiences of Accountability’ in  Ifi   Amadiume and  Abdullah 
 An-Na’im (eds),  Th e Politics of Memory:  Truth, Healing and Social Justice ( London :   Zed Books , 
 2000 ),  137 . 
 2  K.  Asmal ,  L.  Asmal ,  R.S.  Roberts ,  Reconciliation Th rough Truth: A Reckoning with Apartheid’s 
Criminal Governance ( Glosderry :  David Philip Publishers, with Mayibue, University of the Western 
Cape ,  1996 ),  26 . 
 3  Ernesto Sabato (1984), Prologue to  Nunca  Más : Th e Report of the National Commission on the 
Disappearance of Persons (or CONADEP) [website], < http://www.desaparecidos.org/nuncamas/web/
english/library/nevagain/nevagain_002.htm > (accessed 31 October 2011). 
18_9780199671144c18.indd   367 10/3/2013   4:19:41 PM
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in 
any way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
Southern Histories368
 Th e fi rst part reconstructs the narrative memory and socio-legal context of the 
contemporary scene of memory in Argentina concerning  La Guerra Sucia (‘Th e 
Dirty War’) and  los desaparecidos  (literally ‘the disappeared’, but often rendered as 
‘the missing’). Th roughout, these terms remain in Spanish so that they may resound 
with all the pain, suff ering and injustice that they carry to this day. Th e second 
part turns to an engagement with a recent fi lm— El secreto de sus ojos  (Th e Secret 
in Th eir Eyes)—set in Buenos Aires and is concerned with writing the life of the 
law in the aftermath of atrocity. Th is will have returned the account of Argentina’s 
memory work to the conduct of criminal jurisdiction. After reconstructing two 
ways to live a life full of nothing, a life lived with the trauma of a legal case history, 
the coda to the chapter addresses itself to the remnants of a criminal jurisdiction 
of memory. If decisions are constitutive of international criminal justice in times 
of transition, then a memorial jurisdiction of crime and atrocity can be thought 
in terms of its manner of speaking:  its genres of representation, as much as its 
taxonomies. An ethics of testimony and a logic of memory remain unsettled in the 
aftermath of mass atrocity. Perhaps it is now possible to say  that is a legacy that 
international criminal justice receives from Argentina. 
 (II)  Sad Privilege of Argentina 
 Argentina is a community assailed by unassimilable experiences of injustice and 
suff ering that return in parts and images. It is a country possessed by  La Guerra 
Suica that took place from 1976 to 1983. On 24 March 1976, a military junta 
presided over by Jorge Videla took power from Isabel Perón in a coup d’etat. 
Five years later, Videla handed over the presidency of the junta to General Viola. 
Two years later, with the loss of the Malvinas war generating intense domestic 
problems, a transitional military government took power and prepared general 
elections. Raul Alfonsin, from the Unión Civica Radical party, campaigned on a 
platform that promised a national truth commission and a national accounting of 
what happened. 
 From the outset, the military junta with Videla as its leader initiated a pro-
gramme of disappearing leftist guerrillas in an eff ort to cleanse and strengthen what 
was characterized as a weak and feminized social body. 4 Th ere was a quite specifi c 
focus on the student movement. Th e programme soon extended into a systematic 
and generalized disappearing of the left. Th is is  La Guerra Sucia . Th e national 
truth commission (CONADEP), which was set up when Raul Alfonsin was demo-
cratically elected as President, documented some 8,960 deaths and disappearances 
between 1975 and 1983, with most taking place in the fi rst year of the junta led 
by Videla. Counting practices have varied and most estimates of  los desaparecidos 
 4  For an excellent reconstruction of the dirty war in terms of the gendered construction of subjec-
tivity, authority, the state and resistance—as well as the ‘twice performed behaviours’ of the Madres, 
see  Dianne  Taylor ,  Disappearing Acts ( Durham, NC :   Duke University Press ,  1997 ) , particularly 
Chapter 7. 
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 now put the count between 10,000 and 30,000 people. Disappearance was the 
preferred method of the junta. As Ernesto Sabato put it, emphasizing the material, 
visceral and aesthetic conduct of the junta, ‘in the name of national security, thou-
sands upon thousands of human beings, usually young adults or even adolescents, 
fell into the sinister, ghostly category of the  desaparecidos , a word (sad privilege for 
Argentina) frequently left in Spanish by the world’s press’. 5 
 Th e response has been memory politics.  La Guerra Sucia and its  desaparecidos will 
have haunted Argentine politics. In part, the response has been a matter of recover-
ing the untold stories, the hidden histories, so that the narrative of the past can 
recount what was done, where it was done and how, by whom and to whom. In the 
national accounting that followed the end of the military dictatorship, informa-
tion was at a premium, especially since the criminal apparatus of power was carried 
out within a double ordering: one normal, open and offi  cial that targeted ordinary 
criminality; the other abnormal, operating under a de facto power and clandestine 
that targeted ‘subversives’. 6 Nevertheless, the lineaments of the story of the dirty 
war were well-known from quite early on. 7 Th is is not to downplay the importance 
of determining the precise and specifi c facts of particular incidents. In fact, the 
investigations and fi les generated by CONADEP, for example, have provided the 
evidential basis for numerous criminal proceedings beginning with  El Juicio a las 
Juntas in 1985. Similarly, its report has been continuously in print for some thirty 
years and is now in its fi fth edition, as well as having an online and translated pres-
ence. In short, the narrative of the past is presented in the mode of a repetition 
and reminder of what is already known. Th e clandestine nature of the dirty war, 
like the  Nunca Más report itself, and the word  desaparecidos , has something of a 
talismanic quality. In this it assists the audience of the story—those addressed by 
the narrative memory of the past, whether personal or communal—to recognize 
themselves in it. It reminds them of what they already knew and hence forms a 
personal and collective self-understanding. And such recognition and reminders 
are an achievement in the context of a dirty war and its aftermath. 
 5  Sabato, above n 3. Th is chapter will not recount the details of the dirty war. Th e Nunca  Más 
report provides much. For scholarly elaboration that has assisted with my understanding, see  Mario 
Di  Paolantonio ,  ‘Tracking the Transitional Demand for Legal Recall: Th e Foreclosing and Promise of 
Law in Argentina,’  Social & Legal Studies ,  13 ( 2004 ),  351–75 ; Taylor,  Disappearing Acts , above n 4; 
Antonius  C.G.M.  Robben ,  ‘How Traumatised Societies Remember:  Th e Aftermath of Argentina’s 
Dirty War,’  Cultural Critique ,  59 ( 2005 ),  120–64 ;  Mark J.  Osiel ,  ‘Ever Again: Legal Remembrance of 
Administrative Massacre,’  University of Pennsylvania Law Review ,  144 ( 1995 ),  463–704 ;  Mark J.  Osiel , 
 Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory, and the Law ( New Brunswick, NJ :  Transaction Publishers ,  1997 ) . 
 6  Th is is a common topos. It was initiated in the immediate aftermath of the military dictator-
ship in the report of the national truth commission and in the judgment of the court in  El Juicio a 
las Juntas . For a recent example, see the Córdoba judgment in the  Videla case of 22 December 2010, 
at 28. Available at < http://www.eldiariodeljuicio.com.ar/ > (‘22/12 Sentencia Descargá la sentencia 
completa’). 
 7  Th is is not uncommon in transitional justice contexts.  Priscilla B.  Hayner ,  ‘Fifteen Truth Com-
missions—1974–94:  A  Comparative Study’ in  N.  Kritz (ed),  Transitional Justice:  How Emerging 
Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes , Vol. 1, ( Washington DC :  United States Institute of Peace 
Press ,  1995 ),  228 (commenting that ‘while not true in every case, a general understanding of who did 
what during a period of violence is usually well accepted by the civilian population within a country’). 
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 All of which is to say that the telling of the story of the past, its enunciation 
rather than its statement, is important for understanding projects based on narra-
tive memory. Here, rather than a demand for information and a recounting of the 
facts, what comes into view is the demand to ‘send a message’, an attachment to a 
larger normative story—whether it be about the dirty war, whether it be about the 
global rule of law or the complicity of the judiciary in the dirty war, or whether it 
is about the character of the nation. 
 What I have been tracking so far is the way in which contemporary memory 
politics of Argentina are precisely a politics of memory. Information becomes 
meaningful and has value by way of a normative narrative—and this is so simply 
because the narrative memory of the past is a way of dealing with the past which 
implicates and is  addressed to others . In this sense, then, it is a way of forming a 
world in which the narrators can appear to themselves and others. Memory politics 
are always already public and historical. Yet the pressure of the normative is one 
that pushes the story of  La Guerra Sucia and its aftermath towards an insistence 
on breaking with the past, as much as setting right standards for the future and 
moving on. As Ruti G. Teitel astutely notes in her genealogy of transitional justice, 
‘the paradoxical goal is to undo history’ and so the threshold challenge of transi-
tions is one of ‘remaining in history’. 8 Th is has both populist-democratic as well 
as populist-authoritarian orientations. Where ‘moving on’ might be the implicit 
norm associated with liberal rule of law narratives, consider the explicit invocation 
of a break with the past by Aldo Rico—a former lieutenant colonel who served in 
the Malvinas War during the military junta. In 2007, as prosecutions of the mili-
tary for dirty war crimes get up a head of steam under the Kirchner administration, 
he argues that it is ‘counter-productive to return to the past’. 
 Despite the prevalence of a normative politics of memory, it remains possible to 
frame the question of dealing with the past in terms of an ethics of memory. Here, 
dealing with the past is conducted in the mode of  acknowledgement . What is also 
at stake is not so much information as understanding. Narrating the past, recall-
ing it, remembering it, is also a demand that  others recognize the criminality, the 
injury, the injustice, pain, suff ering and death—the disappearances, the tortures, 
the abductions, the kidnapping of children, ‘the stolen identities’, the murders. In 
such projects of memory—whether art installations, human rights advocacy, pro-
tests staged by the Madres de Plaza de Mayo especially in the early years, the sites 
of conscience projects 9 —the demand for information and for an end to impunity 
(‘never again’) not only instantiates a break with the past, a normative pressure to 
 8  Ruti G.  Teitel ,  ‘Transitional Justice Genealogy,’  Harvard Human Rights Journal ,  16 ( 2003 ),  86–
87 . See also  Ruti G.  Teitel ,  ‘Transitional Jurisprudence: Th e Role of Law in Political Transformation’, 
 Yale Law Journal ,  106 ( 1997 ),  2009–2080 ;  Ruti G.  Teitel ,  Transitional Justice , ( Oxford and New York, 
NY :  Oxford University Press ,  2002 ) . 
 9  International Coalition of Sites of Conscience [website], < http://www.sitesofconscience.org/ > 
(accessed 24 February 2013). See also Memoria Abierta, a coalition of human rights organizations 
tasked with the archiving of the memory of abuses that occurred under the juntas. In December 
2010, it launched ‘Vestigios’, an online memorial displaying photos of objects that survivors and rela-
tives of victims kept in memory of their loved ones. Available at < http://www.memoriaabierta.org.ar > 
(accessed 24 February 2013). 
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move on, but also foregrounds an ambivalence. It is as if the acknowledgment of 
the past is caught between the burden of history and the presumption of a future. 
In this engagement with  La Guerra Sucia , such an ethics of memory appears not 
so much as a counter-narrative but as a hyperbolic, overheated acknowledgment of 
the injustice of pain, suff ering and death. Bearing witness is viscerally conducted 
as a life lived with the past. 
 Th e disputes to which memory politics give rise are mediated by history and by 
visceral notions of personal and collective responsibility. In doing so, they force a 
refl ection on the past and on the social context in which the response to the past 
is made. Th is refl ection, I have suggested, amounts to a veritable working through 
of  La Guerra Sucia and its  desaparecidos . But just as important is that this working 
through—the questions of conduct and narration, the demand for information 
and for acknowledgment, its politics as much as its question of ethics—take shape 
within a continual return to law: local, regional and international, criminal and 
civil. Law will have given shape to the public memory of war. As the La Plata tri-
bunal put it in its  Von Wernich judgment in the immediate aftermath of the annul-
ment of the amnesty laws by the Supreme Court and Congress:
 Michel Foucault speaks of the law as a ‘producer of truth’ and, agreeing with that concept, 
permit me to recall again the importance of the recognition of the truth for the construc-
tion of collective memory. Especially in societies such as ours that have suff ered the geno-
cide which led to the trial that has just been completed. 10 
 In the next part of the chapter, I explore the political form and ethical demand of 
this memorial jurisdiction, but fi rst some socio-legal context. 
 Th e contemporary scene of memory politics bears witness to the experience of 
 La Guerra Sucia in large part through a return to criminal prosecution. Since the 
demise of the juntas, investigation, prosecution, trial and punishment has been 
extensive to say the least but it has waxed and waned. Th e most recent round 
emerged in the mid-1990s and then showed a dramatic increase with the rise of 
the Kirchner administration in 2003, fi rst under the presidency of Néstor Kirchner 
and then with Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, the current president since 2007. 
 In the aftermath of a national truth commission ( Nunca más ) and the trials of the 
military leaders ( El Juicio a las Juntas ) in the mid 1980s, amnesties and pardons were 
legislated and decreed for the military. In the wake of military uprisings and as a 
compromise measure, Raul Alfonsin decreed the  Ley de Punto Final (the ‘Full Stop’ 
law of 1986) and  Ley de Obediencia Debida (‘Due obedience’ law of 1987)  that 
eff ectively amnesties many levels of the military. Videla, together with many other 
 10  Juicio a Christian Federico Von Wernich, Causa 2506/07, Tribunal Oral en lo Criminal Federal 
No.1 de La Plata, November 2007, 168–9 (my translation). Available at < http://www.apdhlaplata.org.
ar/Fundamentos%20VW%20chico.pdf > (accessed 11 October 2011). Th e reference to the work of 
Foucault is also to be found in the earlier 2006 judgment of  Etchecolatz (Causa 2251/06), 253–4. For 
commentary on these cases arguing that the pressure of civil society groups on domestic courts risks an 
incorrect yet understandable interpretation of the international law of genocide as the court and civil 
society actors go about building a collective memory, see  Margarita K.  O’Donnell ,  ‘New Dirty War 
Judgments in Argentina: National Courts and Domestic Prosecutions of International Human Rights 
Violations’,  New York University Law Review ,  84 ( 2009 ),  333–74 , particularly 364–73. 
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offi  cers, was subsequently pardoned by Carlos Menem who was elected President 
in 1989. Th ese amnesties and pardons were part and parcel of a decade-long cam-
paign of misinformation and denial by the military. In this climate, two events 
became important. Th e fi rst is a legal innovation. 11 Th e Centro de Estudios Legales 
y Sociales—a human rights investigation, advocacy and litigation organization—
launched in 1995 what have become known as ‘truth trials’. Th ey did so as a way 
to get around the amnesties and pardons. 12 Th e Centre brought cases arguing that 
these legal repertoires were restricted to the conduct of prosecution, conviction and 
punishment. As such, this left room for the court to exercise a declaratory jurisdic-
tion. What the cases have achieved and what the courts have granted was a verdict 
that took the form of a declaration of truth rather than a decision of guilt or inno-
cence. 13 Th e second important event was a series of high profi le and publicly visible 
confessions and apologies by those responsible for the atrocities of the dirty war, the 
most infamous of which was that by Adolpho Scilingo, a naval offi  cer who partici-
pated in the death fl ights ( vuelos de la muerte ) in which detained and tortured  desa-
parecidos were pushed from aircraft, often while still alive, into the Rio de la Plata 
and Atlantic Ocean where they drowned. 14 Th is eruption of memories—especially 
since they were by those who were protected by the amnesties and pardons—in 
eff ect transformed and extended the public space within which  La Guerra Sucia 
could be narrated. Within a few years, the confl uence of these two forces—legal 
evasion of the amnesty laws, and a cultural transformation in the status of the mili-
tary within public debate—ended up with Jorge Videla being prosecuted, convicted 
and sentenced to preventive detention for kidnapping children and falsifying docu-
ments. In what has since become known as the advocacy around ‘stolen identity’, 
the Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo launched litigation which argued, akin to the truth 
trials, that the amnesty laws did not apply to the kidnapping of minors, changing 
their identity, and various property crimes and hence the courts could hold mem-
bers of the junta accountable for such crimes during  La Guerra Sucia . 15 
 11  It is one amongst a number of contributions that Argentine domestic advocacy has made to the 
transformation of regional, international criminal justice, and human rights and humanitarian law. 
For comment on this and other contributions, see Mendez, above n 1;  Pablo  Parenti ,  ‘Th e Prosecution 
of International Crimes in Argentina’ ,  International Criminal Law Review ,  10 ( 2010 ),  491–507 ; and 
especially  Kathryn  Sikkink and  Carrie  Booth Walling ,  ‘Argentina’s Contribution to Global Trends in 
Transitional Justice’ in  Naomi  Roht-Arriaza and  Javier  Mariezcurrena (eds),  Transitional Justice in the 
Twenty-First Century ( Cambridge :  Cambridge University Press ,  2006 ) . 
 12  For the ongoing work of this Centre, see CELS website: < http://www.cels.org.ar > (accessed 24 
February 2013). 
 13  On the truth trials,  Juan  Méndez and  Francisco  Bariffi   ,  ‘Right to Truth’ in  Rudiger  Wolfrum (ed), 
 Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law ( Heidelberg and Oxford :   Oxford University 
Press ,  2007 ) ;  Juan  Méndez ,  ‘An Emerging “Right to Truth”:  Latin-American Contributions’ in 
 Suzanne  Karstedt (ed),  Legal Institutions and Collective Memories ( Oxford :  Hart ,  2009 ) ; Sikkink and 
Walling, above n 11, 316. 
 14  Juan Méndez and Francisco Bariffi  , ‘Th e Scilingo Case’ in Wolfrum, above n 13. For analysis, 
see  Antonius C.G.M.  Robben ,  ‘How Traumatised Societies Remember: Th e Aftermath of Argentina’s 
Dirty War’ ,  Cultural Critique ,  59 ( 2005 ),  120–64 . 
 15  Andrew  Graham-Yool ,  Who Do You Th ink You Are? Th e Search For Argentina’s Lost Children 
( London :   Seagull Press ,  2011 ) provides an account of the cultural resonances of the stolen iden-
tity issue and advocacy and can be supplemented by Francisco Goldman, ‘Children of the Dirty 
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 With hindsight, all these events—together with the activism and advocacy 
that has been ongoing since before the collapse of the juntas (most notably by 
the two strands of the Madres de Plaza de Mayo)—turned out to be a precursor 
to the current round of investigations, prosecutions, trials and judgments which 
began after the election of Néstor Kirchner as President in 2003. Th e unravelling 
of the amnesties 16 began to accelerate. In August 2003, the Supreme Court, with 
the support of the Kirchner presidency, declared the  Ley de Punto Final (the ‘Full 
Stop’ law of 1986) and the  Ley de Obediencia Debida (the ‘Due obedience’ law 
of 1987) unconstitutional, null and void. In June 2005, by a majority of seven 
to one, the judges of the Supreme Court ruled, on a case initiated by the Centro 
de Estudios Legales y Sociales and using the situation of a kidnapped child of the 
disappeared, that the amnesty laws were unlawful. Th is ruling eff ectively reopened 
cases—investigations as well as suspended prosecutions—which had been closed 
for the preceding fi fteen years. It was a watershed and would continually return 
the narrative memory of  La Guerra Sucia to a jurisdictional melding of domestic 
criminal law, regional human rights instruments and institutions, international 
law (both criminal and humanitarian). 17 
 Since then, the number of people investigated, charged, tried, convicted and 
punished has dramatically increased—albeit that concern has been expressed over 
the speed (delay and length) with which proceedings are fi nalized. In the last four 
years, some 652 people have had criminal proceedings brought against them for 
human rights violations in relation to the dirty war. Th ere was a signifi cant increase 
in 2007, and then again in 2009. 18 During 2010, there was ‘a marked increase 
over previous years’. Nineteen trials were concluded. In them, 119 people were 
judged: twelve already had convictions, ninety-eight were new accused, 110 were 
convicted and nine were acquitted. 19 One of these trials brought Jorge Videla 
War: Argentina’s Stolen Orphans,’  Th e New Yorker , 19 March 2012, 54–65. See also Arie Gandsman’s 
recent examination of the ways in which the lives and relationships of the children of the  desaparecidos 
 have become battlegrounds for transitional justice projects:  ‘Retributive Justice, Public Intimacies 
and the Micropolitics of the Restitution of Kidnapped Children of the Disappeared in Argentina,’ 
 International Journal of Transitional Justice, 6 (2012), 423–43. For the Abuelas, or Grandmothers 
of the Plaza de Mayo, see their website available at < http://www.abuelas.org.ar > (accessed 25 
February 2013). 
 16  Here I focus on the amnesties. Th e pardons also begin to unravel. In 2000, the Supreme Court 
in the  Mazzeo case declared them invalid—at least in respect of those who had already been indicted 
but not yet convicted. 
 17  Symptomatic of the synergy between domestic criminal law and international criminal law by 
way of the constitutionalization of human rights, Carmen Argibay, one of the majority judges in this 
ruling, had been a judge on the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 
 18  Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales, ‘Estadísticas de los juicios por crímenes de lesa humanidad 
en Argentina’ (the statistics are extrapolated from the table entitled ‘Total personas de acusadas por 
delitos de lesa humanidad. Evolucion 2007–2011’). Available at < http://www.cels.org.ar/wpblogs/ > 
(‘Ver más estadísticas de los juicios por crímenes de lesa humanidad’) (accessed 31 October 2011). 
 19  Th is information for 2010 is provided in Attorney General’s Offi  ce, Unidad Fiscal de Coordinacion 
y Seguimiento de las causas por violaciones a los Derechos Humanos durante el terrorismo de Estado, 
‘Informe sobre el estado de las causas por violaciones a los derechos humanos cometidas durante el 
terrorismo de Estado  29 de diciembre de 2010 ’, 1 and 4 (my translation). Available at < http://www.
mpf.gov.ar/ > (accessed 31 October 2011). Th is offi  ce and website is charged with monitoring all such 
criminal proceedings. Its website contains statistical information, and annual updates. 
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before the law yet again. He was sentenced and convicted on 22 December 2010 in 
El Tribunal Oral Federal No. 1 de Córdoba. 20 He was found guilty of twenty-nine 
counts of murder, thirty-two counts of torture which the tribunal concluded were 
aggravated by the condition of political persecution, and one count of torture fol-
lowed by death. Th e charges arose out of events that occurred in the early years of 
the coup d’etat, when as mentioned earlier,  La Guerra Sucia was perhaps at its most 
virulent. Videla was sentenced to life imprisonment ( perpetua ), which the court 
decided must be served in an ordinary or civilian prison in Córdoba rather than a 
military prison such as the notorious Campo de Mayo near Buenos Aires where he 
had previously been imprisoned. 21 In a judgment running to over 670 pages, the 
three judges not only narrated the facts and the charges that they instantiated for 
each of the accused but returned to the national truth commission, to  El Juicio a las 
Juntas and its elaboration of a criminal regime that was both offi  cial and clandes-
tine, to the amnesties and pardons and their constitutional invalidity, and to the 
cases that were reopened including the La Plata tribunal judgments of  Von Wernich 
and  Etchecolatz which emphasized the Foucauldian idea of the law as ‘a producer 
of truth’ ( productor de verdad ) and its importance for the transformation of collec-
tive memory. 22 In addition, the judgment engaged in the various controversies that 
have marked the doctrinal disputes arising from the increasing internationalization 
and regionalization of Argentina’s criminal jurisprudence since the mid-1990s. 23 
However, the case was distinctive. As the tribunal declared, the military dictator-
ship’s so-called war against subversion (‘ lucha contra la subversion ’) set up a criminal 
apparatus of power which operated ‘in coordination with or with the consent of 
the rest of the legal institutions of our country’. 24 But beyond this general associa-
tion between the military, ‘state terrorism’ and legal institutions, the tribunal also 
specifi ed that members of its own court had been complicit in the apparatus of 
repression: ‘[T] he various testimonies that we heard in the debate have shown us 
that there was a total lack of protection [ desprotección ] and absence of commitment 
on the part of the judiciary’. 25 
 In a brief response to the judgment of the Córdoba tribunal, Ruti G. Teitel asks 
‘what can such a verdict mean so many years after the restoration of democracy in 
Argentina?’ Her answer is brief and decisive:
 Not giving up on accountability, despite the passage of time, sends an important mes-
sage about human rights, and the distinctive nature of these off ences as ‘crimes against 
 20  Th e  Videla case, decision dated 22 December 2010. Available at < http://www.eldiariodeljuicio.
com.ar/ > (‘22/12 Sentencia Descargá la sentencia completa’) (accessed 31 October 2011). 
 21  During the dirty war the military barracks at Campo de Mayo near Buenos Aires was the site of 
an estimated 5,000 detentions, arising from abductions, and with consequential tortures and deaths. 
 22  Córdoba judgment in the  Videla case, decision dated 22 December 2010, 29 (my transla-
tion). Available at < http://www.eldiariodeljuicio.com.ar/ > (‘22/12 Sentencia Descargá la sentencia 
completa’). 
 23  For a useful conspectus of the disputes in English published just before the judgment of the 
Córdoba tribunal, see  Pablo F.  Parenti ,  ‘Th e Prosecution of International Crimes in Argentina’, 
 International Criminal Law Review ,  10 ( 2010 ),  491–507 . 
 24  Córdoba judgment in the  Videla case, above n 22. 
 25  Córdoba judgment in the  Videla case, above n 22, 340–1. 
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humanity’ . . . Years later, what’s at stake is not just punishment but also political truth . . . Th at 
lesson, handed down along with the judgment against Videla, vindicates eff orts to establish 
a global rule of law. 26 
 Rather than frame the memory politics of the last thirty years in terms of a vin-
dication of rights and a normative shift that presupposes a settled rule of law, 
the remainder of this chapter proceeds to explore a criminal jurisdiction of mem-
ory which works through the trauma of  La Guerra Sucia . Th e lineaments of this 
memorial jurisdiction are here held to the conduct and practices of law. By way of a 
consideration of the diffi  culties that beset the eff ort of narrating a legal case history, 
it will engage the temporality of a life lived with law, the predicament of memory, 
and the slippages and complexities of representation. In order to address these 
matters, I turn to a recent fi lm by the Argentine director Juan José Campanella. 
 (III)  A Memorial Jurisdiction 
 Towards the end of the fi lm  El Secreto de sus ojos (Th e Secret in Th eir Eyes), the 
protagonist—a recently retired deputy clerk in an examining magistrate’s court 27 
who has spent his life working in the criminal justice system of Buenos Aires—
asks, ‘How can someone live an empty life? How do you live a life full of nothing? 
How do you do it?’
 Hastings:  How does the case proceed? [ . . . ] 
 Esposito:  How can I do nothing about it? I’ve been asking myself for 25 years and 
I’ve only been able to come up with one answer. ‘Forget it, it was another 
lifetime. It’s over, don’t ask.’ It wasn’t another lifetime. It was this one. It IS 
the one. 
 I want to understand. How can someone live an empty life? How do you live 
a life full of nothing? How do you do it? 28 
 Th e fi lm off ers a range of responses to this problematic of the intimacies of the 
legal case history. Th ese responses, I want to suggest, mark the fi lm as a contri-
bution to the contemporary annals of international criminal justice, its narrative 
memory and its minor jurisprudence of dirty war crimes. 
 El secreto de sus ojos is the story of Benjamin Esposito, a law clerk, who is trying 
to write a novel in his retirement. Th e novel, he imagines, is based on a case he was 
 26  Ruti G. Teitel (2011). ‘Justice Delayed, But Not Denied,’  Tico Times [online newspaper], < http://
www.ticotimes.net/Opinion/Previous-perspectives/justice-delayed-but-not-denied > (accessed 31 
October 2011). 
 27  Th e fi lm, while not inaccurate, brushes over the precise legal offi  ce of the protagonist, Benjamin 
Esposito. I have followed the convention of the novel on which it is based— La pregunta de sus ojos 
by Eduardo Sacheri—and which is somewhat more precise on this issue. Th e protagonist is a deputy 
clerk in one of two clerk’s offi  ces in a court presided over by the examining magistrate. He is part of 
the investigative jurisdiction. As deputy clerk he is the primary administrator of the clerk’s offi  ce. It is 
a sore point for him, in the book, that he never fi nished his legal studies. 
 28  El Secreto de sus ojos  (Th e Secret in Th eir Eyes) (dir Campanella, 2009). All unattributed quota-
tions in the remainder of the article are from this fi lm, and use the English translation in its subtitles. 
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involved in some twenty-fi ve years previously—the rape and murder of a young 
female schoolteacher. As he writes, he narrates the case but is assailed by images. 
Esposito and his colleagues Hastings and Sandobal investigate and hunt down the 
perpetrator Isidoro Gomez in mid to late 1970s Argentina. After several years, the 
killer rapist is caught by Esposito and sentenced to life imprisonment. Th e death 
penalty, as he explains to the victim’s grieving husband, does not offi  cially exist 
in Argentina. However, after two years in prison, Gomez is released by executive 
order. Th e release and order is engineered by one of Esposito’s fellow law clerks in 
order to use the killer’s talents in a secret police squad against ‘subversives’. 29 
 Th is is one of the many echoes in the fi lm of that mix of democracy and authori-
tarianism that has characterized Argentinean law and politics from Juan Perón 
onwards. And in fact the story of the fi lm is cut from the weave of this political 
cloth. More specifi cally, it begins in 1974, just before the death of Juan Perón and 
the succession of his third wife Isabel to the presidency. It also sets the offi  ce poli-
tics of the law clerks and judges in the context of the imminent dirty war, and then 
returns to its contemporary aftermath with the resurgence of memory projects and 
criminal prosecutions described above. In the foreground however is the narrative 
of the criminal case—the crime, its investigation and its subsequent history. Th e 
‘Morales case’, as it is referred to in the fi lm, reverberates throughout the lives of all 
the characters involved in it: the deputy clerk (Esposito), his fellow clerk and friend 
(Pablo Sandobal), his senior colleague (Irene Hastings, variously clerk and judge), 
the surviving husband of the rape and murder victim (Ricardo Morales), and the 
perpetrator of the crime (Gomez). How is this presented? 
 From beginning to end, the fi lm is staged as a meditation on memory and in 
particular the memory of law, of crime, and of desire. It is the clerk Esposito who 
remembers. However, his memory is not of a singular past but instead  El secreto de 
sus ojos presents us with  fragmented strands echoing in a ruptured present . Th e fi lm 
moves between four times in which the present of legal recall does not occupy the 
position of mastery. Th e fi lm begins with that present but quickly shows it to be the 
site of an overwhelming return of the past, unsettling everyone’s settled accounts 
of the case—crime, investigation and denouement. Th e enigma around which this 
traumatic history is organized and emplotted involves Esposito’s relations with 
two characters—Morales, the grieving husband, and Hastings, the judge and col-
league with whom he is secretly in love. Th ese two relations establish the double 
meaning of the title of the fi lm. First, it is while looking at an old photograph of 
the victim with her husband that Esposito and, unwittingly, the husband discover 
 29  Consider the decrees by Isabel Perón allowing the military to take action against ‘subversives’. 
Arrest warrants were later issued against her concerning forced disappearances during her presidency. 
She was arrested in Madrid where she was living in 2007 but in 2008 the Spanish courts rejected her 
extradition to Argentina. Isabella (or Maria Estela Martinez de Perón) was president from 1 July 1974 
to 24 March 1976. Th e fi lm begins, and the memory of the crime goes back to the day of the murder 
(21 June 1974) a few weeks before the death of Juan Perón and her ascension to become the 42nd 
President. As a result of the coup that initiates the dirty war, Jorge Videla replaces her as president. Th e 
paramilitary group known as the triple A or AAA ( Alianza Anticomunista Argentina ) was particularly 
active during her Presidency, and then moved from the Peronist right to the military junta. 
18_9780199671144c18.indd   376 10/3/2013   4:19:43 PM
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in 
any way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
Dirty War Crimes 377
the identity of the killer and rapist. Th e discovery is based on the intensity of the 
perpetrator’s gaze at the now-dead woman. Second, throughout the fi lm it is the 
exchange of glances and gazes rather than dialogue between Esposito and Hastings 
that cinematically establishes the currents of desire between them both now and in 
the past. Bringing these two together, Esposito will say to Hastings:
 It’s the look in their eyes. Th at’s the key. 
 You see this kid looking at the woman . . . Worshipping her. 
 Th e eyes . . . Speak . . . Th ey bullshit too, they should keep quiet. 
 Sometimes it’s better not to look. 
 While the content of the dialogue refers to the gaze of the criminal, the camer-
awork during the exchange establishes the ocular proof, reveals the untold story, of 
the Esposito–Hastings relation. 
 Th ese two relations provoke a doubled past in the memory of Esposito, but 
importantly, although these remembered pasts overlap they are not coterminous, 
joined but not precisely identical. Similarly, in the present, while he is struggling to 
express himself he is compelled to confront both characters because of the continu-
ing eff ects of his past entanglements with them both. Th is has the eff ect that the 
last third of the fi lm stages Esposito’s attempt to hold on to both relations and both 
histories. Th e fi lm ends by promising that this attempt is successful: the past con-
fronts the future in the moment of a present that off ers the contingent possibility 
of reconciliation. Signifi cantly, though, the law clerk—now retired—will continue 
to be unable to speak his desire, but such inability does not arrest him. At the end, 
he does not give way on his desire. 
 Th is then is the narrative of the fi lm—its enigma and emplotment. Let me 
return to the question that the law clerk asks but cannot get his head around: ‘So, 
how is it possible to live a life full of nothing, to live an empty life?’ Th e fi lm stages 
two responses for us. Both involve trauma and the relations of memory and nar-
rative that it enfolds. 
 One response concerns the life story of the law, and the task of beginning. Th e 
very fi rst scene of the fi lm is presented as a scene of writing and its subsequent 
erasure, literally: the retired Esposito is beginning to write the novel based on his 
memory of the Morales case, but he continually scores out and increasingly fi lls up 
the waste bin. He visits Hastings, who is now a judge, and recounts: ‘My biggest 
problem is that I’ve started fi fty times and never got past the fi fth line.’ She off ers 
him three responses: fi rst, disbelief (‘What do you know about writing novels?’); 
second, a typewriter fondly described as the ‘old Olivetti’; and fi nally concrete 
instruction on how to proceed (start ‘wherever you remember the most . . . which 
part comes back most often? Th at’s the image you should start with’). Start not 
with the word but with the image. What is this image that returns to assail him and 
arrest the possibility of narrative? Th e expectation set up by the fi lm editing is that 
the reader will be shown the scene of the crime that begins the story of the Morales 
case. Instead, there is a reverie, a daydream, in which Esposito recalls when he 
met Hastings and fell in love at fi rst sight. It is only then that the fi lm moves to a 
subsequent point in the past and the event of the Morales rape and murder. Th ese 
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two intersubjective relations determine the shape of the narrative of the case that 
Esposito will have produced. 
 He feels the need to start writing, then, but he suff ers from the impossibility of 
beginning at the beginning. Why? At one and the same time, he experiences the 
last twenty-fi ve years, the time since the Morales case, as his life being ‘sidetracked’. 
Th e impossibility of beginning is that beginnings are always plural, perhaps even 
too many. As Esposito remarks at one point, ‘I remember plenty of beginnings but 
I’m not sure what they have to do with the story.’ Hastings rejoins: ‘Th en start at 
the beginning and stop dwelling on it.’ 
 We dwell in the middle. A  life full of nothing is a life overfl owing with the 
intimacies of the offi  ce, work, marriage, political relocation and not a few aff aires. 
Th at this both arrests the narrative,  and importantly is a spur to writing life, is made 
explicit in the fi lm by the circulation of the ‘old Olivetti’ typewriter which Hastings 
gives to Esposito as part of the instrumentality of narrative. Th e typewriter’s letter 
‘A’ does not work, does not leave a black letter on the page, leaves a blank space. 
Th is is one place where a minor but structuring detail provides a meeting point in 
the fi lm between the life of law and the memory of the dirty war. As noted earlier, 
AAA or  Alianza Anticommunista Argentina was active during the presidency of 
Isabel Perón. With the return to criminal prosecution that has marked the memory 
politics from the mid-1990s, there has recently been a prosecution of the Triple 
AAA for dirty war crimes  prior to the coup on 24 March 1976. And in the fi lm we 
see various characters in the institutions of law expostulating in frustration about 
how hard this typewriter makes it for them to do their work of writing fi les, bind-
ing fi les, fi lling in forms, witness depositions, and writing memos that overfl ow the 
desks and offi  ces that occupy the built legal spaces of the fi lm. As the old Olivetti 
is passed from character to character, it would seem that its function is that of the 
macguffi  n, the cinematic object whose circulation is devoid of meaning and refer-
ence beyond making us aware that we are watching a fi lm. However, in  El secreto 
de sus ojos , the malfunctioning typewriter becomes the circulating representation of 
trauma: a prosaic emblem of an unassimilable experience that overwhelms the life 
of law and its characters, and which Esposito  works through as a legal case history. 
After all, it is the addition of the letter ‘A’ to a word that had come unbidden to the 
lawyer while he slept and which he had written on his bedside pad that will have 
converted ‘I fear’ (TEMO) into ‘I love you’ (TEAMO). ‘A’, the fi rst letter of the 
alphabet, is the emblem of a life ‘lived with’ trauma and law that dwells between a 
‘never again’ and a ‘moving on’. 
 Th e trauma of beginning is also staged as the trauma of being in love for the 
criminal lawyer. Repeatedly, time and time again, Esposito is shown to be arrested 
by the experience of love. Th e loquacious law clerk who has a facility with repartee 
is rendered speechless when it comes to the articulation of his feelings for his senior 
colleague. Th e lawyer’s unspoken love for Hastings is mirrored by the love for the 
dead victim by her surviving husband. Th is love, and its relation to memory, pro-
vides the setting within which the fi lm works out a second response to the question 
of how to live a life full of nothing. 
18_9780199671144c18.indd   378 10/3/2013   4:19:43 PM
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in 
any way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
Dirty War Crimes 379
 Th e husband, Ricardo Morales, is a character who appears in the aftermath 
of the crime (of murder and rape). Remaining, he suff ers. He weeps for his dead 
wife, he gazes at her photographs, he speaks about her in the present tense. He 
says: ‘I know I’m in denial but . . . it helps me go on until we fi nd the guy.’ Th is 
performance is highly ritualistic, which for me recalls the protests of the Madres de 
Plaza de Mayo moving counter-clockwise, same time, same day and same place in 
a crowded plaza. In the fi lm, at the same time each day, Morales sits on the same 
bench at a train station looking for the perpetrator who is believed to be com-
muting in and out of Buenos Aires. He keeps a vigil, held in the moment after his 
wife’s murder. Out of this experience Morales will construct punishment for the 
perpetrator as a way of addressing the question of how to live a life full of nothing. 
For Esposito, writing the case history provides a way of working through crime 
and its repetition in parts and images. For the husband Morales, working through 
requires punishment—and specifi cally life. As the Córdoba tribunal in the Videla 
case inscribes the sentence in 2010:  perpetua . 
 Over the course of a series of conversations initiated by Esposito, Morales 
broaches the form of punishment to be meted out to the killer. Esposito ima-
gines that Morales might fi nd a sense of retribution in the death penalty, but is 
surprised when the grieving husband eschews it. For Morales the death penalty 
is not enough. He concludes: ‘No. Let him grow old. Live a life full of nothing.’ 
It is this comment which provides the enigma for Esposito and which he strug-
gles to emplot. For Morales, it becomes a programme of action which he will 
recount some twenty years later to Esposito: when the perpetrator was released 
after two years from the sentence of life imprisonment, Morales captured him and 
detained him in a cell which he had secretly constructed on a rural property. 30 For 
twenty years, Morales has lived his life in a  pas de deux with the killer of his wife. 
Detention  en perpetua as a life full of nothing: without company, without conver-
sation, without daylight, without hope. 
 Why does Morales keep him in detention? It is neither revenge nor propor-
tionality. Both these are ways—as Foucault has shown—of instituting, codifying 
and maintaining a memory of the crime, and variably in the mind or body of the 
individual and the public. 31 But the fi lm shows Morales discovering the  instability 
of memory. As he says while waiting at the train station:
 30  Th ere are a number of intertexts that are relevant here. One is the web of secret detention cen-
tres—known as ‘pits’ ( pozos ) and ‘black holes’ ( chupaderos )—that form a large part of what made the 
dirty war crimes ‘clandestine’. Another is literary. It is diffi  cult not to hear a dialogue with Chilean 
playwright  Ariel  Dorfman’s  Death and the Maiden ( New York, NY :  Penguin ,  1992 ) , especially in their 
respective staging of the world shattering relation between victim and perpetrator, torturer and tor-
tured. A third would be that the trigger for the capture and detention of the killer-rapist by the griev-
ing husband is that the killer has been imprisoned and then released by executive order. Th is was the 
fate of Videla and other military after the  El Juicio a las Junta , with the amnesties of the  Ley de Punto 
Final (the ‘Full Stop’ law) and  Ley de Obediencia Debida (‘Due Obedience’ law). 
 31  Th is concern with law as a system of memory is most explicitly spelt out in  Discipline and Punish 
(London: Allen Lane, 1977). Th e monarchical system of the ancien regime and the deterrent regime 
of the philosophes are presented as two juridical techniques for the codifi cation of memory; the for-
mer through the body of the condemned and the theatre through which the spectacle of execution 
addresses its public; the latter through the mind and a generalized resemblance. 
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 Th e worst part is I’m starting to forget. I have to constantly make myself remember her. 
Every day. 
 Th e day she was killed, Liliana made me tea with lemon. I’d been coughing all night and 
she said it would help. I remember these stupid things. Can you see? Th en I start having 
doubts and I don’t remember if it was lemon or honey in the tea. And I don’t know if it’s a 
memory or a memory of a memory I’m left with. 
 A life with the killer allows Morales to keep memory alive but at the cost of the 
perpetual occupation of the position of grieving survivor, the one who subjects 
himself to the duty to remember. Like the Vietnam vet who refuses to take the 
drugs that will get rid of the horrifi c hallucinations that possess him on his return 
from the war. As the veteran says, ‘I do not want to take drugs for my nightmares, 
because I must remain a memorial to my dead friends’. 32 
 Th ese then are two ways to live a life full of nothing, two ways to live with the 
trauma of a legal case. What remains is the conduct of criminal law. It is possible 
that this conduct—whether local, regional or international or, as is more likely, 
some melding of the three—engages the obligation to acknowledge experiences 
of mass atrocity in a time  between never again and moving on. In the time that 
remains, this liminal possibility and the predicaments that beset it are explored 
in terms of the rhetoric of testimony and the logic or taxonomy of international 
criminal law. 
 (IV)  Remnants 
 ‘Th ere exist no provisions in our law, that perfectly and precisely describes the 
form of criminality that shall be judged here.’
—Julio Strassera,  El Juicio a las Junta 33 
 International criminal justice arrives on the scene too early or too late. But never 
quite on time. Its temporality is that of deferred action. If we return to  El secreto 
de sus ojos , the fi lm is concerned with a similar constitutive delay; it relates the dif-
fi culties encountered by those who arrive in the aftermath of a crime, the aftermath 
of an atrocity. 
 While this temporal predicament is news to few, what is perhaps less appreci-
ated is its eff ects on the conduct of (international) criminal justice and the eth-
ics of acknowledgement. International criminal law is repeatedly confronted with 
individual and collective situations of oppression and injustice to which it is called 
upon to respond. At the same time, it is confronted by atrocities and injuries 
which are unutterable—and that it is this very unspeakability which positions the 
event as atrocious and which calls for legal representation. In short,  the obligation 
to represent comes up against the unpresentability of the event . Th is is not simply a 
 32  Achilles Heel , quoted as the epigraph to  Cathy  Caruth (ed),  Trauma:  Explorations in Memory 
( Baltimore, MD :  Johns Hopkins University Press ,  1995 ) . 
 33  As quoted in Osiel,  Mass Atrocity, above n 5, 122. 
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matter of noting that law remains silent about particular injustices and mass atroci-
ties. As was said in the account of memory politics with which this chapter began, 
it is important that data is collected, the numbers of the dead and the dying are 
counted, the statistics tabulated, the stories iterated and disseminated, the crimes 
legally enumerated in statutes and the enumeration expanded if necessary. A lack 
of information is not the predicament I have been trying to get at here. Rather, 
the event is atrocious precisely because it is a constitutive limit of representation 
and information. Th is is not an obstacle or hurdle to be overcome by yet one 
more eff ort. 34 Th ere is a constitutive inaccessibility to experiences of trauma. Not 
all experiences of atrocity and injury are traumatic—and in saying this I do not 
want to downplay the sadness and injustice of these experiences. It is their return 
to possess us that constitutes them as traumatic. In sum,  it is the very inaccessibility 
of trauma which generates the demand and struggle for narrative self-representation . 
Th is is the paradox of narrative memory: to narrate the event where the conditions 
of the event remove the very possibility of narrative representation. As my account 
of memory politics at the start indicated, this predicament can be broached in a 
number of ways. In cognitive terms, it is the tension between information and 
understanding; in ethical terms it is what has come to be called ‘bearing witness’ 
rather than providing proof, conducting a hearing rather than reporting on phe-
nomena; and in aesthetic terms it is the diff erence between representation and 
expression. Here, it will be presented as a matter of  working through the inacces-
sibility of trauma—fi rst in terms of the genres of representation, then in terms of 
the taxonomies of international criminal law. 
 Consider the genres of representation. As already mentioned, in  El secreto de sus 
ojos , Esposito is trying to write. But in tension with the fact of his compulsion to 
narrate the Morales case is the question of the form of representation that this nar-
ration takes. If Esposito is to be believed, then he is writing a novel. However, he 
comes up against the incredulity of Judge Hastings:
 Hastings:  What do you know about writing novels? 
 Esposito:  I’ve been writing novels all my life. Take a look in the archive. 
 Hastings:  Oh the case fi les. How many pages will your fi le be? 
 Upon being shown Esposito’s fi nished eff orts, Hastings is no less sceptical: ‘It’s a 
novel. It doesn’t have to be true or even believable . . . ’ And when Esposito shows 
his draft to Morales, he is met with a similar reminder of what he has done. Morales 
remarks off handedly: ‘You should fl esh it out. It’s like a long memo.’ 
 Just when Esposito thinks that he is writing a novel, the responses of others, 
which he has sought out, indicate that the archive is writing him. In  represent-
ing the case as a novel, what is  expressed is a fi le or a memorandum, an artefact 
that emerges out of the archive of his offi  ce—the court documents which he has 
 34  Short of a revolution, it is the juridical tradition that will have to be engaged. But part of the 
diffi  culty is that the conventional understanding of revolution is to present it as rupture, a zero sum 
game. Yet, modern revolutions—and transitional societies are exemplary here—most often take the 
form of negotiated settlements. 
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submitted for signature by his judge, the dossiers that pile up on desks, the loose 
case documents that the viewer is repeatedly shown being stitched together with 
sisal cord out of memoranda by his assistant Sandobal ‘with a surgeon’s move-
ments, an artist’s grace, and the solemnity of an offi  ciating priest’, 35 and so on. Th e 
paradox of testimonial conditions of trauma is that testimony is not simply con-
fronted by an experience that takes place in time, but also involves others. Th ere 
can be no  acknowledgement of trauma without the marks of genre. It is this condi-
tion of address that generates the diffi  culty of deciding whether the case history he 
is writing is a novel, a fi le or a memorandum. 
 Akin to the diffi  culty of pinning down the genre of the lawyer’s writing, inter-
national criminal law has, since its inception in the aftermath of the World War II, 
been given shape by a diffi  culty of classifi cation and its logics of memory. 
 Consider the subject of international criminal law. Is it law? And if law, is it 
international law or criminal law? Th e fact that it is international lawyers engaged 
with crime does not necessarily turn what they say into international criminal law, 
just as the fact that it is criminal lawyers talking about international law does not 
turn their commentary into the doctrines of international criminal law. And the 
diffi  culty becomes even more acute—beyond simply its much-vaunted fragmenta-
tion—with ‘the contemporary confl ation of human rights law, criminal law, and 
the international law of war’ that ‘implies a pronounced loss for those seeking to 
challenge state action’. 36 And if the critic is deprived of a language of critique, then 
the problem also recurs for those interested in a less normative characterization. In 
Argentina, the eruption of memory politics as a question of criminal jurisdiction 
has seen a cross-fertilization of domestic constitutional law, regional human rights 
law in the guise of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and international 
criminal law from the Nuremberg trials to the International Criminal Court via 
the ad hoc tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Th is has seen Argentine case law, as 
Pablo Parenti remarks, carry out a procedure of ‘double classifi cation’: the facts of 
the charges instantiate a legal crime under domestic criminal law and a legal cat-
egory (crime against humanity) under international criminal law. 37 But even this, 
as the Córdoba tribunal’s judgment in the 2010  Videla case illustrates, generates 
anxiety over breaching the double jeopardy rule, or worse, produces a double pun-
ishment. What it foregrounds is that, when considered as a jurisdictional device 
through which law conducts itself, the conduct of international criminal law cir-
culates between the nominative (defi nitional), the adjectival (evidential) and the 
adverbial (procedural). Th is is particularly evident when it comes to addressing the 
coincidence of the category of murder and the category of crime against humanity. 
Here, murder has a nominative place in domestic criminal law, an adjectival place 
in as much as it is part of the enumeration of the crime against humanity, and an 
 35  Eduardo  Sacheri ,  Th e Secret in Th eir Eyes , trans. John Cullen ( New York, NY :  Other Press ,  2011 ), 
 102 . As Vismann has reconstructed for us, the history of the law is a history of the fi le: see  Cornelia 
 Vismann ,  Files: Law and Media Technology ( Palo Alto, CA :  Stanford University Press ,  2008 ) . 
 36  Ruti G. Teitel, ‘Transitional Justice Genealogy,’ above n 8, 91, 92. 
 37  Parenti, above n 23, 498–507. 
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adverbial place in as much as the statute of limitations restricts prosecutions for 
murder in domestic law but not for crimes against humanity under international 
criminal law. 38 Law moves between and across the various parts of speech without 
ever quite settling down. 
 At this point, however, the question of the subject of international criminal 
law has moved from the jurisdictional forms of law to the classifi cation of crime. 
Crime has also stood in to unify the disparate and plural utterances of interna-
tional criminal justice. But which crime? Most obviously, the crime that unifi es 
the subject would seem to be ‘war crime’ but it was precisely the war crimes para-
digm that created so much diffi  culty in holding on to what was unprecedented 
in the Holocaust at the Nuremberg trials as much as the Eichmann trial. Isn’t it 
this unprecedented quality which the category of ‘crimes against humanity’ was 
to address? Since its introduction there has been considerable uncertainty as to 
its scope and meaning, and each category has been interpreted by reference to 
the other. Initially, the war crimes paradigm was simply extended to interpret the 
crimes against humanity prohibited at Nuremberg; yet since the 1970s and more 
obviously since the 1990s, the paradigm of crimes against humanity—at least in 
the context of atrocity—has given content to war crimes as violations of human 
rights. 39 And if, as some have argued, the jurisprudence of the courts has left this 
distinction behind, then it has reappeared in diff erent idioms. For example, con-
sider the jurisprudence of rape that has emerged out of the ad hoc tribunals for 
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Th e incorporation of the social recognition of 
rape and sexual violence against women into a legal recognition was staged initially 
as a question which foregrounded the problem of classifi cation. Can rape be pros-
ecuted as torture, as genocide, as a crime in its own right or as a crime of honour? 
All, one or none? And when it comes to juridically defi ning the crime of rape, 
when such is necessary, the defi nition is construed in terms of violence or consent. 
Here, it remains to simply note that the jurisprudence of rape has restaged the slip-
pages between the war crime paradigm and the crime against humanity paradigm 
in the idiom of violence and consent. 
 In all this, the classifi cation of crime and the forms of legal speech emerge as the 
jurisdictional struggle of legal doctrine to hold on to a position of interiority, just as 
the genre of Esposito’s writing emerges as the point of contestation between him-
self, his addressees, and the case history that he has so much diffi  culty beginning. 
Th e conceit of this chapter, then, is that a criminal jurisdiction of memory can be 
treated as a case history, such that its narrative genres, compulsive repetitions, and 
 38  For an illuminating and somewhat illustrative piece on these matters, see Parenti, above n 23, 497. 
 39  Th is was one of the objections that  Hannah  Arendt in  Eichmann in Jerusalem ( New  York, 
NY :  Penguin ,  2006 ) had with the tradition stemming from Nuremberg. Under the war crimes para-
digm, what is prohibited is the cruelty of the conduct, as if war had norms and the criminals were 
simply breaching the settled rules of war. In the crimes against humanity paradigm, Arendt glimpsed a 
diff erent tradition—not so much an extension of the war crimes paradigm of cruelty measured against 
the humane but something unprecedented which would refl ect the unprecedented quality of the holo-
caust and measure against the human. A helpful reading of Arendt for international criminal lawyers 
which catches at the edges of this question has been provided in  David  Luban ,  ‘Hannah Arendt as 
a Th eorist of International Criminal Law’,  International Criminal Law Review ,  11 ( 2011 ),  621–41. 
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blank letters bear witness to the trauma of its speech. International criminal law 
lives a life full of nothing if its settled accounts of law and crime are not unsettled 
by the injustices and atrocities to which it is called upon, sadly, to respond. Setting 
out from the perspective and tradition of memory politics and its ethics has sug-
gested that attention to the conduct or enunciation of international criminal law 
provides resources for working through that unsettled history. 
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 PART 7
HISTORIES OF A T YPE: 
EXCAVATING THE 
CRIME OF AGGRESSION  
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 Th e Crime of Aggression: From the Trial of 
Takashi Sakai, August 1946, to the Kampala 
Review Conference on the ICC in 2010 
 Roger S.   Clark * 
 (I)  Introduction 
 At the Review Conference on the International Criminal Court (ICC) held in 
Uganda 31 May to 11 June 2010, the States Parties to the Rome Statute brought to a 
next stage the eff orts to defi ne the crime of aggression and to set out the ‘conditions’ 
for the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the crime. 1 
 I want to use the August 1946 trial of the Japanese general, Takashi Sakai, by 
a domestic tribunal in Nanking, the Republic of China, not so much to think 
about the exercise of jurisdiction by an international tribunal like the ICC or the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East as to think both about the meaning 
of the concept of a ‘crime against peace’ or the ‘crime of aggression’ 2 and about the 
 *  Board of Governors Professor, Rutgers-Camden School of Law. 
 1  Article 5(1) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted in 1998, included 
aggression within the crimes over which the Court has jurisdiction, but Article 5(2) required further 
work leading to a ‘defi nition’ and ‘conditions for the exercise’ of that jurisdiction. Th is became the 
main item on the agenda of the 2010 Review Conference. A comprehensive resolution of the aggres-
sion issues left over from 1998 is contained in the Review Conference’s Resolution 6, ICC Doc. RC/
Res. 6 (2010) (Kampala Amendments). See  Roger S.  Clark ,  ‘Amendments to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court Considered at the fi rst Review Conference on the Court, Kampala, 31 
May–11 June 2010’,  Goettingen J. Int’l L. ,  2 ( 2010 ),  689 . 
 2  Th e terms are interchangeable. Generally speaking, the term ‘crimes against peace’ was the more 
common usage in the 1940s and 50s; by the time of the International Law Commission’s (ILC)’s 
Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court in 1994, United Nations (UN) General Assembly 
Offi  cial Records, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/49/10 (1994), ‘crime of aggression’ had largely 
captured the day. An early analysis of the crime, which infl uenced the negotiations on the  Nuremberg 
Charter and thinking on the subject at the time of  Sakai , is A.N. Trainin,  Hitlerite Responsibility Under 
Criminal Law (n.d. probably 1945 English trans.). Professor Trainin, using both terms, set the stage 
for much of the later discussion with these words, at 35:
 Th e direct and most dangerous form of off ence against peace is the attack of one State 
on another—aggression—which directly breaks the peace, and forces war on the peoples. 
Aggression is, therefore, the most dangerous international crime. In the interests of the 
struggle for peace, the penalty for the crime must fall not only on those guilty of carrying 
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exercise of national jurisdiction. My three basic questions go to (a)  what is the crime 
of aggression; (b)  who can commit it (politicians? Colonels? Foot soldiers? Th e jani-
tor at the Ministry of Foreign Aff airs?); and (c)  where may they be prosecuted (only 
in an international tribunal? In an aggressor state? In a victim state? In any state that 
volunteers for the task?). In raising the set of questions about ‘national’ jurisdiction, 
I thus have in mind not only jurisdiction by a ‘territorial’ or ‘victim’ state, such as 
China was, but also those ‘third party states’ who might claim to exercise some version 
of universal jurisdiction. 3 Now that the main unfi nished business of Rome has been 
brought closer to completion, 4 it is time to consider more carefully issues such as these 
which are highly relevant to what states need to do, or may do, when they accept the 
Statute as amended. 
 I do not suggest for a moment that  Sakai provides a defi nitive precedent for 
anything, but I do fi nd it enormously suggestive. Th e account of the trial as it 
appears in the Reports of the United Nations War Crimes Commission 5 is brief 
and conclusory. I have been able to supplement that account. Professor Suzannah 
Linton kindly shared with me a document in English entitled  Summary Translation 
of the Proceedings which she located in the National Archives in London. It appears 
to be the immediate source of the published report. 6 At my request, Jingsi Wang, 
out aggression, but also on those who try to fan the fl ame of war, who prepare aggres-
sion. Activities preparing the ground for aggression must comprise the conclusion of blocs 
and agreements having the aim of aggression (as, for example, the ‘Axis’ Treaty between 
Germany and Italy); the infringement of treaties which serve the cause of peace; the pro-
voking of international confl icts by all kinds of means; the propaganda for aggression. 
 (Footnote emphasizing that aggression does not ‘refer to just wars, wars of liberation’ omitted.) 
 In spite of such arguments, preparation for war alone never gained much traction as an inchoate 
off ence, although the Kampala amendments catch in the criminal net those who prepare or plan for 
an aggression which is in fact completed. See text at n 25 below. 
 3  It is common, in the Anglo-American literature at least, to speak as though there is something of a 
closed list of bases of national jurisdiction that are acceptable in at least some circumstances: territorial 
(including ‘objective territorial’ or ‘eff ects’), nationality (or active personality), passive personality, pro-
tective and universal. See generally  Ellen S.  Podgor and  Roger S.  Clark ,  Understanding International 
Criminal Law ( New York, NY :  LexisNexis , 2nd edn,  2009 ),  25–6 . As we note there, State practice is 
richer than that; it includes other bases that seem to be acceptable such as ‘landing state jurisdiction’ 
(the place where planes or ships arrive following criminal activity) and ‘transferred jurisdiction’. Th ere 
is no need to pursue exotic alternatives here, since the classic categories cover the jurisdictional fi eld 
for at least the issues with aggression that were current in the 1940s and even now. 
 4  Th e ICC will fi nally be able to exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression one year after 
thirty States have ratifi ed the Kampala amendments and there is a further decision from the Assembly 
of States Parties (ASP) bringing everything into eff ect, whichever is later. Th e ASP decision may not 
take place before 1 January 2017. 
 5  Trial of Takashi Sakai , United Nations War Crimes Commission, XIV Law Reports of Trials of 
War Criminals 1, Case No. 83, Chinese War Crimes Military Tribunal of the Ministry of National 
Defence, Nanking, 29 August 1946 (the Report).  Philip R.  Piccigallo ,  Th e Japanese on Trial: Allied War 
Crimes Operations in the East, 1945–51 ( Austin, TX :  University of Texas Press ,  1979 ),  164–5 has some 
newspaper references that reinforce the material in the report.  Sakai was one of a number of trials held 
in Nanking, but the only one reported in the United Nations collection. Piccigallo’s book is the most 
comprehensive discussion of the Nanking Trials that I have found in English. 
 6  Th e summary translation (Summary Translation) is organized under two headings, ‘Facts’ and 
‘Reasons’. Th e material therein appears (somewhat edited and re-organized) as ‘Facts and Evidence’, 
‘Defence of the Accused’ and ‘Findings and Sentences’ of the Tribunal in the Report. Th e report also 
contains four pages of ‘Notes on the Case’, supplied by the UN War Crimes Commission editors. 
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a graduate student at Beijing Normal University, College of Criminal Science, 
located several Chinese secondary sources mentioning this and other Nanking 
prosecutions. He also discovered that China’s Second Historical Archives in 
Nanking have the  Sakai judgment but that the archives are not open to the public. 
He was, however, successful in obtaining what appears to be a copy of all except 
a page or two of the whole judgment (in Mandarin) in the archives in Taipei. 
Yiqiang Lin was kind enough to translate this version for me. 7 It is fairly similar to 
the two derivative documents, except that it contains a lengthy and very interesting 
‘Attachment’ that summarizes the evidence involving Sakai. Neither the determi-
native facts nor the legal theories relied upon by the Tribunal are articulated with 
total clarity in any of the versions. But that is perhaps the beauty of the trial to the 
speculative mind. 
 Essentially, here is what happened. Sakai, a Japanese military offi  cer, who eventu-
ally retired as a general in 1943, spent a period as a military commander in China 
during the war commencing in 1939, and prior to that during the Sino-Japanese 
hostilities from 1931 onwards. For the most part, his activities in the 1930s involved 
consolidating and expanding Japanese control in an undeclared war, rather than 
engaging in wholly new invasions. While not a great deal is made of it in the 
proceedings as a crime against peace, the highlight of his career as a leader seems 
to have been taking charge of the invasion of Hong Kong in December 1941, 8 an 
operation that did not go as smoothly as his superiors had hoped. 9 He was a joint 
holder of the post of Governor of Hong Kong for a while. A decade earlier, in 1931, 
he was responsible for creating terrorist disturbances in what are now known as the 
cities of Beijing and Tianjin and in the province around them (Hobei, or ‘Hopei’ at 
the time). In 1934, following assorted assassinations, he threatened to attack Beijing 
and Tianjin by artillery and air and eff ectively placed Hobei under Japanese control. 
Aside from Hong Kong, it is not entirely clear what new incursions he was involved 
Th e Notes include some matter in the judgment and the Summary Translation that is omitted from 
the Report. 
 7  ‘Th e judgment’. I hope that it will be published. 
 8  Th e Hong Kong invasion seems to be treated, almost in passing, as one aspect of Sakai’s involve-
ment in the aggression against China. On the other hand, the Attachment to the Judgment contains 
twenty-one paragraphs of fi ndings about war crimes and crimes against humanity attributed to him 
in respect of atrocities committed by his troops in Hong Kong, especially against prisoners of war and 
medical personnel. Th ere is no discussion in the materials of the (then) international status of Hong 
Kong as British rather than Chinese territory. Does the tribunal assume (a) that Hong Kong was part 
of China, or (b) that, even if it was to be regarded as within the sovereignty of Great Britain, there is 
jurisdiction over such crimes anyway in a domestic tribunal under some kind of universal theory, or 
(c) neither of the above? Th e trial in question was conducted by the Nationalist or ‘Republic of China’ 
authorities that currently occupied the Chinese seat at the recently established United Nations. Th e 
Republic apparently regarded Hong Kong as part of China but did not resist the British placement of 
it on the General Assembly’s list of non-self-governing territories. After the People’s Republic took up 
the Chinese seat in New York, it insisted successfully that it be removed from the list, as it was to be 
considered part of China. See Letter of March 8, 1972 from the Permanent Representative of China 
to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Special Committee on decolonization, UN 
Doc. A/AC.109/396 (1972). 
 9  In a passage omitted in the later material, the judgment records that he led a large number of 
troops that attacked Hong Kong by surprise on 8 December 1941, ordering his troops to take it 
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in after 1939, although it appears from the judgment that he was commander of 
the army stationed in Guangzhou (Canton) and Hainan in southern China when 
he was sent to take Hong Kong; and some of his war crimes were also alleged 
to have taken place in the south, on Hainan Island and in ‘Kwantung’—which 
in context seems to be another English transliteration of Guangzhou/Canton. 10 
He was convicted of crimes against peace, war crimes, crimes against humanity 11 
and, it appears, ‘off ences against the internal security of the State [which] should 
be punished in accordance with the Criminal Code of the Republic of China’. 12 
Sentenced to death, he was duly executed by a fi ring squad on 30 September 1946. 13 
 In a project like this, dedicated to unearthing the obscure, I suspect that someone 
will prove me wrong, but here goes:  Sakai was the fi rst Japanese accused to be 
convicted of a crime against peace 14 and the fi rst—and perhaps the only one—to 
be shot for it. 15 His conviction and execution pre-dated the decisions of both the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals. 16 
within two days. Th e siege continued until the 17th because of unexpected resistance ‘which made 
[Sakai] turn to revenge by brutality’. 
 10  ‘Kwantung Army’ is also a term used to describe the Japanese crack forces that occupied Manchuria 
in the north. 
 11  Th e material off ers no indication of what the Tribunal regarded as the legal basis of a crime against 
humanity. Th e Tribunal is merely quoted as saying:
 In inciting or permitting his subordinates to murder prisoners of war, wounded soldiers, nurses 
and doctors of the Red Cross and other non-combatants, and to commit acts of rape, plunder, 
deportation, tortures and destruction of property, he had violated the Hague Conventions 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land and the Geneva Convention of 1929. 
Th ese off ences are war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
 Report, above n 5, (Notes) 7. 
 Th e ‘source’ of crimes against humanity as understood at Nuremberg was general principles of law, 
rather than anything to be found in the black letter of the Geneva or Hague Conventions. Th ere is, 
however, an echo of the Martens clause in preamble to the 1907 Fourth Hague Convention in the 
concept of crimes against humanity. Th e big diff erence is that Hague and Geneva required a ‘war’ while 
crimes against humanity did not necessarily require an armed attack. None of this is addressed in  Sakai. 
 12  Report, above n 5, 5. It may be that this was an alternative to convicting him for the crime against 
peace in respect of (some of) his activities in the mid-30s. On the other hand, it may be that the reference 
to the Chinese Criminal Code is to the provisions allowing for the trial and punishment of crimes 
against peace. Th e material is ambiguous. A domestic tribunal has the advantage over a typical inter-
national tribunal that it may well have competence to exercise jurisdiction not only over international 
crimes but also over domestic ones committed on the national territory. Th ere are some nice questions 
that are fi nessed here about the extent of a combatant’s privilege to kill in a messy situation like that 
in China in the 1930s. Was it a military occupation to which the rules of armed confl ict apply to the 
exclusion of territorial law? Were the Japanese occupiers some early example of unlawful combatants 
subject to domestic law? Some wonderful questions, but not much enlightenment! 
 13  As Piccigallo puts it:  ‘Th e court condemned Sakai to be shot. After ratifi cation by Chiang 
Kai-Shek, the execution took place as scheduled, before a large, approving public audience.’ 
 Piccigallo, above n 5, 165. Close your eyes, dear reader, and imagine the cheering throngs at the shooting. 
 14  At least one German, Arthur Greiser, preceded him to conviction and public execution (that time 
by hanging) by a few weeks. See Mark Drumbl’s contribution to this collection. (Th ere must be a good 
article out there somewhere on the esthetics of shooting rather than hanging.) 
 15  It was not the last Chinese trial including aggression. Using newspaper sources, Piccigallo, above 
n 5, 163–4, discusses at least two later Nanking prosecutions in which aggression was one of the 
charges, those of Generals Isogai (life imprisonment) and Tani (executed by hanging). I  have not 
located any comprehensive account of the Chinese trials. 
 16  Th e Sakai trial was concluded on 27 August 1946 (Summary Translation, above n 6, and 
Judgment, above n 7) or on the 29th (the Report, above n 5). It is not clear when it began, although 
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 (II)  What is the Crime of Aggression? 
 If the applicable Chinese Rules governing the Trial of War Criminals 17 contained a 
defi nition of crimes against peace, it is not reproduced in the Report. Instead, we 
learn that the Rules made some kind of reference to international law. Th e Notes 
on the case assert that the verdict on crimes against peace ‘was made with regard, 
though without express reference, to rules which were explicitly formulated in the 
latest development of international law in this sphere’. 18 (How the ‘regard’ was 
made known is not established. None of the materials give any indication that the 
Tribunal referred to these documents.) 19 Th e Notes then quote three ‘defi nitions’ 
that would later be carefully considered in the ICC drafting exercise: those in the 
paragraph 19 of the Attachment to the Judgment has a witness testifying on 11 June 1946. Th e 
Nuremberg verdict did not come until 1 October 1946. General MacArthur promulgated the Charter 
of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo Tribunal) on 19 January 1946; that trial 
began on 29 April 1946 but was not completed until November 1948. Paragraph 4 of the Attachment, 
in the context of the 1935 threats to attack Beijing and Tianjin, refers to evidence given before the 
Far East Tribunal on 9 July 1946 by a Major-General Tanaka. So the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters 
were evidently available to the Chinese judges, as was some of the early evidence given in Tokyo. But 
the Nuremberg and Tokyo judgments were not. By the same token, Control Council Law No. 10 
(CC Law No. 10), under which later American trials, one French trial, and a handful of Soviet trials 
took place, was promulgated on 20 December 1945 and is referred to in the Notes on the case in the 
published account of the Chinese decision, although it is not apparent what use the Chinese Tribunal 
itself made of CC Law No. 10, if any. Th e Report, the Summary Translation and the Judgment make 
no mention of the relevant Charters or CC Law No. 10, but the Report and the Summary do refer to 
Article 1 of the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922 and to Article 1 of the Pact of Paris 192 (Kellogg–Briand 
Pact). In the Nine-Power Treaty (Treaty Between the United States of America, Belgium, the British 
Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Portugal, signed at Washington, February 
6, 1922) the Contracting Powers undertook in Article I(1) ‘[t] o respect the sovereignty, the independ-
ence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China’. Th e Notes on the case, at 7, refer to 
these two treaties and point out that the Tribunal ‘had thereby stressed’ Sakai’s guilt in taking part in 
‘a war in violation of international treaties’. None of the earlier British, US, Australian or Dutch tri-
als that I have found included aggression (or later ones, for that matter), although the Australian law 
permitted such a charge. Th e Soviet Union had instituted war crimes trials against German military 
(and Soviet collaborators) beginning with the December 1943 Kharkov trial. See  George  Ginsburgs , 
 Moscow’s Road to Nuremberg: Th e Soviet Background to the Trial ( Boston, MA and Leiden :  Martinus 
Nijhoff  ,  1996 ),  52 . While Soviet scholars had written since the 1930s about the criminality of aggres-
sion, it is not clear which of these early trials included that off ence and I  am aware of no trials 
conducted by other states that defi nitely included aggression before this one, other than the Polish 
prosecution of Greiser. Nonetheless, over the next few years the Soviet Union convicted a large num-
ber of German military for illegal activity that included crimes against peace. Th is is defi nitely an area 
begging for more research. Pioneering archival research is contained in Irina  V.  Bezborodova ,  Generaly 
Vermakhta v plenu (Generals of the Wehrmacht in Captivity) ( Moscow :   Rossi ĭ ski ĭ gos. gumanitarny ĭ 
universitet ,  1998 ) , carefully reviewed in  George  Ginsburgs ,  ‘Light Shed on the Story of Wehrmacht 
Generals in Soviet Captivity,’  Crim. L. Forum , 11 ( 2000 ), 101–20 . 
 17  Th e Notes to the Report, at 3 n 1, after quoting part of the Rules, says that ‘[t] he above Rules 
were later replaced by a Law Governing the Trial of War Criminals of 24th October, 1946, an account 
of which will be found in the Annex to this Volume [Vol. 14 at 152]’. Since we are not given most of 
the text of either document, it is hard to know how they diff er. On some apparent textual diff erences 
between the two sets of Rules, see below n 47. 
 18  Report, above n 5, 3. 
 19  Compare the explicit references to the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg–Briand Pact, above 
n 16. 
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Nuremberg Charter, those in the Tokyo Charter and those in Control Council Law 
No. 10. 20 
 Th e Nuremberg Charter reads:
 Crimes against peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, 
or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a 
common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing. 21 
 Th e Tokyo Charter provides:
 Crimes against peace: namely,  the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a  declared or 
undeclared war of aggression, or a war in violation of  international law , treaties, agreements or 
assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any 
of the foregoing. 22 
 Control Council Law No. 10, the second to last chronologically 23 (before Tokyo) 
is the most detailed of the three. It reads:
 Crimes against peace: Initiation of invasions of other countries and wars of aggression in violation 
of international  laws and treaties,  including but not limited to planning, preparation, initiation 
or waging of a war or aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or 
assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any 
of the foregoing. 24 
 None of these instruments was as detailed in defi ning the crime as the Kampala 
amendments. Article 8 bis of the Kampala amendments, which defi nes aggression, 
 20  Th e last of these gave rise to the second round of United States prosecutions in Nuremberg and to 
the French prosecution of Roechling. Unlike the Nuremberg trials, which did not permit an appeal, 
the French system did, luckily for Roechling. His conviction was reversed on appeal on the basis that 
‘his vanity perhaps allowed him to attribute more authority to himself than he was actually entitled 
to’. An embarrassing way to escape punishment! See the UN Secretariat’s Historical review of develop-
ments relating to aggression, UN Doc. PCNICC/2002/WGCA/L. 1, 83. 
 21  Nuremberg Charter, Article 6(a). Article 6 concludes with the following, applicable to all the 
Nuremberg crimes:
 Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution 
of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the forgoing crimes are responsible for 
all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan. 
 It has always been a hard question who beyond leaders, organizers and instigators can be held 
responsible for aggression. 
 22  Tokyo Charter, Article 5(A). Words in italics do not appear in the Nuremberg Charter. Th e words 
clarify that a declaration of war is irrelevant. Th ey also contain a reference to international law (adding 
custom to treaties) that would in theory be helpful to the prosecution. In practice, the Kellogg–Briand 
Pact of 1928 provided the main legal source for prosecution at Nuremberg and Tokyo (and it may 
well be of  Sakai ). 
 23  Above n 16. 
 24  Control Council Law No. 10, Article II(1)(a). Words in italics are not in the Nuremberg Charter. 
Th e reference to ‘invasions’ fi nesses an argument that took place in the International Military Tribunal 
at Nuremberg and in the drafting of the Kampala amendments. Th e invasion of Austria, Bohemia 
and Moravia occurred as a result of threats rather than actual fi ghting (would such fi ghting be neces-
sary for a ‘war’?) and the Tribunal stopped short of calling those actions wars of aggression. CC Law 
No. 10 would encompass such actions, although no one was ultimately convicted on such a theory. 
(Prosecutions failed on the merits.) Th e mysterious meaning of ‘war’ was a major reason why the 
Kampala amendments avoided the use of that term, against the assertion that Nuremberg required 
that there be a war. CC Law No. 10 at least muddied those waters. CC Law No. 10 also included 
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makes a careful drafting distinction between a ‘crime of aggression’ and an ‘act of 
aggression’, the later being an element of the former. ‘Crime of aggression’, as defi ned 
in Kampala for the purpose of the Rome Statute, ‘means the planning, preparation, 
initiation or execution, by a person in a position eff ectively to exercise control over 
or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression 25 which, 
by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter 
of the United Nations’. 26 Th e defi nition goes on to explain ‘act of aggression’ in 
these words: 
 2.  For the purpose of paragraph 1, ‘act of aggression’ means the use of armed force by 
a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another 
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Any 
of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in accordance with United 
Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, qualify as an act 
of aggression: 
 a)  Th e invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another 
State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion 
or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or 
part thereof; 
 b)  Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State or 
the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State; 
 c)  Th e blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State; 
 d)  An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and 
air fl eets of another State; 
the insidious drafting words ‘including but not limited to’. Th ere was a great deal of discussion in the 
drafting of the Kampala amendments about whether the list of ‘acts’ therein were the only ones that 
could amount to aggression—was the list, ‘open’, ‘closed’ or ‘semi-closed’? Th e received wisdom is that 
the Kampala list is (semi-)open, but that any additions must be ejusdem generis with those named 
specifi cally. 
 25  One major challenge with defi ning the crime of aggression since Nuremberg has been how to 
explicate the intricate relationship between what the aggressor state does (for which there is state 
responsibility) and what the individual actor does. Th e drafters of the Kampala amendments used a 
drafting convention under which what the state does is defi ned as an ‘act of aggression’ and what the 
individual does is the ‘crime of aggression’. Th e defi nition of ‘act of aggression’ in the amendment is 
derived substantially from the General Assembly’s famous Defi nition of Aggression, GA Res. 3314 
(XXIX) of 14 December 1974, stripped of much of its indeterminacy. Resolution 3314 is, in turn, 
substantially derived from the Convention for the Defi nition of Aggression signed in London, 3 July 
1933. During the drafting of the Nuremberg Charter, Justice Jackson endeavoured to incorporate 
some of the detail from this treaty, pointing out quite correctly that the Soviet Union was its main 
proponent. Th e USSR was not so keen, at that point, on something that could apply generally in the 
future. Th us the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters took for granted that ‘it’ was what their adversaries 
did. See  Roger S.  Clark ,  ‘Nuremberg and the Crime against Peace’,  Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. ,  6 
( 2007 ),  529–36 . 
 26  Article 8bis(1). Article 8bis represented the drafting work of the Court’s Special Working Group 
on the Crime of Aggression (SWGCA), open to all states. Between 2003 and 2009 the SWGCA had 
picked up work begun before Rome and in the Preparatory Commission for the Court which func-
tioned between 1998 and 2002. Article 8bis and its accompanying Elements of Crime (which spell 
out exactly what the prosecution must prove) were adopted with no change whatsoever in Kampala. 
Th e Group’s Article 15bis, which dealt with the ‘conditions’ for the exercise of jurisdiction, was less 
refi ned and far more contentious. In the end, a somewhat diff erent pair of Articles, 15bis and 15ter, 
emerged in Kampala. Article 15bis deals with complaints triggered by states or by the Prosecutor act-
ing proprio motu; 15ter deals with Security Council referrals: Clark, above n 1. 
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 e)  Th e use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another State 
with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided 
for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the 
termination of the agreement; 
 f )  Th e action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of 
another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression 
against a third State; 
 g)  Th e sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, 
which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount 
to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein. 27 
 How consistent is this with the Sakai prosecution? I put aside for the moment 
the question whether Sakai fi tted into an appropriate place in the structure of the 
Japanese Government. Th at is the subject of the next section of this chapter. For 
the moment, though, consider the ways in which the depredations in which he was 
engaged fi t the (now detailed) categories that can constitute an ‘act of aggression’. 
Consider Article 8bis (2), (a)–(g). At some points, there must have been an ‘invasion 28 
or attack by the armed forces of another State on the territory of another State’; a 
‘military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack’; 
an ‘annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof ’; 
‘bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State 
or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State’; a ‘block-
ade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State’; an ‘attack 
by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fl eets 
 27  One of the debates that took place during the drafting of the ICC provisions on aggression 
was whether the public law ‘defences’, such as self-defence of the state, authorization of the Security 
Council or (more controversially) humanitarian intervention, should be specifi cally included. 
Ultimately, they were not, the matter being left to be dealt with under the requirement that a breach 
of the Charter be ‘manifest’ and/or by the material dealing with defences in Article 31 of the Rome 
Statute. Due process requires that an accused be entitled to raise such issues. Th ere was an interest-
ing example of this in  Sakai , best explained in the Summary Translation, above n 6. In respect of the 
events in the 1930s, the Summary states that the ‘defendant pleaded on the grounds that when he 
demanded the withdrawal of Chinese troops from Hopei and the dismissal of Chinese Administrative 
Heads in Hopei, he acted within the stipulations of the Final Protocol of 1901’. (Th e Protocol repre-
sented the settlement with the ‘Powers’, including Japan, at the conclusion of the Boxer Rebellion.) 
Th e Tribunal responded, implicitly agreeing that the argument was one that might be made, but 
nonetheless dismissing it on the merits:
 [T] here is no stipulation in the Final Protocol of 1901 which prohibits the Chinese 
Government from stationing Chinese troops in Hopei and it does not give Japan the right 
to demand the dismissal of Chinese Administrative Heads in Hopei. Th e argument that 
the Exchange of Notes appended to the Protocol provides a limit of 20 li, separating the 
stationing of Japanese troops in Tientsin from Chinese troops, is untenable. It is clear that 
this plea is a deliberate mis-interpretation of the said Protocol. 
 (Summary Translation, above n 6, 2.) 
 Th e Notes, at 5–6, discuss this argument as though it applied to charges of the breach of Chinese 
domestic law; I think it more likely from the context in the Summary and the judgment that it related 
to an aggression theory. 
 28  Notice the reference to an ‘invasion’ in Article 8bis(2)(a), thus sidestepping the Austria/Bohemia/
Moravia problem of lack of a ‘war’: see above n 24. Th reats by Sakai to attack Beijing and Tianjin with 
artillery and air force led to the withdrawal of Chinese troops and eff ective control by Japan. Was this 
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of another State’; ‘use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory 
of another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the 
conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such 
territory beyond the termination of the agreement’; 29 and ‘sending by or on behalf 
of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts 
of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed 
above, or its substantial involvement therein’. 
 In short, every action except possibly item (f ) on the list seems to be plainly 
involved. In fact, with a little creativity, even (f ) is perhaps implicated in Japanese 
activities (although Sakai was not involved in all of them). Consider, for exam-
ple, the invasion of Hong Kong and the drive south to Burma, Malaysia and 
Indonesia, some of which was conducted from the Chinese mainland—the only 
real issue is whether China had ‘placed [the territory] at [Japan’s] disposal’ in any 
meaningful way. 
 To recapitulate, the actions of the Japanese State in China are encompassed by 
the Kampala defi nition of an ‘act of aggression’. But what of Sakai’s individual 
responsibility? 
 (III)  Who can Commit the Crime of Aggression? 
 Sakai appears to have been convicted in some generalized reliance on the three 
1940s sources of law reproduced above, on the theory that he was guilty of ‘partici-
pating in the war of aggression’. 30 Th e note on the case asserts:
 In the Nuremberg Charter the range of persons liable to prosecution and punishment for 
crimes against peace is defi ned in the fi rst and last paragraph of Article 6. It includes  any person 
similar to Goering’s threat to bomb Prague off  the map, followed by an incursion: an ‘invasion’ rather 
than a ‘war’? 
 29  Consider, in respect of this ‘act’, the creeping nature of the activities in which Sakai engaged, 
bearing in mind that ‘consent’ of some kind (‘not real’?) was extracted from China from time to 
time. 
 30  Report, above n 5, 2, 6.  In summarily denying the accused’s defence of superior orders, the 
Tribunal is also reported as saying: ‘Granted that the defendant participated in the war on the orders of 
his Government, a superior order cannot be held to absolve the defendant from liability for the crime’ 
(at 5). Participation’ appears in the Nuremberg text both in the basic defi nition of aggression which 
includes also a separate inchoate crime of a ‘common plan or conspiracy’ to commit a crime against 
peace and also in the fi nal paragraph of the defi nitional Article. In the latter, it relates to complicities 
and is applicable to all crimes. Th e basic defi nition of crimes against peace reads:
 namely the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a declared or undeclared war of 
aggression, or a war in violation of international law, treaties, agreements or assurances, 
or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the 
foregoing. 
 Th e fi nal paragraph of Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter deals generally with individual respon-
sibility for each of the three Nuremberg crimes. It reads:
 Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execu-
tion of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible 
for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan. 
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implicated in its commission whether as an individual or a member of organisations, or as a 
leader, organiser, instigator or accomplice. Th e same follows from the Far Eastern Charter and 
Law No. 10. 31 
 ‘Th e’ war 32 rather begs the question about the events of the 1930s. What exactly 
was the nature of that confl ict? Th ere is, moreover, no discussion in the Report 
of why ‘participating’ is the appropriate verb (or why the notes on the case 
instead use the word ‘implicated’) or whether the theory was that he was 
part of a broad conspiracy. ‘Participating’ (or ‘implicated’) represents a pretty 
open-ended explanation of the conduct explaining who can commit the crime, 
and could catch those well down the food chain—although Sakai no doubt 
regarded himself as of some importance, as did his Chinese captors. 33 Would the 
language used be enough to encompass the sergeants and the foot soldiers as well 
as the top generals and cabinet ministers who were prosecuted at Tokyo? 34 Th e 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg tried to rein in the generality of 
the language 35 and the subsequent Nuremberg tribunals made some more eff orts 
in this direction. 36 
 Th ink back to the conduct words in the Kampala defi nition. A perpetrator must be 
involved in the ‘planning, preparation, initiation or execution’ of an act of aggression. 
Sakai, if he fi tted this, was probably mostly on the ‘execution’ end of the list. I doubt 
that even a high level person who carries out someone else’s policy, without more, 
 Th e discussion of the General’s connection to the crimes of his subordinates did not add anything 
to our understanding of the rules for command responsibility. It did, however, fl ag the issues for 
later analysis. He was apparently charged on the basis that he ‘incited’ or ‘permitted’ his subordinates 
to commit the relevant war crimes and crimes against humanity (which were not precisely distin-
guished). Report, above n 5, 7. He defended on the basis that ‘he could not be held responsible for 
the . . . violations because they were perpetrated by his subordinates and he had no knowledge of them’ 
(at 7). His argument must have raised the nice question about what element of culpability applied to 
a commander. Was it a case for strict liability? Negligence? Recklessness? Knowledge? Intent? Rather 
than entering into a debate on the law, the Tribunal found against him on the facts: ‘All the evidence 
goes to show that the defendant knew of the atrocities committed by his subordinates and deliberately 
let loose savagery upon civilians and prisoners of war’ (at 7). Knowledge accompanied by deliberate 
inaction was evidently enough. Compare the standard for military leaders in Article 28 of the Rome 
Statute (‘knew or should have known’). 
 31  Report, above n 5, 4.    32  Above n 24. 
 33  Th e Summary Translation, above n 6, 2, describes Sakai as ‘one of the leaders who came to China 
to carry out Japanese aggressive policy’. Th e Report, above n 5, 1, renders this as ‘one of the leaders 
who were instrumental in Japan’s aggression against China’. Yiqang Lin’s translation of the judgment 
says ‘he was one of those chiefl y responsible for implementing the Japanese war of aggression.’ Th e 
diff erences are subtle and the Report’s version perhaps ascribes to Sakai a little more policy-making 
capacity than the others. 
 34  Article 5 of the Tokyo Charter limited jurisdiction of the Tribunal to ‘the power to try and 
punish Far Eastern war criminals who as individuals or as members of organizations are charged 
with off enses which include Crimes against Peace’. A judgment call had to be made by the prosecu-
tion and some of the accused had a tenuous connection to the aggression, yet all were ultimately 
convicted of it. 
 35  See generally, Clark, above n 25, 527. 
 36  See  Kevin Jon  Heller ,  ‘Retreat from Nuremberg: Th e Leadership Requirement in the Crime of 
Aggression’ ,  EJIL ,  18 ( 2007 ),  477 . 
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makes the cut, today at least. Th e drafters of the amendments adopted in Kampala 
tried to refi ne a little further in their defi nition who might be guilty by adding a 
circumstance element 37 to the conduct one. To this end, the important language in 
their eff orts is the requirement that the perpetrator be ‘a person in a position eff ec-
tively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State’. 38 
 Th e crime of aggression is thus a ‘leadership’ crime, a proposition captured by 
the element that the perpetrator has to be in a position eff ectively to exercise 
control over or to direct the political or military action of a state. Th ere was vigorous 
discussion in the work leading up to Kampala about how this applies to someone 
like an industrialist who is closely involved with the organization of the state but 
not formally part of its structure. 39 Some support was shown for clarifying the mat-
ter by choosing language closer to that used in the United States Military Tribunals 
at Nuremberg, namely ‘shape and infl uence’ the political or military action of a 
state, rather than ‘exercise control over or to direct’. 40 Nevertheless, the quoted 
language remains in the Kampala amendments. Sakai does not appear from the 
material I have located to have been one who was able to ‘shape and infl uence’, 
let alone to ‘exercise control over or to direct’. He apparently acted on someone 
else’s policy decisions. Of course, one can see why the Chinese populace cheered at 
his execution—he was the hated person on the spot, not the remote one in Tokyo. 
I very much doubt, however, that he would have been convicted of a crime against 
peace had he lived to be indicted in the Tokyo Trial. 
 Perhaps it should be added that one can, in principle, be liable for most crimes 
either as a principal or as an accessory. It is fair to say that  Sakai ’s analysis runs 
together both the conduct words in the early part of the Nuremberg Charter’s 
defi nition 41 —words which are most applicable to principals—and the accomplice 
language that is found in the latter part of Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter. 42 
Th is latter language applies on its face to all three Nuremberg off ences, but fi ts a 
little awkwardly with aggression. If it really is a leadership crime, then it is more 
intellectually satisfying to characterize its perpetrators as principals rather than 
accomplices—the accomplice category applies more readily to underlings. It was 
 37  Th e Elements of Crimes, echoing Article 30 of the Rome Statute, treat the material elements of a 
crime as being conduct, consequence or circumstance elements. 
 38  Above n 25.    39  See Heller, above n 36. 
 40  See Informal Intersessional meeting of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, 
held at the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton 
University, from 11 to 14 June 2007, Doc. ICC-ASP/6/SWGCA/INF.1 (2007) at 3. Towards the end 
of the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Court, Samoa made a proposal for the Elements 
of Aggression which included a statement that the perpetrator ‘need not formally be a member of 
the government or military’ but the group thought it unnecessary to spell this out. See Elements of 
Crime of Aggression—Proposal Submitted by Samoa, UN Doc. PCNICC/2002/WGCA/DP.2. On 
‘shape and infl uence’ as the standard in the Tokyo Trial, see  Neil  Boister &  Robert  Cryer ,  Th e Tokyo 
International Tribunal: A Reappraisal ( Oxford :  Oxford University Press ,  2008 ),  151–3 . 
 41  Above n 21. 
 42  American federal law, and the law of some states, has two concepts of conspiracy, one as an inchoate 
crime, and one as a mode of complicity. Th e inchoate version was apparently what was contemplated 
in Article 6(a) of the Nuremberg Charter, above n 21; ‘common plan or conspiracy’ also found its way 
into the concluding (complicity) words of Article 6 about leaders and organizers and the rest. 
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thoughts such as these that led in the Kampala negotiations not only to the defi nition 
of the crime which is found in Article 8bis, but also to an amendment to Article 25 
of the Rome Statute. Article 25(3), found in the general part of the Rome Statute, 
deals with the various ways in which primary and secondary parties can be associ-
ated with an off ence. Relatively early drafts of the aggression amendments simply 
excluded the application of Article 25(3),  in toto , 43 but some of the participants in 
the negotiation thought that this went too far and insisted on language designed 
to assert the leadership point again (perhaps from an abundance of caution) 44 and 
at the same time leave open the possibility that the Court might fi nd it useful to 
divine some residual possibilities in the Article for those close to the centres of 
power. 
 At all events, it is diffi  cult to argue with the comments made by Lord Wright, 
Chairman of the United Nations War Crimes Commission, in the Foreword to the 
second of the two volumes containing a report of the Sakai trial:
 [Th e case] included charges of crimes against peace as well as war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. I need only comment on the fi rst of these charges: the main current of thought 
and decisions on crimes against peace which have been given since the end of the war have 
been that such crimes can only be committed as a matter of legal principle by accused 
individuals who may be described as acting on the policy-making level. In this particular 
case, however, it is diffi  cult to see that the accused came with that category. I do not think 
that this decision can be relied on as substantially aff ecting the general current authority 
on this matter. 45 
 One has thus to leave the issue of ‘who can’ with an expression of extreme doubt. 
Without knowing more about where he fi tted in the Japanese hierarchy, is most 
unlikely that Sakai would be guilty of aggression under the Kampala defi nition. He 
was just not close enough to the centre of power as expressed there. 
 43  See fi nal Discussion paper by the Coordinator on the Crime of Aggression at the Preparatory 
Commission for the Court, UN Doc. PCNICC//2002/WGCA/RT.1/Rev. 2 (2002). Th is drafting 
model had been carried over from the work of the ILC which had not really addressed itself to general 
part issues and aggression. At this point, it was widely assumed that the aggression defi nition would 
stand on its own (later called a ‘monist’ approach) without reference to the general provisions on 
criminal responsibility in Part 3 of the Statute. In the Rome process from late 1995 onwards there 
was an understanding that there would be heavy reliance for defi nitions of responsibility in respect 
of genocide, war crimes and crime against humanity, on a general part as well as on the provisions 
on specifi c crimes, but this was not carried forward into the drafting of the provision on aggression, 
I think by oversight. Later in the negotiations, it was agreed that the drafting should follow the model 
of the other three crimes and rely on the general part—a default rule that could be set aside where 
appropriate. Th is drafting approach came to be known as the ‘diff erentiated’ approach. 
 44  Para 3bis is added to Article 25, paragraph 3 of the Statute which deals with individual 
responsibility:
 In respect of the crime of aggression, the provisions of this Article shall apply only to persons 
in a position eff ectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action 
of a State. 
 45  Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Selected and Prepared by the United Nations War Crimes 
Commission . Vol. XIV (1949) at x–xi. Lord Wright added that ‘there was abundant evidence against 
the accused of peculiarly atrocious off ences in the nature of war crimes and crimes against humanity 
which would have justifi ed the sentence’. Th e Attachment to the Judgment (above n 7) confi rms this. 
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 (IV)  Jurisdiction 
 Jurisdiction is a fundamental issue of international criminal law. I think that if an 
offi  cious bystander had asked the members of the Tribunal that tried Sakai where it 
got its competence/jurisdiction from, it would have answered that its competence 
came (immediately at least) from the Chinese Rules governing the trial of war 
criminals. 46 As a matter of positive law, it would probably have referred to Article 
I of the Rules in force at the time:
 In the trial and punishment of war criminals, in addition to rules of international law, the 
present Rules shall be applied; in cases not covered by the present Rules, the Criminal Code 
of the Chinese Republic shall be applied. 
 In applying the Criminal Code of the Chinese Republic, the Special Law shall as far as 
possible be applied, irrespective of the status of the delinquent. 47 
 Now, if one probes a little deeper, the Tribunal might add that there are various 
ways in which one might state questions of jurisdiction, especially in terms of 
jurisdiction to prescribe (that is to apply one’s laws to the situation) and in terms 
of jurisdiction to enforce (that is to apply the law to this particular person). It will be 
noted that China apparently domesticated the Nuremberg/Tokyo crimes in some 
fashion (as a matter of substantive law) but left open the application of other rules 
of existing domestic criminal law (both the general and the special parts) as needed. 
What might be the Tribunal’s specifi c theory when it came to applying interna-
tional law, the details of which were apparently not spelled out in the legislation? 
 46  China was going through a revolutionary upheaval at the time. I am not sure how this legislation 
was promulgated, but all concerned appear to have accepted it as legitimate under the domestic system 
at the relevant time. Th e Tribunal was obviously created after the event, but the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
decisions would argue that the substantive law already existed, as treaty or customary law, and that 
there was no  ex post facto problem with setting up a mechanism for trial in such circumstances. Some 
twenty-fi rst century sensitivities would be more squeamish about the military aspects of the trial. 
 47  Language of rule as quoted in the report. An Annex to Vol. XIV of the UN War Crimes Commission 
Reports contains a lengthy discussion of a successor law, Law governing the Trial of War Criminals, of 24 
October 1946 (United Nations Day—coincidence or deliberate?). Unfortunately, neither of the actual 
texts (or a translation thereof) is reproduced and I do not have access to a complete text of either. Th us 
it is not clear to me whether the defi nition of crimes (other than those crimes already contained in the 
Chinese code) had any specifi c detail or whether it relied simply on the reference to ‘international law’ 
quoted above, which could be interpreted as incorporating the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters by refer-
ence. Th e Rules adopted later in 1946, as discussed in the Annex, are quoted as containing essentially the 
same language but also as having the following content on crimes against peace (not explicitly so labelled):
 A person who commits an off ence which falls in any one of the following categories shall 
be considered a war criminal: 
 1.  Alien combatants or non-combatants who, prior to or during the war, violate an International 
Treaty, International Convention or International Guarantee by planning, conspiring for, 
preparing to start or supporting, an aggression against the Republic of China, or doing 
the same in an unlawful war. 
 [Th ere follows a general reference to other crimes: to violations of the ‘Laws and Usages 
of War’, to assorted crimes that would fi t the crimes against humanity category (including 
a China-specifi c item of ‘distributing, spreading, or forcing people to consume, narcotic 
drugs or forcing them to cultivate plants for making such drugs’) and another general reference 
to ‘Chinese Criminal Law’.] 
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Was it simply a domestic tribunal exercising jurisdiction over what happened in 
the territory on an eff ects, passive personality or protective theory? 48 Or is it to be 
regarded as a tribunal acting for the international community, exercising some sort 
of universal jurisdiction? 
 Th ese thoughts fl ow inevitably into an examination of some of the arguments that 
have arisen concerning the ICC and the extent to which international law contem-
plates domestic jurisdiction in respect of the crime of aggression. One aspect of the 
terms of this debate is to look at how aggression and the fundamental principle of 
complementarity enshrined in the Rome Statute work together. Th is matter received 
some, albeit cursory, examination during the life of the SWGCA, whose work prod-
uct paved the way for the Kampala amendments on aggression. 49 Recalling that 
discussion is a good way into an appreciation of the issues. Th e discussion occurred 
in the context of the application of the concept of complementarity to the crime of 
aggression. Complementarity in the Rome Statute is the fundamental principle that 
deals with the implications of the proposition that there is concurrent jurisdiction as 
between a national jurisdiction, or set of national jurisdictions, and the ICC itself. 
 Article 17 of the Rome Statute teases out the basic rule of complementarity as 
one of ‘admissibility’. It provides, in relevant part, that: 
 1.  Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and article 1, the Court shall determine 
that a case is inadmissible where: 
 (a)   The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction 
over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investiga-
tion or prosecution; 
 (b)  Th e case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State 
has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from 
the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute; 
 (c)  Th e person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the subject of the 
complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted under article 20, paragraph 3. 50 
 48  Note that what Sakai did was mostly done with him located in China (or Hong Kong). Some 
Japanese aggressors (including many of those tried in Tokyo) never set foot on Chinese soil. As to 
them, a territorial theory would have to be based on an ‘eff ects’ or ‘objective territorial’ analysis: above 
n 3. Th e 24 October 1946 Law, above n 47, required that a defendant be an ‘alien combatant or 
non-combatant’ but was silent on where the perpetrators had to be at relevant times. Local collabora-
tors apparently would be (and were) prosecuted under local law. Th ere is no reason in principle why 
a high-level collaborator, located in and a national of a country that is occupied with his assistance, 
could not be guilty for, say, aiding and abetting the aggression, but I suppose that treason or some 
similar crime would always be enough to trigger appropriate punishment. 
 49  Report of the inter-sessional meeting of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, 
held at the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Woodrow Wilson School, at Princeton 
University, New Jersey, United States, from 21 to 23 June 2004, Doc. ICC-ASP/3/25 (2004) (concluding 
that relevant Articles of Rome Statute on complementarity could be applied to crimes of aggression 
without modifi cation). 
 50  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 17(1). Paragraph 1 concludes with ‘(d) 
Th e case is not of suffi  cient gravity to justify further action by the Court.’ Th is appears to be an issue 
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 Two essential issues remain to be decided, probably by the Court in due 
course: (1) what is meant by ‘a State which has jurisdiction’? (2) Does this include 
a state acting on the basis of a universal jurisdiction theory? 
 A key phrase in both subparagraph (a) and subparagraph (b) is thus ‘a State which 
has jurisdiction over it’. 51 Th ere are three possible ‘states’ to which this might refer: 
an aggressor state; a victim state 52 and a third (or ‘bystander’) state. ‘Has’ is perhaps 
interesting here. It must refer to the ground level requirement that the national 
law of the relevant state authorizes the prosecution and adjudication of the case 53 
of admissibility that, unlike the three preceding subparagraphs quoted above, is distinct from comple-
mentarity. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 17 defi ne ‘unwillingness’ and ‘inability’. Article 20(3), on  ne 
bis in idem , referred to in para 1(c) above, precludes trial in the ICC of a person tried in another court 
for the same conduct, unless the other proceedings were (a) for the purpose of shielding the person 
concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, or (b) were oth-
erwise not conducted independently and impartially or in accordance with the norms of due process 
recognized by international law and were conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was 
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice. On complementarity in gen-
eral, see especially  Mohamed M.  El Zeidy ,  Th e Principle of Complementarity in International Criminal 
Law: Origin, Development and Practice ( Boston, MA and Leiden :  Martinus Nijhoff  ,  2008 ) . 
 51  Article 19(2)(b), using similar language, permits a challenge to jurisdiction or admissibility by ‘a 
State which has jurisdiction over a case’. Article 18(1), which deals with preliminary rulings regarding 
admissibility, uses slightly diff erent language. It requires the Prosecutor at an early stage to ‘notify all 
States Parties and  those States which , taking into account the information available,  would normally 
exercise jurisdiction over the crimes concern ed.’ (Emphasis added.) Paragraph 2 of Article 18 states that, 
within a month ‘a State may inform the Court that it is investigating or has investigated its nationals 
or  others within its jurisdiction with respect to criminal acts which may constitute crimes referred to 
in Article 5 . . .’ (Emphasis added.) ‘Would normally exercise’ (Article 18(1)) is perhaps a nod in the 
direction of territorial or nationality jurisdiction; ‘within its jurisdiction’ (Article 18(2)) is neutral. 
 52  As a practical matter, absent a successful extradition request (made almost certainly to a third 
state to which the alleged perpetrator had travelled), a victim state would probably have not only 
to fend off  the aggression but also get its hands on the perpetrators by advancing to the aggres-
sor’s capital or capturing leading military in the fi eld. See  Nicolaos  Strapatsas ,  ‘Complementarity 
and Aggression: A Ticking Time Bomb’ , in  C.  Stahn and  L.  van den Herik (eds),  Future Perspectives 
on International Criminal Justice ( Th e Hague :  TMC Asser Press ,  2009 ),  460 . I know not how China 
obtained custody of Sakai, who seems to have been enjoying his retirement back in Japan from late 
1943. Somebody, presumably the occupation authorities, must have handed him over. (His ‘residence’ 
is described in the Summary Translation and the Judgment as ‘Tokyo’.) At its First Session earlier in 
1946, the UN General Assembly adopted GA Res. 3 (I) of 13 February 1946, in which the Assembly:
 Recommends that members of the United Nations forthwith take all the necessary meas-
ures to cause the arrest of those war criminals who have been responsible for or have taken 
a consenting part in [war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes against peace], and 
to cause them to be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done, 
in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of those countries. 
 Th is language echoes that in the October 1943 ‘Statement on Atrocities’ made by Roosevelt, Churchill 
and Stalin concerning punishment of responsible Germans. (Th e drafting was largely Churchill’s.) 
China participated in the 1943 ‘Four Nation’ meeting in Moscow, but there was no similar statement 
on Japanese atrocities then. China was also an active member of the United Nations War Crimes 
Commission which, no doubt, helps explain why  Sakai is one of the cases selected for publication. 
But why this and not others? 
 53  Th is will almost certainly be pursuant to legislation criminalizing aggression in the particular 
jurisdiction. Th e decision of the House of Lords in  R v Jones [2006] UKHL 16 is suggestive of the 
way in which national courts approach such problems. Just before hostilities began in the Second 
Gulf War in 2003, several people entered military bases in the United Kingdom, committing damage 
in an endeavour to disrupt preparations for war. Charged with off ences including criminal damage, 
aggravated trespass and attempted arson, they sought to justify their actions on the basis that the 
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and to an absence of procedural obstacles to domestic prosecution. 54 But does 
it also include some concept of the legitimacy of the exercise of jurisdiction by 
reference either to some considerations in the Statute itself or to some questions 
of general international law? For the purposes of complementarity in this respect 
there does not appear to be anything ‘special’ about aggression concerning aggres-
sor state or victim state jurisdiction. Th ey are relatively straightforward examples 
of states having nationality and territorial (or perhaps ‘protective’) jurisdiction. 55 
Th e more diffi  cult case is that of universal jurisdiction by a bystander state. Two 
questions arise: (1) Does Article 17 even contemplate that the Court might defer 
to a bystander state on complementarity grounds? (2) Is aggression the subject of 
pending actions by the US and UK Governments would amount to the crime of aggression. Th ey 
might therefore, they argued, lawfully use force in an attempt to prevent that off ence from taking 
place. Th e House held that, while aggression was recognized in customary international law as a crime, 
it was not a crime in English law absent action by the legislature. Th e power that English courts once 
had to create common law crimes no longer existed. See  Roger S.  Clark ,  ‘Aggression: A Crime Under 
Domestic law?’  NZLJ , [ 2006 ],  349 . Th e House of Lords does not off er any thoughts about universal 
jurisdiction here—given the procedural stance in  Jones , the relevant criminal activities would have 
been taking place in England. Jurisdiction would have been based on territoriality. 
 54  Pål Wrange comments:
 At the domestic level, there would be certain diffi  culties, such as the question of immuni-
ties of foreign leaders. Procedural immunity is enjoyed by some types of offi  cials as long as 
they hold offi  ce, and it will prevent a State from prosecuting, even for international crimes 
(International Court of Justice (ICJ),  Arrest Warrant case ). While immunity does not apply 
before the International Criminal Court, the renunciation of immunity inter partes in the 
Rome Statute probably does not have eff ect on domestic prosecutions. Domestic prosecu-
tions might also apply national immunities protecting offi  cials from prosecutions before 
their  own courts. Such domestic immunity would however not be a valid excuse to not 
prosecute cases falling under the Rome Statute. 
 Pål Wrange, ‘Th e principle of complementarity under the Rome Statute and its interplay with the 
crime of aggression’, in summary of Conference on International Criminal Justice held in Turin, Italy, 
14–18 May 2007, Doc. ICC-ASP/6/INF.2 at 37 (2007). See also Wrange’s discussion of potential 
problems of ‘act of State’ and ‘executive privilege’. Th e reference to the Arrest Warrant or ‘Yerodia’ case 
is to  Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (D.R. Congo v Belgium), 2002 ICJ, which 
contains an extensive discussion of the jurisdictional and immunity issues involved in prosecuting 
foreign leaders. If there is immunity, there is an inability to prosecute nationally and the case should 
go to the ICC where immunities do not apply (Article 27 of the Rome Statute). Such problems affl  ict 
prosecutions in aggressor states, victim states and universal state jurisdictions, but perhaps not equally. 
In the aggressor state, it is at least possible that the immunity problems will have been removed in 
Rome Statute implementation legislation. Th at is, however, (absent a change of regime) the place 
where prosecution is least likely to occur. In the victim state or a third state, there will be the problem 
of whether one formerly eligible for immunity ratione personae as a head of state or senior offi  cial 
continues to have immunity ratione materiae after leaving offi  ce for involving the state in an act of 
aggression. Th e Pinochet case in the UK stands as authority for the proposition that there are some 
activities like torture that are not part of a leader’s function for the purposes of producing immunity. 
It is not clear whether this is consistent with dicta of the ICJ in the Yerodia Case and with the direc-
tion in which the ILC is proceeding Immunity of State offi  cials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction. 
See generally, Roman A. Kolodkin, Special Rapporteur, Second Report on Immunity of State Offi  cials 
from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, UN Doc. A/CN.4/631 (2010). Th ese authorities suggest that at 
least some examples of immunity ratione materiae continue to apply after the actor leaves offi  ce. Sakai 
made a plea based on superior orders but does not seem to have argued that he had immunity (either 
before or after his 1943 retirement). 
 55  Th e SWGCA discussed theories of jurisdiction not in the context of Article 17 but in the context 
of Article 12 of the Rome Statute. Article 12 requires, as a ‘precondition’ to the Court’s exercise of 
jurisdiction, that either the territorial state or the state of nationality be a party to the Statute. What 
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universal jurisdiction under customary law? Th e fi rst question applies to all of the 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court; the second is specifi c to aggression. 
 (1)  Does a ‘State which has jurisdiction’ include one claiming 
universal jurisdiction? 
 As to the fi rst question on how Article 17’s ‘has jurisdiction’ should be interpreted on 
universal jurisdiction, the position is frankly mysterious. One might have thought 
that the issue would be the subject of some useful preparatory work somewhere. 
If there is, it has not come to my attention. Th e author represented the Government 
of Samoa in the negotiations in New York and Rome leading to conclusion of the 
Statute. He asked on several occasions for an explanation about whether complemen-
tarity applied to a state contemplating acting on a basis of universal jurisdiction. 
He does not recall ever having received a useful answer. Th e subsequent literature is 
surprisingly sparse. 56 For example, in the leading commentary of the Statute edited 
of a situation where a victim state (where the eff ects of the aggression were apparent) is a party but the 
aggressor state (where all the preparations took place) is not? Th ere was wide support in the Special 
Working Group for the proposition that the victim state’s acceptance should be suffi  cient to meet he 
requirements of Article 12. One of the SWGCA’s Reports commented:
 Given that the conduct of a leader responsible for the crime of aggression would typically 
occur on the territory of the aggressor States, the question was raised whether the crime 
could also be considered to be committed where its consequences were felt, namely on the 
territory of the victim State. Th e answer to that question had important consequences 
for the application of article 12, paragraph 2 (a), which linked the Court’s jurisdiction to 
‘the State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred’. Broad support was 
expressed for the view that concurrent jurisdiction arises where the perpetrator acts in one 
State and the consequences are felt in another, while some delegations required more time 
to consider the issue. While some delegations expressed the possible need for clarifying lan-
guage, possibly in the elements of crime, several stated that the Rome Statute was suffi  ciently 
clear and that ‘over-legislating’ should be avoided. Th e reference to ‘conduct’ in article 12 
encompassed also the consequences of the conduct. Th e decision in the  Lotus case supported 
this reasoning. 
 Report of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, ICC-ASP/7/SWGCA/1 (26 
November 2008). Compare possible diff erent inferences from the work of the ILC, below n 77. Th e 
reference to  Lotus is, of course, a reference to  Th e SS Lotus (France v Turkey), (1927) PCIJ, Ser. A, No. 
10, at 4 (negligence on board French ship leading to deaths on Turkish ship—Turkey has jurisdiction, 
concurrent with France, at least on basis of the eff ects on Turkish territory but perhaps not on a passive 
personality theory). Th e Special Working Group’s result was rejected, although the logic of its reason-
ing was perhaps underscored in Article 15bis (5) of the Kampala Amendments, above n 1. It asserts 
that ‘[i] n respect of a State that is not party to this Statute, the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression when committed by that State’s nationals or on its territory.’ Th e implica-
tions of  Lotus are avoided by the treaty language. 
 56  Th e issue does not appear to be discussed in El Zeidy, above n 50, the leading work on complemen-
tarity. Nor is it mentioned in the account of the negotiations by John Holmes, the Canadian diplomat 
who chaired the Article 17 discussions at the Preparatory Committee in New York and then in Rome, 
 John  Holmes , ‘Th e Principle of Complementarity’, in  Roy  Lee (ed),  Th e Making of the Rome Statute, 
Issues, Negotiations, Results ( Th e Hague :  Kluwer Law International ,  1999 ),  41 . His main concern in the 
negotiations was that states would need to legislate in order to ‘have’ jurisdiction. He says, at 67:
 It was not enough that a State had instituted national proceedings, it must establish to the 
Court that it had jurisdiction in such a case. Th is addition was intended to forestall situations 
where a State could challenge (and delay) the Court from proceedings on the ground that 
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by Otto Triff terer, the authors of neither the commentary on Article 17 57 nor that 
on Article 18, 58 address the issue. On the other hand, the late Christopher Hall, 
the author of the commentary of Article 19, discusses ‘State which has jurisdiction 
over a case’ 59 in these words:
 Since all States under international law may exercise universal jurisdiction over the crimes 
within the Court’s jurisdiction, it is likely that paragraph 2(b) meant only to include 
those States which had provided their own courts with jurisdiction under national law 
over the case under the relevant principle of jurisdiction, whether based on territory, the 
protective principle, the nationality of the suspect or the victim or universality. 60 
 Th e assumption here is that complementarity applies to situations in which it is 
appropriate to exercise universal jurisdiction (assuming the necessary legislation is in 
it was investigating when in fact the investigation was sure to fail because the State lacked 
jurisdiction even as far as its own courts were concerned. 
 In a later book chapter, Holmes comments:
 Of course, in reality there is a need for the ICC, since States may be unwilling to exercise 
jurisdiction over international crimes, despite a duty to do so, especially when the nexus 
between the State and the crime is limited. Universal jurisdiction exists with respect to 
many of the crimes included in the Statute, but States have been reluctant to exercise it. 
 J.T.  Holmes ,  ‘Complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC’ , in  A.  Cassese ,  P.  Gaeta &  J.R.W.D. 
 Jones (eds),  Th e Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary ( Oxford :   Oxford 
University Press ,  2002 ) . Th is can be read as assuming that complementarity applies to universal juris-
diction, but as saying nothing about whether aggression is one of the ‘many’ over which there is 
universal jurisdiction. 
 57  Sharon A.  Williams and  William A.  Schabas ,  ‘Article 17, Issues of Admissibility’ , in  Otto  Triff terer 
(ed),  Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court—Observers’ Notes, Article by 
Article ( Oxford :  Hart Publishing , 2nd edn,  2008 ),  605 . 
 58  Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko, ‘Article 18, Preliminary Rulings regarding Admissibility’, Triff terer, 
above n 57, 627. Judge Nsereko’s discussion of the notifi cation requirement in Article 18(1) under-
scores that complementarity issues can arise both in respect of state parties to the Statute and 
non-parties. 
 59  Th e issue here is who might make a challenge to admissibility. Can a ‘volunteer’ make such a 
claim? It will be noted that there are actually two issues not resolved by the language of Article 19. 
Does a volunteer have ‘standing’ to raise the admissibility issue and insist that it wants to proceed; 
what are the criteria by which the Court will determine whether to accede to its claim as a matter of 
‘substance’ or not? 
 60  Christopher K. Hall, ‘Challenges to the jurisdiction of the Court or the admissibility of a case’, 
above n 57, 649. Hall’s references are perhaps telling. He writes:
 Th ere have been three comprehensive global studies that have described state practice con-
cerning universal jurisdiction over crimes under international law. 
 See ‘Harvard Research in International Law,’  Am. J.  Int’l L.  Supp., 29 (1935), 435;  Amnesty 
International,  Universal Jurisdiction: Th e Duty of States to Enact and Implement Legislation (Sep. 2001,  AI 
Index :  IOR 53/022—018/ 2001 ) (Second Edition forthcoming); J.-M. Henckaerts/L. Doswald-Beck, 
 Customary International Humanitarian Law , Vol. 1, 604–7; Vol. 2, 3383–940 (2005). 
 None of these sources deals with the crime of aggression—while at least the later ones support 
universal jurisdiction for breaches of humanitarian law, it is not clear how far they go to support Hall’s 
proposition that all states ‘may exercise jurisdiction over the crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction’. 
Hall was one of the authors of the Amnesty International study that he cites; it contains nothing 
indicating that there is universal jurisdiction over aggression—the word is barely mentioned and then 
only in passing. Amnesty was, indeed, one of a handful of major non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) that was singularly unsupportive of the eff ort to complete the left-over mandate from Rome 
on aggression. 
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place). Th e same assumption appears in an important article by Professor Darryl 
Robinson, 61 a member of the Canadian delegation leading up to and in Rome who 
describes himself as ‘the drafter of the text that became Article 17’. 62 Th at Robinson 
believes that ‘a State which has jurisdiction’ includes one operating on the basis of 
universality appears from his interesting discussion of ‘burden-sharing’ between 
the ICC and national courts. He invites the reader to:
 Consider the scenario of a ‘third State’. Th e ICC has investigated a situation, and one of the 
persons most responsible has fl ed to a third State. Although the third State could initiate 
its own proceedings (for example under universal jurisdiction), and indeed the State would 
have the right to do so under complementarity, the ICC and the third State may agree that 
the ICC is the most effi  cient and eff ective forum to prosecute that person, because it has 
already amassed the necessary evidence. 63 
 Neither the Hall comment, 64 nor that by Robinson, 65 addresses specifi cally the 
second question, to which we now turn, whether universal jurisdiction is appropri-
ate  for aggression. 
 (2)  Is universal jurisdiction over aggression recognized in 
contemporary international law? 
 As to the question of the propriety of exercising universal jurisdiction over 
another State’s aggression there is fairly widespread agreement that aggression is 
a crime under international law. 66 But does that translate into a crime for which 
there is universal jurisdiction? It is very doubtful that under current customary 
law it can be asserted unequivocally that aggression ‘is’ subject to universal juris-
diction. 67 Th e (mostly) non-governmental authors of the  Princeton Principles on 
 61  Darryl  Robinson ,  ‘Th e Mysterious Mysteriousness of Complementarity,’  Crim. L.  Forum ,  21 
( 2010 ),  67 . Robinson is at pains to correct a (common) misconception of Article 17, namely that the 
main issue is whether a state is ‘able and willing’. From the plain meaning of Article 17, it is apparent 
that the basic rule is that a case is admissible whenever there are no domestic proceedings taking place. 
It is only when there are such proceedings that it is necessary to go to the second prong, that is whether 
the state in question is able and willing to investigate or prosecute genuinely. Many commentators see 
the ‘able and willing issue’ as the primary one, rather than the ‘is being’ or ‘has been’ one. 
 62  Robinson, above n 61, 68. 
 63  Robinson, above n 61, 97. Th is excellent hypothetical was fl oated earlier, but without the reference 
to universal jurisdiction, in a 2003 Informal Expert Paper,  Th e Principle of Complementarity in Practice , 
produced for the ICC Offi  ce of the Prosecutor by a distinguished group coordinated by Professor 
Robinson, found at < http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc654724.pdf > (accessed 25 February 2013). 
 64  Above n 60.    65  Above n 61. 
 66  Podgor and Clark, above n 3, 160–1;  R. v Jones , above n 53. 
 67  Something could, in principle, be a crime under international law without that necessarily carry-
ing with it a right to exercise universal jurisdiction. It may entail simply an obligation to penalize it at 
the national level or only a right to do so. Th e sixth preambular paragraph to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court reads:
 Recalling that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those 
responsible for international crimes, . . . 
 Writing shortly after Rome, Slade and Clark said this about the paragraph:
 It is delightfully ambiguous. Does the State obligation of which it speaks ‘to exercise its 
criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes’ refer to jurisdiction 
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Universal Jurisdiction contend that there is universal jurisdiction over a person 
‘duly accused of committing serious crimes under international law’. 68 ‘For the 
purposes of these Principles’, they contend, ‘serious crimes under international 
law include:  (1)  piracy; (2)  slavery; (3)  war crimes; (4)  crimes against peace; 
(5) crimes against humanity; (6) genocide; and (7) torture’. 69 Yet one has to have 
some doubts about how far the inclusion of crimes against peace in this list is sup-
ported by State practice. Other authorities are much more equivocal. 70 Putting 
aside  Sakai and the other cases brought in victim states, 71 the only prosecutions 
clearly for the crime against peace were those under the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Charters and under Control Council Law No. 10 in the 1940s and these were 
before tribunals best described as ‘international’ or ‘victor’s’ (or both). I know 
of no disinterested third-party prosecution for aggression. On the other hand, 
Astrid Reisinger Coracini’s careful research has located what she describes as 
‘statutory provisions relating to aggression as a crime under international law in 
some twenty-fi ve countries, predominantly Eastern European and Central Asian 
States’. 72 Some, but by no means all, of those twenty-fi ve (and there may be a few 
others) contemplate universal jurisdiction. 73 But as practice, this is pretty thin! 
 Th en there is the work of the International Law Commission on the Draft 
Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, commencing in the 
1940s and concluding in 1996. 74 Th e work had proceeded on the basis that the 
over crimes within the territorial ‘jurisdiction’ of the State? Or is it referring to a much broader 
‘jurisdiction’ of the ‘universal’ kind, regardless of where the events occurred? In this respect, 
perhaps, it perhaps refl ects the ambiguity of some negotiators about whether the International 
Court should derive its jurisdiction on some theory of universal jurisdiction or whether it 
should be narrower, based on the consent of the territorial State or the State of nationality. 
 Tuiloma Neroni Slade and Roger S. Clark, ‘Preamble and Final Clauses’, in Lee, above n 56, 427. 
 68  Princeton Project on Universal Jurisdiction,  Th e Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction 
(2001), principle 1(2). Principle 3 asserts that with respect to serious crimes under international law 
‘national judicial organs may rely on universal jurisdiction even if their national legislation does not 
specifi cally provide for it’. Th ere appears to be no existing example of such reliance. If  Sakai turns on 
a universal theory, the tribunal has its empowering legislation to rely upon. 
 69  Princeton Project on Universal Jurisdiction, above n 68, principle 2(1). 
 70  I could fi nd no reference to aggression in the most important recent study of universal jurisdiction, 
 Luc  Reydams ,  Universal Jurisdiction: International and Municipal Legal Perspectives ( Oxford :  Oxford 
University Press ,  2003 ) .  Cedric  Ryngaert ,  Jurisdiction in International Law ( Oxford :  Oxford University 
Press ,  2008 ) has a very erudite discussion of the universality principle at 100–26 in which he discusses 
numerous candidates for universal jurisdiction, especially over what he calls ‘core crimes’—but aggres-
sion does not even make it into the discussion. See also Holmes’s opinions, above n 56. 
 71  Above n 16. 
 72  Astrid Reisinger  Coracini ,  ‘Evaluating domestic legislation on the customary crime of aggression 
under the Rome Statute’s complementarity regime,’ in  Carsten  Stahn and  Göran  Sluiter (eds),  Th e 
Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court ( Boston, MA and Leiden :   Martinus Nijhoff  , 
 2008 ),  734 (footnote omitted). 
 73  In a note to the author, Dr. Reisinger Coracini said that almost all those with legislation espoused 
at minimum a territorial theory of jurisdiction. She added that universal jurisdiction appeared to be 
asserted by, at least, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary (but in respect of incitement only) and Moldova. 
Others, like Armenia, Bosnia, Estonia, Georgia and Kazakhstan, adopt some kind of passive personality 
or protective principle which supports victim state jurisdiction. 
 74  Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind,  Yearbook of the International 
Law Commission , 1996, Vol. II (Part Two). For some history of the Draft Code, see  Timothy L.H. 
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Nuremberg and Tokyo crimes—war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes 
against peace—were part of a more general category, the details of which would 
emerge from rational analysis. Th at hope ultimately proved illusory and the 
work-product in 1996 included essentially the Nuremberg crimes, amplifi ed by 
the addition of genocide, which had emerged from crimes against humanity, and 
crimes against United Nations and associated personnel. Article 16 of the Draft 
Code notes 75 the crime of aggression; Article 17 the crime of genocide; Article 18 
crimes against humanity; Article 19 crimes against United Nations and associ-
ated personnel; and Article 20 war crimes. For present purposes, the interesting 
issue is the jurisdictional theories addressed by the Commission. Article 8, entitled 
‘Establishment of jurisdiction’, provides:
 Without prejudice to the jurisdiction of an international criminal court, each State Party 
shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the crimes 
set out in articles 17, 18, 19 and 20, irrespective of where or by whom those crimes were 
committed. Jurisdiction over the crime set out in article 16 shall rest with an international 
court. However, a State referred to in article 16 is not precluded from trying its nationals 
for the crime set out in that article. 76 
 Notably absent is any reference to a requirement for the exercise of universal jurisdic-
tion over the crime of aggression. Th e International Law Commission’s (ILC’s) draft 
can thus be read as an assertion that general international law supports universal 
jurisdiction for the other crimes to which the Draft Code refers, but that aggression 
is diff erent—jurisdiction rests there with an international court or the courts of the 
aggressor state. Indeed, by implication, the ILC even casts doubt on whether there 
is jurisdiction in the courts of the victim State. 77 
 McCormack &  Gerry J.  Simpson ,  ‘Th e International Law Commission’s Draft Code of Crimes 
against the Peace and Security of Mankind: An Appraisal of the Substantive Provisions,’  Criminal Law 
Forum ,  5 ( 1994 ),  1 ;  Rosemary  Rayfuse ,  ‘Th e Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind: Eating Disorders at the International Law Commission,’  Criminal Law Forum ,  8 ( 1997 ), 
 43 . Th e exclusion of universal jurisdiction over aggression is especially telling in the context of the 
ILC’s concurrent work on state responsibility. In its commentary on the obligations of states arising 
from a breach of a peremptory norm, the Commission notes widespread agreement that peremptory 
norms ( jus cogens ) extend at least to the prohibitions of aggression, slavery and the slave trade, geno-
cide, racial discrimination and apartheid. See  James  Crawford ,  Th e International Law Commission’s 
Articles on State Responsibility ( Cambridge :  Cambridge University Press ,  2002 ),  284 .  Jus cogens norms 
are often equated with those over which there is universal criminal jurisdiction for the individuals 
responsible, but the ILC, certainly in relation to aggression, did not make that precise connection. 
 75  Th e 1996 Draft Code makes no serious attempt to ‘defi ne’ in any detail either the specifi c off ences 
or the general part of the Code. 
 76  Th e 1996 Draft Code, Article 8. See also Article 9, which proceeds on a similar basis of distinc-
tion: ‘Without prejudice to the jurisdiction of an international criminal court, the State Party in the 
territory of which an individual alleged to have committed a crime set out in article 17, 18, 19 or 20 
is found shall extradite or prosecute that individual.’ Th e discussion of these Articles by the ILC in 
 Yearbook of the International Law Commission , 1996, Vol. I at 49–53, supports the present author’s 
caution about universal jurisdiction for aggression. 
 77  Cf. the comments in the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, above n 55. Th e 
matter was not without controversy in the ILC. In the fi nal discussion of the jurisdictional issues there, 
the Special Rapporteur on the Draft Code commented:
 [T] he text clearly raised a number of problems. Mr Kabatsi had proposed that a court of the 
country of the author of the crime of aggression should be considered competent. In that 
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 Th e United States did not participate in the work of the SWGCA. However, it 
sent a large delegation to the fi nal meetings of the Assembly of States Parties that 
took place before the Review Conference, expressing doubts there and in a number 
of informal meetings early in 2010 about the jurisdictional principles applicable to 
the crime of aggression. It pursued the matter in Kampala. At its insistence, the fol-
lowing paragraphs were asserted in the ‘understandings’ annexed to the resolution 
adopting the aggression amendments, beneath the heading ‘Domestic jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression’:
 4. It is understood that the amendments that address the defi nition of the act of aggression 
and the crime of aggression do so for the purpose of this Statute only. Th e amendments 
shall, in accordance with article 10 of the Rome Statute, not be interpreted as limiting or 
prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of international law for purposes other 
than this Statute. 
 5. It is understood that the amendments shall not be interpreted as creating the right or 
obligation to exercise domestic jurisdiction with respect to an act of aggression committed 
by another State. 78 
 Paragraph 4 can hardly be regarded as saying anything more than Article 10 of 
the Rome Statute says about leaving principles of international customary law 
free to develop for purposes other than the Statute. (Th is is not to say that the 
Statute does not, inevitably, contribute to the development of customary law. 
Believing to the contrary is like believing that King Canute could really order 
the waves back.) It is perhaps best understood as an eff ort to insist on the hardly 
earth-shattering proposition that, whatever customary law is on the meaning of 
‘act of aggression’ and ‘crime of aggression’, it might not be exactly the same as 
in the 2010 amendment. Paragraph 5 is likely to have more practical eff ect. It is 
plainly aimed at discouraging states from exercising jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression based on universal jurisdiction, and possibly even on the basis of being 
a victim State. 79 It is, however, hardly a forceful proposition about the right to 
exercise these jurisdictions, other than to assert that the right does not rest on the 
amendments—it has presumably to be found in existing customary law. 
case, why not a court in the victim country? Given the large number of proposals made, 
the Commission was in danger of adopting an unsatisfactory provision if it was too hasty 
in its decisions. A small informal group should look into the question. 
 Yearbook of the International Law Commission , 1996, Vol. I, at 50 (summary records). Nothing fur-
ther happened on the record other than the fi nal adoption of the text as described above. Strapatsas, 
above n 52, 454–455, points out that there is some post-World War II practice of states, such as 
Australia, China, Denmark, Greece, Poland and the United States (with regard to the Pacifi c theatre 
of war) claiming jurisdiction on the basis of being a victim state and, in the case of China [Sakai] and 
Poland [Greiser and Koch], actually exercising it. He gives short shrift to the argument that there 
is no victim state jurisdiction. (See also the practice of the USSR in respect of German generals, 
above n 16.) 
 78  Understandings to Kampala Amendments, above n 1. 
 79  In arguing in Kampala for such an understanding, Harold Koh, Legal Adviser to the US State 
Department, asserted in a Statement dated 4 June 2010:
 Even if states incorporate an acceptable defi nition into their domestic law, it is not clear 
whether or when it is appropriate for one state to bring its neighbour’s leaders before its 
domestic courts for the crime of aggression. Such domestic prosecutions would not be 
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 (V)  Conclusion 
 In my introduction, I raised three basic questions about the crime of aggression:  What 
is it?  Who can commit it?  Where (other than in an international court or tribunal) 
may the perpetrators be prosecuted? I suggested that  Sakai , while it has no defi ni-
tive answers to any of these questions and hardly stands as authority for anything, 
is very suggestive of the issues and of potential answers. Th ese issues were all on the 
table over fi ve decades later at Kampala and are bound to suck up the lives of many 
trees (and their electronic equivalents) in decades to come. 
 As to the  what is it? question, it has always been clear that, for purposes of 
criminal responsibility, the elements of the crime of aggression entail a combination 
of something that a State 80 as an entity ‘did’ and something that an individual did 
on behalf of that state. Both sets of elements are necessary. 
 As to the State: at Nuremberg and Tokyo and, I think, in Nanking, there was 
little discussion of what acts by a State could, in general, amount to aggression. 
Th e assumption was that the Axis powers had done ‘it’ (subject to any possible 
justifi cations such as self-defence that tended inexorably to fail on the facts); the 
question was whether the accused was a person who should bear the responsibility. 
Kampala, using the General Assembly’s defi nition as a basis, has come up with a list 
of things that a state might do to bring itself within the aggressor category. Using 
the Kampala defi nition of ‘act of aggression’ as a checklist, I have suggested that 
Japan’s actions fi tted most of those ‘acts’ on the list. 
 As to the individual and the  who question:  Sakai acted on behalf of Japan, 
although his plea that he was only acting on orders and that Japan alone should 
therefore be responsible was not acceptable. 81 Denying the accused a plea of ‘act of 
state’ was again a major move made at Nuremberg, Tokyo, and Nanking. Nanking 
described Sakai as a ‘leader’ but did not further explain the category. Kampala, 
echoing Nuremberg, speaks of a ‘person in a position eff ectively to exercise control 
over or to direct the political or military action of a State’. As in any legal category, 
there will be easy cases and more diffi  cult cases when it comes to apply this 
formula, but prosecutors I have spoken to assure me that it can be applied, with 
subject to any of the fi lters under consideration here, and would ask the domestic courts of 
one country to sit in judgment upon the state acts of other countries in a manner highly 
unlikely to promote peace and security. 
 80  It is certainly possible to conceive of aggression being committed by a non-state entity (a terrorist 
organization, or a dissident group that spreads across borders, for example) but that is not what was 
prosecuted at Nuremberg and Tokyo and in Nanking. Nor is it what is contemplated in the Kampala 
Amendments. Other legal categories of crime (terrorism, war crimes, crimes against humanity) are 
necessary to capture such activities. Professor Larry May, whose path-breaking book suggests a diff er-
ent conceptualization in general from that adopted in Kampala, argues forcefully that ‘some terrorist 
groups can wage war and . . . terrorist leaders can be prosecuted for waging aggressive war as long 
as such prosecutions are subject to the rule of law’:   Larry  May ,  Aggression and Crimes against Peace 
( Cambridge :  Cambridge University Press ,  2008 ),  297 . Given that the ICC will not have jurisdiction 
in such cases, at least in the foreseeable future, should such developments be encouraged by (another) 
treaty? By unilateral practice? 
 81  Above n 30. 
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little more diffi  culty than many other criminal categories. I doubt that Sakai would 
fi t the category, but more information about his place in the Japanese hierarchy 
would perhaps be helpful. 
 Th en there is the question of  where (in addition to an international tribunal) the 
crime may be prosecuted. Nanking China had legislation in place (although I do 
not have the exact text) that permitted the trial of a defeated enemy. No one seems 
to have had the slightest doubt at the time about the appropriateness of this. As 
we have seen, there was, however, some debate about the propriety of victim state 
jurisdiction both in the ILC and surrounding the Kampala amendments. As for 
universal jurisdiction, there are legislative precedents for taking such jurisdiction, 
and there are arguments against it. Th is is no doubt a work in progress and we 
shall see what happens as states adopt the Kampala amendments as part of their 
domestic legal structures. 
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 ‘Germans are the Lords and Poles are the 
Servants’: Th e Trial of Arthur Greiser in 
Poland, 1946 1 
 Mark A.  Drumbl * 
 In the aftermath of the World War II, the fi rst aggression verdict implicating an 
infl uential Nazi offi  cial was delivered not by the International Military Tribunal 
at Nuremberg (IMT) but, rather, by the Supreme National Tribunal of Poland 
(Tribunal). Th e accused was Arthur Greiser. 2 Beginning in September 1939, 
Greiser served as Gauleiter (ie Governor/territorial leader) of the Warthegau, a large 
expanse of western Poland illegally annexed to Nazi Germany. Th e Warthegau’s 
residents suff ered brutally under Greiser’s boot. 
 Greiser’s trial lasted for about two weeks. It started after the commencement of 
the IMT proceedings, but concluded a few months before the IMT judgment was 
rendered. Th e Tribunal sentenced Greiser to death on 9 July 1946. His execution by 
hanging from a plain wooden gallows took place in the early hours of the morning 
of 21 July 1946. 
 Th e London Agreement and Charter of the IMT and the approaches and strate-
gies of the IMT prosecutors informed the charges brought against Greiser, as well 
as the legal basis of the judgment. Neither Polish prosecutors nor Tribunal offi  cials 
saw themselves competing with the IMT. Rather, they saw themselves operational-
izing the principles that underpinned the IMT on behalf of the Polish people as 
victims. Polish national prosecutors felt that the IMT proceedings insuffi  ciently 
examined the suff ering of the Polish people. A pressing need arose to tell this story, 
for which Greiser’s trial served as the opening act. 
 1  Th e text quoted in the title represents Greiser’s own words. See ‘Trial of Gauleiter Artur Greiser’, 
 Th e UN War Crimes Comm’n, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, 13 (1949) 70, 98 [hereinafter  Law 
Reports ]. 
 *  Class of 1975 Alumni Professor of Law and Director, Transnational Law Institute, Washington and 
Lee University. I thank Lisa Markman and Joanna Heiberg for invaluable research assistance, and Ron 
Fuller for critical library help. Th is chapter, which was presented at (and grew enormously from) the 
‘Untold Stories: Hidden Histories of War Crimes’ conference held at the Melbourne Law School, expands 
signifi cantly upon material initially presented at pages 301–3, 313–14, and 317 of my article ‘Th e Push 
to Criminalise Aggression: Something Lost Amid the Gains,’  Case W. Res. J. Int’l L., 41 (2009), 291–319. 
 2  His fi rst name also is reported as Artur, for example, in the  Law Reports. 
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 Greiser, according to Telford Taylor, was the fi rst person to ever be convicted of 
waging aggressive war. 3 In addition to being forerunners on the crime of aggres-
sion, the Greiser prosecution and judgment also liberally incorporated Raphael 
Lemkin’s understanding of and approach to genocide—including the invocation of 
cultural and spiritual aspects. It did so, however, within the strictures of the charge 
of ‘exceeding the rights accorded to the occupying authority by international law’. 
Polish national prosecutors strove to edify a narrative of the extermination of the 
Polish population by the Nazis and the intended replacement of that population 
through Germanization eff orts that Greiser avidly pursued in the Warthegau. Th e 
 Greiser  case involved genocide, albeit outside the context of the legal defi nition in 
the Genocide Convention, which had not yet been adopted at the time. 
 Greiser’s story is not a completely hidden history. With the exception of a beau-
tifully written biographical work by historian Catherine Epstein 4 and the summary 
recounting of his trial in the 1949  Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals ( Law 
Reports ), 5 however, Greiser’s story remains largely outside common knowledge. 
Few international observers have had interest in the verdict either then or now. Th e 
judgment has never been published in German. 6 Moreover, notwithstanding its 
pioneering role regarding the crime of aggressive war, the  Greiser judgment played 
virtually no role sixty years later in the activities of the Special Working Group, 
which defi ned a crime of aggression for the purposes of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC). Despite the unremitting production of legal 
scholarship on international criminal law and war crimes proceedings, Greiser’s 
trial receives only fl eeting and fragmented mention in a handful of law review and 
law journal articles. 
 In sum, then, Greiser’s story has been told, but its telling is notably understated. 
In this regard, Greiser’s is an undertold story. Yet it is a story whose recovery fulfi ls 
valuable pedagogic and didactic purposes. 
 I aim to accomplish three goals in this chapter, all of which share in common 
the overarching aim of bringing Greiser and his trial more prominently to the 
attention of international criminal lawyers, professionals committed to transitional 
justice, and a general readership concerned with redressing mass atrocity and his-
torical injustice. My fi rst goal is to sketch a portrait of Greiser—his youth, his 
family, his path to power, and his eventual dénouement—that draws heavily from 
Epstein’s research. My second goal is to summarize Greiser’s trial, judgment, and 
punishment—noting how the proceedings narrated his story and, in turn, a tale 
of aggressive war. My third goal is more normative in nature, namely, to chart the 
 3  Telford  Taylor ,  Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy ( Chicago, IL :  Quadrangle Books , 
 1970 ),  87 . 
 4  Catherine  Epstein ,  Model Nazi:  Arthur Greiser and the Occupation of Western Poland 
( Oxford :  Oxford University Press ,  2010 ) . 
 5  See above n 1. Th e  Law Reports summarize the indictment, the trial, and the judgment (in places 
through direct excerpted quotation of the language of the Tribunal itself ). Th e  Law Reports also pro-
vide analysis of key legal issues and factual background. Th at said, the  Law Reports do not verbatim 
reproduce the judgment. 
 6  Epstein, above n 4, 329. 
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Greiser judgment’s eff ects in international criminal law today and, furthermore, to 
inquire whether contemporary law and policy can learn anything from it. 
 (I)  Who is Arthur Greiser? 
 Even though it is easy to reduce atrocity perpetrators to simplistic caricatures of 
evil, Greiser is a complex individual. Catherine Epstein’s seminal book elegantly 
brings this nuance to life, while also emphasizing the horrid consequences of his 
orders, the devastation wrought by his activities, and the imperiousness of his 
intentions. Among a variety of archival sources, Epstein excerpts from the letters 
Greiser wrote to family and loved ones. 
 Arthur Karl Greiser was born in 1897 in the German/Polish borderlands (the 
Prussian province of Posen) into a close family of ‘lower middle-class’ means. 7 His 
father was a bailiff . Greiser was the youngest of four children. Th roughout his 
life, Greiser remained especially familiar with his brother Otto—the two shared a 
similar temperament and politics. His oldest brother, Willy, was never a Nazi. His 
sister, Käthe, married Alfred Kochmann, a doctor of Jewish origin. With Arthur 
Greiser’s assistance, the couple emigrated to China in 1933 and, ultimately, to 
New York City, where Käthe lived until her death in 1966. Kochmann was a suc-
cessful physician. Otto died at the hands of the Russians in the Warthegau during 
World War II. Willy passed away in 1951. 
 Greiser fought in World War I. He was devastated by Germany’s loss of Posen 
province. Th ereafter, he moved to Danzig. 8 It was during these interwar years 
that Greiser became an avid German nationalist. According to Epstein, insofar 
as Greiser’s ‘experiences had been determined much more by Poles than by Jews, 
Greiser viewed Poles as the main threat to his nationalist vision’. 9 In short, then, 
Greiser ‘defi ned Poles, and not Jews, as his major enemy’—a Weltanschauung that 
stuck with him throughout his life. 10 
 Greiser was twice married. His fi rst wife, Ruth (whom he divorced in 1934) sur-
vived the war and died in Hamburg in 1984. Greiser met his second wife Maria 
while he was still married to Ruth. Maria was an accomplished concert pianist 
devoted to the Nazi party and Nazi classical composer Hans Pfi tzer. Heinrich 
Himmler himself served as a witness at Arthur and Maria’s wedding. Greiser had 
three children—all with Ruth. Two pre-deceased Greiser. His son, Erhardt, per-
ished in a car accident in 1939 while coming home from boarding school to spend 
Christmas with Greiser; his daughter, Ingrid, died in Germany in the immediate 
aftermath of World War II; Rotraut, his one surviving daughter—childless—lives 
in Germany. At the time Epstein conducted her research, Maria—ninety-eight 
years old—apparently was also still living in Germany. 
 7  Epstein, above n 4, 16.       8  Epstein, above n 4, 4. 
 9  Epstein, above n 4, 339.    10  Epstein, above n 4, 113. 
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 Greiser fi rst became a member of the Nazi Party in December 1929. He was 
a late joiner. Th is indelible fact haunted him throughout his career and lingered 
as a source of insecurity. But Greiser rose in the Nazi ranks—and did so not-
withstanding his poor education (he never fi nished high school). Greiser soon 
became Deputy Gauleiter for Danzig and, as of May 1934, concurrently served as 
President of the Danzig Senate. 
 In Danzig, Greiser was Deputy to Gauleiter Albert Forster, one of Hitler’s favour-
ites, who in turn became Greiser’s arch-rival. In 1939, Forster eff ectively sacked 
Greiser. With war imminent, Forster amalgamated the position of Gauleiter and 
Head of State of Danzig (a constitutional violation). 11 In order to do so, Forster 
obtained Greiser’s authorization, which was delivered in the form of a pre-arranged 
letter. Th is letter endorsed what Greiser had previously spent years trying to fend 
off . Ironically, this letter came to fi gure prominently at Greiser’s trial. Without 
acknowledging that, essentially, Greiser was forced to commit to the letter, the 
Tribunal turned to it to signal how Greiser was a major decision-maker in the 
planning of the aggressive war in Danzig. Tellingly, after expanding his power, 
Forster ‘insisted that Greiser give up his keys, and forbade his entry into the senate 
building’. 12 
 Greiser was despondent. His fortunes, however, miraculously turned for the 
better when he was off ered the post of Gauleiter of Posen (which was renamed 
the Warthegau in early 1940), the Polish region that Germany lost after World 
War I but the Th ird Reich regained by annexing it following the 1939 invasion of 
Poland. In 1939, its population encompassed some four million Poles, 325,000 
Germans, and 400,000 Jews—all living on a territory of roughly 44,000 square 
kilometres. 13 Th e Warthegau was largely rural. It only had two major cities—Posen 
(Poznán) and Litzmannstadt (Łódź). To its east lay the General Government, from 
which it was separated by a customs border; a police border separated it from the 
Old Reich to the west such that passport controls were required. 14 
 In his capacity as Gauleiter, Greiser ‘decisively shaped policy’ in the Warthegau. 15 
He fervently introduced a Germanization programme. Germanization ini-
tially involved the destruction of Polish society and then, according to Matthew 
Lippman, the ‘imposition of a German socio-political and economic structure’. 16 
Th e infl ux of Germans was fi nanced by theft, confi scation, and expropriation from 
those residents who were expelled. Poles deported to Germany for forced labour 
were made to wear as a distinguishing mark a purple P on a yellow background. 17 
All told, Greiser:
 wanted to rid his region of Poles and replace them with  Volksdeutsche (ethnic Germans). He 
took away Polish property, placed Polish orphans with ‘Aryan’ families, terrorised the clergy, 
 11  Epstein, above n 4, 121.    12  Epstein, above n 4, 121. 
 13  Epstein, above n 4, 135 (approximately the combined land mass of Massachusetts, Vermont, and 
New Hampshire). 
 14  Epstein, above n 4, 140.    15  Epstein, above n 4, 340. 
 16  Matthew  Lippman ,  ‘Th e Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide: Fifty Years Later’,  Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. ,  15 ( 1998 ),  448 . 
 17  Law Reports, above n 1, 79. 
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and limited cultural and educational programs. From 1939–1945 he kicked out 630,000 
Jews and Poles and replaced them with 537,000 ethnic Germans. 18 
 Statistics on resettlement are inconsistent, however, with German news outlets of 
the time estimating that 818,000 ethnic Germans from diff erent countries had 
been resettled into western Poland. 19 In any event, tensions—exacerbated by eco-
nomic pressures—arose within the putative German community regarding the 
resettlement program. Epstein adroitly documents how the German community 
in the Warthegau encompassed three subgroups: Reich Germans (those who came 
from the Old Reich, who comprised the elite), ethnic German resettlers from other 
regions, and ethnic Germans native to the region. 20 Th e three categories tended not 
to speak the same language. Many resettlers, in fact, did not even speak German. 
 Greiser ‘created the harshest anti-Polish regime in Nazi-occupied Europe’. 21 In 
this regard, he diff ered from his contemporaries at the Gauleiter level. As part of 
his Germanization eff orts, Greiser even went so far as to alter the Warthegau’s 
natural and physical environment. He changed place names, appropriated art, 
and removed traditional Polish monuments. He supported reforestation pro-
grammes: ‘To Germans, nature represented immortality, authenticity, seriousness, 
resurrection, and German “willpower” . . . [t] rees and forests occupied a particularly 
special place in the imagined German landscape’. 22 
 Once possibilities diminished for other regions to absorb deported Poles and 
Jews, the mass gassings at Chelmno (which began in late 1941) and other concen-
tration camps emerged as the next turn. Greiser thereby became entwined with 
the operationalization of the Final Solution. Chelmno was located sixty kilometres 
from Litzmannstadt (Łódź), whose ghetto was the main collection point for the 
camp. 23 Chelmno was under the direct command of SS and Police leadership in 
the Warthegau, who, in turn, cooperated with Greiser. 24 Greiser never had day-to-
day control over the activities of the Chelmno execution squad, but he certainly 
‘shaped the Final Solution in his territory’. 25 Th e indictment against Greiser alleged 
 18  SHOAH Resource Centre, Th e International School for Holocaust Studies, Yad Vashem,  Greiser, 
Arthur (document on fi le with the author). 
 19  Law Reports, above n 1, 88. Epstein reports the fi gure of 536,951. See Epstein, above n 4, 174, 
192 (‘Greiser raised the percentage of Germans in the Warthegau from 6.6 percent of the population 
in 1939 to 22.9 percent by April 1944’.) 
 20  Epstein, above n 4, 175–6 (‘Reich Germans looked down on ethnic Germans; ethnic Germans 
resented the Reich Germans; Reich Germans were often dismayed by the ‘un-German’ qualities of 
resettlers; the resettlers were angered by patronizing Reich Germans; ethnic Germans were jealous of 
resettlers; and the resettlers felt ill at ease among the ethnic Germans.’) 
 21  Epstein, above n 4, 230.    22  Epstein, above n 4, 254. 
 23  Law Reports, above n 1, 95. 
 24  Holocaust Education & Archive Research Team (2007), ‘Chelmno Death Camp’,  Holocaust 
Research Project [website], < http://www.holocaustresearchproject.org/othercamps/chelmno.html > 
(accessed 26 February 2013)  (‘Th e Chelmno death camp was under the direct command of 
 SS-Gruppenführer Wilhelm Koppe, the SS and Police Leader in the Warthegau, who was under the 
direct command of Heinrich Himmler, but Koppe in many cases acted in co-operation with . . . Greiser’ 
and in addition noting that ‘Greiser visited Chelmno death camp personally to thank the Commando 
on their work’). 
 25  Epstein, above n 4, 182. 
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that ‘[i] t must be taken that more than 300,000 persons perished in Chelmno’, 
almost all of them Jews. 26 Th is statistic has been found to be in error, as noted by 
Epstein, who affi  rms that 160,000 Jews were murdered there. 27 Th e monument 
at the site of the camp today, moreover, states that 180,000 Jews were murdered 
there, along with 4,300 gypsies. 28 
 According to Epstein, Greiser spent his life trying to become a model Nazi. Why? 
Epstein suggests Greiser strove to overcome his late conversion to the party, as men-
tioned earlier, as well as doubts about his war record, his antecedent membership 
as a Freemason, and his scandalous divorce, adultery, and remarriage. 29 Epstein 
also deduces that much of Greiser’s policies hinged upon positioning. For example, 
when he thought he could get ahead by being a more moderate Nazi, he did so—
such was the case in Danzig when he positioned himself against his foil, Forster. 30 
But when he thought he could get ahead by being a zealously radical Nazi, for 
example while he was Gauleiter, he did so, as well. Epstein posits that, after having 
been compromised in Danzig when manoeuvring to the moderate side of the party, 
Greiser subsequently endeavoured to remain on the activist radical fringe. 
 On 21 January 1945, Greiser’s world was rapidly falling apart. Just shy of his 
forty-eighth birthday, Greiser drove from Poznán to Frankfurt. He did so pursuant 
to Hitler’s order. Nevertheless, as Epstein reports, senior Nazis—whether aware of 
this important fact or not—scathingly belittled Greiser for this departure which 
they likened to an abandonment. Goebbels, who was urging the German popula-
tion to stay and fi ght, became irate when he had to contend with Gauleiters who 
abandoned their posts. Goebbels specifi cally ridiculed Greiser’s courage, manli-
ness, and strength. 31 Bormann, who had sent Hitler’s telegram telling Greiser to 
return West, later professed astonishment with Greiser’s departure and subsequent 
arrival in Berlin. Ultimately, Greiser succeeded in persuading Bormann to dis-
seminate a circular that indicated that Greiser left Poznán only because of Hitler’s 
orders. Epstein, however, is skeptical that Bormann’s setting the record straight 
actually ‘improved Greiser’s negative reputation’ or otherwise fulfi lled a rehabilita-
tive function. 32 
 Th e Americans arrested Greiser on 16 May 1945, in the Austrian Alps. At the 
time, Greiser was hiding in a lodge with Maria, together with the equivalent of 
$35,000 (in 2007; USD) in Reichmarks and briefcases of important documents. 33 
 Epstein notes that Greiser faced competing pressures at the end of the war: on 
the one hand, to maintain stature and honour among the frayed and decaying 
Nazi leadership and, on the other hand, to minimize perceived liability in the face 
of imminent defeat and justifi able fears of war crimes trials. After his arrest, in a 
 26  Law Reports, above n 1, 95.    27  Epstein, above n 4, 317. 
 28  Holocaust Education & Archive Research Team, above n 24. 
 29  Epstein, above n 4, 339. 
 30  See also Epstein, above n 4, 85 (‘Th is “moderate” Greiser has even found literary rendition. In 
 Th e Tin Drum , Günther Grass’ masterpiece about the Nazi era in Danzig, Oskar Matzerath, the main 
character, recalled that ‘Greiser never made much of an impression on me. He was too moderate’) 
and 113. 
 31  Epstein, above n 4, 306.    32  Epstein, above n 4, 308.    33  Epstein, above n 4, 310. 
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manner typical for such cases, Greiser downplayed his standing, role, and responsi-
bility for violence. He trotted out the fact that his sister had married a Jew; as well 
as other tiresome canards, to wit, that the ghettos in Poland were fairly comfortable 
and that he had no knowledge of the extermination camps. 
 Th e German people of the Warthegau were furious with Greiser’s delayed evacu-
ation of civilians. Because of this, they lost several days to escape the oncoming 
Red Army, whose systematic atrocities against the German civilian population also 
remain an undertold aspect of the World War II. Evacuees endured terrible condi-
tions. Fifty thousand Germans died during their ‘fl ight from the Gau’. 34 
 (II)  Trial, Judgment, and Execution 
 On 23 October 1945, the Polish government—evoking the Moscow Declaration 
of 1943—requested the Americans to deliver Greiser to Poland to face war crimes 
proceedings. 35 Th e Moscow Declaration provided that ‘war criminals who had 
committed crimes in occupied countries would be sent back to those countries and 
stand trial and be sentenced on the basis of those countries’ laws’. 36 Th e Americans 
agreed. Greiser was transferred in March 1946. 
 A Polish decree of 22 January 1946, delineated the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and 
powers. 37 Th e Tribunal was created to prosecute major war criminals. Its purpose 
was to operationalize the Moscow Declaration. Earlier decrees from 1944 and 
1945 elucidated its substantive law of application, in particular a Decree of 31 
August 1944, promulgated by the Polish Committee of National Liberation, con-
cerning the punishment of ‘fascist-hitlerite criminals’ and ‘traitors to the Polish 
nation’. 38 All told, the Tribunal presided over seven cases (the number of individual 
defendants was greater). Although its seat was in Warsaw, it conducted some of its 
trials in other cities in Poland. Th e substantive law applied by the Tribunal took 
the form of a hodge-podge of special decrees, pre-existing municipal law, and the 
London Agreement—understandable, to be sure, in light of the paucity of com-
prehensive law regarding war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes against 
the peace available at the time. Unsurprisingly, the Tribunal’s work was challenged 
by retroactivity claims, which I discuss below because they arose in Greiser’s trial. 
 Th e work of the Tribunal has nonetheless been lauded. One commentator, for 
example, renders a favourable assessment of the quality of the Tribunal’s work when 
placed within its historical and temporal context:
 In sharp contrast to the numerous political trials carried out in the country during the same 
period, in which thousands of individuals accused of ‘hampering socialist reconstruction’ were 
 34  Epstein, above n 4, 303.    35  Epstein, above n 4, 312.    36  Epstein, above n 4, 312. 
 37  Subsequent decrees were adopted on 17 October 1946, and 11 April 1947. Th e 17 October 1946 
Decree extended the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to all war criminals rendered to Poland for trial and 
over alleged war crimes regardless of their place of commission. 
 38  Th e Decree of 31 August 1944, as modifi ed, was eventually consolidated in a Schedule to the 
Proclamation of the Minister of Justice dated 11 December 1946. 
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sentenced to death or long prison terms, the [Tribunal’s] proceedings applied conventional 
legal and moral standards comparable to those used in Western courts and investigated each 
case comprehensively on its own merits. 39 
 No doubt, ‘Western’ courts of the time impinged upon retroactivity principles 
in the name of the self-evident greater good of prosecuting Nazis—the not-so-
self-evident triumph of obvious justice over legalistic minutiae. Th e favourable 
assessment of the Tribunal’s work when it came to the high-profi le Nazis, how-
ever, belies a disturbing shadow cast by some of its foundational instruments. Th e 
Decree of 31 August 1944, for example, has been characterized as an ‘infamous’ 
piece of legislation ‘promulgated by the Communist proxy regime and used mainly 
as a political and legal tool of repression’ that facilitated post-war prosecutions, 
harassment, and torture of persons deemed anti-communist. 40 Th is Decree, it has 
been argued, was deployed to target anti-communists on the pretext they were 
Nazi sympathisers. 41 Consequently, at least insofar as its application to this large 
class of defendants goes, ‘the intention of the authors of the August Decree was 
to limit, if not outright preclude, the possibility of a fair investigation and a fair 
trial’. 42 
 Greiser’s trial, in any event, opened in Poznán on 22 June 1946, to enormous 
local interest but considerably less international interest. His was the fi rst of the 
Tribunal’s prominent trials. Epstein notes that these trials were intended ‘to edu-
cate the Polish public about the Nazi occupation’. 43 She observes that ‘[w] hile 
the Greiser indictment did not ignore Holocaust crimes, it subsumed the Final 
Solution under crimes against the Polish people’. 44 
 Th e Tribunal was composed of three judges and four jurors. 45 Greiser stood 
before it accused of three off ences covering a lengthy time period. Th ey involved 
Greiser’s activities in Danzig at the outset of the war, and also his activities while 
he was Gauleiter of the Warthegau. Although Prosecutors presented these activi-
ties as continuous, within the framework of Greiser’s life, as discussed earlier, they 
represented two distinct phases. 
 Th e fi rst off ence in the indictment against Greiser alleged that, between 1930 
and May 1945, he ‘took part in the activities of a criminal organisation’, to wit, 
 39  Alexander V.  Prusin ,  ‘Poland’s Nuremberg:  Th e Seven Court Cases of the Supreme National 
Tribunal, 1946–1948,’  Holocaust and Genocide Studies ,  24 ( 2010 ),  1 (abstract). 
 40  Marek Jan Chodakiewicz, ‘Th e Dialectics of Pain: Th e Interrogation Methods of the Communist 
Secret Police in Poland, 1944–1955’,  Glaukopis 2:3 (2004–2005), available at < http://www.project-
inposterum.org/docs/chodakiewicz2.htm > (accessed 26 February 2013) (noting also that ‘[t] he lan-
guage of the August Decree . . . refl ected the language of contemporary Communist propaganda’). As 
an aside, Article 4(1) of this Decree criminalized membership in ‘a criminal organisation established or 
recognised by the authorities of the German State or of a State allied with it, or by a political associa-
tion which acted in the interests of the German State or a State allied with it’. 
 41  Chodakiewicz, above n 40 (arguing that the language used in and extrapolated from the Decree 
‘was a convenient propaganda device commonly employed to dupe the West into believing that the 
opponents of the Communists were pro-Nazi and that the brutal crushing of the independentist 
insurrection and the parliamentary opposition in Poland was simply a mop-up operation which fi t-
tingly concluded the anti-German struggles of the Second World War’). 
 42  Chodakiewicz, above n 40.    43  Epstein, above n 4, 315. 
 44  Epstein, above n 4, 317.    45  Epstein, above n 4, 318. 
20_9780199671144c20.indd   418 10/3/2013   4:21:52 PM
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in 
any way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
‘Germans are the Lords and Poles are the Servants’ 419
the Nazi Party, of which he was charged with being ‘one of the leaders’. 46 Th e 
second off ence in the indictment alleged that Greiser was ‘in charge of ’ the Nazi 
Party branch ‘in the territory of the Free City of Danzig’ and that in this capacity 
between 1933 and 1 September 1939 he ‘conspired’ with German chief govern-
ment organs to cause warlike activities, aggression, and military occupation of 
Poland. 47 Th e indictment off ers a detailed account of the unfurling of Nazi aggres-
sion against Poland. In actuality, however, it remains doubtful that Greiser was ‘in 
charge of ’ the Danzig branch. Forster was. 
 Th e third stated off ence involved the period from 12 September 1939 to 
mid-January 1945 in the Warthegau. Th e indictment specifi cally characterized 
World War II as having ‘begun as a result of German aggression’ 48 (unsurpris-
ing, insofar as this was—at the time—a legal precondition to charge crimes 
against humanity). Greiser, in his capacity as Reichstatthalter and Gauleiter of the 
Warthegau, was accused of ‘exceeding the rights accorded to the occupying author-
ity by international law’ and of ‘contravening the principles of the law of nations 
and the postulates of humanity and the conscience of nations, both on his own 
initiative and in carrying out the unlawful instructions of the civil and military 
authorities of the German Reich’. 49 Th is part of the indictment charged Greiser 
with acting ‘to the detriment of the Polish State and of its citizens’ by his incit-
ing, assisting in the commission of, and personally committing a listed series of 
off ences. 50 Pertinent off ences included mass murders of civilians, persecution, dep-
rivation of the private property of the Polish population, and also the ‘[s] ystematic 
destruction of Polish culture . . . and Germanization of the Polish country and 
population’. 51 Th e third charge against Greiser was further bolstered by extensive 
reference to impugned acts, such as the torturing to death of Poles and Jews in con-
centration and extermination camps, the ‘insulting and deriding [of ] the Polish 
nation by proclaiming its cultural and social inferiority’, and persecution of the 
Polish population that ‘exceed[ed] in practice the legal and administrative regula-
tions’. 52 Prosecutors, responding to public pressure, emphasized Greiser’s role in 
the destruction of the ‘cultural values of the Polish nation’ undertaken,  inter alia , 
by closing Polish scientifi c institutions, press, schools, cinemas and, also, destroy-
ing monuments, art, and limiting the use of the Polish language. 53 Th e specifi cs of 
the indictment noted Greiser’s eff orts to liquidate the intelligentsia. Greiser intro-
duced a comprehensive legal regime that systematically persecuted Poles, limited 
their movements, and festooned public parks with Kein Zutritt für Polen (‘No 
Entry or Access for Poles’) signage. Mention was also made in the indictment of 
Greiser’s role in ‘depriv[ing] Poles of all confessions of the means of freely practis-
ing their religious cult, especially the Catholics who constituted 90% of the popu-
lation of that area’. 54 Sexual relations between Polish men and German women led 
to death for the implicated Pole and public humiliation for the woman. 
 46  Law Reports, above n 1, 70.    47  Law Reports, above n 1, 70. 
 48  Law Reports, above n 1, 71.    49  Law Reports, above n 1, 71. 
 50  Law Reports, above n 1, 71.    51  Law Reports, above n 1, 71. 
 52  Law Reports, above n 1, 71–3. 
 53  Law Reports, above n 1, 74.    54  Law Reports, above n 1, 73. 
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 Technically, the alleged crimes were proscribed by the 1944 and 1945 decrees and 
also by the Polish Civil Criminal Code of 1932. 55 So, too, were the punishments. One 
gap, however, involved the charge of membership in a criminal organization. At the 
time of Greiser’s trial, this crime was not proscribed by the Polish war crimes legisla-
tion (a proscription only arose several months after Greiser’s trial had concluded). 
 Th e indictment itself was extremely detailed. Th e  Law Reports set out many 
of the particulars, 56 which comprehensively narrate the germination of aggression 
against Poland and the harrowing abuses infl icted upon civilians and prisoners of 
war in the region. According to the  Law Reports , however, the Tribunal judgment 
‘did not deal . . . in detail with the specifi c charges’ but did ‘in its fi ndings of a gen-
eral character rel[y] to a very large extent on the Indictment’. 57 
 Greiser pleaded not guilty. Th e Tribunal assigned him very competent defence 
counsel—two prominent Poznán barristers. Upon notifi cation, both lawyers 
immediately sought to quash this appointment, in particular, because Poznán 
had suff ered so much under Greiser’s boot (according to Epstein, one of Greiser’s 
attorneys had himself been deported, and the Germans had murdered two of his 
brothers). 58 Th eir requests, however, were denied. Notwithstanding what must 
have been a searing personal confl ict, both counsel engaged in good faith and 
praiseworthy defence strategies. 
 At trial, the prosecution called witnesses to testify. Statements that some wit-
nesses had made before Allied authorities in Germany ‘were read during the trial’. 59 
Nonetheless, ‘the case for the Prosecution rested overwhelmingly on legal enact-
ments and administrative orders, and regulations, issued by the accused and other 
German authorities’ and also evidence submitted by requested experts. 60 Th e  Law 
Reports summarize much of this expert evidence. 61 
 How did Greiser defend himself? He claimed that: (1) he opposed the war as 
an instrument to attain the aims of the Nazi party; (2) he submitted resignations, 
which were never accepted, on four occasions; (3) he acted only upon the express 
orders of Hitler or Himmler and under the strict supervision of central German 
authorities; and (4) he had only a restricted responsibility for general matters of 
policy. 62 Greiser also sought to advance a claim that neither the ordinary police, 
nor the Gestapo, nor the SS were ‘ever subordinated to him in any way or measure 
[but] always took their orders and instructions directly from Berlin, and particu-
larly from Himmler’. 63 Specifi cally, Greiser claimed ‘for all matters of policy and 
measures applied and carried out in this territory the responsibility rested entirely 
 55  Law Reports, above n 1, 107.    56  Law Reports, above n 1, 74–102. 
 57  Law Reports, above n 1, 74.    58  Epstein, above n 4, 315. 
 59  Law Reports, above n 1, 95. Although, in principle, under municipal Polish law witnesses are to 
appear in person, Article 11(1) of the Decree of 1946 exceptionally permitted ‘[a] ny records taken 
during the preliminary investigation and any public or private documents’ to be ‘read at the trial’. 
Article 11(2) added that: ‘Any records taken during the preliminary investigation within or without 
the country by the Polish authorities or by any allied authorities, or made by any private persons acting 
on their own initiative, or any other evidence given with a view to establishing the crime or bringing 
the criminal to justice, may be read at the trial’. 
 60  Law Reports, above n 1, 96.    61  Law Reports, above n 1, 96–102. 
 62  Law Reports, above n 1, 102–3.    63  Law Reports, above n 1, 102. 
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and exclusively with Hitler and Himmler . . . in his actions he . . . was always strictly 
supervised by the central German authorities’. 64 Th e heart of Greiser’s defence 
was that he was a subordinate of Hitler and Himmler; whatever he did they had 
ordered; and he was routinely subject to their command, censorship, and supervi-
sion. In sum, then:
 Th e accused . . . disclaimed any responsibility for anything that had occurred in concentra-
tion and other camps, and for what had been done as regards the extermination of Jews, 
deportation of Poles, expropriation of property, denationalisation, persecution of churches 
and other incriminating activities, and alleged that he had no infl uence whatsoever in these 
matters. Moreover, in regard to many instances of undoubtedly criminal acts committed 
by German authorities and offi  cials, which were brought before the Tribunal, the accused 
denied any knowledge of them. 65 
 Greiser had prepared a list of 126 witnesses to testify in his favour, but only ‘a few 
were brought to the stand’. 66 His chief witness was his deputy, Alfred Jäger. Th e 
Tribunal did not accept Jäger’s evidence as being in good faith. Jäger, in any event, 
was deeply implicated in wrongdoing as well. He, too, was eventually tried and 
executed. 
 Th e Tribunal delivered its judgment on 7 July 1946. It convicted Greiser of 
all the crimes with which he was charged—save for one exception, namely, that 
Greiser did not personally commit any murders or acts of cruelty or infl ict bodily 
harm. 67 Greiser, therefore, was convicted of membership in a criminal organiza-
tion, aggressive war, and exceeding the rights accorded to the occupying power 
under international law (in other words, the war crimes and crimes against human-
ity charge). Th e  Greiser  case, moreover, has been described as the ‘fi rst ever legal 
ruling on the crime of genocide’. 68 Although the Polish decree that governed the 
trial did not explicitly refer to genocide, in its judgment regarding the third charge 
the Tribunal referenced Greiser’s actions within the framework of crimes against 
humanity as a ‘general totalitarian genocidal attack on the rights of small and 
medium nations to exist, and to have an identity and culture of their own’. 69 Th e 
Tribunal noted the genocidal character of the repression and the genocidal nature 
of the attacks on Polish culture and learning. 70 Lemkin’s neologism was used to 
explicate the systematic and legislative nature of the violence against the Polish and 
Jewish populations. Th e Tribunal contemplated the physical, biological, spiritual, 
and cultural aspects of genocide, including Nazi destruction, confi scation, theft, 
and seizure of cultural property, art, and archives, whether publicly or privately 
held. Hence, the Tribunal ‘broadly conceiv[ed] of genocide as encompassing both 
the cultural and physical extermination of a religious or national group’. 71 
 64  Law Reports , above n 1, 102.    65  Law Reports , above n 1, 102–3. 
 66  Epstein, above n 4, 320.    67  Law Reports , above n 1, 104. 
 68  David L.  Nersessian ,  ‘Th e Contours of Genocidal Intent:  Troubling Jurisprudence from the 
International Criminal Tribunals,’  Tex. Int’l L. J. ,  37 ( 2002 ),  231 , 253 . 
 69  Law Reports , above n 1, 114.    70  Law Reports , above n 1, 112. 
 71  Lippman, above n 16, 448. 
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 Th e Tribunal judgment relied heavily on documentary evidence. In terms of the 
substantive law, as discussed earlier, the Tribunal based itself in municipal Polish 
law. On the charge of membership in a criminal organization, which at the time 
was not proscribed municipally, the Tribunal grounded itself upon the London 
Agreement and Charter and, in a subsidiary sense, two provisions of the Polish 
Criminal Code. 72 On a more general note, as Epstein remarks, the language and 
principles of the IMT greatly infl uenced the proceedings against Greiser. 73 A Polish 
delegation had been granted access to IMT proceedings; one of the prosecutors 
in the Greiser proceedings had been a member of this delegation. According to 
Epstein, plans had been made for Robert Jackson to come to Poznán to attend 
Greiser’s trial but these did not come to fruition. 
 When it came to the aggressive war charge in Danzig, which was proscribed by 
the governing decrees, the Polish Tribunal also referenced the Versailles Peace Treaty 
of 1919, the Paris Convention of 1920, and other international treaties including 
a non-aggression pact signed between Germany and Poland on 26 January 1934. 
Greiser’s defence lawyers had argued that ‘international treaties and conventions con-
cerning the renunciation of war as a means for settlement of inter-State disputes . . . can-
not be regarded but as a lex imperfecta, as they did outlaw the war but did not provide 
for any penalties in this respect’. 74 Th e  Law Reports further indicate that Greiser’s 
defence counsel ‘also raised the defence of  nullum crimen sine lege poenali ,  nulla poena 
sine lege as far as Polish municipal law is concerned’. 75 Th e Tribunal rejected these 
pleas, putatively ‘in accordance with the state of international and municipal law at 
the time of the trial’, in which the London Agreement and Charter fi gured promi-
nently. 76 Th e approach of the Tribunal, assuredly, is not fully convincing from a legal-
ity perspective, insofar as the impugned conduct had occurred several years earlier. 
 Th e Tribunal found Greiser to be ‘one of the chief instruments’ in ‘the gradually 
unfolding plan for aggressive war on a world scale . . . and especially in Danzig’. 77 It 
characterized Greiser as ‘fanatically given over to the idea of a Greater Germany’. 78 
Greiser was portrayed as an enthusiastic proponent of Nazi policies. Although the 
Tribunal linked him to Hitler in a ‘conspiratory’ sense, it also held that Greiser 
‘successfully carried out the criminal order of his leader’ and found him ‘devoted 
to his leader’. 79 Th e Tribunal, therefore, seems to implicitly accept that Greiser was 
not a policy-maker or high-level leader, but still convicted him for crimes against 
the peace. Th e Tribunal—either consciously or inadvertently—was tone-deaf to 
the tensions that raged between Greiser and Forster. 80 In this regard, it seemed to 
accept the Prosecutor’s position that Greiser and Forster were ‘in full agreement 
 72  Law Reports , above n 1, 108. Th e Polish government fi rst proclaimed adherence to the London 
Agreement on 25 September 1945. Legislative ratifi cation of this adherence ensued in 1947, as did 
promulgation in the  Offi  cial Gazette , meaning that the London Agreement then became binding law 
in Poland. To be sure, this formal offi  cialization post-dated Greiser’s trial. 
 73  Epstein, above n 4, 315.    74  Law Reports , above n 1, 109–10. 
 75  Law Reports , above, n 1, 110. 
 76  Law Reports , above n 1, 110.    77  Law Reports , above n 1, 104. 
 78  Law Reports , above n 1, 104.    79  Law Reports , above n 1, 105. 
 80  Epstein, above n 4, 317 (‘Th e indictment included some factual errors. It did not recognise that 
Greiser and Forster had been arch rivals in Danzig . . . It also stated that Greiser aided Forster in his 
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as to the plan of action’ and that the relations between the two men were ‘so 
close’. 81 Th is historical carelessness is rendered all the more paradoxical insofar as 
the appointment of Forster as Gauleiter of Danzig proved to be a key element in 
Greiser’s conviction. On this note, the Law Reports state:
 [Greiser] was entrusted with one of the main Party functions (deputy chief of the branch of 
the NSDAP in Danzig) and put in the principal administrative posts (senator for internal 
aff airs, then vice-president and president of the Senate), in order that he might through 
such long-term activities bring about an internal revolution in the Free City of Danzig 
when the time came. Th is took place on 23rd August, 1939, when, as President of the 
Danzig Senate, Art[h] ur Greiser, in violation of international law and agreements (Article 
104 of the Treaty of Versailles, and the Polish-German non-aggression pact) on Hitler’s 
orders made Gauleiter Albert Forster Chief of ‘Danzig State’, who in turn illegally incorpo-
rated the Free City in the Reich by unilateral act a week later. 82 
 According to Epstein, ‘the most notable feature of Greiser’s verdict—that he was 
the fi rst man ever convicted of ‘crimes against the peace’—was based on the least 
credible evidence. In Danzig, Greiser was hardly engaged in an organized ‘con-
spiracy’ to wage aggressive war’. 83 As an aside, Forster himself was convicted by the 
Tribunal two years later and was eventually executed in 1952. 84 
 With regard to the third charge, namely crimes committed by Greiser in his 
capacity as Gauleiter, the Tribunal found that ‘as a result of [his] direct or indirect 
orders . . . thousands of Poles and Jews lost their lives, their property was destroyed 
or removed, Catholic and Protestant churches were ruined, schools and teaching 
centres shut down’. 85 Th e judgment summarized the many crimes that had been 
committed against the Polish population. Unlike the situation with the aggres-
sion charge, in this capacity Greiser seemingly acted quite independently and ‘did 
not intend to be merely the trusted servant of his leader’. 86 In this sense, the third 
charge rested on more solid factual footing. Greiser, in the words of the Tribunal, 
‘by no means simply blindly carried out the orders of his leader, Hitler, whom 
allegedly there was no possibility of opposing, but was an independent, ambitious 
and cunning instigator and organiser of the cruel methods which led to the mass 
extermination of the local populations’. 87 Greiser, in a nutshell, had considerable 
agency and discretion once he became Gauleiter of the Warthegau. 
 Th e Tribunal was minded that superior orders did not serve as a defence to the 
charges against Greiser. In this regard, the Tribunal adhered to applicable munici-
pal Polish law, according to which superior orders could only be considered as 
being named head of state in Danzig—surely a galling charge, since Greiser had tried to keep Forster 
from assuming such a position. Th e section of the indictment dealing with Greiser’s actions in Danzig 
was the least accurate part of the indictment’.) 
 81  Law Reports , above n 1, 77.    82  Law Reports , above n 1, 105. 
 83  Epstein, above n 4, 328 (but also noting that, despite the fact that ‘[b] y western standards 
[Greiser] hardly had a fair proceeding’, overall, ‘the court arrived at a fair estimation of Greiser’s 
crimes’.) For Epstein, ‘[d]espite the fl aws of the proceedings, Greiser’s trial served both justice and 
history reasonably well’: at 329. 
 84  Epstein, above n 4, 338.    85  Law Reports , above n 1, 105. 
 86  Law Reports , above n 1, 113–14.    87  Law Reports , above n 1, 114. 
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a mitigating factor in sentencing. 88 Th e Tribunal lambasted Greiser for lacking 
the ‘moral courage to admit responsibility for any one of the crimes’; sardonically 
mocked his claims that he had no knowledge of the crimes that were widespread in 
the region; and ridiculed him for ‘not even accept[ing] responsibility for his own 
speeches and publications, alleging that they were forced upon him by the central 
authorities’. 89 
 Th e Tribunal sentenced Greiser to death and, in addition, pronounced the loss 
of his public and civic rights and the forfeiture of all his property. 90 Matthew 
Lippman reports that Greiser ‘attempted to mitigate his genocidal acts by pointing 
to the benevolent treatment he extended to his Polish house staff ’. 91 Th e Tribunal 
responsively noted that a German typically ‘can have a “public soul” and a “private 
soul” ’. 92 Greiser’s ‘benevolence’ was found not to transcend the private sphere. 93 
Although describing Greiser’s attitude as ‘good natured and correct,’ the Tribunal 
found that it did not mitigate the gravity of his crimes. 94 Contemporary tribunals 
have also had to deal with these sorts of claims: to wit, that the defendant saved 
some members of the victim group, for example, Tutsi in Rwanda. Similarly to the 
case with Greiser, these claims have for the most part proven ineff ectual. 
 Th e Tribunal’s decisions were fi nal, subject to the caveat that the Polish President 
had the right of pardon. Greiser feverishly sought to revisit his conviction and 
sentence. Pope Pius XII interceded on his behalf in this regard, urging the Polish 
government to grant him clemency (rather ironic, given Greiser’s fervent persecu-
tion of Catholics in the Warthegau). Th ese attempts, however, were to no avail. 
 Greiser was executed publicly by hanging on 21 July 1946 in front of the 
Warthegau Governor’s mansion. Crowds of spectators poured in—15,000 in total. 
It was a quick and absolute reversal of fate for the man who, fi ve years earlier, had 
boldly brayed: ‘Never again will so much as a centimetre of the land we have con-
quered belong to a Pole. Th e Poles may work with us, but not as masters, for which 
they have shown themselves lacking aptitude, but as hirelings.’ 95 
 (III)  Jurisprudential Legacies 
 Th e  Greiser  judgment has received very limited play in subsequent international 
criminal law jurisprudence. 96 A  search of the International Criminal Tribunal 
 88  Law Reports , above n 1, 117.    89  Law Reports , above n 1, 115. 
 90  Law Reports , above n 1, 104. 
 91  Matthew  Lippman ,  ‘Prosecutions of Nazi War Criminals before Post-World War II Domestic 
Tribunals’,  Miami Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. ,  8 ( 1999–2000 ),  1 , 111 . 
 92  Law Reports , above n 1, 106.    93  Lippman, above n 91, 111. 
 94  Lippman, above n 91 (citing  Law Reports, above n 1, 106). 
 95  Law Reports , above n 1, 86 (citing the  Ostdeutscher Beobachter  of 7 May 1941). 
 96  Nor has  Greiser substantially fi gured in the work of infl uential publicists or experts in interna-
tional humanitarian law. For example, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Rules 
on Customary International Humanitarian Law refer to  Greiser only four times in the comprehensive 
section on practice: in regard to rules relating to public and private property in occupied territory, pil-
lage, forced labour, and the act of displacement. See ICRC, ‘Practice’,  Customary IHL , < http://www.
icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2 > (accessed 26 February 2013). 
20_9780199671144c20.indd   424 10/3/2013   4:21:53 PM
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in 
any way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
‘Germans are the Lords and Poles are the Servants’ 425
for Rwanda and Special Court for Sierra Leone websites reveals no references to 
the judgment. At the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY),  Greiser has been cited fi ve times: in three trial judgments, in a separate 
and partly dissenting appeals opinion, and in a partly dissenting appeals opinion. 
 In  Prosecutor v Kupreskić et al , the  Greiser  case was noted as an interpretive aid in 
defi ning the meaning of the term ‘persecution’ for the purposes of Article 5 of the 
ICTY Statute. 97 Th e  Kupreskić Trial Chamber, Judge Cassese presiding, referenced 
Greiser’s conviction for crimes, including acts of persecution and extermination. 
Th e  Kupreskić Trial Chamber quoted directly from the  Greiser judgment, which 
had elucidated Greiser’s participation in these acts as involving  inter alia :
 [M] urdering [Polish and Jewish people] on the spot, concentrating them in ghettos . . . whence 
they were being gradually deported and murdered, mainly in the gas-chambers of the exter-
mination camp at Chelmno . . . , submitting the Jewish population from the very beginning 
of the occupation to every possible kind of vexation and torment, from verbal and physical 
eff ronteries to the infl iction of the most grievous bodily harm, in a way calculated to infl ict 
the maximum of physical suff ering and human degradation. 98 
 In addition to  Greiser , the  Kupreskić Trial Chamber cited several other cases in sup-
port of a capacious understanding of the crime of persecution, to wit:
 [T] hat the crime of persecution both during and since the Second World War did not 
consist only of those acts not covered by the other types of crimes against humanity. On the 
contrary, these Tribunals and courts specifi cally included crimes such as murder, extermina-
tion and deportation in their fi ndings on persecution. 99 
 Th e ICTY Trial Chamber determined that this understanding was refl ective of 
customary international law. 100 Th e Trial Chamber, however, then emphasized how 
persecution is distinguishable from other crimes against humanity insofar as it is 
committed on discriminatory grounds. 
 In his partly dissenting appeals opinion in  Prosecutor v Stakić , Judge 
Shahabuddeen invoked the  Greiser judgment’s approach to the defi nition of 
‘deportation’. 101 Judge Shahabuddeen posited that the  Greiser  indictment arguably 
used the term ‘deportation’ in the sense of meaning a ‘transfer’. 102 Th e question 
that concerned Judge Shahabuddeen was whether a deportation could refer only to 
the crossing of a border of a state. Th e  Greiser indictment had turned to this term 
in regard to the ‘forcible displacement of civilians from one place to another within 
the same state’—specifi cally, to the area of the General Government, meaning, 
according to Judge Shahabuddeen, ‘from one area of Poland to another area in the 
same country’. 103 According to Judge Shahabuddeen, there ‘was a demarcation line 
 97  Case No. IT-95-16-T (14 January 2000), [600]. 
 98  Case No. IT-95-16-T (14 January 2000), [600]; see also [635] footnote 904 (noting that Greiser 
was charged with the persecution of Polish as well as Jewish people). 
 99  Case No. IT-95-16-T (14 January 2000), [604]. 
 100  Case No. IT-95-16-T (14 January 2000), [605]. 
 101  Case No. IT-97-24-A (22 March 2006), [29]. 
 102  Case No. IT-97-24-A (22 March 2006), [29]. 
 103  Case No. IT-97-24-A (22 March 2006), [29] footnote 957. 
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which could not be transgressed’. 104 Greiser, it was noted, was found guilty. In the 
end, for Judge Shahabuddeen, it did not appear from ‘several cases connected with 
the Second World War’, including  Greiser , ‘that there was occasion for the courts 
to focus on any precise distinction between deportation and transfer or to speak of 
the former alone in respect of external forcible displacement and of the latter alone 
in respect of internal forcible displacement’. 105 
 Th e deportation and international borders question also arose in the case of 
 Prosecutor v Naletilić and Martinović . 106 In his separate and partly dissenting appeals 
opinion, Judge Schomburg noted—similarly to Judge Shahabuddeen—that the 
Polish Tribunal had tried Greiser for  inter alia  ‘imprisoning Polish Jewish citizens 
under his authority in the Łódź ghetto and fi nally deporting them to the Chełmno 
extermination camp (both located in Poland)’. 107 Judge Schomburg noted that 
Greiser was also convicted for ‘deporting Polish civilians to the General Government 
and to forced labour camps in “Germany proper” ’. Both acts were considered by 
the Polish Tribunal to be deportation. In this regard, Judge Schomburg included 
the  Greiser case as among ‘Nuremberg jurisprudence’ that, as a whole, was too 
inconsistent to serve as authority for a ‘ de jure cross-border transfer requirement 
for the crime of deportation’. 108 Ultimately, Judge Schomburg concluded that ‘the 
crime of ethnic cleansing by uprooting specifi c parts of a population needs to be 
called by the name it deserves: Deportation’. 109 
 In the Trial Chamber’s judgment in  Prosecutor v Krstić ,  Greiser  was cited in a 
lengthy footnote (containing six other citations) in support of the proposition that, 
in a number of decisions by the Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Supreme 
National Tribunal of Poland, although the crime of extermination was alleged, 
these judgments ‘generally relied on the broader notion of crimes against human-
ity and did not provide any specifi c defi nition of the term “extermination” ’. 110 
Finally, in the Trial Chamber’s judgment in  Prosecutor v Krajišnik ,  Greiser  again was 
cited (among other cases) in a footnote, this time in support of the proposition 
that post-World War II jurisprudence addressed, in the context of crimes against 
humanity, acts such as denial of freedom of movement, denial of employment, 
denial of the right to judicial process, denial of equal access to public services, and 
the invasion of privacy through arbitrary searches of homes. 111 
 Th e eff orts of the Special Working Group tasked with the defi nition of the 
crime of aggression for the purposes of the Rome Statute also reveal the anaemic 
nature of the  Greiser  judgment’s jurisprudential legacy. Th e  Greiser  case played 
 104  Case No. IT-97-24-A (22 March 2006), [29]. 
 105  Case No. IT-97-24-A (22 March 2006), [29]. 
 106  Case No. IT 98-34-A (3 May 2006).    107  Case No. IT 98-34-A (3 May 2006), [12]. 
 108  Case No. IT 98-34-A (3 May 2006), [13]. 
 109  Case No. IT 98-34-A (3 May 2006), [34]. 
 110  Case No. IT-98-33-T (2 August 2001), [492] footnote 1132 (specifi cally noting the  Greiser  case 
for the proposition ‘that the programme implemented by the Nazis corresponded to a systematic 
programme of genocide which involved  inter alia the extermination of national and racial groups’). 
 111  Case No. IT-00-39-T (27 September 2006), [738] footnote 1645. 
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virtually no role in the Special Working Group’s conversations or debates. 112 In 
fact, the formulation of the crime of aggression advanced by the Special Working 
Group—and subsequently adopted by consensus by the Review Conference on 11 
June 2010, as a proposed amendment to the Rome Statute 113 —would arguably 
preclude the imposition of individual penal responsibility for the crime of aggres-
sion upon offi  cials whose status, authority, and power match that which Greiser 
himself had exercised. 
 Proposed Rome Statute Article 8bis (1) defi nes the crime of aggression as ‘the 
planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position eff ectively 
to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an 
act of aggression which, by its character, gravity, and scale, constitutes a manifest 
violation of the Charter of the United Nations.’ Subsection (2) thereof defi nes an 
act of aggression as the ‘use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, ter-
ritorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations’ while referring to the acts 
identifi ed under UN General Assembly resolution 3314 (1974) as qualifying as acts 
of aggression. Th ese acts include invasions, bombardments, blockades, and other 
evident manifestations of inter-state armed force. Not every act of aggression, to 
be sure, constitutes a crime of aggression. Th e acts must be manifest violations of 
the Charter by virtue of their character, gravity and scale. Moreover, only persons 
in a position eff ectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military 
action of a state can be found personally responsible for crimes of aggression. Th is 
latter requirement immediately emerges from the language of Article 8bis (1), as 
previously discussed, and also is buttressed by proposed Article 25 (3bis) (which 
addresses principles and modalities of individual criminal responsibility) as well as 
the proposed amendments to the Elements of the Crime of Aggression adopted 
at the Review Conference. 114 Th ese stipulated leadership requirements distinguish 
the crime of aggression from the other crimes—to wit, genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes—proscribed by the Rome Statute. 
 Although transhistorically there is little doubt that the Nazi invasion of Poland 
would classify as an  act of aggression that would give rise to fi ndings of the com-
mission of  crimes of aggression under the Rome Statute, the question arises as to 
 who exactly would bear individual penal responsibility under the proposed Rome 
Statute framework. Greiser? Probably not. He did not eff ectively control the politi-
cal or military action of a state. Nor did he direct such state action. Certainly, he 
 112  Drumbl, above n *, 299 (noting that Greiser is ‘not discussed in the otherwise comprehen-
sive  Historical Review of Developments Relating to Aggression , undertaken by the Secretariat for the 
Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court’). 
 113  Resolution RC/Res.6 (11 June 2010) (also setting forth proposals for the exercise of jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression). 
 114  Proposed Article 25 (3bis) provides: ‘In respect of the crime of aggression, the provisions of this 
article shall apply only to persons in a position eff ectively to exercise control over or to direct the 
political or military action of a State.’ Element 2 to the proposed amendments to the Elements of 
Crimes for Aggression requires that the ‘perpetrator was a person in a position eff ectively to exercise 
control over or to direct the political or military action of the State which committed the act of aggres-
sion’, while recognizing that ‘more than one person may be in a position that meets these criteria’. 
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did not exercise such infl uence with regard to Nazi Germany. He did not even 
exercise it, realistically, within Danzig itself. He was involved in the implementa-
tion of aggressive war, but he was not a top policy-maker. He acted upon the orders 
of others and, ultimately, was sacked by his superior Forster in the immediate 
run up to war. Assuredly, Greiser exercised great discretionary authority over the 
Warthegau once aggressive war had begun; in this capacity, however, his crimi-
nality involved war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity, to which the 
leadership requirement is not, in any event, formally applicable pursuant to the 
Rome Statute. 
 Th e Rome Statute governs only the ICC. Hence, as articulated by Understanding 
4 adopted at the Review Conference, ‘the amendments that address the . . . crime of 
aggression do so for the purpose of this Statute only . . . [they] shall . . . not be inter-
preted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of inter-
national law for purposes other than this Statute’. National courts can therefore 
prosecute the Greisers of today—just as a national court had prosecuted Greiser 
himself. Th e Rome Statute, however, has tremendous social constructivist eff ect. It 
informs the content of national legal systems, whether through direct incorpora-
tion or through its status as a normative trendsetter. Its defi nition of aggression—
and attendant leadership requirements—foreseeably may, in turn, come to suff use 
national jurisdictional frameworks. Th e content of the Rome Statute certainly 
infl uences the broader corpus of international criminal law in both substance and 
practice. If the Rome Statute’s approach to individual penal responsibility for the 
crime of aggression seeps into that corpus, and informs national jurisdictional 
frameworks, then national courts also would be stymied in their ability to pros-
ecute the Greisers of today for the crime of aggression. 
 (IV)  Conclusion 
 I have elsewhere expressed considerable scepticism about the deterrent and retribu-
tive value of international criminal punishment, although I remain more optimis-
tic about the expressive and didactic value of such proceedings. 115 Arthur Greiser’s 
trial refl ects the expressive and didactic value of prosecuting and punishing a senior, 
albeit not top, offi  cial for aggressive war. Th e proceedings off er a detailed account 
of the build-up to aggressive war in Danzig. Th ey also provide an account of the 
suff ering of the Polish people. Local offi  cials, after all, matter greatly to affl  icted 
local populations. 
 Th e restrictiveness of the Rome Statute’s approach to who may be prosecuted for 
aggression refl ects, on the one hand, international criminal law’s understandable 
tendency to focus on the most senior policymakers. But, on the other hand, this 
leadership requirement also may enable many other participants in the aggressive 
 115  Mark A.  Drumbl ,  Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law ( Cambridge :  Cambridge University 
Press ,  2007 ) . 
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war eff ort to avoid justice and, accordingly, for the  meso -narratives of aggressive 
war to remain untold. 
 Without the committed support of the upper and senior ranks, and person-
nel such as Greiser, there would be no war eff ort at all. Assuredly, as the  Farben 
 and  Krupp judgments noted, reaching down and criminally implicating everyone, 
including the foot soldier, who somehow assists in the war eff ort would be tanta-
mount to mass punishment. 116 Upper and senior ranks that presently fall outside 
the scope of the Rome Statute, however, could be included in accountability con-
versations for aggression without having the law veer in the direction of collective 
punishment. 
 Such accountability conversations, moreover, need not take the form of crimi-
nal trials. Transitional justice contemplates a broad range of processes. At present, 
however, criminal courtrooms and jailhouses represent the ideal-type pinnacle of 
justice, the fi rst-best practice, and the iconic response. Simply put, international 
criminal law normatively defi nes the justice agenda. Hence, persons who fall out-
side of its parameters are, in eff ect, collectively exonerated. Th is putative exonera-
tion, in turn, might insulate such persons from other forms of post-confl ict justice, 
such as truth commissions, inquiries, reparations, sanctions, and customary mech-
anisms. When international criminal law parsimoniously rushes to blame only the 
very top leadership, it runs the risk of sapping the ability of other accountability 
processes to deracinate the deeper, structural, systemic, and connived causes of 
aggressive war. 
 
 116  I.G.  Farben Trial ,  Th e UN War Crimes Comm’n, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals ,  10 ( 1949 ), 
 37–8 ;  Krupp  Trial ,  Th e UN War Crimes Comm’n, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals ,  10 ( 1949 ), 
 127–8 (Judge Anderson’s concurring opinion) (also underscoring deterrence as a penological goal of 
proscribing aggressive war). 
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 Th e Finnish War-Responsibility Trial in 
1945–6: Th e Limits of Ad Hoc Criminal Justice? 
 Immi  Tallgren * 
 (I)  Global and Local Histories 
 (1)  Tell me a story 
 Th e story of the Finnish war-responsibility trial in 1945–6 may be untold else-
where, but in Finland it is diffi  cult to hide from that part of history. 1 Th e trial has 
remained a sore point, at any time susceptible to controversy and vivid emotions. 
For some of the contemporaries, the trial was part of the preparation for revolu-
tion, behind which the whole of international communism was mobilized. 2 For 
others, criminal responsibility was simply evident and the absence of pre-existing 
national legislation on the crimes a detail. 3 In the midst of the claims on violation 
of the legality principle, victors’ justice or national political vengeance, the story of 
the trial became a battlefi eld of political, ideological and generational confl icts and 
identifi cation. 4 Commentaries, legal actions and political motions have proliferated 
 *  Post-doctoral research fellow, the Erik Castrén Institute of International Law and Human Rights, 
University of Helsinki and the Saint Louis University, Brussels. Th is chapter is based on a presentation 
in the symposium ‘Untold Stories: Hidden Histories of War Crimes Trials’, held at Melbourne Law 
School on 14–16 October 2010. I would like to warmly thank the organizers of the seminar, Kevin 
Jon Heller, Cathy Hutton and Gerry Simpson, and all persons who have kindly either commented 
on the text or provided valuable information: Grietje Baars, Antoine Buchet, Jukka Kekkonen, Arto 
Kosonen, Raimo Lahti, Jukka Lindstedt, Stiina Löytömäki, Sarah Nouwen and Kari Silvennoinen. 
NB All translations of quotations from Finnish to English are by the author. 
 1  Most of the historians of recent Finnish history have addressed the trial in one way or another, 
and the literature is quite overwhelming. Much less research has taken place by legal scholars, and 
even less so from the point of view of international law. A recent study commissioned by the Ministry 
of Justice has been most useful for providing both a historical overview and a meticulous analy-
sis of the current context, see Jukka Lindstedt and Stiina Löytömäki: Sotasyyllisyysoikeudenkäynti, 
Oikeusministeriön selvityksiä ja ohjeita, 22/2010. 
 2  Yrjö  Soini ,  Kuin Pietari hiilivalkealla, Sotasyyllisyysasian vaiheet 1944–1949 ( Helsinki :   Otava 
 1956 ),  373 . 
 3  Minister Leino in a government meeting on 8 August 1944, see  Hannu  Rautkallio (ed), 
 Sotasyyllisyyden asiakirjat , ( EC-Kirjat  2006 ),  318 . 
 4  See, eg,  Jukka  Tarkka ,  ‘Tuomio, syyllisyys ja kunnia’ , in  Jukka-Pekka  Pietiäinen (ed),  Sota ja 
tuomio , ( Helsinki :  Edita  2002 ) . For a compilation of personal recollections, see  Aarne  Långfors (ed), 
 Isänmaan vangit ( Helsinki :  Otava   1997 ) . 
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throughout the decennia. Recently, an annulment claim in the Supreme Court of 
Finland, followed by a complaint in the European Court of Human Rights, brought 
the trial into the limelight again. 
 In this sense, the story of the Finnish trial situates its narrator directly in the mid-
dle of the questions of (collective) memory and its politics: what does the memory 
of the trial represent and to whom? Why does the story of this trial matter so much? 
Likewise, the teller is confronted with the discussion on the judicial treatment of 
(legal) history: can the past be redone, improved the second time? How should today’s 
democracies look back to legally defi cient past trials, if at all? Should controversial 
judgments be annulled or public apologies presented, as is frequently proposed in 
Finland? What messages would the annulment or excuse send to the society con-
cerned? What would it tell about that society? 
 Th is is clearly one important way to look at the Finnish story, and this chapter will 
address it. Another way to make sense of telling this story today, in 2013, is to search 
for lessons for the current international criminal justice project, 5 of which today’s 
Finland is one of the most unconditional supporters. Th is approach situates the story 
in our current interrogations on the legality and rationality of ad hoc or hybrid tri-
als, as well as on the complementarity of national jurisdictions and the International 
Criminal Court (ICC). Generally in that project, a criminal trial is seen both as an 
accomplishment as such, and as having the potential of delivering positive results. 
Th is chapter examines this assumption in the context of the Finnish trial that we 
could—stretching our imagination and tolerance to anachronism—see as a predeces-
sor of a national trial replacing an international one in the spirit of complementarity. 
But let us start at the beginning. 
 (2)  Of a tiny, young state in world wars from 1939 to 1944 6 
 Th e winter had been frightful; the terrible cold, hunger, hardships and toil 
had shrunk the faces of the Finnish people. Th e hard, bony features of the 
Kalevala heroes, as painted by Gallen Kallela, were showing again in the pale 
fl eshless faces. 7 
 5  By this is meant here both the existing legal and institutional forms (national and international 
norms, bureaucracies and adjudication) of international criminal justice, and the political ‘movement’ 
that furthers their enlarged role and use in the world. On the ‘ICC movement’, see Frédéric Mégret, 
ICC, R2P, and the International Community’s Evolving Interventionist Toolkit (2011), (available at 
< http://ssrn.com/abstract=1933111) >, 5–6. Th e concept of ‘transitional justice’ is often used in the 
context of emerging democracies with regard to their former regimes, as a broader concept including 
domestic, hybrid, and international prosecutions, truth-telling commissions, reparations, institutional 
reform, vetting of abusive, corrupt, or incompetent offi  cials, promoting reconciliation, constructing 
memorials and museums, see International Centre for Transitional Justice,  What is Transitional Justice? 
(2006). 
 6  Th e wealth of historical commentaries on the events of 1939–44 is such that this limited chap-
ter based on a conference presentation is not able to take them all into account. When describing 
the events preceding the trial, it aims simply at presenting an uncontroversial background summary. 
References are used for additional information only. 
 7  Curzio  Malaparte ,  Kaputt ( New York :   New York Review Books  2004 ),  50 . First published in 
Italian in 1944. 
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 In 1938, the Soviet Union, threatened by Germany, started to pressure Finland 
with territorial claims to gain space for its defence, in particular to protect the 
city of Leningrad. After failed negotiations conducted under tense circumstances 
and repeated threats on Finland’s territorial integrity, the Soviet Union attacked 
Finland in November 1939. Finland was requesting help from its Nordic neigh-
bours and beyond. It received mainly moral or political support, including the 
exclusion of the Soviet Union from the League of Nations. Promises of military 
help by the UK and France did not materialize. 
 Finland’s army was small, unprepared and poorly equipped compared to the 
Red Army, but managed to defend its territory longer than expected. However, 
by the end of February 1940 Finland was at the point of military collapse. On the 
Finnish side, some 26,000 military were dead or missing, and 44,000 wounded. 
On the Soviet side, 127,000 military were dead or missing, and 190,000 wounded. 
 Finland and the Soviet Union concluded the Moscow Peace Treaty in March 
1940. 8 Th e conditions of peace were considered extremely hard by the Finns, forc-
ing Finland to cede some eleven percent of its territory and some thirty percent of 
its economic assets, to accept a Soviet military base on its coast, and to evacuate 
and resettle over 400,000 persons from the lost territories. 
 Despite the peace treaty, the Finnish government continued to keep the army 
on war alert, referring to the tense situation in the widening Second World War. It 
undertook important fortifi cation and rearmament projects. As a result, Finland’s 
military preparedness was remarkably higher soon after the Winter War than 
before it. 9 
 Establishment of good relations with Germany became a priority for the gov-
ernment, while the relations with the Soviet Union were tense, with several minor 
confl icts arising from the implementation of the peace treaty. In September 1940, 
an agreement with Germany was concluded, granting troop transfers in Finland 
to supply the German troops in Northern Norway. At the latest in spring 1941, 
Finland was negotiating its participation in Germany’s war eff ort on the Finnish 
front and thus preparing for the war that was generally considered as a continua-
tion of the Winter War, and by many as an opportunity for seeking compensation 
for the losses of it. 10 
 Th e Continuation War started in June 1941. By September, Finland had reached 
its previous borders. In Eastern Karelia, it crossed the pre-war borders and occu-
pied areas that had never been part of the Finnish territory, but were populated 
by peoples linguistically related to Finns. 11 Occupation of these territories meant 
 8  See Suomen asetuskokoelman sopimussarja, 3/1940. 
 9  It has been suggested that a promise by Hermann Göring of a future recuperation of the lost terri-
tories together with the German ally was behind the reasons why Finland accepted the severe Moscow 
Peace Treaty in 1940. Th us a conscious plan on the Continuation War would have existed very early, 
see  Heikki  Ylikangas ,  Tulkintani talvisodasta ( Helsinki :  WSOY   2001 ) . 
 10  Research on the ‘drifting’ of Finland into the war versus an active stance by Finland in that direc-
tion has been vivid though decennia. Th is chapter follows the currently prevailing understanding 
based on  Mauno  Jokipii ,  Jatkosodan synty ( Helsinki :  Otava,   1986 ) . 
 11  In 1923, Finland had brought the issue of Eastern Karelian populations to the League of Nations, 
and an advisory opinion of Th e Permanent Court of International Justice was sought although the 
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interning a signifi cant number of Soviet civilians of mainly Russian or Ukrainian 
origins in concentration camps. Th e total death toll amongst camp inmates is esti-
mated at 4,000–7,000. Th e treatment of civil population considered as representa-
tives of the kindred peoples of Finland was preferential in the occupied territories. 
 Occupation of the Soviet territories was condemned by several states previously 
on friendly terms with Finland. Th e widespread international empathy Finland 
had benefi ted from as the tiny victim of the Soviet aggression in the Winter War 
started to fade away. Th is development isolated Finland internationally, thus mak-
ing it even more dependent on Germany for food and military supplies. A fur-
ther point of international criticism was the treatment of Soviet prisoners-of-war 
(POWs). Some thirty per cent of the estimated 64,000 Soviet POWs died in 
Finnish prison camps. 12 
 After a two-and-a-half-year standstill in the hostilities, during which Germany’s 
future defeat started to become evident, the Soviet Union intensifi ed its 
counter-off ensive in summer 1944. It drove the Finns back to behind the 1940 
borders and forced Finland to accept an armistice. Finland had lost 63,000 mili-
tary and some 160,000 were wounded. On the Soviet side, some 200,000 military 
were dead or missing, and almost 400,000 wounded. 
 Th e Moscow Armistice between the Soviet Union and the UK with Finland 
in September 1944 13 meant ceding Finnish territories even further than in the 
1940 peace treaty, as well as massive reparations to be paid to the Soviet Union, 
the dismantlement of Finnish ‘fascist-minded’ organizations and the handing 
over to the Soviets various categories of persons. Most importantly, the Armistice 
obliged Finland to actively disarm and remove German troops from Finland. In 
the Lapland War between Finland and Germany that followed from this obliga-
tion in 1944–5, Northern Finland was devastated. Th e Paris Peace Treaty in 1947 14 
confi rmed the conditions of the Moscow Armistice. 
 (3)  Of how stories matter 
 Soldiers! Th e ground you are stepping on is holy ground, impregnated by the 
blood and suff ering of our people. Your victories will free Karelia, your accom-
plishments will bring Finland a great, happy future. 15 
Court declined to grant it, see ‘Status of Eastern Carelia, Advisory Opinion, 1923 PCIJ (ser. B) No. 5’ 
(July  1923),  < http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1923.07.23_eastern_carelia.htm > 
(accessed 20 December 2011). 
 12  See  Lars  Westerlund ,  ‘Th e Mortality Rate of Prisoners of War in Finnish Custody Between 1939 
and 1944’ , in  Westerlund (ed),  POW Deaths and People Handed Over to Germany and the Soviet 
Union in 1939–55:  A  Research Report by the Finnish National Archives ( Helsinki :   Kansallisarkisto, 
 2008 ),  14–84 . 
 13  See Suomen asetuskokoelman sopimussarja, 4/1944. 
 14  See Suomen asetuskokoelman sopimussarja, 20/1947. 
 15  An extract of the famous fi rst ‘order of the day of the Continuation war’ by the Finnish 
Commander-in Chief Mannerheim, 10 July 1941. He referred to his promise made to the neighbour-
ing Karelian peoples in 1918 ‘that I will not scabbard my sword before Finland and Eastern Karelia are 
freed’. Mannerheim’s order was his own initiative; it was controversial and caused a wave of immediate 
political reactions. See, eg,  Jukka  Tarkka ,  Neither Stalin Nor Hitler ( Helsinki :  Otava,  1991 ),  48–50 . 
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 One of the most controversial questions in recent Finnish history deals with the 
character of the Continuation War: was Finland an ally of Nazi Germany or merely 
fi ghting a ‘separate war’ on the side? Proponents of the latter maintain that while 
participating in the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 (Operation 
Barbarossa), Finland was solely engaged in its own fi ght to restore the injustice and 
the lost territories of the Winter War. In Finland, the ‘separate war’ has been part 
of the dominant narrative about the geopolitical and historical context of World 
War II (WWII). 16 Finland was victim of the 1939 aggression by the Soviet Union, 
and the following years of WWII are seen in this light. Th e situation was simply 
too diffi  cult for a young, tiny, pacifi c state caught in the middle of two dangerous 
giants: its communist neighbour, the Soviet Union, and its historical, cultural ally 
Germany, now ruled by an aggressive dictator. Th ere were no alternatives to the 
Continuation War: it was a political necessity, a battle for survival. In this light the 
war begins to look like self-defence since, the argument goes, the Soviet Union (or 
Germany) would have attacked Finland in any case. 
 To support this narrative of a separate war, it is often stated that Finland did not 
sign the Tripartite Pact, unlike the Axis Countries (of course, the Tripartite Pact 
did not as such contain any obligation to fi ght a common war). Finland adhered 
to written and oral agreements on practical cooperation with Germany and de 
facto acted as its ally, allowing, for example, for the presence of some 200,000 
Wehrmacht soldiers in Finland. Based on this, it has been maintained that as a 
military ally Finland’s position can be qualifi ed as an independent co-belligrent of 
Germany, not decisively diff erent from Hungary, Italy or Romania. 17 
 Th e idea of a ‘separate war’ also tacitly emphasizes that for Finland’s part, the 
war was ‘as clean as warfare could be’. 18 Finland was neither a totalitarian dictator-
ship like Nazi Germany, nor involved in formulating its imperialistic territorial 
objectives or its ideology of racial dominance aiming at destruction of others. It is 
commonly maintained that the Finnish government or administration refrained 
from the extermination campaign against Jews. While notorious examples of 
deplorable treatment of foreign Jews, either as refugees or Soviet POWs in Finnish 
custody, exist 19 , Jewish citizens of Finland were in general well integrated in the 
society and not discriminated against, including in the army. 20 As a result, Finnish 
 16  See President Mauno Koivisto’s speech in 1993, referred to in  Jukka  Tarkka ,  Hirmuinen asia 
( Helsinki :   WSOY,  2009 ),  360–1 ; the speech by President Tarja Halonen at French Institute of 
International Relations (IFRI), 1 March 2005: ‘For us the world war meant a separate war against the 
Soviet Union and we did not incur any debt of gratitude to others’, see < http://www.tpk.fi  >, speeches. 
 17  See Jokipii, above n 10, 625–8;  Mauno  Jokipii ,  Hitlerin Saksa ja sen vapaaehtoisliikkeet 
( Helsinki :  Suomalaisen kirjallisuuden seura,  2002 )  46 . 
 18  Jokipii,  Jatkosodan , above n 10. 
 19  See, for example, Ida Suolahti, ‘POW Transfers During the Continuation War 1941–44’, in 
Westerlund (ed), above n 12; Oula Silvennoinen, ‘Th e Transfers of Civilians to German Authorities’, 
in Westerlund (ed). For a journalistic documentary, see  Elina  Suominen ,  Kuolemanlaiva S/S 
Hohenhörn—juutalaispakolaisten kohtalo Suomessa ( Helsinki :  WSOY,   1979 ) . 
 20  Public and academic discussion of the treatment of Jews in Finland during WWII remains often 
polemic, oscillating between picturing Finland as the rescuer (of the Finnish Jews) to be celebrated, or 
on the other hand as the persecutor (of foreign Jews, the exact number of victims not being unambigu-
ously known) to be undisguised. See, eg,  Hannu  Rautkallio ,  Holokaustilta pelastetut ( Helsinki :  WSOY, 
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Jews fought in the Finnish army together with the Germans in the Continuation 
War. 21 A few Finnish Jews were granted German decorations for their acts in the 
front, but declined to accept them. 
 A few post-war studies and some recent ones have criticized the ‘separate war’ 
narrative. 22 Other studies suggest that the walls separating Finland from its Nazi 
ally in military and executive activities may not have been as water-tight as is often 
maintained. 23 Th is chapter is neither intended nor equipped for taking a position 
in this debate. Th ese controversies are evoked simply because they have a decisive 
eff ect on the way the object of our story—the war responsibility trial—is seen in 
Finland: if the war was separate and ‘clean’, why did the Allies insist on trials in 
Finland, just as in the Axis countries? While keeping these sensibilities concerning 
the Continuation War in mind, we will now turn to the trial itself. 
 (4)  Of the law establishing the Tribunal and criminal 
responsibility 
 We will take the matter out of its own hands, the list of accused will be pro-
longed, and the punishments hardened. 24 
 Th e Moscow Armistice between the Soviet Union and the UK with Finland in 
1944 stated in Article 13:  ‘Finland shall co-operate with Allied Powers to arrest 
and pass judgment on those accused of war crimes’. Th e Finnish leadership under-
stood the obligation to concern prosecution of conventional war crimes only. 25 As 
 2004 ) ; Suominen, above n 19;  Elina  Sana ,  Luovutetut—Suomen ihmisluovutukset Gestapolle 
( Helsinki :  WSOY,  2003 ) ;  Hannu  Rautkallio ,  Ne kahdeksan ja Suomen omatunto ( Helsinki :  Weilin & 
Göös,   1985 ) . 
 21  Even a fi eld synagogue was active on the Finnish-German front. Th e picture was not always as 
idyllic as that, however; some forms of discrimination and tension existed, see  Hannu  Rautkallio , 
 Suomen juutalaisten aseveljeys ( Helsinki :  Tammi,   1989 ) . 
 22  See, eg,  Markku  Jokisipilä ,  Aseveljiä vai liittolaisia? ( Helsinki :  Suomalaisen kirjallisuuden seura, 
 2004 ) . Generally on the whole discussion, see  Timo  Soikkanen ,  ‘Objekti vai subjekti? Taistelu jatko-
sodan synnystä’ , in  Markku  Jokisipilä (ed),  Sodan totuudet ( Helsinki :  Ajatus,   2007 ) . 
 23  For recent research on the cooperation between the security police during the Continuation War, 
implying the knowledge of and some participation of the Finnish State Police in the torture and 
execution of POWs, mainly Jews and Communists by the German authorities, see  Oula  Silvennoinen , 
 Secret Brothers in Arms ( Helsinki :  Otava,  2008 ) . For a journalistic account of the handing over by the 
Finnish authorities to the German authorities of POWs or other individuals, presumably based on 
various discriminatory grounds, see Sana, above n 20. See also the research report Lars Westerlund 
(ed), above n 12;  Sari  Näre and  Jenni  Kirves (eds),  ‘Ruma sota. Talvi- ja jatkosodan vaiettu historia’ 
( Helsinki :  Johnny Kniga Publishing,   2008 ) . 
 24  Chairman of the Allied Control Commission Zdanov, threatening the Finnish government that 
was hesitating on the war responsibility issue, quoted by  Jukka  Nevakivi ,  Zdanov Suomessa, Miksi 
meitä ei neuvostoliittolaistettu? ( Helsinki :   Otava,  1994 ),  159 with reference to the Archives of the 
Allied Control Commission. Zdanov has also been reported to orally have threatened Finland with a 
new war, although the threat may have been rhetoric only, see Tarkka, above n 16, 127 and 340–1. 
 25  Th e Tokyo International Military Tribunal (IMT) was established in January 1946 based on 
Principle 10 of the Potsdam declaration which promised stern justice for  war criminals . Th e defence 
then challenged its jurisdiction for crimes against peace. Th e challenge was rejected by arguing that the 
Japanese government had understood that war criminals referred also to those responsible for initiat-
ing the war. See judgment of the Tokyo IMT, at 48, 440–1. 
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the Allies developed their plans concerning the ‘major war criminals’ of the Axis, 
they made it clear that they expected the highest leadership of wartime Finland to 
also face criminal liability for the war of aggression. 26 
 Th e Allied Control Commission, established to supervise the implementation 
of the Armistice in Finland, exercised considerable infl uence. Th roughout its activ-
ity, the leadership and power of the Allied Control Commission were in Soviet 
hands, and the British members of the Commission were not always informed of 
events. When they were, even if only retroactively, they generally supported the 
Soviet position. Th ey explicitly made the Finns understand that any hope of more 
favourable treatment from the Western powers was futile. 27 
 Th e Allied demands for a trial created public controversy in Finland. 
Parliamentary questions, authoritative legal opinions and committee reports 
addressed the issue. 28 Overwhelmingly, the impossibility of such retroactive crimi-
nal trials in Finnish law and legal tradition was highlighted. However, there was 
also internal political support for them, demanding the clarifi cation of political 
and legal responsibility for the war. 29 Th e Allied Control Commission’s impa-
tience with the Finnish Government culminated in the approval of the London 
Agreement of 8 August 1945, containing the Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal (IMT). As a reaction to the escalating external and internal pressure, two 
weeks later the government presented the draft law on the responsibility for war. 
Th e Government threatened to step down if the Parliament failed to adopt it. 30 
 Th e draft law established the criminal responsibility of individuals having, as part 
of the Government, ‘in a signifi cant manner contribut[ed] in Finland’s engagement 
in the war . . . or prevent[ed] peace’ in 1941–4. With the explicit temporal limita-
tion included in the law, the trial could address the Continuation War of 1941–4 
only. Th e preceding Soviet attack on Finland and the Winter War of 1939–40 
were left outside its scope. Th e draft law created a special tribunal to conduct the 
trial, consisting of the presidents of the Supreme Courts, a law professor from 
the University of Helsinki and twelve Members of Parliament (MPs) appointed 
by the Parliament. Th e prosecution was to be carried out by the Chancellor of 
 26  Th e Soviet Union also used Article 13 to require prosecution of conventional war crimes, alleg-
edly committed by Finnish military in the territories Finland was occupying. In 1944, Finnish soldiers 
were arrested for expected trials. Most of them were freed after pre-trial detention without charges 
and received compensation from the Finnish state for deprivation of liberty. Th e most known group is 
the so-called List No. 1, in which the Soviet Union had included 61 names of alleged war criminals, 
see  Lauri  Hyvämäki ,  Lista 1:n vangit : vaaran vuosina 1944–48 sotarikoksista vangittujen suomalaisten 
sotilaiden tarina; toimittanut Hannu Rautkallio , ( Helsinki :  Weilin & Göös,  1983 ) . On other trials see 
discussion further under section II.3. 
 27  Th e Commission consisted of a majority of Soviet offi  cers, plus a few British members. On the 
role of the Commission and its power constellations, see Tarkka,  Hirmuinen , above n 16, 121–46; 
 Tuomo Polvinen ,  Jaltasta Pariisin rauhaan ( Helsinki :  WSOY,  1981 ),  147–8 . Lasse Lehtinen ja Hannu 
Rautkallio’s recent book’s main argument is to contest the existence of an important external pressure, 
and accord the holding of the trial rather to internal political actors, in particular the minister of jus-
tice Kekkonen, see  Kansakunnan sijaiskärsijät (Helsinki: WSOY, 2005). 
 28  See Lindstedt and Löytömäki, above n 1, 19–22. 
 29  See Nevakivi,  Zdanov Suomessa , above n 24, 154–69. 
 30  Hallituksen esitys nro 54/1945 vp. Laiksi sotaan syyllisten rankaisemisesta, 21.8.1945. 
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Justice. Th ere was no mention of a right of appeal, but amnesty was possible. Th e 
draft law contained no reference to the context of the war, in the sense of Finland 
having fought as an ally of Nazi Germany. Th e Chairman of the Allied Control 
Commission later referred to this tactful omission as a sign of the extraordinary 
tolerance accorded to Finland in letting it organize its own trial. 31 
 Th e special character of the draft law was made evident in the government bill 
in two main aspects. Firstly, the law was to be adopted according to the special 
legislative procedure for the enactment of constitutional legislation (where a reg-
ular law is considered to deviate from the constitutional order). In essence this 
means applying the highest qualifi ed majority voting rule (fi ve to six). According 
to the bill, the deviations concerned the constitutional prohibitions of retroactive 
criminal law and of establishing special tribunals. Secondly, the bill, as well as 
the preamble of the draft law, made direct reference to Article 13 of the Moscow 
Armistice, thus positing the international legal obligation binding on Finland as 
the reason behind the proposal. 
 Serious controversies persisted throughout the parliamentary procedure. Many 
concerned retroactivity:  the draft law created the tribunal, established penal 
responsibility, and defi ned the crimes  ex post facto . Th e government bill proposing 
the law acknowledged this retroactivity but referred to the example of the IMT 
Charter to argue that the responsibility for war could now entail individual crimi-
nal responsibility. 32 
 Opinion was divided. Th e Supreme Court, following a request from the 
Constitutional Law Committee of the Parliament, declared that the draft con-
tained so many fundamental deviations from the Constitution and the general 
principles of law that it could not be regarded as compatible with the Finnish 
legal order. 33 Th e Court observed that Article 13 of the Armistice referred to ‘war 
crimes’ that the IMT Charter defi ned as a separate category (Article 6(a)) from 
the ‘crimes against peace’ (Article 6(b)). Th e wording of Article 13 on ‘war crimes’ 
could therefore not also cover the ‘responsibility for war’ of the Finnish draft law, 
which was more properly understood as a ‘crime against peace’ according to the 
logic of the IMT Charter. 
 A professor of constitutional and international law of the University of 
Helsinki, Kaarlo Kaira, argued that the wording ‘war crimes’ in Article 13 of the 
Armistice had to be interpreted in a restrictive manner, to include only crimes 
against the laws and customs of war, although a broader interpretation could not 
be totally excluded. Th e London Agreement was not binding on Finland, since 
it was concluded after the Moscow Armistice. Professor Kaira emphasized that 
although the London Agreement dealt with those guilty of aggressive war, this 
type of individual responsibility was novel in international law and should there-
fore be interpreted narrowly. Th e Constitutional Law Committee concluded that 
the London Agreement and the responsibility for crimes against peace concerned 
 31  See Polvinen, above n 27, 139–41.    32  See Hallituksen esitys, above n 30. 
 33  Opinion of the Supreme Court to the Constitutional Law Committee, n 1488, dated 28.8.1945, 
1945 Vp., reprinted in Rautkallio (ed), above n 3, 674–8. 
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the leadership of the Axis only; it could not be applied to the political leadership 
of Finland. 34 
 Just before the decisive vote in the parliament, the Allied Control Commission 
published its view on the validity of the draft law in the major newspapers. It 
claimed that the Constitutional Law Committee and the Supreme Court had 
interpreted Article 13 of the Moscow Armistice erroneously and arbitrarily. It fur-
ther argued that the Moscow Armistice superseded any contradictory Finnish leg-
islation and therefore suffi  ced in itself as a necessary basis for the trial of leaders. 35 
Th e parliament fi nally accepted the logic of political necessity behind the govern-
ment proposal and adopted the law with votes 129 to 12. 36 Th e President ratifi ed 
the law on 12 September 1945. Th e nomination of the members of the tribunal, 
pre-trial investigations and the preparation of the charges began shortly thereafter. 
 (5)  Of how some characters are given a special role 
 Backs were turned to eight men, of whom we knew that they had tried their 
best for their nation. Th eir services were compensated by hard labour and 
prison. 37 
 Th e exceptional character of the trial is demonstrated by the fact that the indict-
ments were made by the Council of State, and the prosecution was led by the 
Chancellor of Justice. Th e scope of the accused and the details of the charges fol-
lowed in large terms the approach of the fi rst investigatory committee in the mat-
ter, but in the subsequent investigations the minister of justice in person exercised 
an important role. 38 Th e war-time President Risto Ryti, six members of the gov-
ernment and the ambassador in Berlin were prosecuted, but the military leader-
ship was left out of the scope of the prosecutions entirely. Th e Allied Powers, in 
particular the Soviet Union, played an important role in determining the scope of 
the prosecutions. Th is may have been most obvious in the decision not to indict 
wartime hero and post-war president, Mannerheim. 39 
 Th e prosecution detailed the charges in seven counts. 40 Th e fi rst two covered 
the acts of engagement in the war: having left the country in a state of war alert 
after the Winter War; having allowed the German forces to trespass and to settle 
in Finland; having de facto given a declaration of war to the Soviet Union; having 
 34  Opinion of the Constitutional Law Committee, n 40/1945, 4 September 1945, reprinted in 
Rautkallio (ed), above n 3, 666–73. 
 35  See Polvinen, above n 27, 137–8; Jukka Tarkka,  13. artikla (Helsinki: WSOY 1977) 148–9. 
 36  For an analysis of the decision-making in the parliament, see, eg, Tarkka,  13. Artikla , above n 35, 
139–49. 
 37  Soini, above n 2, 371. 
 38  For the conclusions of the Committee, see the memo by its chairman Onni Petäys 24.10.1945, 
OKV sotasyyllisyyden asiakirjat 1945/1432, Ea 166 (KA). For an analysis of the preparation of the 
indictment, see Lindstedt and Löytömäki, above n 1, 35–9. 
 39  On the pre-trial investigations and the choice of the accused, see Tarkka,  13. artikla , above n 35, 
157–77; Tarkka, Hirmuinen, above n 16, 206–13; Lindstedt and Löytömäki, above n 1, 35–9. 
 40  See Rautkallio (ed), above n 3, 631–41. 
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occupied the territories lost in the Moscow Peace in 1940; and, having penetrated 
into and occupied territories in Eastern Karelia beyond previous borders. Th e third 
count covered government conduct in relation to the state of war with the United 
Kingdom. 
 Th e three fi rst counts comprise conduct that falls under ‘crimes against peace’ 
according to the London Charter. Th e latter four counts concerned the ‘preventing 
peace’ part of the tribunal’s material jurisdiction (see above). Th is was interpreted 
by the prosecution as consisting of decisions or acts having caused Finland to stay 
in the war from 1941 to 1944 despite several opportunities to seek a separate peace 
settlement. 41 
 Th is understanding of crimes against peace as consisting also of acts of prevent-
ing peace departs from the defi nition of the Nuremberg Charter and appears to be 
a Finnish particularity. It can be questioned whether this special approach resulted 
from the eff orts of the Finnish legislators and prosecution to make the crime 
against peace retroactively fi t the events in the predefi ned period of 1941–4. Since 
the circle of government members that were publicly singled out by the Allies and 
the government as guilty of war—those planned to be prosecuted—had actually 
entered the government only after the decisive steps of engagement to war, the way 
to target these individuals was to include in the indictment acts committed after 
the start of war in 1941 as well. 
 (6)  Of a trial with the big bad wolf 
 Finland had to be declared the aggressor, and the Soviet Union had to be pic-
tured as a peace-loving, violated victim of an unjustifi ed attack. 42 
 Th e trial was conducted exclusively by the Finns, but the Allied Control 
Commission exercised considerable infl uence and interfered at numerous occa-
sions in the work of the tribunal. Its members—the presidents of the two Supreme 
Courts, a law professor from the University of Helsinki and twelve MPs appointed 
by the Parliament—worked under heavy pressure, and at least two of the MPs have 
been, in later analyses, considered biased and sources of leaks of secret delibera-
tions of the tribunal. Th e trial was public and the accused had defence attorneys 
but the defence did not have access to all fi les it requested and was allowed to 
present the defence to a limited extent only. 43 As a result, no references to the 
 41  Th e counts singled out diplomatic or informal contacts via the United States or other channels 
after August 1941 proposing peace negotiations with the Soviet Union that had been declined by the 
Finnish government. In 1943, the Finnish government communicated a further eff ort to mediate a 
separate peace with Germany that urged it to decline. In early spring 1944, the government gave an 
insuffi  cient mandate to the peace negotiators and thereby caused a cessation of the negotiations. In 
summer 1944, the government recommended giving an assurance to Germany that Finland would 
not seek separate peace with the Soviet Union, and the President signed it. 
 42  Th e defendant Ryti felt that this was the general expectation of the trial, limiting the way he 
could defend himself, see  Martti  Turtola ,  Risto Ryti. Elämä isänmaan puolesta ( Helsinki :   Keuruu, 
 1994 )  321–2 . 
 43  See Tarkka,  Hirmuinen , above 16, 235–63. 
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preceding Winter War were allowed, although the war and the harsh Moscow 
Peace Treaty of March 1940 were part of the context in which the subsequent acts 
leading to the Continuation War took place. 
 Major incidents of interference with high tensions between the Control 
Commission, the Finnish government and the tribunal occurred. Th e decision of 
the tribunal to set four of the accused free was a red rag to the Soviet chairman 
of the Allied Control Commission, Zdanov. In response to his virulent protesta-
tions, he succeeded in persuading the tribunal to reconsider its decision, and all 
but one were arrested again. 44 Zdanov also strongly criticized the soft and courte-
ous ‘club-like’ way the trial proceeded. Th e accused were allowed to interact with 
members of the public while entering and leaving the courtroom, receiving expres-
sions of support, and were addressed respectfully with their previous offi  cial titles. 
Some restrictions were introduced at his request. 
 Th e most fl agrant interference by the Allied Control Commission concerned 
the judgment itself. Th e Commission had previously signalled its expectations as 
to the gravity of the sentences. Th e draft version of the judgment was leaked to the 
Commission two days before it was due to be declared. Th e draft convicted seven of 
the accused to prison sentences ranging from two to eight years, and acquitted one 
(the ex-ambassador in Berlin). Early one Sunday morning chairman Zdanov pre-
sented himself at the home of the prime minister and angrily protested against the 
fact that the Commission had not been consulted on the judgment. He criticized 
the lack of control by the Finnish government over the proceedings and requested 
that the announcement of the judgment be postponed. He referred to his instruc-
tions from the highest military leadership of the Allies. Th e British also exerted pres-
sure on the Finnish government to have the sentences toughened. Th e government 
took these interventions very seriously and passed them on to the tribunal both 
formally and informally. After painful manoeuvres amongst the members of the 
tribunal to satisfy the demands of the Commission, the judgment was rewritten. 45 
In the revised judgment, all the accused were found guilty. Th e most severe sentence 
was given to the war-time President Risto Ryti—ten years’ hard labour. Th e other 
accused were sentenced to prison sentences from two to six years. Th e ambassador 
acquitted in the original judgment was now condemned to fi ve years in prison. 
 (7)  Of ‘real persons going to real prisons’ 46 
 Th is is the most noble deed I have been involved in in the last fi ve years . . . it 
partly gives redemption to the shameful act . . . that we felt obliged to commit 
in 1945. 47 
 44  See Polvinen, above n 27, 139–41; Tarkka,  Hirmuinen , above 16, 224–35. 
 45  See Polvinen, above 27, 145–8; Tarkka, Hirmuinen, above 16, 264–74;  Toivo T.  Kaila , 
 Sotaansyyllisemme säätytalossa ( Helsinki :  Werner Söderström,  1946 ),  224–6 . 
 46  Leila Nadya  Sadat ,  Th e International Criminal Court and the Transformation of International 
Law: Justice for the New Millenium ( Ardley-on-Hudson, NY :  Transnational Publishers,  2002 ),  8 . 
 47  Diary note of date 23 June 1949 by President Paasikivi who accorded the pardons:  J.K.  Paasikiven , 
 Päiväkirjat 1944-1956, 2. osa ( Porvoo :  WSOY ,  1986 ),  21 . 
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 Th e enforcement of sentences took place in a prison in central Helsinki. Th e 
condemned had material conditions of relative comfort, considering the general 
deprivation and shortages in the post-war period. Generous food packages and 
other material support arrived at the prison in a regular manner. Th e condemned 
were allowed to wear civilian clothing and had opportunities for sport and social-
izing. Th ey used most of their time for literary and scientifi c work, and one convict 
drafted legal expert opinions on command. Dozens of books were published by the 
convicts. Most of the work undertaken by them was remunerated. 48 
 As soon as the Allied Control Commission left Finland in September 1947, 
paroles and pardons of the sentences began, in accordance with the law in force 
at the time. Th e last group of condemned were pardoned by President Paasikivi 
in May 1949, including the President Ryti, who was hospitalized with a serious 
illness. 
 Th ose former convicts who were in good health were integrated back into soci-
ety. Expressions of respect and new professional opportunities were presented to 
them. Th ey received academic honours and leading posts in academia. Two of 
them were re-elected as members of parliament. One regained his position as the 
chairman of the social-democrat party. When President Ryti died in 1956, he was 
given a state funeral. Huge crowds of Finns followed the funeral. Most of the con-
demned are buried in the national honorary cemetery in Helsinki. 49 
 (II) Today’s Eyes on the Past 
 (1)  Sixty-fi ve years of controversy 
 If it is a crime to love one’s home country and people more than one’s own 
right to life, condemning [president] Risto Ryti has been just. If one regards it 
as a virtue, a judicial murder has been committed against him. 50 
 Th e political and legal polemics surrounding the Finnish war responsibility trial 
have remained vivid since 1945. Th e trial has been subject to a wealth of publica-
tions, political activity such as parliamentary motions and public statements, and, 
on several occasions, judicial action (appeal claims to the Chancellor of Justice, 
extraordinary appeals, as well as a complaint to the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR)). 51 In this climate, a new episode suffi  ces to revive the public 
discussion and the controversies: Was the entire trial actually orchestrated by the 
domestic left and centre, without any real international obligation or pressure 
 48  As described in a recent study by  Risto  Niku ,  Kahdeksan tuomittua miestä. Sotasyyllisten vankila-
vuodet ( Helsinki :  Edita,   2005 ) . 
 49  Niku, above n 48, 229–40. 
 50  Speech by a close collaborator (Mr Puntila) in the funeral of the war-time President Risto Ryti, 
condemned to ten years hard labour in 1946, see Tarkka,  Hirmuinen , above n 16, 246. 
 51  See Tarkka,  Hirmuinen , above n 16, 359–61; Lindstedt and Löytömäki, above n 1, 61–2. 
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behind it, as a recently published study claims? 52 Should the judgment be annulled, 
or simply accepted as a political necessity of its time? 
 In this context, successive Finnish governments, the judiciary, academia, media 
and the public have been wrestling with the same questions of memory, history 
and justice as known in many other states. 53 Firstly, how to relate to history by legal 
means? Th is question typically appears in the form of how far in history does it 
make sense to hold a criminal trial, when individuals concerned age and the gath-
ering of evidence becomes increasingly problematic. 54 Secondly, how to relate to 
embarrassing legal history, to procedures that are gravely defi cient either in accord-
ance with current law or already with the law of their time? 
 In the case of the Finnish trial, serious criticisms can and have been levelled. 
Th ere is no doubt that the law on war responsibility and the trial itself were in clear 
violation of the Finnish legal order of the time. A retroactive law created a special 
tribunal and defi ned the material [applicable?] law. Th e prosecution’s choice of the 
accused was selective and strongly infl uenced both by the Allies and by national 
politics (see section I.5). As has been discussed above (see section I.6), insuffi  cient 
rights were granted to the defence. Some members of the tribunal were most likely 
biased, and both the Allied Control Commission and the Finnish government 
interfered seriously throughout the trial and with the judgment. Th e list goes on, 
but we will leave it here for now. 55 
 Compared internationally to other trials directly after the war 56 or, as today’s 
example of an exceptional situation with exceptional legal needs, to the ‘war on 
terror’ from 2001 onwards—the anachronism and absurdity of the comparison 
notwithstanding—the Finnish story appears in a very diff erent light: Th ere was a 
public trial, based on a parliamentary law. Th ere was no arbitrary detention, no 
allegations of torture or other mistreatment, no transfer to a foreign state, neither 
for investigations, trial nor for enforcement of sentences. Nobody died in custody 
or in prison. Considering the widespread damages of the war, the punishments 
were lenient, both compared to those for serious crime in the regular national 
context and to other comparable trials of the time. Th e prison conditions were 
comfortable considering the standards of the diffi  cult time. Paroles and pardons 
were granted. Although the convictions must have been a tremendous burden to 
the individuals and their families, there was no general rejection of the condemned 
by the society and their reintegration proceeded smoothly. 
 52  See Lehtinen and Rautkallio, above n 27. 
 53  Th e obvious examples of these contexts are Germany with the Vergangenheitsbewältigung after 
Nazism, France’s collaboration with Russian and Eastern European communist totalitarianism, and 
colonizing states with colonialism, although most countries and regions are likely to have their national 
traumas. On France, but with interesting general methodological positions, see  Henry  Rousso ,  Th e 
Haunting Past ( Philadelphia :  University of Pennsylvania Press,  2002 ) . See also  Stiina  Löytömäki ,  ‘Law 
and the Global Phenomenon of Righting Old Wrongs’ , ( 2004 )  Finnish Yearbook of International Law , 
Vol.  XV ,  273 . 
 54  For a recent case, see ECtHR,  Kononov v Latvia , 17 May 2010. 
 55  See Lindstedt and Löytömäki, above n 1, 29–48. 
 56  A comparison is beyond the scope of this Chapter. For limited comparisons, see Tarkka,  13. 
artikla , above n 35, 63–6 and 150–7; Tarkka,  Hirmuinen , above n 16, 304–14; Polvinen, above n 27f 
WW n, 148–9. 
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 Based on the story so far, we could tentatively conclude here that the Finnish 
trial represented exceptional justice following WWII. Compared to the aftermath 
of WWII internationally, Finland may appear as a special case: why were there so 
few accused, and why were the punishments so lenient compared to other coun-
tries in a similar position? How was it that everything was so calm and controlled, 
with no self-infl icted justice or scandals? In this respect, it would be a mistake to 
point to a general consensual and lenient climate in Finnish legal culture and crim-
inal policy, in particular in conditions of political instability or war. Only some 
twenty-fi ve years before the war responsibility trial there was a wave of legal and 
extra-legal retribution during and after the 1918 Finnish civil war, with violence 
on both sides (though predominantly on the side of the Whites, the conservative 
coalition). 57 
 Seen through modern eyes, this becomes intriguing. Why was the war responsi-
bility trial so shocking? Where does the lasting sense of tragedy and injustice come 
from? It seems we need to dig deeper to fully understand the trauma of the trial. 
 (2)  Legal treatment of past legal treatment 
 Th e most recent legal action concerning the trial that had considerable public 
attention was an annulment claim to the Supreme Court of Finland in 2008. Mr 
Ilkka Tanner, grandson of the social-democrat wartime minister Väinö Tanner, 
requested annulment of the 1946 judgment by which Tanner had been declared 
guilty of ‘misuse of offi  cial authority to the detriment of the nation’, and the annul-
ment of his fi ve-and-a-half-year prison sentence. 
 In its decision, the Supreme Court analysed the law of 1945 and the trial in con-
siderable detail. It unequivocally stated that the trial violated many of the essential 
principles of the Finnish legal order. It went on to declare that its establishment 
and activity took place on grounds and in circumstances that must be regarded 
exceptional. Th e Court pointed out that the law of 1945 did not contain provi-
sions on ordinary or extraordinary means of appeal. Highlighting the special cir-
cumstances, the Court concluded that a retroactive examination of the judgment 
and the procedure leading to it on the basis of the general Finnish law on annul-
ment of judgments or extraordinary appeals for procedural fault was not within 
its competence. 58 
 Mr Tanner then brought the case before the ECtHR. He based his claim on 
Article 13 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), which sets out 
the ‘right to an eff ective remedy’, and on Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 on the ‘right 
of appeal in criminal matters’. In his complaint, the applicant claimed that since 
 57  See  Jaakko  Paavolainen ,  Poliittiset väkivaltaisuudet Suomessa 1918. Osa 1:  Punainen terrori 
( Helsinki :   Tammi,  1966 ) ;  Osa 2:  Valkoinen terrori (Helsinki:  Tammi 1967);  Jukka  Kekkonen , 
 Laillisuuden haaksirikko. Rikosoikeudenkäyttö Suomessa vuonna 1918 ( Helsinki :   Lakimiesliiton 
Kustannus,  1991 ) ;  Lauri  Hannikainen ,  ‘Th e Finnish Civil War in 1918 and its Aftermath’ in  Lauri 
 Hannikainen ,  Raija  Hanski and  Allan  Rosas (eds),  Implementing Humanitarian Law Applicable in 
Armed Confl icts, Th e Case of Finland , ( Leiden :  Martinus Nijhoff  Publishers,  1992 ),  8 . 
 58  Supreme Court of Finland, decision 2008:94. 
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annulment of the war responsibility judgment was not explicitly excluded in the 
law of 1945, the Supreme Court could have considered itself competent. Th e lack 
of any means of appeal violated his rights. 
 In the wake of these domestic and European legal procedures, active public 
discussion followed, prompting the Ministry of Justice to react. Diff erent means 
to redress the situation were considered, including legislative means, either to 
open a possibility for extraordinary appeal or to directly annul the judgment. 59 
Th e Ministry commanded a report on the legal aspects of the past trial and the 
potential options for an offi  cial reaction to it outside the sphere of legal remedies, 
such as a public apology or a statement. 
 In the meantime, the ECtHR, by a committee of three judges, including the 
Finnish judge, declared the application inadmissible on 23 February 2010. Th e 
basis of incompatibility evoked in the decision was that of  ratione personae , ie, the 
appellant could not be considered victim of a violation in the sense of Article 34 
of the ECHR. 
 Th e report commissioned by the Ministry of Justice was published on 12 March 
2010. It states without ambiguity that Finland’s military activity in the Soviet 
Union fulfi lled the material elements of crimes against peace. 60 Th e report questions 
whether international law was already at the time of the trial considered to super-
sede potentially contradictory national law, and whether the London Agreement 
(together with the IMT Charter) formed a suffi  cient basis for the individual crimi-
nal responsibility imposed on the eight accused in the Finnish trial in accordance 
with Article 13 of the Moscow Armistice. With strong reservations, it concludes 
in the positive, 61 while at the same time highlighting in detail the serious breaches 
of the Finnish constitution and the other highly problematic aspects of the trial. 62 
 In conclusion, the report emphasizes how the war responsibility trial is not the 
only controversial or questionable legal episode in Finnish history, and invites 
examination of the (legal) past using a global approach. Th e report cautions against 
using legislative means to redress the outcome of the war responsibility trial, but 
otherwise refrains from recommendations on whether a political reaction, such as 
a public apology or a statement aimed at nullifying the judgment would be advis-
able. 63 As the report points out, the practice of expressing public apologies by the 
government is almost unheard of in Finland. 64 Th e public apology by Prime Minister 
Paavo Lipponen in 2000 concerned the handing over by the Finnish State Police to 
the German authorities of eight Jewish refugees, including two children, all but one of 
whom died in Auschwitz. 65 Th is is so far the only precedent against which to measure 
the gravity of wrongs necessitating a public apology. 
 59  ‘Väärät tuomiot sotasyyllisyydestä ministeriön syyniin’,  Helsingin Sanomat 5.2.2009. See also 
Lindstedt and Löytömäki, above n 1, 84–5. 
 60  Lindstedt and Löytömäki, above n 1, 51. 
 61  Lindstedt and Löytömäki, above n 1, 52–4. For a critical view on this, see  Mikaela  Heikkilä , 
 ‘Suomen sotasyyllisyysoikeudenkäynti ja kansainvälinen rikosoikeus’ , ( 2010 )  Lakimies  4 ,  638 . 
 62  See Lindstedt and Löytömäki, above n 1, 29–48. 
 63  Lindstedt and Löytömäki, above n 1, 81–8.    64  Lindstedt and Löytömäki, above n 1, 85. 
 65  See Sana, above n 20, 15–16. 
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 In 2008, the Finnish judiciary chose to remain silent. Now that the ECtHR has 
declared the case inadmissible, the executive is likely to remain silent as well, at least 
until the next major eruption. Let us profi t from the calm to try to make some sense 
of the story. 
 (3)  Why criminal justice? 
 In the aftermath of WWII, the sense of the trials did not attract much explicit analysis. 
Considering the large-scale violence and destruction experienced, elaborate debates 
on justifi cations for punishing the perpetrators may have seemed irrelevant or even 
absurd. 66 As Robert Sloane writes, ‘[a] t the time, the very notion that the most cul-
pable Axis leaders and war criminals, men like Göring, should be subjected to the 
unwieldy and costly processes of the law proved controversial’. 67 
 Some recent studies have started to sketch the outlines of a criminological approach 
to international criminal justice, by analysing the justifi cations for and legitimate goals 
of punishment. 68 Here it is enough to say that punishment is conventionally justi-
fi ed either by its presumed positive functions in controlling future crime (by general 
and specifi c deterrence, incapacitation or rehabilitation of the off ender) or by ret-
ribution. 69 Additional expectations of positive eff ects justifying international crimi-
nal justice frequently evoked include the expression 70 (or communication, implying 
interaction and inclusion 71 ) of values of the international community, reaction to the 
expectations of the victims, contribution to establishing or maintaining peace or the 
rule of law (locally or internationally), establishment of historical understanding and 
a record of the dolorous past, or performance of a ceremony or service advancing 
reconciliation and the feeling of closure in a community. 72 
 66  See  Robert D.  Sloane ,  ‘Th e Expressive Capacity of International Punishment:  Th e Limits of 
the National Law Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law’ , ( 2007 ) 43  Stanford 
Journal of International Law  39 ( 2007 ),  65 ;  Telford  Taylor ,  Th e Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials 
( Boston :  Knopf,   1992 ) . 
 67  Sloane, above n 66, 65. 
 68  See  Mark A.  Drumbl ,  Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law ( Cambridge :   Cambridge 
University Press,  2007 ) ; Sloane, above n 66 ;  Marc  Osiel ,  ‘Why Prosecute? Critics of Punishment 
for Mass Atrocity’ , ( 2000 )  22  Human Rights Quarterly ,  118 ;  Immi  Tallgren ,  ‘Th e Sensibility and 
Sense of International Criminal Law’ , ( 2002 )  13  European Journal of International Law ,  561 . See 
also  Anthony  Duff  ,  ‘Can We Punish the Perpetrators of Atrocities’ ,  Th e Religious in Responses to Mass 
Atrocity ,  Brudholm ,  Cushman (eds) ( Cambridge :  Cambridge University Press,  2009 ),  79 ,  Laurel E. 
 Fletcher ,  ‘From Indiff erence to Engagement: Bystanders and International Criminal Justice’ , ( 2005 ) 
 26  Michigan Journal of International Law ,  1013 ;  Laurel E.  Fletcher &  Harvey M.  Weinstein ,  ‘Violence 
and Social Repair:  Rethinking the Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation’ , ( 2002 )  24   Human 
Rights Quarterly ,  573 . 
 69  See, for example,  Anthony  Duff  and  David  Garland (eds),  A Reader in Punishment ( Oxford :  Oxford 
University Press,  1994 ) ;  David  Garland ,  Punishment and Modern Society ( Oxford :  Oxford University 
Press , 1990 ) . 
 70  See  J.  Feinberg ,  ‘Th e Expressive Function of Punishment’ in  Doing and Deserving ,  Feinberg (ed) 
( Princeton :  Princeton University Press,  1970 ),  95 ; compare to  A.J.  Skillen ,  ‘How to Say Th ings with 
Walls’ ,  55  Philosophy ( 1980 ),  509 . 
 71  See  Anthony  Duff  ,  Punishment, Communication, and Community ( Oxford :   Oxford University 
Press,   2001 ) . 
 72  On these additional aspects, see the references above n 68. 
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 Assuming a set of rational objectives exists, one should, in theory, be able to 
evaluate the usefulness of criminal justice by seeking to understand how far it 
enhances these objectives. Criminological research is challenging, even in estab-
lished, stable domestic legal systems. Concerning international criminal justice, 
the diffi  culties grow exponentially: what area, which actors, what timeframe? How 
to obtain empirical evidence? Focusing on isolated trials such as the Finnish one 
hardly makes any sense at all. We do not have opinion surveys, statistics or other 
material. On prevention of future crime, we could hardly say more than that wars 
of aggression have been waged in the world since, although none with the involve-
ment of Finnish government members. When it comes to the other potential posi-
tive eff ects referred to above, however, we might for the sake of our story sketch 
some observations. What sense may the trial have had, what purpose may it have 
served, and what kind of eff ects—if any—may it have on the society? 
 Th e trial derived from the same origins as the London Agreement and expressed 
the condemnation of the emerging international community of 1945 (itself in 
transition) of the violation of the principles of territorial sovereignty and the pro-
hibition of wars of aggression that was more explicitly expressed the same year in 
the Charter of the United Nations (UN). However, in 1945–6, crucial years for 
the further development of international criminal justice, the trial was often seen 
in Finland as a separate issue from the trials in the Axis states and their satellites, as 
discussed above. For Finns, it was all between Finland and the Soviet Union. Any 
expression of values must have suff ered from this: it was not clear to Finns who 
was behind the trial. Th e international community had a Soviet face and a Soviet 
voice. Further, the fact that the law on war responsibility, enacted under con-
straint, still underwent careful scrutiny involving not only the parliament but also 
the judiciary and academia (discussed above) could be seen as a strong sign that 
Finland had remained an independent democracy with a legalistic political culture. 
Th e military defeat was unambiguous, and the Soviet threat was felt strongly, in 
particular in the light of what was simultaneously occurring in the neighbouring 
Baltic States. Nevertheless, an important part of the society rejected a trial that 
they saw as unfair. In that sense, the resistance to the trial became a heroic continu-
ation of the war. From the criminological point of view, however, the conditions 
for communicating values in a criminal trial were clearly not optimal; the messages 
got blurred. 
 With regard to establishing a historical understanding of a diffi  cult past, or 
advancing reconciliation and the feeling of closure in a community, we are again 
facing large-scale and complex sociological phenomena. Th e trial and its eff ects form a 
piece in the puzzle of the evolution of today’s Finland, and we are unable to see clearly 
how. We have observed the repeated demands for annulment of the judgment, for 
public apologies to the condemned or their families and for other gestures countering 
the judgment. As the latest developments show, these demands enjoy widespread sup-
port and perhaps a tacit approval from the government, but they also have opponents. 
Has the trial contributed to reconciliation, social peace and establishing a historical 
record, or might it have played its part in hindering open, honest analysis of past 
traumatic events? Rather than serving as a forum for bringing light to the shared 
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experiences of the people and its leadership, could the ‘shameful trial’ have turned the 
accused leaders into martyrs? 
 We might then refl ect upon whether, rather than bringing the transitional society 
towards understanding and acceptance of the past, the trial might have contributed 
to creating a taboo: that Finland, after its war of self-defence against the Soviet Union 
in most unequal conditions, turned into an ally of Nazi Germany and attacked the 
Soviet territory beyond its previous borders, with major damage to human life, society 
and economy on both sides. Further, that although the Finnish army did not directly 
participate in the siege of Leningrad, by holding positions close to the city it contrib-
uted to its immense losses of life. 73 Th e taboo might have rendered some questions 
inappropriate or ‘political’, such as: was the conduct specifi ed in the charges merely—
as presented by the defence and in many commentaries—patriotic acts by rational, 
law-abiding leaders, solely driven by the salvation of an independent Finland? Had 
the Finnish leaders not, by engaging in the war, fi rmly counted on the future victory 
of Nazi Germany in WWII? If that was not the case, does their choice of alliance 
not appear self-destructive? What was the ideological drive behind this choice? Had 
the leaders not thereby accepted the consequences of Hitler’s victory worldwide, in 
Europe, and in Finland, including the racial policies and the persecution of political 
opponents? What kind of an independent Finland did they envisage? 
 We may also inquire about the judicial treatment of the war crimes outside 
the jurisdiction of the special tribunal, such as the treatment of the Soviet POWs 
or civilians in occupied territories and the summary executions, or handing over 
Jews, presumed communists and other individuals to the Germans. 74 Although a 
number of trials took place after the war, primarily concerning the treatment of 
the Soviet POWs, the legal responsibility at the decision-making level for the vari-
ous crimes was not addressed at that time, and has not been addressed since. 75 It 
seems as if the war responsibility trial exhausted any will and confi dence in legal 
treatment of the diffi  cult past. 
 Th ese questions are by no means secret. However, public discussion and research 
on them seems to remain prone to stigmatization and dramatization. Claims of 
‘dirtying the nest’, ‘insulting the veterans’ or ‘bowing in the direction of Moscow’ 
are not infrequent. We have no intention to engage further in counterfactual 
history-writing here, but it is diffi  cult to resist the following query: Would the 
understanding of history, as well as of the political or legal responsibilities for 
 73  Th e eventuality of this, as well as a potential responsibility of Finns for it was known to Finnish 
leadership, see, for example, Tarkka, Hirmuinen, above n 16, 36–7. 
 74  A recent research project in the National Archives has provided several publications, summaries 
of which are compiled in English, see Westerlund (ed) above n 12. See also Lindstedt and Löytömäki, 
above n 1, 68–79. 
 75  Hundreds of trials targeted low-ranking offi  cials on the treatment of the Soviet POWs and the 
interned persons. See Raija Hanski, ‘Th e Second World War’, in Hannikainen, Hanski, Rosas (eds), 
above n 57, 41, 72–3;  Antti  Kujala ,  Vankisurmat. Neuvostosotavankien laittomat ampumiset jatkoso-
dassa ( Helsinki :   WSOY,  2008 ),  11 ; Hyvämäki, above n 26. On the political side, an exception to 
impunity was the trial of Arno Anthoni, Director of the Finnish State Police, on the handing over of 
Jewish refugees to German authorities. See, eg, Rautkallio,  Ne kahdeksan , above n 20; Anthoni was 
condemned to a warning, and he was compensated for the time of pre-trial detention. 
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eventual mistakes or crimes committed, not have come to light in a democratic 
society more easily had the trauma of the trial not frozen opinions and rendered 
open questioning unpatriotic? In that sense, the rejection of the trial may have 
been a way to deny or obscure the damages of the war that encompassed the soci-
ety, political culture and economy, as well as Finland’s identity as a democratic and 
peace-loving state. By victimizing and traumatizing the trial may thus have, for its 
part, slowed down the mourning, healing, and closure after the wars. 
 We may today feel inclined to include this failed experience among many other 
controversial post-WWII examples that belong to the stone age of international 
criminal justice—as part of the unfortunate but necessary local problems that are 
a turning point in global history. Th is is why we will proceed to briefl y examining 
how far criminal justice in comparable situations today has evolved in a direction 
that guarantees more favourable preconditions. 
 (4)  Limits of ad hoc criminal justice 
 Th e ICC was created to remedy the existential defi ciency of international criminal 
justice, either totally absent or relying on ad hoc foundations, such as peace treaties 
or UN Security Council resolutions. Th e adoption of the ICC Statute 76 in 1998 
carried the promise of a major change: a permanent, independent and impartial 
judicial organ was empowered to decide on individual criminal responsibility, even 
at the level of heads of state. 
 As our Finnish story and so many other stories demonstrate, the basic ideol-
ogy of international criminal justice has by defi nition a tense relationship to the 
dominant political entities controlling the use of force in their territory and to 
their citizens or interests, ie, states. Th e prerogative of states includes criminal law, 
understood to embody the most coercive norms in a society. In that sense, interna-
tional criminal justice is not meant for peaceful, healthy democracies where indi-
viduals enjoy rights eff ectively protected by the national legal system. Its landscape 
is rather that of confl ict, crisis, war, regime changes, or totalitarian governments 
with legal systems harnessed to further their objectives. 
 International criminal justice thus typically actualizes in a broader context of 
condemning the past and reorienting for the future, whereas national criminal jus-
tice operates in existing domestic constellations: the law in force, the judiciary in 
function, the executive in power. By its name and defi nition, and following from 
this basic setting, international criminal justice contains non-national infl uences, 
actors, and involvement. Seen from the perspective of a state, international criminal 
justice can stand for various degrees of foreign intrusion in national legal systems and 
power structures. Th e transforming potential of international criminal justice in this 
optic is part of the more general leverage potential of international law, human 
rights law or the ideology of internationalism in general. International criminal 
justice belongs to the package of international instruments and eff ects to incite, 
 76  Th e Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 37 ILM 1002 (1998). 
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bring about or even violently force societies towards political change, revolution 
and reorientation. Th is partly explains why international criminal justice is con-
stantly faced with confl icts and criticism, be it on its legitimacy, independence or 
methods of proceeding. 
 In today’s international criminal jurisdictions, and at the ICC in particular, 
this ‘revolutionary element’, a sort of inbuilt incitement to reconsider the exist-
ing power structures of a state, is clearly present. Instead of mission statements, it 
appears in jurisdictional mechanisms or legal principles. Th is was evident in the 
establishment of the ICC, in the sense that the states negotiating the Rome Statute 
did not seem to consider its creation as anything that should ever concern them 
directly. On the contrary, utmost care was taken by all states in the position to play 
a role to make sure it never would. 77 Th e Statute thus underlines that ‘it is the duty 
of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for interna-
tional crimes’. 78 Th e ICC’s proper jurisdiction is meant as a mere safeguard system 
that—in the optic of the negotiating states—was meant for others: for aggressive 
or disruptive states, for failed states, or for weak states that lack a functioning legal 
system. 
 Th e delicate relationship of national and international criminal jurisdictions in 
the context of the ICC is referred to as the complementarity of international crimi-
nal jurisdiction. Th e complementarity is anchored in Articles 17 and 20 of the ICC 
Statute, and can be condensed as follows: the ICC may proceed with a case only 
if the state or states with jurisdiction are unwilling or unable to genuinely carry 
out the investigation or prosecution. 79 In order to determine whether this is the 
case, independence and impartiality of national proceedings are evaluated, as well 
as whether the national proceedings or decisions were made with the purpose of 
shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility. In the Finnish story, 
we can see elements of a comparable evaluation exercised by the Allied Control 
Commission and the Finnish executive, albeit awkwardly and illegally. 
 Compared to the time of the post-WWII trials such as the Finnish one, the 
role of the principle of legality ( nullum crimen sine lege ,  nulla poena sine lege ), 
 77  On the ICC negotiations, see  Philippe  Kirsch and  John T.  Holmes ,  ‘Th e Rome Conference 
on an International Criminal Court:  Th e Negotiating Process’ , ( 1999 )  93  American Journal of 
International Law ,  2 ;  Roy S.  Lee ,  ‘Th e Rome Conference and its Contribution to International Law’ 
in  Roy S.  Lee (ed),  Th e International Criminal Court: Th e Making of the Rome Statute ( Alphen aan 
den Rijn :   Kluwer Law International,  1999 ),  1 ;  John  Washburn ,  ‘Th e Negotiations of the Rome 
Statute for the International Criminal Court and International Lawmaking in the 21st Century’ , 
( 1999 )  11  Pace International Law Review ,  361 . See also  Antoine  Buchet and  Immi  Tallgren ,  ‘Sur 
la route de Rome—Les negotiations préalables à l´adoption du Statut de la Cour pénale interna-
tional’ in  Emmanuel  Decaux and  Serge  Sur (eds),  Commentaire du Statut de Rome de la Cour Pénale 
Internationale ( Paris :  Pedone,   2012 ) , 171. 
 78  Rome Statute, above n 76, 17 July 1998, preamble. 
 79  See John T. Holmes, ‘Th e Principle of Complementarity’ in Roy S. Lee (ed), above n 77;  William 
W.  Burke-White ,  ‘Proactive Complementarity: Th e International Criminal Court and National Courts 
in the Rome System on International Justice’ , ( 2008 )  49  Harvard International Law Journal ,  53 . See 
also  Immi  Tallgren ,  ‘Completing the “International Criminal Order”—Th e Rhetoric of Repression 
and the Notion of Complementarity in the Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court’ , 
( 1998 )  67  Nordic Journal of International Law ,  107 . For the resolution of the Kampala Diplomatic 
Conference on complementarity, see Resolution RC/Res. 1 (8 June 2010). 
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too, has evolved dramatically, in two directions. It has been further clarifi ed and 
strengthened in the sense that it has been encoded in human rights conventions 
and innumerable national constitutions. 80 Th e existence of individual criminal 
responsibility solely based on customary or treaty-based international law for the 
most serious international crimes has been fi rmly established. We can thus see 
more clearly today than in the 1940s the coexistence of a legality principle of gen-
eral international law, ‘broader and considerably more tolerant of imprecision’ 81 
and of the particular forms of the same principle either in national legal systems or 
in specifi c treaty-based contexts, such as the ICC. 
 Th e ICC Statute contains articles on the  nullum crimen sine lege (Article 22), 
 nulla poena sine lege (Article 23) and on non-retroactivity  ratione personae (Article 
24). Th e ICC is clearly meant as a permanent jurisdiction, not as a special tribunal 
created for a limited period of time, a particular chain of events, or even a particu-
lar group of individuals, as was, for example, the Finnish tribunal. However, from 
the perspective of the states or individuals concerned, this may in some cases be 
less clear. Th e most evident case encompasses non-State Parties and their nationals. 
Out of the 193 UN member states at the time of writing, 119 states are members 
of the ICC. Th e non-members include China, India, the United States, Russia, 
Indonesia, Pakistan, Th ailand, Vietnam, and Sudan, to name a few. In terms of 
population, a majority of the world’s population today are citizens of states not 
parties to the ICC. 
 In accordance with the ICC Statute, the ICC Prosecutor can initiate an inves-
tigation on the basis of a referral from any State Party or from the UN Security 
Council. In addition, the Prosecutor can initiate investigations  proprio motu on the 
basis of information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC received from 
individuals or organizations. For alleged crimes taking place in non-State Parties 
or by their nationals, the most likely way to end up in the ICC is by a referral of the 
Security Council. 82 Th e referral takes place either after or in the midst of the situa-
tion in which crimes have been allegedly committed (examples of Darfur and Libya). 
Considering that the permanent members of the Security Council have a right to veto 
 80  See Article 15 of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) UNTC, vol. 999, 171; 
Article 7 of the European Convention of Human Rights (1950). 
 81  Bruce Broomhall, ‘Article 22’,  Otto  Triff terer (ed),  Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court ( Berlin : 2nd edn,  Nomos,  2008 )  713 ,  716 . M Cherif Bassiouni wrote, 
before the ICC era:  ‘the “principles of legality” in international criminal law . . . are necessarily  sui 
generis because they must balance between the preservation of justice and fairness for the accused and 
the preservation of world order, taking into account the nature of international law, the absence of 
international legislative policies and standards, the  ad hoc processes of technical drafting and the basic 
assumption that international criminal law norms will be embodied into the national criminal law 
of various states.’:  Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff  
Publishers, 1992), 112. 
 82  In accordance with Article 13(b). In addition, a non-State Party can ‘accept the exercise of juris-
diction by the Court with respect to the crime in question’ (Article 12, para. 3). Finally, the Court may 
exercise its jurisdiction for crimes committed in the territory of States Parties, including on nationals 
of a non-State Party. Th is was behind the special agreements the USA has concluded with several ICC 
Member States. See ICC Statute Article 12 and its commentary by  Sharon A.  Williams and  William 
A.  Schabas ,  ‘Article 12’ ,  Otto  Triff terer , above n 81,  547 ,  556–7 . 
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these decisions, some states are able at their will to permanently keep their citizens 
and leaders, as well as those of their allies, outside the ICC jurisdiction (the current 
example being Syria). 
 Th e rainbow of expectations in international criminal justice thus ranges from (i) a 
national jurisdiction to (ii) ICC jurisdiction on alleged crimes in a State Party or by its 
nationals, further to (iii) ICC jurisdiction established retroactively in a non-State Party, 
to (iv) the establishment of an ad hoc tribunal, and fi nally, at the other end, to (v) total 
impunity for ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a 
whole’. 83 Even if we may wish to see as ‘one of the most valuable eff ects of international 
criminal law . . . its contribution to the creation of a sense of a cosmopolitan identity, 
an identity which values all human beings equally, independent of their national or 
other ties’, 84 the status of international criminal justice today rather confi rms striking 
inequalities—of both victims and suspects—that defi ne international legal space. 
 An additional challenge to the predictability of the ICC jurisdiction is presented by 
the crime of aggression. Following the Diplomatic Conference of Kampala in 2010, 
the ICC may one day be tasked to exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. 
Th e revisions adopted in Kampala introduce complex rules on the entry into force 
and application of the jurisdiction for the crime of aggression and thereby accentuate 
the tailor-made character of ICC’s jurisdiction. 85 Th e individual criminal responsibil-
ity for the crime of aggression in international law, fi rst expressions of which formed 
the basis of the Finnish trial and so many others after WWII, now becomes subject to 
consent-based treaty law mechanisms, including opt-out, in the revised ICC Statute. 86 
Furthermore, for aggression, the exercise of national jurisdiction in compliance with 
the complementarity principle presents supplementary challenges. 87 
 Th e challenges of predictability and clarity of individual criminal responsibility, 
derived from the legality principle, as well as the expectation of equal treatment, 
consistency and coherence might suggest that the ICC era in some respects remains 
close to the previous era of ad hoc jurisdictions, established in the aftermath of the 
acts allegedly committed, as in Finland. Even in the ICC era, the determination 
of the existence and the exercise of jurisdiction—national, international or 
nothing—often takes place retroactively, and the applicable law follows from this 
choice. Th e ICC, as its predecessors, is not necessarily able to address the chronol-
ogy of causalities of a larger confl ict, nor does it always manage to address all sides. 
 83  Rome Statute, see above n 78, preamble. 
 84  David S.  Koller ,  ‘Th e Faith of the International Criminal Lawyer’ ( 2008 )  40  International Law 
and Politics ,  1019 ,  1023 . 
 85  On the entry into force of the revisions, see, eg,  Claus  Kress and  Leonie  von Holzendorff  , 
 ‘Th e Kampala Compromise on the Crime of Aggression’ ( 2010 )  8  Journal of International Criminal 
Justice ,  1179 . 
 86  Even States Parties can declare their opt-out from the jurisdiction for aggression ‘prior to the rati-
fi cation or acceptance’, Review Conference, RC/Res. 6, preamble operative para 1; Article 15bis (4). 
 87  As demonstrated, for example, by the fi fth Understanding adopted at Kampala: ‘It is understood 
that the amendments shall not be interpreted as creating the right or obligation to exercise domestic 
jurisdiction with respect to an act of aggression committed by another State,’ RC/Res. 6, Annex III 
Understandings regarding the amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
on the Crime of Aggression. 
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 From Articles 17 and 20 of the ICC Statute (discussed above), we can derive 
independence, impartiality and integrity as criteria that defi ne whether national 
justice is deemed ‘suffi  cient’. 88 If the ICC, other international tribunals and 
national courts are understood to act together with the goal of ending impunity, it 
is all of them together that face quality requirements that we could understand as 
preconditions for the presumed positive outcomes of criminal justice. How much 
independence, impartiality and integrity, then, can today be expected of national 
jurisdictions, acting in the aftermath of war (as in the Finnish trial), or other major 
crisis, such as a wave of large-scale terrorism? 89 How far can national trials based on 
an international obligation be detached from their cultural roots, public expecta-
tions and power-relations? Had the Finnish war responsibility trial been conducted 
by the Allied Powers directly, by a hybrid tribunal or an international one, what 
would be diff erent? 
 Having come this far in our story, we start to acknowledge that the eff orts 
undertaken earlier to examine the Finnish trial in the light of the diff erent con-
ceptions of positive eff ects to be gained by criminal justice seemed disturbingly 
artifi cial. Of course we knew the consequential theories could not really match, 
of course we knew those WWII trials were held for so many other reasons and 
served other purposes that we cannot address within the criminal law discourse 
only. Th e trials for wars of aggression, in particular, helped to mark the changes 
of power and of the identities of suitable allies, by explicitly condemning the 
acts of the previous leaders and making them bear the responsibility for the lost 
wars and the decline of the states. Individual criminal responsibility contributed 
to a speedy change of decor in the public scene: transforming powerful leaders 
into criminal convicts symbolized both the victory of the Allied and a new start 
in a new direction for many states, including Finland. By performing a series of 
familiar acts (criminal procedure), in a familiar forum of public power (criminal 
court), the trials amalgamated the lived and imagined worlds, and emphasized 
the power of the new normative system behind the trials. Seen from this perspec-
tive, the trial in Finland was a tiny link in a chain of public rituals of reorienta-
tion after WWII. We can question the technicalities of the trial, argue on many 
issues, but we cannot deny that there was this one function it completed with 
effi  cacy. 
 88  Th ere is a wealth of commentaries on the application of complementarity. For the argument that it 
suffi  ces exclusively to compare the (actual or likely) sentences, see  Kevin  Jon Heller ,  ‘A Sentence-based 
Th eory of Complementarity’ ,  ( 2012 )  53  Harvard International Law Journal ,  202–49 . 
 89  See Frédéric Mégret’s analysis on the presumed ‘vertical’ essence of international criminal jus-
tice, as compared to the ‘horizontal’ of domestic criminal justice, ‘In Search of the “Vertical”: An 
Exploration of What Makes International Criminal Tribunals Diff erent (And Why)’ (October 9, 
2008). Available at SSRN: < http://ssrn.com/abstract=1281546 > (accessed 21 May 2013) or < http://
dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.128154 >. On the presumed benevolence of the vertical, see Mégret, 41–2. 
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 (III)  Concluding Remarks: Never-ending Stories? 
 So much time has passed since the end of the war that we must, if only for the sake of our 
own mental state, take into an honest examination also this issue which at its time dramati-
cally aff ected the Finnish public opinion. We have to get so close to this sensitive issue that 
it stops bothering our movements as a chip of stone in the sock. 90 
 Is there a lesson to the Finnish trial story? We might see it as an example of how 
diffi  cult the national exercise of jurisdiction based on an international obligation 
can be. It reminds us of how limited and contingent the instrument of criminal 
justice, intended for determining individual criminal responsibility in particular 
cases, may prove in elucidating historical contexts or addressing collective loss. We 
may also observe how far-reaching and powerful eff ects criminal trials may have, 
at many levels and in many directions. We are reminded of how they may awaken 
strong emotional and societal reactions, even in a context that could, in compari-
son, seem relatively successful or at least harmless in the eyes of the outside world. 
 International criminal justice is far more entrenched today than in 1945–6, in 
many important respects. No matter the lists of ratifi cations, the concept of inter-
national crimes and individual responsibility for them can no longer be ignored. 
Nevertheless, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and other ad hoc or hybrid tribunals 
have faced and continue to struggle with comparable dilemmas in a variety of 
contexts. Even the permanent ICC, due to the inherent fragility of its jurisdiction, 
acts at times in conditions resembling those of an ad hoc tribunal: competent on a 
retroactively determined slice of time and space, with strong expectations of pros-
ecutorial discretion. Regardless of the way its jurisdiction is launched, the ICC is 
in its daily work obliged to manoeuvre between parties and take sides in a critical 
manner, as the examples of ongoing cases suggest. 91 
 Th e perceived legitimacy and credibility of international criminal justice are 
thus constantly questioned. A highly publicized criminal trial is a powerful instru-
ment for stating or affi  rming beliefs and directions, of establishing identities of 
good and bad, inclusion and exclusion. To call it a ritual is not to degrade it. It is 
rather to emphasize its full potential. Rituals are diffi  cult to master, however. Th ey 
may seem to work in one direction on the surface level, but also create adverse 
eff ects. A defi cient trial may by its trauma engender taboos and martyrs. It may 
endanger open analysis of acts and responsibilities, thereby cementing a period in 
 90  President Urho Kekkonen, minister of justice at the time of the war responsibility trial, in a 
speech at the Finlandia Hall in 1977, quoted in Lehtinen and Rautakallio, above n 27, 5. 
 91  See  Sarah  Nouwen and  Wouter  Werner ,  ‘Doing Justice to the Political:  Th e International 
Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan’ ( 2010 )  European Journal of International Law ,  941 ; see also 
 Sarah  Nouwen ,  Complementarity in the Line of Fire: Th e Catalysing Eff ect of the International Criminal 
Court in Uganda and Sudan ( Cambridge :  Cambridge University Press,  2013 , forthcoming) ;  Chacha 
 Murungu and  Japhet  Biegon (eds),  Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa ( Pretoria :   Pretoria 
University Law Press,  2011 ) . 
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history under its protective cover. In a bedtime story turning into a nightmare, a 
trial becomes a damaged nuclear reactor that maintains its toxicity for intermina-
ble periods, slowly leaking emissions into its environment. But are those periods 
interminable, after all? Perhaps the current and future generations of Finland will 
soon be far enough from the wars. Perhaps the virtues of peace and democratic 
government were advanced by the trial, in one way or another. Perhaps in Sudan 
or Libya this will happen even sooner. We  know that bedtime stories with happy 
endings exist. 
21_9780199671144c21.indd   454 10/3/2013   5:35:59 PM
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in 
any way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
Ahrens judgment 201
Allied Commission 293
Allied Control Commission 436, 437, 438, 
439–40, 441, 442, 449
Almelo trial 113–4, 116
Argentina
case law, ‘double classifi cation’ of 382
Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales 372
Dirty War 1976–1983 see Dirty War, 
Argentina, 1976–1983
disappeared 8, 368–9
Madres de Plaza de Mayo and 370, 373, 379
Malvinas War and 368, 370
military amnesties and 371–3
military junta 1976–1983 see Dirty War, 
Argentina, 1976–1983
politics of memory and 370
public apologies and 372
return to criminal prosecution 371
truth trials and 372
Armenian genocide 3, 4, 15 see also Ottoman 
Courts-Martial
acknowledgment of by Ottoman 
Courts-Martial 94–6
Allied Commission and 293
arrest and detention of suspects 293–4
as ‘forgotten genocide’ 80–2
casualties 291
crimes against humanity and 293, 297
denial of 78, 96
deportations and 78–9, 81, 99, 292




Ottoman Parliament and 85
recognition of at Paris Peace Conference 84
stages of 81
Treaty of Sèvres and 294–5
Attatürk, Mustafa Cemel 81
Auschwitz 104, 183, 184, 185, 189, 444
Australian military trials of the Japanese, 
1945–1951
acquittal rate 343
as fair trial 345–7
admissible evidence at 333–5
civilians and natives and 360
Command Responsibility cases 334, 340, 
341
emphasis on Asian war crimes victims by 350
Rabaul trials and 359–62
holding group trials 335–6
inconsistency in sentencing and 339–41
language diffi  culties of 328, 336–8
legislation governing 333, 353
classes of victims and 353–5, 357
resident in Australia and 354–9, 360
miscarriage of justice and 330
Morotai trials and 327, 329, 335, 336, 
339, 340, 345–6, 349, 350, 352–3, 
356, 360
participant accounts of 344
qualifi cations for presiding at 327
Rabaul trials 350, 355, 357, 359–66
request by Japanese for documentation 
of 349
research on 329–30, 349–50
review process as safety net and 341–3
right to try war criminals and 334
sex crimes and 330–2
summary justice and 330, 332, 333
universal jurisdiction and 351–2
victims as witnesses at 334
attitudes towards, 
Rabaul trials 362–6
‘victor’s justice’ and 343–7
Yoshio trial and 331–2
Bagaragaza, Michael 269
Baltic States see also Estonia; 
Latvia; Lithuania
codifi cation of criminal law in 256
history of, post Russian Revolution to World 
War II 248–49
Nazi crimes in 251–4
occupation of 250
prosecution of crimes against humanity and 
genocide cases in 257–9
complaints of defendants to the 
European Court of Human Rights 
and 261–4
purge of legislation of distinctly Soviet 
off ences 255
rewriting history and 266
Soviet crimes in 254–61
preparatory steps to trial of 254–7
war crimes prosecutions in 260–1
Bordeaux Trial 138 see also Oradour-sur-Glane 
massacre
Alsatian public opinion and 145, 148, 149, 
155, 156
anti-insurgency and 143–4
as single trial 146–7
collectivization and moral hierarchy 
and 144–6
court and its procedure 140–3
Index
22_9780199671144Index.indd   455 10/3/2013   4:24:57 PM
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in 
any way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
Index456
Bordeaux Trial (cont.)
crimes against humanity and 143–4
departure from French criminal law principles 
by 149
dossier d’instruction and 141–2
inquisitorial nature of 141
joinder and disjoinder and 146–7
Law of Collective Responsibility 1948 
and 142, 148, 152, 155–6
legacy of 156–8
legislation covering 147–8
orders, forced enlistment and duress 
and 150–5
organizational guilt and 148
politics and amnesty and 155–6
presumption of criminality and 150
pre-trial detention problems and 141
ratio of Alsatians and Germans on trial 
at 146
representation of victims at 142
role of judge in 141–2, 150
sentencing 154–5
youth and immaturity defence and 152
Bureau Ehrhardt 196–7, 199
cartels, Germany 167, 170, 175–6, 190
Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales, 
Argentina 372
Charles (the Bold), Duke of Burgundy 13–14, 
21–2, 29, 30, 31, 34, 37, 38–41, 43, 
47, 48 see also Hagenbach, Peter von
Austria, Switzerland and Alsace and 23–5
confl ict with Louis XI 22–3
Chelmno gassings 415
Citivella case
as action against foreign state within a 
criminal proceeding 221
developments following 225–7
International Court of Justice fi ndings 
on 227–8
Italian Supreme Court’s notion of state 
immunity and 222–5, 227
Civitella massacre 215, 217–20 see also Italian 
Supreme Court
motivation for 217
survivor memories of 217–9
Chieng-Kiem
handover of by British to Siam 52
Commission on Responsibility of the Authors 
of the War and on Enforcement of 
Penalties see Allied Commission
Commission to Counter Attempts to Falsify 
History to the Detriment of Russia’s 
Interests 7
Concentration Camp Mathausen see also 
Spanish Kapos trials
arrivals of Spanish at 118
as criminal enterprise 107, 120
mass atrocities and 107
Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 281
Repak and 280, 281
Constitutional Court of Hungary
crimes against humanity and 232
principle of constitutionality and 245
prosecution of crimes from 1956 revolution 
and 233–4, 239–44
prosecution of international crimes 
and 232
statute of limitations and 231–2
Continuation War (Finland-Soviet Union) 8, 
432, 434, 435, 436, 439
core international crimes 267 see also crimes 
against humanity
autonomy of judicial procedures in domestic 
prosecution of 283
citizenship status of accused and 279
country of atrocities and 279
extradition of citizens and 285
jury trial and 282–3
universal jurisdiction and 268, 279
crime of aggression 428
as leadership crime 397
defi nition of 5, 387, 391–5
who can commit 395–8
crimes against humanity 14, 16, 18, 139, 278 
see also core international crimes
as an extension of war crimes 237
Armenian genocide and 293, 297
Bordeaux Trial and 143–4
Estonian legislation and 255–6
Ethiopia 303–4
Hagenbach Trial and 44–6
Hungarian revolution, 1956 and 237–9, 
242–244, 246
Hungarian Constitutional Court and 232
Latvian legislation and 255
Ottoman Courts-Martial and 83
prosecution of in Baltic States 257–9
Repak and 275, 277
systematic commission and 238–9
crimes against peace 437, 439, 444
customary international law 258
in domestic European criminal 
proceedings 243
universal jurisdiction over aggression 
and 405–8
customary law
as automatic part of Hungarian legal 
system 232
crime of aggression and 402–3
customary norms
international law and 223–5, 227–8, 278
Dachau parent case 113
De Gaulle, Charles 123, 128, 130, 131, 134
Bordeaux Trial and 156, 157
view on Pétain trial 129
22_9780199671144Index.indd   456 10/3/2013   4:24:59 PM
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in 
any way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
Index 457
Derg 290, 303 see also Ethiopian Red Terror 
domestic trials
abolition of imperial regime by 308
Ethiopian famine and 301
evidence against 312–13
formation of 300
membership, criminal charges and 306–7, 
313, 317–18, 319, 321, 322, 323
victims of 300–1
Devawongse, Prince 55–6, 57, 74
Dirty War, Argentina, 1976–1983 8, 370
disappeared (desaprecidos) 8, 368–9, 371
documentation and 369
ethics of memory and 371
memorial jurisdiction of crime and atrocity 
and 368, 375–80
memory politics in response to 369
number of criminal proceedings related 
to 373
stolen identity crimes 372
Videla and 374–5
Dubois, Josiah 165, 174, 181, 183, 186–7, 189
due process
Baltic States trials and 261
Eisentrager and 196
Franco-Siamese Mixed Court and 72–4
Hagenbach Trial and 48
Spanish Kapos trials and 110, 120, 121
‘economic’ case, Nuremberg 163–4, 168–73
Eisentrager, Lothar 197, 200
Eisentrager case 4, 193–211
Ahrens judgment and 201
arguments for dismissal of case 198
Bureau Ehrhardt and 196–7, 199
due process and 196
factual background 196–8
habeas proceedings in lower courts 
and 200–2
implications of 209–10
jurisdictional objection in 198, 202
jurisprudential background of 195
military commission’s rulings and 198–200
Scuttled U-Boat Case and 199
Supreme Court decision in 206–9
underlying military proceedings and 194–5
unique nature of proceedings 196
épuration 123, 125–7, 141 see also French 
collaboration trials
Estonia see also Baltic States
crimes against humanity and genocide 
prosecutions in 257–8
legislation dealing with crimes against 
humanity and 255–6
Ethiopia
opposition parties in 313, 315
Special Prosecutor’s Offi  ce 302, 303, 308, 
313, 316, 321
appeal of sentencing decisions by 321–2
limitations of mandate 310
Red Terror campaign and 300, 307–10
casualties 301, 308–9
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party 313, 
315





choice of domestic or international law 
by 302–3
Derg membership, criminal charges 
and 306–7, 313, 317–18, 319, 321, 
322, 323
documentation and 310, 311–12, 323
dispersal of trials 303, 310–11
fi ling of charges by 302–3
individual criminal responsibility and 323
international input to 311, 323
language of 311, 323
notion of planning and 320
objections to charges 316–18
Extraordinary Court Martial, Turkey
establishment of 296–7
indictment 297
judgment and sentence of 298
key trials of 297–300
Ittihadist and wartime cabinet 
ministers 299
Trabzon trials 298
Yozgat trials 91, 298
reasons for lack of research on 299–300
Farben case see IG Farben case
Ferrini, Luigi 221
Ferrini case 222–3, 225
Finland
Allied Control Commission and 436, 437, 
438, 439–40, 441
Continuation War and 8, 432, 434, 435, 
436, 439
Lapland war and 433
separate war and 434–5
treatment of Soviet POWs by 433, 434, 447
Tripartite Pact and 434
Winter War and 432–3, 434, 436, 440
World War II and 431–3
public apology and 444
Finnish War-Responsibility Trial 1945–1946 430
Allied Control Commission and 439, 442, 
449
annulment requests and 431, 443, 446
charges 438–9
controversy surrounding 441–3
crimes against peace and 437, 439, 444
criticisms of 442
historical understanding of the past 
and 446–7
22_9780199671144Index.indd   457 10/3/2013   4:24:59 PM
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in 
any way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
Index458
Finnish War-Responsibility Trial (cont.)




Flick, Friedrich 180, 183
Flick case 179, 180–1, 184
France
applicability of war crimes to 
nationals 146–7
claims to the Mekong 51–2
Cour de Cassation 115, 141, 147, 149, 150, 
243
épuration post World War II 123, 125–7, 
141
Haute Cour de Justice 127
ultimatum to Siam, 1893 53–4, 55
Franco-Siamese Convention 1893 51, 56
Franco-Siamese Mixed Court 51, 55, 56 see 
also Phra Yot Trial
as international entity 70–71
assessment of 69–75
bill of indictment of 65–6
birth of international due process and 72–4
character of 70–2
cultivation of new substantive norms 
and 74–5
jurisdiction and rules of 64–6, 71, 73–4
law of war and 70–1
sentence of 68–9, 73
verdict of 67–9
witness testimony before 67, 73–4
French collaboration trials see also épuration
acts committed under Vichy regime 
and 125
ambiguities of process of 131–2
application of Criminal Code by 124–5
collaborator types 124
Comité Général des Etudes 123
Comité National Judiciare 123
general context of 123–4
national indignity off ence and 123, 125–7
legal basis for 124
legislation covering 123–4, 125
lessons from 132–6
partiality of 131–2
persecution of Jews and 135
principles of legality and 133
procedural fairness and 132, 134
prosecution narrative goals 129–31
status of Allied troops and 125
symbolic dimension of 128–9
genocidal intent
Baltic States and 269
genocide see also core international crimes
Armenia see Armenian genocide
Ethiopia 302–3, 306, 313
Greiser case and 412
legislation, Baltic States 255–6
prosecutions, Baltic States 257–9
Germany
‘aryanization’ of 171, 180
cartels 167, 170, 175–6, 190
reaction to Citivella decision 225–7
slave labour and 171, 173, 183–6
Göring, Herman 170, 171, 172–3, 445
Greiser, Arthur 5, 411
as fi rst person convicted of waging aggressive 
war 412
as Gaultier of Warthegau 414–15
resettlement of Poles and Jews and 415
attitude to Jews 413
authorization letter and 414
biography 413–17
Final Solution and 415
genocide and 412
Nazism and 413–14, 416
Greiser trial 417–24 see also Supreme National 
Tribunal of Poland










Grosgurin, Inspector 52–3, 59, 61, 62, 67
La Guerra Sucia see Dirty War, Argentina, 
1976–1983
habeas corpus see Eisentrager case
Hadamar trial 113
theory of the direct interest and 116
Hagenbach, Peter von 6, 12, 16 see also Charles 
(the Bold), Duke of Burgundy
arrest, inquisition and torture of 31–2, 48
biography 25–6





points of consensus in historical record 
and 21–6
revisionist portrait of 28–30
Hagenbach Trial 32–6, 75–6
aftermath of 37–8
analogy to Nuremberg 15–17
as fi rst international war crimes trial 13–16, 
18, 41–4
confession under torture and 35
crimes against humanity and 44–6
defence argument 34–5
fairness of 48
historical record and 44–6
historiography and 19–21
22_9780199671144Index.indd   458 10/3/2013   4:24:59 PM
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in 




international criminal law perception 
of 14–18, 47, 49
legacy of 48–9
motion to withdraw charges 35
opening statement 34
superior orders defence and 16–18, 35, 44
Herman Göring Division 215, 217, 220
High Command case 16
Hitler, Adolf 139, 140, 147, 152, 164, 
165, 167, 170, 172, 173, 187–8, 
416
Hitler Youth 140, 151, 152
Holocaust 135, 163, 168, 299, 415
Holy Roman Empire 14, 16, 21, 23, 41, 42, 
49, 140
Hungarian historical justice trials 229, 237
Hungary
Constitutional Court see Constitutional 
Court of Hungary
crimes against humanity and 237–9, 241–4, 
246
initiation of criminal investigations 231
post World War II political history 229–31
reliance on international law for criminal 
prosecution 232
war crimes trials related to 1956 revolution, 
jurisprudence of 234–7
IG Farben 165–6, 170, 188, 191
IG Farben case 165–6, 179, 181–2, 185, 186, 
189, 190, 429
indignité nationale 123, 125–7
defi nition 125–6
legal justifi cation of 126
Industrialist cases, Nuremberg 164, 165, 
178–91
International Criminal Court 133, 236, 267, 
382, 387, 431, 448, 450, 453
international criminal justice
Finnish War-Responsibility Trial, 1945–1946 
and 448–9
expectations of 451
inquisitorial style and 141
local jurisdiction and 6, 8
international criminal law
as ‘commodifi ed morality’ 191
as element of capitalist imperialism 164
as law 382
classifi cation of crime and 383
criminological approach to 445–6
Hungarian historical justice trials and 229, 
237
perception of Hagenabach Trial and 14–18, 
47, 49
role in world politics 163
state immunity, Citivella case and 222
universal jurisdiction and see universal 
jurisdiction
international criminal lawyers
methodological and conceptual diffi  culties 
and 122–3
International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda 133, 236, 269, 311, 317, 
320, 323, 383, 425, 453
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia 18, 133, 236–7, 272, 307, 
317, 320, 323, 382, 383, 425, 453
jurisdiction 280
international military tribunals
establishment of, post World War I 15
infl uence of Pal on 328–9
jurisdiction over war criminals and 351–9
International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg 300, 307, 390
analogy to Hagenbach Trial and 15–17
Charter 184, 237, 257, 258, 265, 351, 
395–6, 397, 411, 436, 439, 444
convictions, challenges in US Supreme 
Court 200–1
‘economic case’ 163–4, 168–73
criticism of 171
economic causes of World War II 
and 165–73
Flick case 179, 180–1, 184
High Command case 16
IG Farben case 165–6, 179, 181–2, 185, 429
indictment-drafting committees of 170
industrialists case 164, 165 177–8
aftermath of 187–91
as théâter de l’absurde 178–80
excessively conciliatory language 
and 180–2
facts and charges not proved 182–4
necessity as defence contrary to Nuremberg 
principles and 184–5
sentences 186–7
slave labour and 171, 173, 183–6
Justice case 186
Krupp case 179, 185–6, 429
‘McCloy clemency’ and 165, 190
Ministries case 16, 43, 186
Pohl case 186
Polish national prosecutors and 411
International Military Tribunal of the Far 
East 300, 328–9, 348, 390
Charter 351, 392
criticisms of 348
omission of zaibatsu trials at 163, 165
Iraqi Special Tribunal
establishment of 290
Italian Military Court of La Spezia
judgment on Civitella massacre case 216, 
220–1
Italian Supreme Court 216
accountability for Civitella massacre 
before 220–1
notion of principle of state immunity 
and 222–5, 227
22_9780199671144Index.indd   459 10/3/2013   4:24:59 PM
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in 
any way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
Index460
Ittihad Party 80–1, 85, 89, 96–7, 295, 296, 
299 see also Extraordinary Court 
Martial, Turkey
Jackson, Robert 169, 170, 171–2, 177–8, 
194–5, 196, 200, 206–10, 265, 422




Kham Muon 1, 48
Aff air of 55, 58, 61, 64, 67
assassination of Grosgurin and 52
Kononov, Vasily 7, 260–1, 262
Kononov case 133, 261, 264, 266
Krupp, Alfried 170, 171–2, 185, 190
Krupp, Gustav 171–4
Krupp AG 180, 185
Krupp case 179, 185–6, 429
Latvia see also Baltic States
legislation dealing with crimes against 
humanity and 255




law of armed confl ict 227, 253, 257, 260–1, 
263–4
League of Constance 30, 32, 37, 41, 43
League of Nations
Ottoman Courts-Martial and 83–4
Le Myre de Vilers, Charles, 53, 54–5, 56, 57, 
60, 64, 73
Lithuania see also Baltic States
legislation dealing with responsibility of 
genocide in 255
crimes against humanity and genocide 
prosecutions in 258
London Agreement 140–1, 149, 411, 436, 
436, 437, 439, 444, 446
‘McCloy clemency’ 165, 190
macquis, 139, 143–4, 152–3





mediation on, El secreto de sus ojos and 376
narrative, paradox of 381
politics of 370–1
Mengistu, Haile Mariam 301–2, 304, 306, 312
Mengistu trial see also Ethiopian Red Terror 
domestic trials
affi  rmation of fi ndings in 322
charges 303
concept of co-perpetration and 318–9, 323
criminal responsibility issues in 316–23
importance of 306–7
Ministries case 16, 43, 186
Missions Pavie 41–2
Morgenthau, Henry 82, 95, 167, 174–5
Germany Is Our Problem 167, 174
Morgenthau Plan 167–8, 174
‘Morgenthau Boys’ 168, 175
Morotai trials 327, 329, 335, 336, 339, 340, 
345–6, 349, 350, 352–3, 356, 360
myth of war 7
Soviet and Russian 265–6
Nagy, Imrin 230
Nazi-Soviet Treaty of Non-Aggression 1939 
249
non-international armed confl ict
determination of 235–6
Hungarian revolution, 1956 and 240–1
Norway
Bagaragaza trial and 269, 277
legislation prohibiting core international 
crimes 269–71
prosecution of core international crimes 
by 269–70, 271
Supreme Court of see Supreme Court, 
Norway
Nuremberg Judgment 133, 141, 263
participation in a criminal organization 
off ence and 149




as joint criminal enterprise 148
historiography and contextual problems 
of 138–40
Limousin and Alsace and 139–40, 145–6
military orders committed under 143
motiviation fpr 143–4
trial see Bordeaux Trial
Ottoman Courts-Martial 78 see also Armenian 
genocide
academic analysis of 79–80
acceptance of by local population 91–2
acknowledgement of genocide by 94–6
aims of 87
Allies joint declaration and 83, 85
basis of legal proceedings 87
classes of perpetrators before 89




Fifth Committee of the Ottoman Chamber 
of Deputies and 86
indictments from 79, 87, 93
Key Indictment 89
22_9780199671144Index.indd   460 10/3/2013   4:24:59 PM
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in 
any way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
Index 461
League of Nations and 83–4
main series of trials within 88
Mazhar Inquiry Commission 86
operation of 88–92
political context of 96–7
records of 92–4, 100
relationship to peace treaty 84, 97
Responsible Secretaries trial 90
trials focusing on provinces 90–1
Yozgat Offi  cials trial 91, 281
Ottoman State Special Military Tribunal see 
Ottoman Courts-Martial
Pal, Radha Binod 328–9
Pavie, August 51–2, 57–8, 60, 61
Pétain, Philipe 7, 134, 140
trial of 127–132
Phra Yot 52, 55–7
charges against 59–60
death of Grosgurin and 62
protest letters to French by 61–2
Phra Yot Trial
before National Tribunal 57–63
courtroom culture and 59–61
creation of Special and Temporary 
Court 57–8
public opinion on Special Court verdict 
and 64
re-trial before Mixed Court see Franco-
Siamese Mixed Court
superior order defence and 63





legal dimension of 133–4
narrative function of 134–6
relationship to history 135
Potsdam Agreement 167, 177
principle of legality 449–50
Prisoner X 6
Rabaul trials 350, 355, 357, 359–62
attitudes to Asian witnesses at 362–6
charges 359–60
rape
as a war crime, Hagenbach Trail and 13, 
15, 18
Red Spaniards 117–18
Red Terror trials see Ethiopian Red Terror 
domestic trials




Supreme Court judgments and 274–6, 
277–8
Riga trials 251–2
Rolin-Jaequemyns, Gustav 54, 56–7, 74
Sakai, Takashi 5, 387–8, 389–90, 409
crime against peace and 390
Sakai trial 8, 409
archives of 388–9
jurisdiction 399
participation in war of aggression and 395
Schwarzenburger, Georg
analogy between Nuremberg and Hagenbach 
tribunals and 15–16
Scuttled U-Boats case 199
El secreto de sus ojos (Th e Secret in Th eir Eyes) 
(fi lm) 8, 368
as mediation on memory 376
constitutive delay and 380
contribution to international criminal 
justice 375
instability of memory and 379
narrative 375–7
Siam
French claims to the Mekong and 51–2
ultimatum from France, 1893 and 53–4, 
55, 56
Siamese Special Court 51
Spain
neutrality of in World War II 112
Spanish Kapos
internment of in concentration camps 104
trials against see Spanish Kapos trials
Spanish Kapos trials see also Concentration 
Camp Mauthausen; United States 
military courts in Dachau
accusations against 110–11
as challenge to US military courts’ 
jurisdiction 112
as subsequent cases 108, 109
charges against 108–9
defi nition of Kapos and 109–10
due process and 110, 120, 121
lack of interest by Spanish government 
in 110
language issues and 110, 120
nationals of neutral states and 116–17, 120
theory of the direct interest and 116
universal jurisdiction and 115–17, 121
Spanish Republican Army veterans
not of Spanish nationality 117–19
protection from foreign states and 119
World War II service of 104
Special Court for Sierra Leone 289, 311, 425
Special Prosecutor’s Offi  ce, Ethiopia 302, 303, 
308, 313, 316, 321–2
state immunity, doctrine of
Civitella case and 222–5, 227
statute of limitations
Constitutional Court of Hungary and 231–2
Supreme Court of Norway and 275
Sturdee, Vernon 330, 331, 342–3
22_9780199671144Index.indd   461 10/3/2013   4:25:00 PM
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in 
any way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
Index462
superior orders defence
Bordeaux Trial and 150–1, 154
Hagenbach Trial and 16–18, 35, 44
Phra Yot Trial and 63
rejection of 15
Supreme Court, Norway
Repak appeals and 274–6, 277
Supreme Court, United States of America
challenges to Nuremberg decisions in 200–1
collateral review of courts-martial and 204–5
collateral review of military commissions 
and 205
collateral review of state court convictions 
and 202–3
scope of collateral habeas and 202–5





Taylor, Telford, 16, 44, 173, 177, 180, 187, 
189, 412
theory of the direct interest 116
Tokyo International Tribunal see International 
Military Tribunal of the Far East







Truman, Harry 171, 175
Truman Doctrine 175
Turkey see also Armenian genocide
Administration Inquiry Commission 
and 296
attempts to counter national myth of 
Armenian genocide 79
entry into World War I, Armenian genocide 
and 80–1, 291, 297
Extraordinary Court Martial see 
Extraordinary Court Martial, Turkey
motion for trial of cabinet ministers 295–6
Paris Peace Conference and 292–3
Select Parliamentary Investigation Committee 
and 296
Treaty of Sèvres and 294–5
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
crimes in Baltic States 254–64
war crimes commissions of 251–4
United States of America
Constitution
extraterrestrial scope of, Eisentrager 
and 193–4, 201, 206
Suspension Clause 194, 202
habeas review of courts-martial and 196
non-citizens’ Fifth Amendment rights 
and 194
‘Restatement of Policy on Germany’ 175
role as leader of the free world, Nuremberg 
Tribunal and 164, 168
Supreme Court see Supreme Court, United 
States of America
turnaround in foreign and economic policy, 
post-World War II 164
view on causes of World War II 165
United States military courts in Dachau
authorization of 105–6
parent cases 106





Australian military trials of the Japanese, 
1945–1951 and 351–2
core international crimes and 268, 279
customary international law and 405–8
development of 103
international law and 268
law of 268–9, 281
Norwegian legislation governing 270–1
over aggression, international law and 405–8
reasons for lack of employment of by 
states 268–9
Spanish Kapos trial and 115–17
Spanish neutrality and 112
‘State which has jurisdiction’ and 403–5
stateless persons and 117–19, 121
war crimes trials and 114, 351
victor’s justice 5, 69, 164, 187–91, 430
Australian military trials of the Japanese, 
1945–1951 and 343–7
Videla, Jorge 368, 371–2
 2010 trial of 373–4
Videla case 369, 375, 379, 382
Vyshinsky, Andrey 7
Waff en SS 139, 143, 147
Alsatian membership of 151–2, 153, 158
war crimes see also core international crimes
crimes against humanity and 237, 240
Ethiopia 304
Finland 435, 437
France, applicability to French 
nationals 146–7
Hungary, 1956 Revolution and 232–7
neutrality and, Spanish Kapos trials 
and 115
prosecutions, Baltic States 260–1
rape, Hagenbach Trial and 13, 15, 18
Treaty of Lausanne and 84
22_9780199671144Index.indd   462 10/3/2013   4:25:00 PM
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in 
any way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
Index 463
World War II
economic causes of, 167
Nuremberg Tribunal and 165–173
economic history of 163
imperialist nature of 164
Italian massacres during 216
view of Soviet leadership on 167
Yoshio, Yaki 331
Young Turks see Ittihad 
Party
Yozgat trials 91, 298
zaibatsu 163, 165, 187
Zyklon B case 113–14, 116, 188
22_9780199671144Index.indd   463 10/3/2013   4:25:00 PM
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in 
any way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
22_9780199671144Index.indd   464 10/3/2013   4:25:00 PM
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in 
any way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
